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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on symbolic politics as ‘meaning-making’ and a ‘co-
constitutive’ form of representation. It seeks to analyze subject formation in the context 
of symbolic political mobilizations in contemporary India. By symbolic politics, I mean 
political rituals, cultural symbols, commemorative memorials and spectacular 
performances. Through deploying Bourdieusian idea of symbolic power and Butler’s 
framework of performativity and subject formation, this thesis contributes to rethinking 
of the relationship between symbolic politics and subject formation. It critically engages 
two dominant frameworks for the study of the politics of symbolism and the nature of 
political subjectivities–elite manipulation, where the subjectivities of the participants are 
assumed to be contrived, and the dismissal of performative politics as not 
democratically substantial because of the passionate subjectivities involved.  
I demonstrate this based on the study of three contemporary symbolic 
mobilizations – Modi’s 2014 election campaign around the figure of Vikaspurush, 
Mayawati’s construction of B.R. Ambedkar Parivartan Sthal and the Anna Hazare-
Kejriwal led Anti-Corruption movement in India. By combining field-work based on 
interpretive and visual ethnography, this thesis makes the following three claims. First, it 
argues that people’s participation in symbolic mobilization plays a crucial role in 
political subject formation as claim making subjects whose identities are constituted 
through their struggles for rights and recognition. Second, claim-making outside of 
institutional spaces, the negotiation between legal and cultural citizenship may signal the 
emergence of democratic subjectivities, even as non-democratic forms of political 
mobilization are also present. Third, the thesis challenges the contrast between symbolic 
and material politics. Symbolic politics by making spatial assertions activates time and 
space and thus has an equally significant material dimension to it.  
4 
This work illustrates that far from being inconsequential; the symbolic political 
field operates as a space wherein political subjectivities are constituted through the 
consolidation of citizen-subjects. However, the field of contention and mobilisation in 
symbolic politics could also signal a limitation in performative political action as it can 
also constitute co-opted subjects, limit democratic subjectivities and render some 
subjects invisible. 
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1 Introduction: Mapping the Symbolic Terrain of Indian 
Democracy: A Sketch 
In September 2012, a story appeared in The Hindu, an Indian newspaper, about 
the people displaced by the Omkareshwar Dam project (M.P. Singh, 2012). The 
villagers’ crops had been ruined as a result of the water level in the dam being raised 
from 189 to 193 metres and they also feared flooding as they resided in low-lying 
villages. In protest, villagers launched a jal satyagraha1 by immersing themselves in their 
flooded fields at Ghogalgaon village in the East Nimar region. After 16 days, the 
government agreed to their demands to reduce the water level and provide adequate 
land for land compensation and the villagers won the battle.2 
This performance of resistance presents in concise form the encounter between 
the politics of symbolism and political subjectivities that I wish to explore in the thesis. 
It poses some important questions – why did the villagers choose this symbolic mode 
of protest? Was it experienced as empowering? How did the choice of performative 
resistance constitute political subjectivities? These questions lie at the heart of the thesis 
which asks: what is the nature of symbolic mobilisation in politics and of the political 
subjectivities that are constituted through such performative political action? 
1.1 The Symbolic Political Triad 
The questions raised above are discussed in the context of three recent symbolic 
mobilisations in India. By symbolic politics I mean the signifying function of political 
rituals, cultural symbols, commemorative memorials, statues and spectacular 
performances. The symbolic political triangle studied here consists of three case studies: 
                                                 
1 Satyagraha is a Gandhian form of non-violent civil resistance. Jal Satyagraha means civil resistance 
through immersion in water. 
2 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jal-satyagraha-ends-on-victory-
note/article3881157.ece 
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two based on identities of religion and caste-based assertions and one of social protest 
based on a civic identity assertion. All three case studies incorporate overlapping aspects 
of political rituals, politics of statues and spectacle politics. 
In the early 2000s, the only exemplar of successful political dividends for the 
Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) agenda of surajya (good governance) was the then Chief 
Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi. The narrative of vikas (growth) in the state of 
Gujarat enabled Modi to recover from the trust deficit of the pogrom of 20023 and he 
ruled the state for three consecutive terms (2001–2014). In these fifteen years, he 
initiated a developmental model embedded in yearly political rituals and spectacular 
summits performing the growth story for Gujarat.  
A substantial period of the BJP’s political trajectory since its inception in 1980, 
as the political heir to the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS),4 was overtly laced with Hindu 
majoritarianism which deployed its attendant religious symbolism for political 
mobilisation. For instance, the demand for construction of a Ram Mandir (Ram Temple) 
at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, and its culmination in the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
(Babri Mosque) demonstrated the political success of the powerful symbolic campaign 
around the Hindu deity Ram and his alleged birthplace by the BJP and the Sangh 
Parivar.5 In the early 2000s there was a departure from this trend as Hindutva politics 
and BJP’s agenda transformed into an overt non-religious agenda with the narrative 
shifting to economic growth and development. On the pan-India level this transition 
played out in the party’s India Shining Campaign for the general elections of 2004. The 
campaign failed and led to a severe downturn in the political fortunes of the Hindu 
                                                 
3 Gujarat pogrom - refers to targeted violence against Muslim minorities in the state of Gujarat in 2002 
when Modi was the Chief Minister of the state. The state administration and the law and order machinery 
were condemned nationally and internationally for its ineffectiveness in dealing with the situation.  
4 The Jan Sangh was the political wing of the RSS until 1977. It merged into the Janta Dal and in 1980 
owing to the split, remerged as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  
5 Sangh Parivar (Family of Organisations) – refers to the set of organisations that believes in the Hindu 
right wing ideology with Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS) as its ideologue. The most active 
organisations are the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, Rashtriya Swayam Sevika Samiti and 
Durga Vahini. 
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Nationalist Party until the resurgence of Modi in Gujarat. Based on his successful track 
record, Modi acquired the title of Vikaspurush (Development Man) for his role in 
transforming Gujarat into a successful model of good governance.  
The first case study dissects the narrative and symbolism underlying Modi’s 
image as Vikaspurush in the general election of 2014. It maps his two Lok Sabha6 
constituencies,7 tracing his agenda of development in Vadodara (Gujarat) and in 
Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh) as Modi and the BJP sought to extend his Gujarat model to a 
pan-India level, staking his claim to become the next prime minister of India. The 
declining political fortunes of the incumbent government, the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA), under the leadership of the Indian National Congress (INC) 
(henceforth Congress) and the latter’s decision to field a political novice, Rahul Gandhi, 
as their candidate did little to challenge Modi’s track record. In the absence of a 
distinctive agenda and credible leadership by a national party such as Congress, the main 
political opponent to Modi turned out to be Arvind Kejriwal, from the Aam Aadmi 
Party (AAP). The nascent political party8 provided a strong alternative in both 
leadership and a substantial agenda to challenge Modi in Varanasi.  
Besides the spectacular politics of development, this case also offers the 
opportunity to analyse the caste dynamics and Gujarati sub-nationalism involved in 
Modi’s campaign for the world’s tallest Patel statue. Vallabhbhai Patel was a nationalist 
leader belonging to the Congress party and the first deputy prime minister of 
independent India. He played an important role in ensuring a unified country and was 
                                                 
6 Lok Sabha (House of Representatives) is the lower house of India’s bicameral parliament. 
7 According to the Representation of People Act of India, a candidate can contest from a maximum of 
two seats. Usually candidates use these provisions as a safety measure. “The rule of limiting the candidate 
to contesting from a maximum of two seats was introduced in 1996 through an amendment to the 
Representation of the People Act (RP Act) of 1951”(Nathan, 2014). Candidates are expected to give up 
one seat, if they win both. For example, after winning in both Vadodara and Varanasi in the 2014 general 
election, Modi gave up his seat in Vadodara. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/the-
two-seat-solution/ 
8 The AAP was only formed in 2012. After its unprecedented election victory at the Delhi Assembly 
elections, Arvind Kejriwal decided to contest at the national level in 2014. 
https://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/arvind-kejriwals-eyes-set-on-7-rcr.html. 
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known as the ‘Iron Man of India’. In 2013, Modi commissioned the world’s tallest 
statue to be built in Gujarat to commemorate Patel; it was to be known as the Statue of 
Unity to capitalise on the fact that the statesman belonged to Gujarat.9 
The relationship between Hindu nationalism and overt religious symbolism has 
been analysed extensively in Indian politics. However, this enquiry aims to unearth the 
secular realm of development and growth projected by Modi and the BJP. Some of the 
questions explored are: what was the nature of the yearly developmental rituals held in 
Gujarat? Spatially, what effect did Modi’s symbolic campaign have on the cities of 
Vadodara and Varanasi? What did Modi’s Patel statue campaign signify for the politics 
of development? 
In India’s democratic tradition, the 1995 emergence of the Bahujan Samaj Party 
(BSP) in Uttar Pradesh (India’s largest state) as a powerful political stakeholder under 
the leadership of Mayawati marked a moment of reckoning for Dalits. Mayawati’s 
regime as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh is associated with the construction of the 
spectacularly grand B.R. Ambedkar Samajik Parivartan Sthal10 in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh), 
in 2005. The second case study aims to unpack this commemorative memorial and the 
symbolism of statues in Dalit politics. The construction of the commemorative 
memorial changed the contours of Dalit symbolism. In Uttar Pradesh (UP), Dalit 
households have been building Ambedkar statues to demarcate and assert their claim on 
space at the local levels. The Sthal encompasses the politics of statues at the macro-level 
and by constructing the monumental memorial in the heart of the city, Mayawati made 
the lower caste symbolic assertion central to the life of Lucknow.  
However, Mayawati was accused of being a megalomaniac leader indulging in 
wasteful expenditure by the opposition parties and the upper caste dominated media 
                                                 
9 https://www.ndtv.com/cheat-sheet/the-sardar-patel-statue-commissioned-by-narendra-modi-10-point-
cheatsheet-539518 
10 A sthal is a commemorative memorial/site; B. R. Ambedkar campaigned for the rights of Dalits 
(traditionally seen as ‘Untouchables’) in India. 
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alike. In the dominant Brahmanical discourse and field of perception the memorial was 
identified as and considered symbolic of political corruption. Furthermore against the 
backdrop of the 2012 Assembly elections in the state, the Election Commission (EC) 
ordered statues of Mayawati and BSP’s symbol – elephants – within the Sthal in 
Lucknow and Noida to be draped until the elections were over. The spectacular draping 
of these symbols and statues reinvigorated the debate around the construction of the 
memorial.  
This analysis aims at exploring the Dalit perspective on Mayawati’s symbolic 
interventions. It also examines the anti-Patel statue campaign in Gujarat from the Dalit 
perspective. It interrogates the demands made by the Dalit civil society groups to build 
a taller statue for Ambedkar than for Patel. Apart from highlighting the caste politics 
around the Patel vs. Ambedkar statues, an analysis of the shifts in the iconopraxis and 
the self-reflexivity in the Dalit movement across the two sites of UP and Gujarat is also 
attempted here. 
The relationship between Dalit politics and symbolism has attracted limited 
research and analyses compared with Hindutva politics. While there has been scholarly 
engagement with the significance of Ambedkar statues and their importance in 
enhancing Dalit citizen assertion, most of the discussion around Dalit symbolism is 
focused on the material/symbolic binary. This enquiry aims to dismantle the binary 
approach to analyse the significance of the Sthal from the standpoint of the Dalit 
community. Some related questions that are explored are: how do Dalits experience the 
Sthal? Do Dalits regard construction of the Sthal and other statues of Ambedkar as a 
waste of money, as mainstream discourse claims and portrays? Spatially, how does the 
construction of the Sthal change the landscape of Lucknow? By changing its iconopraxis 
what does the anti-Patel statue campaign seek to demonstrate to the 
Brahmanical/nationalist gaze? 
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The third case of the thesis moves from religious and caste-based mobilisations 
to civic assertion through social protest against corruption wherein the assertion of civic 
identity locates the individual within a national political community. The anti-corruption 
protests of August, 2011 embedded in Gandhian symbolism brought large masses of 
people out on the streets in the capital city of New Delhi. The massive outrage was 
against the backdrop of corruption charges against the incumbent Congress-led UPA 
government and the political class at large. It was described as India’s ‘Second 
Independence Struggle’ or the ‘Tahrir Square’ moment in the electronic media. The last 
time India had seen such a surge against corruption was under the leadership of 
Jayprakash Narayan (JP) in November 1973, which was against the Congress 
government under Mrs. Gandhi.  
The coalition India Against Corruption (IAC) led by Arvind Kejriwal and Kisan 
Baburao Hazare (popularly called Anna Hazare) initiated the campaign with the demand 
for the passing of the Jan Lokpal Bill or an ombudsman to investigate political and 
bureaucratic corruption in India. Chants of I am Anna and India is Anna filled the Ramlila 
Maidan11 for 13 days. The protests soon spread from Delhi to other major cities across 
India such as Mumbai and Bangalore, especially attracting the youth. The spectacle of 
Anna’s fasting at the Maidan, sit-ins by people outside MPs’ houses and other protests 
brought Delhi to a halt. This stalemate between the political class and Team Anna led to 
the emergence of a new political party, the Aam Aadmi Party (Common Man’s Party), 
led by Arvind Kejriwal in 2012. The anti-political stance of the movement and the 
Gandhian influence informed its symbolism from the tricolour (the Indian flag) to the 
Gandhi cap adorning the Maidan and streets of Delhi. From Anna’s ritualistic prayers 
and fastings to Kejriwal’s performative actions, the anti-corruption movement was 
replete with spectacular performances. Also, the emergence of the AAP as a political 
                                                 
11 Refers to a huge ground, which was initially used to stage the Ramlila (plays about the life of Rama) but 
has subsequently been used for political rallies and protests. 
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force, despite being entrenched in neo-liberal aesthetics, altered the political culture of 
India’s capital not just in its bureaucratic demeanour, but also undercutting the 
complacency of established national parties such as Congress and the BJP. The AAP’s 
decision to contest the Delhi Assembly elections of 2013 provided a suitable 
opportunity to analyse the mobilisation both of the movement and the nascent party. 
Some of the questions explored are: what were the reasons for the supporters joining 
the anti-corruption protests? How did this public performance of protests impact New 
Delhi as the capital city? What was the role of the middle-class and the social media in 
the protest?  
The thesis examines these three case studies of symbolic mobilisations based on 
persuasive public performances in the political domain, the subjectivities that they 
constitute and how they construct the ‘political’ by performative political action, and the 
possibilities that emerge for new or altered forms of individual subjectivities that have 
an impact on democratic political culture.  
The Argument 
This thesis argues that participation in symbolic mobilisations activates 
‘identification’ and interrupts the fixed political subject through performative political 
action. This encounter therefore has the potential for the emergence of new or altered 
forms of individual subjectivities and constitution of a democratic political subject. 
However, the field of contention and mobilisation in symbolic politics could also signal 
a limitation in performative political action as it can also constitute co-opted subjects, 
limit democratic subjectivities and render some subjects invisible. The thesis makes 
three principal claims.  
First, it argues that people’s participation in symbolic mobilisation plays a crucial 
role in political subject formation, whether it is wearing Modi masks, protesting against 
defaced Ambedkar statues or protesting against corruption in the Ramlila Maidan. In 
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contrast to influential approaches to political symbols that perceive these mainly as 
instruments of elite manipulation, this thesis foregrounds political actors as claim-
making subjects in the public sphere whose identities are constituted through these 
symbolic assertions and performative practices in their struggles for rights or 
recognition.  
Second, it argues that claim-making outside of institutional spaces, and 
negotiations between legal and cultural citizenship may signal the emergence of new 
types of subjectivities, including democratic subjectivities, even when non-democratic 
forms of political mobilisation are also present. The political intersection of identity, 
symbols and performativity is usually assumed to be not democratically substantial 
because of its passionate subjectivities. However, this intersection needs to be further 
analysed for its interruption of the existing field of perception in political culture and 
emancipatory potential. 
Finally, the politics of symbolism, by making spatial assertions, activates public 
space and thus makes an equally cogent material assertion. By re-signifying city spaces 
with embodied participation and selected meanings, symbolic mobilisations may 
constitute counter-spaces of collective political action that challenge established 
institutions, even as they are embedded in neo-liberal aesthetics. 
1.2 The Symbolic Terrain: An Overview 
The symbolic representations are important because they represent and 
constitute a collective, are public in nature and allow actors to communicate either 
through power or to power. Various stakeholders, from nation states to identitarian 
groups, have utilised symbolic representation and performative political action. The first 
set of literature which engages with the encounter between symbolism, performance 
and representation is most directly visible in the scholarship that discusses the nation 
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state and its investment in political rituals and nationalism, mostly in the works of 
Anderson (1991), Geertz (1980), Roy (2007) and Verdery (1999). The link between 
politics and spectacular performance of political rituals is paramount. Geertz’s (1980) 
study of state power and rituals demonstrated that dramaturgy was an essential part of 
its exercise of power and embedded in the nature of the state. Ritual performances were 
crucial as “the state cult was not a cult of the state. It was an argument made over and 
over again in the insistent vocabulary of ritual” (p. 102).  
Political rituals have the potential to generate communitas as argued by V. Turner 
(1969). Differentiating this social bond from community, he stresses how passages 
through these ritual performances have the potential to shift a subject’s position. For 
instance, in the context of voting practices in India, Banerjee (2011) argues that standing 
in queues to vote has the potential to create communitas since it not only involves an in-
between situation temporally but also a moment of a democratic citizen’s assertion of 
the self, reflecting “uber democratic ideals’’ (p. 82). Turner establishes the co-
constitutive nature of rituals and symbolic action, as well as symbols as vehicles of 
ritual. He defined “ritual as prescribed formal behaviour for occasions not given over to 
technological routine, having reference to beliefs in mystical beings and powers” (V. 
Turner, 1967, p. 19). Extending Turner’s framework of symbols, rituals and symbolic 
action along with Geertz’s idea of a ‘theatre state’ (1980) for contemporary analysis 
contributes to dissecting the modern state’s performance of political rituals in 
constituting a nation and its nationalist citizen subjects. For instance, Anderson (1991, 
p. 10) discusses how showing public reverence to a “tomb of an unknown soldier” 
signifies symbolically the “national imagining” of a political community.  
Similarly, in the context of post-colonial imaginaries and subject creation 
spectacular political rituals have played an important role in binding notions of 
patriotism and loyalty through “external effects and public practices’’ (Roy, 2007, p. 14). 
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Roy argues that, specifically in the post-colonial context, it is crucial for the state to 
demonstrate that it is capable of embodying the nation through, for example, yearly 
rituals such as India’s Republic Day celebrations. “Republic Day celebrations in India 
have ever since their inception been both a means of ideological-symbolic reproduction 
and a site or an arena for the performance, expression and practice of nationhood” 
(Roy, 2007, p. 102). The politics of nationalism during the pre-independence period also 
had the attendant symbolisms of Gandhi and the national flag (Amin, 1984; Jha, 2008; 
Lal, 2003; Nandy, 1983; Rao, 2009; Roy, 2006; Trivedi 2007). People symbolically 
construct their community, making it a resource and repository of meaning and referent 
of their identity. Leaders such as Gandhi, Ambedkar and Martin Luther King were 
symbolic of the hopes and anxieties of their respective groups. Gandhi symbolised 
India’s anti-colonial struggle to the world. Kaviraj (2007, p.71) analyses the defining 
moment of Gandhi’s trial in 1922 in the exchanges between the British colonial power 
and the leader of the Indian nationalist movement as “the elements of drama or theatre 
in the contest between the colonial state and the most celebrated rebel that in Gandhi 
they had faced”. He describes Gandhi’s use of communicative strategies as, 
a semiotic gesture. It is structured like a register, with discrete communicative forms – 
stretching from non-verbal forms like bodily gestures, the symbolism of dress, the use 
of food as language, to the verbal levels of words, which is subdivided into two 
elementary strata of the spoken and the written (p. 77) 
Other scholars have also highlighted Gandhi’s enactment of dissent through non-
violence and his advocacy of androgyny and celibate sexuality as deeply unsettling to the 
colonial and nationalist realms of politics and body politics (Lal, 2003; Nandy, 1988). 
The second set of scholarly analysis has focused on politics of identity and 
ethnic conflicts. Symbolic politics also contributes to and intervenes in identitarian 
assertions. Investment in symbolism contributes to cohesiveness amongst groups or 
communities based on religion, caste, ethnicity, class or sexuality. In the context of 
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identity-based symbolic mobilisation, Barth (1969) claims there exists a “field of 
communication and interaction’’ (p. 11) that characterises an ethnic group. For Cohen 
too, a community is symbolically constructed as a system of values and norms which 
provides a sense of identity within a bounded whole to its members. “Community is 
just such a boundary-expressing symbol, but its meaning varies according to its 
members’ unique orientation towards it” (1989, p. 15). Since individual perceptions may 
vary, the feeling of cohesiveness has to be kept alive through constant creative 
interventions; “In the face of this variability of meaning, the consciousness of 
community has to be kept alive through manipulation of its symbols” (1989, p. 15). 
Emphasising that symbols play a role in binding groups collectively and ensures 
stability, Parel (1969) argues that symbolism evokes dynamism and motivates action; 
“without symbols, community life becomes chaotic and community action difficult to 
sustain” (p. 180). In his discussion on the symbolic relevance of the cow in India, he 
highlights how different nationalist leaders such as Dayanand, Tilak and Gandhi 
constructed narratives appropriating the cow as a political symbol. From a being a 
Hindu nationalist symbol to a symbol of communal unity, it eventually contributed to 
dividing Hindus from Muslims while uniting the upper caste Hindus. Condensation 
symbols of community leaders, memorials and statues, while unifying group memory, 
can also play a divisive role. Socio-symbolic solidarity can unite one group while 
dividing it from others: “ethnic groups also use cultural symbols in order to create an 
identity that is opposed to the other, leading to conflict” (Brass 1991, p. 19). The 
demolition of Babri Masjid (Babri Mosque) as the site for Hindu assertion against 
Muslims and the erection of Ambedkar statues by Dalits against caste Hindu dominance 
demonstrate how symbols play an important role in condensing group memory, history 
and solidarity, and are equally capable of instigating divisive political action.  
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The members of a particular group are brought together by unifying them 
symbolically while differentiating them from the ‘other’; “construction involves internal 
frontiers and the identification of an institutionalized ‘other’” (Laclau, 2005, p. 117). 
According to him, othering of one section of the population leads to a group having a 
sense of their own cohesion. “one difference, without ceasing to be a particular 
difference, assumes the representation of an incommensurable totality” (p. 70). 
However, this totality or aggregation has the potential to undermine differences as 
“equivalence is precisely what subverts difference, so that all identity is constructed 
within this tension between the differential and the equivalential logics” (p. 70). In a 
similar vein, Marx (1998) argues that the agreement on a racially defined ‘other’ as a 
common enemy defined and encouraged white unity. Similarly, the BSP’s building of a 
grand history around Ambedkar and Periyar, by installing their statues and constructing 
parks in their names against the ‘Brahmanical other’, marginalised the micro-histories of 
the sub-castes within Dalits and sought to create a unifying force or equivalence. 
Through Bourdieu’s (1991) conceptual frame of symbolic power one can 
understand how investment in symbols within identity politics plays a crucial role in 
making political interventions. According to him, the ability to change the world and the 
ways of world-making by which groups are produced or reproduced rests on symbolic 
power this in turn, “has to be based on the possession of symbolic capital” (1989, p. 28) 
implying that not everybody or every group has the same ability to influence the 
political field. “Symbolic capital is a credit; it is the power granted to those who have 
obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (p. 28). The 
location of group identities within the social hierarchy will determine their symbolic 
power and influence in the political field. Groups on the periphery of the power 
struggle utilise symbolic resources to mobilise against the state/dominant narrative and 
to intervene in the existing power dynamics. In this performance of opposition, 
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symbols provide a unifying bond and a sense of oneness with other deprived 
individuals.  
While much of the literature on symbolic political action places it in contexts 
such as nationalism or ethnicity, by using the lens of performative identification, my 
work foregrounds politics of symbolism in itself as an analytical frame, together with 
aspects of symbolic participation i.e. the nature of political subjectivity it constitutes. 
This thesis aims at interrogating the encounter further for its potential in enhancing 
democratic political subjectivity. The thesis is anchored along two fundamental axes: 
symbolic politics and visual practices discussed in the next section. 
1.3 Symbolic Terrain: Meaning and Practices 
It was Gandhi cap wearers in particular who were singled out for abuse by frustrated 
revenue officials and police who confiscated land and offered it for sale at absurdly low 
prices to those who were prepared to refrain from civil disobedience. (Tarlo, 1991, p. 
140) 
During the anti-colonial struggle, the appearance of a Gandhi topi (cap) wearer 
on the Indian streets had a destabilising impact on the colonisers since it signified non-
violent protest against the empire. Gandhi’s aim to introduce the topi was propelled by 
the idea of equality amongst the Indian masses, sartorially, politically and visually. 
However, as British suppression and prohibition increased, the topi emerged as a 
powerful symbol of rebellion and eventually evolved its own trajectory outside of the 
control of both Gandhi and the British.  
I start the discussion with the example of the Gandhian topi because it 
demonstrates the complex dynamics involved with a political symbol, instigating 
political action along with interrupting the visual political culture. The materialist and 
rationalist approaches that are dominant in the study of politics have tended to discount 
symbolic politics and the impact it has on transforming political subjectivity and, more 
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generally, the political field. This work, however, aims to put the politics of symbolism 
and visual practices centre-stage in understanding the political. 
1.3.1 Symbolic politics: getting meaning-making back into politics 
Everyday experiences of politics also involve the world of signification. “Politics 
is not merely about material interests but also about contests over the symbolic world, 
over the management and appropriation of meanings” (Wedeen, 1999, p. 30). This 
work foregrounds symbols in a political cultural context as part of political rituals, 
commemorative memorials, statues and spectacles. 
All symbols are signs but not all signs are symbols. Therefore, it is only through 
the process of interpretation that signs become symbols. First, by locating symbols in 
their “processual fate” (V. Turner, 1974b, p. 55),12 my work analyses individual symbols 
as part of political rituals and also their potential outside of it. This is informed by an 
open-ended approach in contrast to the essentialist understanding of locating symbols 
based on artificial distinctions such as “traditions of meanings or tradition of masters” 
(Klatch, 1988, p. 138).13 I focus on political rituals in the context of identitarian 
assertion by groups rather than by institutions of state. Aimed at social cohesion as well 
as questioning the status quo, symbols as part of political rituals can contribute to 
understanding what is politically significant to a political community and determines 
their social relations. Anthropology has subjected symbols to rigorous analysis by 
focusing on a specific social and cultural context. This is illustrated prominently by V. 
Turner (1967, p. 20) who elaborated on the role of rites and symbols in understanding 
social structures and the everyday:  
                                                 
12 According to Turner, “from the very outset I formulate symbols as social and cultural dynamic systems, 
shedding and gathering meaning over time and altering in form, I cannot regard them merely as ‘terms’ in 
a temporal logical or protological cognitive systems” (Turner, 1974b, p. 54). I follow Turner in analysing 
symbols in the political field as they evolve over time.  
13 Klatch highlights that the study of politics of symbolism is marked by the split between symbols being 
perceived as meanings or masters. “While the meanings tradition emphasizes the positive role symbols 
play in the integration of society, the masters tradition views symbols in a more sceptical way, stressing 
the use of political symbols in manipulation” (1988, p. 138). 
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Symbols, too, are crucially involved in situations of societal change... For these reasons, 
the structure and properties of a ritual symbol become those of a dynamic entity, at 
least within its appropriate context of action. 
According to Turner, symbols are open to “multiple variability” (1974b, p. 55) and can 
be part of the structure or anti-structure. He makes a distinction between symbols of 
structure and anti-structure. During phases of transition or threshold, new symbols 
emerge which challenge the existing social order and are anti-structural in nature. It is 
Turner’s multi-vocal approach to symbols that allows and enables the analysis here to 
adopt a meaning-making and dynamic perspective towards socio-political contexts and 
processes. 
My work traces individual symbols, from statues and caps to political rituals in 
political rallies and social protests. For instance, my discussion on AAP topis as a symbol 
of an insurgent activist citizen traces the political trajectory of the Gandhian cap coming 
full circle in Indian politics as a symbol now used against the Congress party itself. The 
inauguration of the Ambedkar Sthal by Buddhist monks was a powerful symbolic act by 
Mayawati against Hindu practices. The political ritual of inauguration has been overtly 
dominated by Hindu practices such as lighting lamps and deity worship performed by 
Hindu priests. In its symbolisms and architecture, the Sthal emerges as an anti-structure. 
The next sets of symbols I pursue are statues and commemorative memorials. 
Statues are symbolic markers of historical and political times and are integral to the 
public collective life of a political community. The destruction of the Buddha statues by 
the Taliban in the Bamiyan valley of Afghanistan (2001)14 or the pulling down of 
Saddam Hussein’s statue in Bagdad’s Firdous Square (2003) during the American 
invasion of Iraq15 demonstrates the significance of statues/memorials for political 
orders. There is considerable scholarly attention given to public statutory and national 
                                                 
14 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1326063/After-1700-years-Buddhas-
fall-to-Taliban-dynamite.html. 
15 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jul/19/iraq. 
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identification. For instance, Mayo (1988) discusses war memorials as symbolic of 
political memory and honour while Khalili (2007) explores the transformations in 
Palestinian nationalism through the study of commemorative practices. On the other 
hand, emphasising and tracing rupture in political order through public statutory, 
Verdery (1999) in post-socialist European societies and Marshall (2010) in post-
apartheid South Africa highlight how the dismantling/erecting of statues signifies not 
just shifting political landscapes, but also social and emotional healing for political 
communities. The analysis here goes beyond the axis of nationalism and race engaged 
thus far, to include caste-related public statutory in India. By focusing on statues and 
commemorative memorials as part of the Dalit symbolic repertoire, I draw attention to 
their assertion and their role in visualising anti-caste struggles against the dominant 
Brahmanical16/nationalist field of perception. 
I employ a co-constitutive lens of representation through political symbols and 
signification in the political field. In mainstream political science the dominant approach 
to symbolic politics has been from a political communication perspective which 
perceived symbolic politics as a top-down mobilisation based on manipulation. In 
contrast, this thesis advances a constructivist understanding, wherein the symbolic 
encounter is embedded in the practice of meaning-making, building on the pioneering 
work of scholars such as Wedeen (1999, 2008), Hansen (1999, 2002) and Verdery 
(1999). In examining the co-constitutiveness of the symbolic universe, I employ a post-
Geertzian understanding of culture, enabling an analysis of people’s understanding of 
their symbols and motivation to political action. Rather than a top-down approach, a 
meaning-making approach allows for more fluidity as it emphasises practices and avoids 
reifying symbols and actions. 
                                                 
16 In the Indian caste system Brahmans (priests) are the highest in the caste hierarchy followed by 
Kshatriyas (administrators and warriors), Vaishyas (traders) and Shudras (untouchables/outcastes). The 
persistence of the caste-based social order has enabled the Indian political and cultural worldview to be 
dominated by the Brahmanical perspective, thus marginalising the lower castes’ experiences. 
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1.3.2 Visual practices: visualising and reordering the political 
“Most citizens most of the time are not decision makers, relating to politics with 
their voices, but spectators who relate to politics with their eyes” (Green, 2010, p. 4). 
Starting with the premise that the democratic political field is usually mapped 
discursively/vocally, the aim is to shift attention towards visual practices. Democratic 
life is constituted through performative claim-making and assertion in the symbolic 
political field. The symbolic universe is co-constituted by citizen-subjects as audience in 
the political field. By importing the notion of gaze, Green (2010) challenges the 
emphasis on voice/speech in democratic theory, making a case for the ocular model of 
popular empowerment by emphasising the role of the spectator. Extending and re-
emphasising the importance of the ocular realm, I draw attention to symbolic 
intervention and political action by people, not just as spectators but also as equal 
participants in the creation of the visual field as they are not just consumers of symbols, 
but also are their producers. 
This complex field of visual reciprocity is not merely a by-product of social 
reality but actively constitutive of it. Vision is as important as language in 
mediating social relations, and it is not reducible to language, to the “sign”, 
or to discourse. (Mitchell, 1996, p. 82) 
The discipline of politics needs to engage with the visual. Following the ‘visual 
turn’ in modern Indian studies inaugurated by the scholarship of Brosius (2005), Freitag 
(2014), Jain (2007), Pinney (2003), Ramaswamy (2003) and Roy (2007), this thesis 
foregrounds visual practices in the contemporary political culture of India. Emphasising 
the importance of “what do we make of what we see” (Eck, 1985, p. 14), I pursue the 
‘visual’ as a means to further understand how democracy is performed and experienced 
every day, grounded in visual practices. The anthropological perspective on 
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understanding democracy with its ‘multiple contestations’ (Michelutti, 2007; Paley, 2002; 
Spencer, 2007) gives us the scope to consider the symbolic political field as one such 
field in the life of a political community. 
Existing scholarship on mapping the visual in modern Indian studies is 
dominated by tracing nationalist and state-centric identification; “[s]o, patriotism or 
nationalism in India is an intensely ocular ideology and set of visual habits, grounded in 
the practice of seeing the nation, and being seen in turn adoring and worshipping the 
nation” (Ramaswamy, 2003, p. xxiii). In the post-colonial context, Roy (2002, p. 233) 
explores the “visual representation of Indianness” from the Nehruvian phase to the era 
of liberalisation by focusing on videos and films produced by both state and non-state 
actors to decipher the constitution of nationalist imagination and citizen-subjects. 
Pinney, in his incisive account of India’s political struggle, makes a case for pursuing the 
visual as an arena to unpack “gaps between official forms of knowledge” (2003, p. 117) 
and the possibilities for new identities and narratives to emerge. Based on the study of 
chromolithographs, he argues that textual histories of the struggle for independence in 
India were preoccupied with Gandhi and Nehru; by contrast, the “popular visual 
representation” (2003, p. 144) celebrates radical practitioners such as Bhagat Singh. 
Beyond this, visual practices have been employed to analyse identity-based 
assertions such as Hindutva mobilisations. The dominant analytical frame for Hindutva 
visual practices has been through the lens of darshan. Eck (1985) describes the Hindu 
way of ocular transaction through the concept of darshan17 and Brosius (2005) applies it 
to analyse Hindutva inter-visuality leading up to the Ram temple campaign constituting 
communal subjects. In the absence of an alternative analytical frame for visual practices 
to analyse different ways of looking, the darshan framework has come to dominate the 
analysis. However, it has limited application beyond the Hindutva-related socio-political 
                                                 
17 Eck (1985, p.3) refers to the Hindu way of seeing as the “darshan effect” or the “visual perception of 
the sacred”. 
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contexts as other identity-based forms of gaze and claim-making exist and are used 
outside the Hindutva sacred devotional parlance. For instance, the same analytical frame 
of darshan cannot be employed for Dalit mobilisations or even social protest; the politics 
of seeing differs with context. For instance, the Dalit perception of admiring the 
Ambedkar statue, as I demonstrate in Chapter 5, is not governed by a sacred or 
devotional gaze. I aim to trace varied forms of seeing/gaze across different identity-
based mobilisations.  
The visual practices involved in seeing the symbolic universe in a democracy also 
define the nature of subjectivity constituted through embodied participation and 
meaning-making to the worldview. I apply this lens to discern the visual practices of the 
symbolic mobilisations that are part of this study. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses the methodology employed to conduct this research. I 
elaborate on how the eleven months of multi-sited immersion across New Delhi/Uttar 
Pradesh/Gujarat were negotiated by operationalising concepts of identity, performative 
practices and the symbolic habitus in the field. A combination of interpretive 
ethnography and visual research tools enabled me to deconstruct the local symbolic 
habitus of the three case studies. I also outline the dilemmas and ethical practices 
informing this study. 
Chapter 3 outlines the analytical framework for the thesis. Contextualising the 
intersection between identity and symbolic mobilisation through the conceptual frames 
of performativity and symbolic habitus, this chapter lays the foundation for assessing 
the politics of symbolism and the nature of political subjectivities that this encounter 
may entail. The discussion focuses on two aspects of symbolic politics: symbolic 
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participation and symbolic representation. Defining these two anchors theoretically, I 
go on to outline my analyses of democratic political subjectivity. 
The following three chapters (4, 5 and 6) discuss political performativity and the 
nature of political subjectivities in three specific case studies based on ethnographic 
fieldwork. 
Chapter 4 discusses the symbolic mobilisation around Modi as the ‘Vikaspurush’ 
(Development Man) in the context of the 2014 general elections of India. It analyses the 
symbolic field, the narrative around his agenda of Vikas (Development) and the imagery 
of Vikaspurush which contributed to an unprecedented victory for the BJP. It also 
explores the nature of spatial sites that the politics of ‘Gujarat Model’ activates in 
Vadodara and Varanasi. By juxtaposing the image of ‘Marut’ purush (Hyper-Virile Man) 
with Vikaspursush it traces the symbolic habitus and the resultant subjectivities that it 
visualises. It also traces Modi’s campaign for the tallest Patel statue and the underlying 
caste dynamics. The significance of this case study lies at the intersection of two crucial 
axes of mobilisation: the ethno-religious Hindu/Gujarati identity layered with a neo-
liberal subject. I argue that the political symbolism of the Vikaspurush with its 
underlying politics of development, mobilises embodied political participation, but 
prevents transgressions, negotiations or challenges to a democratic subject formation, 
and thus constitutes an embodied ‘infantile’ subject.  
Chapter 5 discusses the symbolic mobilisation around the commemorative 
memorial constructed by Mayawati in Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh) in 2005. Analysing the 
symbolic field of memorials and statues in the context of Dalit politics, it maps the 
performative essence of defiance of the dominant Brahmanical/nationalist field of 
perception through these symbolic interventions. I examine the nature of spatio-
material assertion that these commemorative memorials may make in the spatio-political 
landscape of Lucknow. I also go on to probe the politics of statues within Dalit politics, 
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both in Lucknow and Gujarat (in the wake of the Patel statue controversy), and trace 
the inherent iconographic practices, highlighting both the continuities and shifts across 
these regions. The significance of this mobilisation lies in the constitution of Dalit 
political subjectivity and its intervention through iconopraxis at two levels – first, 
against the Hindu Brahmanical order and, second, the redefining of iconographic 
practices from within the community itself as in the case of Gujarat mobilisation. This 
chapter argues that the constitution of the Dalit political subject as an embodied ‘visible’ 
subject in conjunction with inbuilt discursive spaces for renegotiation within the 
community itself reflects the potential for democratic subject formation present in Dalit 
politics. 
Chapter 6 discusses the symbolic mobilisation around the Anti-Corruption 
Movement that began in 2011, and the new political Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) that was 
subsequently formed, and their impact on the nature of political subjectivities. It 
analyses the re-emergence of the Ramlila Maidan as a space of anti-systemic protest and 
its impact on the spatial political field of the capital city of New Delhi. The significance 
of this case lies on two crucial axes: the individual citizen-subject as the basic unit of 
identification as opposed to group/community identities, and the political agenda of the 
anti-corruption movement being a civic issue rather than an ethnic or sectarian one. 
This chapter argues that by revitalising apolitical and anti-political citizens through 
sustained political work the anti-corruption movement fostered civic citizen 
subjectivities. While operationalising the category of a ‘common man’ and a 
transgressive claim-making subject, nevertheless the movement promoted a ‘neo-liberal’ 
civic citizen.  
Chapter 7 links the three case studies with the analytical frame to identify and 
highlight broad thematic continuities with respect to the politics of symbolism and the 
constitution of subjectivities. The discussion is divided along the three parameters of 
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symbolic representation, participation and democratic subjectivity. By linking the theory 
with the empirical case studies I suggest how these may contribute to our understanding 
of the encounter between symbolic politics and identity based assertions.  
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2 Studying the Symbolic Terrain: Methods and Sources 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research techniques and methods informing the study. 
Embedded in a post-positivist philosophy, I employed a combination of interpretive 
and visual ethnography to uncover the encounter between identitarian18 affiliations, 
symbolic mobilisation and political subjectivity. This study aims to analyse and 
understand the relationship between performativity, representation and participation 
within a symbolic mobilisation in a local setting. The selection of the three case studies 
and the ethnographic enquiry were governed by the broad research questions outlined 
below: 
 How does representation through symbols shape the politics of identity 
analysed through the conceptual frame of performativity in politics?  
 In the spatial political field, what does the encounter between symbols and 
the political subject entail in a local symbolic habitus? 
 Why do political subjects participate in symbolic mobilisations? What is the 
nature of this participation and how does it impact political action? 
 Does symbolic mobilisation and participation build or elide aspects of 
democratic political subjectivity? 
These questions were explored through ethnographic immersion and using photographs 
from the field sites.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section on interpretive 
ethnography outlines the theoretical and practical aspects of doing this. The second 
section explores the multi-sited fieldwork across the symbolic terrain. The third discusses 
                                                 
18 Following Brubaker and Cooper (2000), I use the term ‘identitarian’ rather than ‘identity’ as an 
alternative analytical concept to foreground agency and ‘identification’ exercised by the subjects rather 
than working within established liabilities of an ‘identity’ both culturally and analytically. 
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how the visual in ethnography contributes to this analysis, elaborating on visual practices 
and classification. The discursive and the visual are divided into two different sections 
as they are treated as two equally important tools to generate ethnographic knowledge. 
The last section discusses the ethical considerations informing the project. 
This research consists of three case studies. Each case study, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, is a specific identity-based symbolic mobilisation; all are discussed in a 
comparative framework. Despite their agenda-based differences, they are bounded by 
similar symbolic repertoires. The first two are ascriptive identity-based assertions selected 
because, despite catering to opposing identities, both of their symbolic habitus entail a 
combination of political rituals and politics of statues within their ambit for 
mobilisation. Unlike the first two which are based on religious (Hindu) and caste (Dalit) 
based identity assertions the third explores social protest based on civic activism – a 
non-ascriptive identity. In its overlapping symbolism of political rituals, the third study 
seeks to demonstrate the relevance of symbolic politics across the political spectrum.  
All three, apart from representing claim-making outside institutional corridors, 
also activated their respective cityscapes. The first two case studies are interesting cases 
in a comparative framework because they allow us to politically analyse the significance 
of an alternative symbolic universe to democratic claim-making. The discussion of both 
the Hindutva and the Dalit symbolisms (for instance, around the Patel statue campaign) 
displays the counter-hegemonic assertions through symbolic interventions, enabling me 
to highlight that symbolic contestations in the political field is an equally cogent mode 
of identity-based assertions. 
The first case aims to unpack the majoritarian Hindu subjectivity embedded in 
Modi’s developmental agenda and his claim to being a Vikaspurush. The second focuses 
on decoding marginalised Dalit subjectivity in the context of Mayawati’s construction of 
the Ambedkar commemorative memorial and other statues of him. The third case 
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analysed is the anti-corruption crusade of 2011 which aims to deconstruct a civic-citizen 
subject. While all three cases activate performative practices, political action and 
participation in powerful symbolic settings, I explore to what extent these mobilisations 
are producing democratic political subjectivity. These cases placed in a comparative 
frame provide the scaffolding for this research anchored in interpretive ethnography. 
2.2 Interpretive Ethnography 
This research has relied on ethnographic methods combining immersion 
(participant observation) and interpretive “sensibility” (Schatz, 2009, p. 5). Ethnography 
is equated with participant observation implying “immersion in a community, a cohort, 
a locale, or a cluster of related subject positions is taken to be the sine qua non of the 
approach” (Schatz, 2009, p. 5). The ethnographer thus “participates, overtly or covertly, 
in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening 
to what is said, asking questions” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 2). These 
observations and experiences are then recorded in field notes. In all, ethnography 
encompasses not just immersion but, along with participant observation, combines a 
number of activities such as semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis. 
However, it cannot be reduced to these methods as there are broader “epistemological 
commitments” (Schatz, 2009, p. 6) than just collection of data. Scholars (Kubik, 2009; 
Schatz, 2009) have argued that ethnography also involves sensitive perceptiveness that 
goes beyond direct contact “to glean the meanings that the people under study attribute 
to their social and political reality” (Schatz, 2009, p. 5). For instance, Scott’s incisive 
work on peasant rebellion (1990) is illustrative of this ethnographic sensibility. 
Why ethnography? First, ethnography as a mode of enquiry facilitates a reflexivity 
that is valuable for social research. The “hypothetico-deductive” method (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 1995, p. 21) informing positivism overlooks the fact that social reality is 
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multilayered, complex and dynamic. Ethnography embedded in reflexivity contributes 
to “the development of theory” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 23) while also 
situating the researcher in the social world s/he is studying. Second, following on from 
the above, broadly speaking ethnography falls within a hermeneutic conception of 
enquiry, emphasising therefore understanding and interpretation of the social world. The 
constructivist/interpretive approach in knowledge production is not just an alternative 
qualitative method but a political standpoint against the positivist worldview. Finally, 
my research employs a symbolic-cultural approach to politics (Wedeen, 1999, 2008) 
rather than an institutional-materialist approach. Studying performativity and symbolic 
mobilisation entails untangling collective participation and political action in local 
settings. Ethnography enables engagement with questions such as “how symbols are 
inscribed in activities that operate to produce observable political effects” (Wedeen, 
2002, p. 714) and many others at the micro level. Ethnography as an interpretive 
exercise informs this research.19  
For fieldwork, my challenge was to operationalise the theoretical/conceptual 
ideas of identity, performativity, symbolic habitus and subjectivity in the field. Rather 
than pursuing each of these theoretical concepts separately, the practice approach 
enabled me to interlink them through a unified lens. To deconstruct the nature and 
motivation for identification within a symbolic context it is necessary to have an open-
ended understanding of identity and culture. Following Wedeen (2002) and Brubaker 
and Cooper (2000), I adopted a practice approach to identity20 during fieldwork to 
disentangle “people’s practices and systems of signification” (Wedeen, 2002, p. 723). 
This meant observing the community’s everyday semiotic practices having three 
                                                 
19 Kubik (2009) highlights that ethnography informs both positivist and interpretive research agendas. He 
also opines that there is no assumed co-relation between ethnography and interpretation. However, their 
combination is useful to study culture and practices. 
20 According to Wedeen (2009), practices are human actions (as opposed to behaviour). “Practices are 
actions or deeds that are repeated over time. They are learned, reproduced, and subjected to risk through 
social interaction” (p. 87). 
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advantages. First, ethnography enabled me to capture the dual nature of these practices 
(the community’s understanding of these practices and the ethnographer’s 
interpretation of the same); for example, the Dalit practice of installing statues of 
Ambedkar in their villages or how the practice of applying henna evolved into being 
part of a political campaign. Second, to conceptualise identity as a performative21 
practice enabled the decoding of subject-formation through iterative practices within 
symbolic mobilisation. The performative essence of activists wearing AAP topis (caps), 
for example, was demonstrative of their politico-moralistic subjectivity. Finally, 
emphasising practices also enables possibilities for creative interpretation, disorder and 
subversion as highlighted by Butler (1993, 1997).  
My research is based on a constructivist approach and challenges mainstream 
understanding of symbolic mobilisations in politics, thereby informing two fundamental 
decisions made before starting fieldwork. First, it challenges the instrumentalist idea of 
elite manipulation, implying the assumed binary between leaders/followers within a 
symbolic context is not made with reference to the three case studies in this project. 
Second, locating my work in a post-Geertzian perspective of understanding culture22 
and identity (as discussed above) allows the consideration of a symbolic universe with 
its own dynamism (bottom-up approach); this enabled the exploration of newer 
symbols and narratives emerging in a local symbolic habitus/intra-identity and how 
perceptions affect political outcomes and political identifications are established. 
Fieldwork was conducted in three northern states of India, New Delhi, Uttar 
Pradesh and Gujarat, over eleven months (September 2013–August 2014) and followed 
                                                 
21 According to Wedeen, performative implies “a theory of self formation in which the iterative character 
of speech and bodily practices constitute individuals as particular kinds of social beings or ‘subjects’” 
(2009, p. 88). 
22 Geertz’ understanding of culture, identity and symbols has been mostly rigid, as his 1980 study of Bali 
demonstrates, with not much scope for a constructivist perspective on agency and multiple meanings. I 
adopt a post-Geertzian perspective which is alert to creative agential assertion by people and groups and 
their identification with symbols and identity.  
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three specific symbolic mobilisations. Immersion involved observing respondents as they 
lived their everyday realities and understanding how they negotiate their symbolic habitus 
to draw “cultural inferences’’ (Spradley, 2016, p. 10). I also attended various activities 
ranging from political party-organised campaign programmes such as the AAP’s jan 
sabhas (public meetings) and the BJP’s chai-pe-charchas (discussions over tea)23 to specific 
community-based events such as Ambedkar Jayanti (Ambedkar’s birth anniversary) 
organised by Dalit groups and NGOs. I shadowed specific political activists of both the 
BJP and AAP during election campaigning, spending time with them in their respective 
party office spaces, and attending rallies, protests including volunteer meetings. For the 
Dalit case study, apart from the urban location in the city, there was an equally crucial 
rural component (see Chapter 5 for discussion). Participant observation meant spending 
three and a half months on each case site. Additional methods were combined to aid 
the process of immersion: semi-structured open-ended interviews and focus group 
interviews.  
I engaged in both purposive and snowball sampling and conducted a total of 
150 interviews across the three case studies. The sample was purposive because it was 
focused on interlocutors who were part of specific mobilisations. My respondents had 
particular caste and religious affiliations and were relatively convinced about a particular 
movement and their reasons for identification. The sample included upper caste Hindus 
(upper, middle and lower class), Muslims (lower class) and Dalits (middle and lower 
class) across the three case studies. Access to my respondents was enabled by 
institutional gatekeepers (see individual case studies for details). For each case study, 50 
interviews were conducted, 25 of which were in-depth interviews lasting between 1-1½ 
hours. I conducted in-depth interviews for this project as this is the most effective 
                                                 
23 A tech-savvy BJP election campaign strategy for 2014 elections, the chai-pe-charcha (discussions over tea) 
involved Modi simultaneously talking to his supporters over a cup of tea (see Chapter 4 for further 
discussion). 
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manner to comprehend the social life of the respondent. It is a “meaning-making 
partnership’’ (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010, p. 105) to understand the respondent’s 
everyday experiences and then subjecting these conversations to critical analysis. The 
sample size for in-depth interviews was informed by the fact that ethnographic 
knowledge reaches saturation and responses tend to be repetitive after that point. In-
depth interviews were conducted with all interlocutors in Delhi, Gujarat and Uttar 
Pradesh. The remaining 25 interviews for all three cases were of respondents whom I 
met at events/rallies; they were supporters/audiences who had come from outside to 
participate. The interviews were conducted with consent and all were recorded.  
In rural and village-based group settings, I realised that the focus group 
approach would offer better access along with participant observation; “the hallmark of 
focus groups is their explicit use of group interaction to produce data and insights that 
would be less accessible without the interaction found in the group” (Morgan, 1996, p. 
2). It is important to highlight the reasons for choosing the focus group approach. First, 
for its dynamism (as this allows insights into the dynamics of identity-based assertions): 
group-based interviews are live and active situations involving a number of respondents 
which also helps to dissect intra-group equations. Second, and more crucially, these 
interviews can be sources of “knowledge-building processes’’ (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2010, p. 166). For instance, during my focus group interviews with Dalit respondents, 
the manner in which women respondents actively participated and responded to 
questions and sometimes disagreed with their male counterparts in a mixed group 
setting helped me to discern two types of power relations – the relationship between 
men and women within the community and also women’s identification with and 
assertion of their caste identity.  
The focus group approach differs slightly in its format from the standard 
interviewing process and hence requires planning to get several participants on board at 
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the specified time, to decide who the participants will be and how the researcher will 
interact with the group. I used this approach for respondents in a rural setting – in 
relation to Dalit villagers in UP and anti-Patel statue campaigners in Gujarat (the Dalit 
case study) and anganwadi (rural health workers) (the Modi case study). Each group 
consisted of 8-10 participants (three groups across three villages in the Dalit case study 
both in UP and Gujarat, and two groups of anganwadi workers). The composition of 
the groups was based on homogeneity or “segmented sample”24 (Morgan, 1997, p. 35). 
Caste was the defining factor for the Dalit group whereas for the anganwadi workers it 
was their gender which determined their participation. In relation to the structure of the 
sessions, I followed what is described as the “funnel strategy’’ (Morgan, 1997, p. 41) for 
interviews; this is a balance between structured and less-structured approaches, thereby 
enabling the dynamism of group interaction to play out and to identify trends in 
perception. I moderated each session as by then there was a level of comfort and trust 
with my participants and, since the important questions were structured, I could 
observe and record responses, participant enthusiasm, body language and mood of the 
discussion. The focus groups were recorded and each session was followed by 
transcription and interpretation based on broader themes.  
Being a multi-sited ethnography,25 fieldwork involved “following the people” 
(Marcus, 1995, p. 106) across multiple sites. In all three case studies – anti-corruption 
protests (New Delhi and Pune), Dalit mobilisation (Lucknow and Ahmadabad) and the 
Modi campaign (Vadodara and Varanasi) – multi-sited immersion enabled me to 
understand the specific spatial habitus and comparisons which were crucial for this 
project. For instance, following the AAP, first in Delhi and later in Varanasi during the 
general election campaign, enabled me to analyse the shift in the symbolic narrative of 
                                                 
24 “The decision to control the group composition to match carefully chosen categories of participants is 
known as segmentation” (Morgan, 1997, p. 35). 
25 Multi-sited fieldwork: within this framework: “ethnography moves from its conventional single site 
location” to “multiple sites of observation and participation” (Marcus, 1995, p. 95). 
54 
Kejriwal and the AAP and also provided the context to probe further an alternate 
symbolic universe in relation to Modi’s campaign. One critique and anxiety levelled 
against multi-sited ethnography, underscored by Marcus (1995), is that it is not ‘deep 
enough’ as it takes place for shorter periods across different sites. Being in multiple 
sites, on the contrary, allowed me to keep track of the varied spatial positionalities of 
my respondents and aided in comparative analysis. This was challenging as 
mobilisations evolved in multiple spatial locations and sometimes simultaneously. 
2.3 Mapping the Symbolic Terrain: In the Field 
I began in New Delhi, the nerve centre of the anti-corruption protests. The 
focus for this case study was to untangle the symbolic universe of the anti-corruption 
crusade that shook India in 2011. The anti-corruption mobilisation led by the India 
Against Corruption (IAC) coalition that activated the political capital of India had split 
by the time I started my fieldwork in August 2013 due to the ideological differences 
between the two prominent leaders of the movement, Anna Hazare and Arvind 
Kejriwal. The Anna Hazare faction (was against party politics) was now Jantantra Morcha 
(JM) and the Arvind Kejriwal faction (pro-party politics standpoint) had become a new 
political party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP). Due to the split I decided to first establish 
contact with the AAP, since I was aware that many participants in the initial protests 
had joined Kejriwal’s political initiative and the party had decided to contest the 2013 
Delhi Assembly elections. I took the election campaign as an opportunity to get access 
to participants in the 2011 protests and to assess their motivations for participation, 
both in the IAC and the AAP. 
The day started at the AAP office situated on Hanuman Road off Connaught 
Place (CP)26 as it was the centre of all election-related planning and hence became my 
                                                 
26 The AAP headquarters was in Koshambi (Gaziabad) when they began as a new political party but the 
hub of all activities was the CP office because a) Kejriwal was contesting the New Delhi constituency and 
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source centre. After meeting some senior leaders and volunteers, I received permission 
to follow their Delhi Assembly election campaign for 2013. After attending a few 
volunteer meetings, I identified 20 respondents for in-depth interviews who fulfilled 
two essential criteria – they had participated in the 2011 protests and were first-timers in 
political activism. They were mostly young students (male and female), professionals 
(especially legal experts/advocates), businessman/small traders, auto-rickshaw drivers, 
NGO and human rights activists, retired bureaucrats, Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and 
homemakers. The respondents included both campaign managers at different levels and 
volunteers27 and belonged to a combination of urban middle and lower classes. I 
followed candidates across four constituencies – Shazia Ilmi, Munirka (South Delhi), 
Dharmesh Kohli, Sunder Nagri (North-East Delhi), Arvind Kejriwal, New Delhi 
(Central Delhi) and Hrishipal Pehalwan, Aya Nagar (South-West Delhi). The choice of 
these four constituencies is reflective of the socio-economic spatial distribution and 
composition of Delhi. The decision was informed by an attempt to engage with and go 
beyond the upwardly mobile and social media-active city dwellers associated with the 
‘middle class’ tag given to the movement.  
Anna’s decision to hold the last phase of his fast to pass the Jan Lokpal Bill in 
Lok Sabha in his village in Ralegan Siddhi, Pune gave me the opportunity to gauge the 
rural support base for these protests. His village had been the base for his various 
campaigns ranging from saving the local environment by rainwater harvesting to 
national campaigns such as the Right to Information (RTI). Staying at Ralegan Siddhi28 
enabled me to interact with the villagers and supporters who came from nearby 
villages/states to express solidarity with Anna and the issue of anti-corruption. During 
                                                                                                                                          
b) because the location of this office was more central, all activities, meetings and press conferences were 
held here and it was also easier to co-ordinate. 
27 AAP, as a new political party in a post ideological phase, prefers to use the term volunteers for its 
members rather than the old classic style of referring to them as cadres or party members/workers.  
28 I stayed in Ralegan Siddhi village for a month. The Anna Hazare Trust and JM were instrumental in 
facilitating access in Ralegan Siddhi, Pune.  
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his nine days of fasting, the Yadavbaba temple compound was filled with Anna’s 
supporters who included old Gandhian activists, rural peasants, small farmers and many 
women peasants. During interviews, I realised that many had made trips to Ramlila 
Maidan and New Delhi during the first phase of the protests in 2011. Attending Anna’s 
fast allowed me to reach the supporters of the anti-corruption movement, in addition to 
the urban volunteers of AAP. 
From January, 2014, I moved to Lucknow, the centre for Mayawati’s memorial 
building project, the Dr.B.R. Ambedkar Parivartan Sthal. The Ambedkar Bhavan, 
situated just opposite the Uttar Pradesh Assembly compound at Hazratgunj, was my 
base. The Bhavan, a deliberating space, had a library, a small meeting room and a 
separate enclosure housing Ambedkar’s statue and his ashes. As it was the centre for all 
non-party meetings and mobilisations, I got the opportunity to talk to many activists 
who were leading various civil society groups and NGOs, allowing me to meet both 
urban and rural (potential) respondents. In the course of attending many of these 
activists’ meetings about ideological standpoints and debates, strategies to be pursued in 
the context of the general elections of 2014 and organising their local events, I met with 
activists from DAG29 and PMARC30 who became gatekeepers to my respondents. Both 
of these organizations were engaged in organising and intervening in the representation 
of Dalit interests in UP. It was a considered decision to not gain access through the 
official political party route, i.e. the BSP. Although party leaders and members were 
interviewed, the commemorative structure was built under Mayawati’s political rule and 
the objective was to avoid the party-mediated responses to the construction of the Sthal.  
                                                 
29 The Dynamic Action Group (DAG) formed in 1981 was a collaboration of roughly 30 NGOs set up to 
raise Dalit concerns in the state of Uttar Pradesh from a common platform. 
30 The People’s Media Advocacy and Resource Centre (PMARC) is a media initiative started by Arun 
Khote (a journalist/activist). He, with the help of other Dalit activists, journalists and academics, started 
this initiative to mainstream the issues of Dalit violence and atrocities in the media, both with the purpose 
of reporting/archiving human rights violations and consequently petitioning centre/state authorities. 
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I started by every day making trips to the Sthal in the district of Gomti Nagar. It 
took me two weeks to imbibe in the massive architectural structure alone. Then I 
gradually observed the staff and visitors, occasionally profiling and doing short 
interviews with a few of them. Daytime visitors were usually tourists which included 
both Dalit and non-Dalits in groups/families.31 Surprisingly, unlike the official timings 
of the vast majority of tourist spots that shut by 5 p.m., the Sthal was open until 9 p.m., 
allowing me to record the change in the nature of visitors in the evenings. In the 
evenings, mobile eateries, ice-cream vendors and balloon sellers appeared along the 
streets of Gomti Nagar with the beautifully lit Sthal in the background and the vast 
majority of visitors were residents, usually college students, couples and families out to 
take a stroll, many of whom were non-Dalits. It was equally important to seek what the 
resident Dalits felt about the construction of the Sthal, especially those who were middle 
class. Through DAG and PMARC, I got access to the urban middle class respondents 
who were professionals, mostly teachers, lawyers or activists belonging to the Jatav32 
community. I also explored the inter-caste dynamics by doing 15 in-depth interviews 
with respondents from the Balmiki33 caste (access was provided by the Adarshila NGO 
based in Lucknow).  
As part of my three village rural sample, I decided to include two that were part 
of the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP).34 Residing in Khaprela village for almost 
                                                 
31 The distinction between the Dalit/non-Dalit identities of visitors was made based on a combination of 
interactions – interviews, conversations and small chats both inside and outside the premises. As an 
ethical practice, there were no direct questions asked to the respondents/visitors enquiring about their 
caste. However there were indirect questions asked along with many other feelers that enabled me to 
decipher the caste-based location of these visitors. Here I am using this distinction to make some general 
observations.  
32 Jatavs are Dalits and one of the caste groups belonging to the Scheduled Caste Category in Uttar 
Pradesh. Mayawati also belongs to this caste category and the majority of BSP supporters are Jatav. 
According to the traditional caste-based occupational structure they are tanners. 
33 Balmikis are also Dalits and a caste group that belongs to the Scheduled Caste category. In the caste 
hierarchy within Dalits itself, they are placed lower than the Jatavs and believe that this intra-caste 
hierarchy perpetuates discrimination within the community. Occupation-wise, they are expected to do 
menial jobs, including manual scavenging. 
34 The Ambedkar Village Programme was introduced by Mayawati in 2005 for targeted development of 
Dalit villages. For me, this criterion was important to assess both Mayawati’s success in distributing 
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two months (March-April) with one of the activists from the Prayatna Foundation35 
gave me the opportunity to observe my interlocutors who were mostly peasants/daily 
labourers. Initially, I accompanied the activists in their daily rounds, which allowed me 
to become familiar to the villagers and led to gradual acceptance, after which I 
established direct contact with them. After only two individual in-depth interviews, I 
realised that my interviewees were quite hesitant and uncomfortable (they appeared 
distracted and took a long time to respond to questions). I then modified the 
questionnaire to accommodate a focus group setting; this successfully changed the 
dynamics and the villagers were much more forthcoming. The focus group interviews 
with ten participants each were conducted in three nearby villages: (AVP) Samesi and 
Balsinghkhedha (Jatav caste) (Lucknow District, Mohanlalganj Tehsil) and (non-AVP) 
Khaprela Village (Pasi/Rawat caste) (Zahirabad Tehsil, Barabanki District). I also did a 
second round of follow-up interviews in late July. 
To scrutinise Modi’s image as Vikaspurush, the symbolic mobilisation of the 
2014 election campaign was timely. The important sites were his two Lok Sabha 
constituencies, Vadodara (Gujarat) and Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh). In April, Modi had 
filed his nomination from Vadodara to contest the 2014 general election. When I 
arrived there in late April, the rickshaw ride from the Vadodara railway station to 
Maharaja Sayajirao University (MSU) made it very clear that one had arrived in Modi’s 
state: even the visual presence of Congress was missing from the streets and all one 
could see were big Modi posters, saffron flags and huge BJP hoardings. After reaching 
MSU, I walked to the nearby BJP Vadodara office. Despite having previously 
established contact with the local party functionary, it took ten days to gain official 
permission to follow their campaign as they insisted on conducting background checks 
                                                                                                                                          
material benefits to Dalits and whether that has impact on identity-based assertion through symbolic 
means at all for them. 
35 Prayatna Foundation is an NGO active in Dalit empowerment in villages around Lucknow.  
59 
before providing access. Initially, spending time every day in the party office helped me 
to get to know the campaign managers of the overall team, youth and the women’s 
wing. After identifying my respondents for in-depth interviews, I started following them 
in their respective campaigns. The male respondents included middle-aged 
upper/middle class Hindu males from in and around Sayyajigunj in west Vadodara. 
They were all long-time party members and were small traders, businessmen and 
banking professionals. The majority of women respondents from the party were 
homemakers.  
Election campaign aside, it was important to assess the everyday experience of 
Modi’s Vikas (Growth). The Gujarat model is known for its various annual mass re-
distributive developmental drives introduced under Modi’s Chief Ministership in 2002. 
During fieldwork, two of the drives – Shala Pravesh Utsav (school enrolment drive) in 
Behrampura and Garib Kalyan Melo (fair to empower the poor) in Chotta Udepur – were 
on-going and this gave me the opportunity to talk to the beneficiaries of these policies, 
mostly minorities and rural poor. Similarly, it was important to speak to women 
supporters of Modi, who claimed to have been benefitted as workers under his rule due 
to targeted empowerment programmes. I chose to focus on the anganwadi36 workers, 
which was one of Modi’s flagship programmes. Through the ICDS programme head of 
Vadodara city, I arranged considerable time to observe and interview them on their 
changed working conditions, their self-identity as health care workers and how Modi’s 
government has changed women’s lived experiences. The sample consisted of mostly 
young rural women who had completed only higher secondary school, were married, 
                                                 
36 Anganwadi literally means ‘courtyard shelter’; they are rural health care centres set up by the 
Government of India in 1975. An initiative to combat rural child malnutrition and hunger, Anganwadi 
workers provide basic health care education and support under the Integrated Child Development 
Scheme (ICDS). The Modi government, under the ‘Mission Mangalam’ programme started schemes for 
rural women empowerment, also initiating some changes in the Anganwadi workers’ working conditions. 
For details see https://www.narendramodi.in/cm-fetes-anganwadi-workers-calls-upon-women-to-make-
gujarat-a-malnutrition-free-state-3882 
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but also trained as community workers. I used a combination of (three) in-depth 
interviews and focus-group interviews to accommodate their working schedule and time 
constraints. 
Crucial to gauge the success of Modi’s growth story, was to examine his 
minority support base for which Muslims and Dalit perspectives were to be accessed. 
The official Muslim voice was accessed through the BJP’s Laghumati Morcha (Minority 
Wing) and the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM)37 headed by Ghani Bhai Quereshi. The 
MRM’s two-day conference on cow protection was an opportunity to establish contact 
with Muslim supporters from different cities and explore their views on the success of 
the Gujarat model. The Muslim respondents quoted here are thus male BJP 
functionaries, members and supporters. Many of the Muslim BJP supporters who were 
interviewed belonged to lower classes and were small traders, owned small shops or 
were auto-rickshaw drivers. In order to build a complete picture of the growth story, 
however, it was also imperative to analyse the other, unofficial, side.  
The trail of anti-Patel statue campaigning brought me to Ahmadabad. It was 
during my fieldwork in Vadodara that I heard and read about the anti-Patel statue 
campaign in Ahmadabad. After initial groundwork, I first got in touch with the 
Navsarjan Trust, a human rights organisation which led the campaign.38 They put me in 
touch with the groups co-organising the campaign, the Dalit Shakti Kendra (DSK)39 and 
Samata Sainik Dal (SSD). Conversations with leaders such as Martin Mackwan 
convinced me that it was a campaign worth pursuing on two fronts. First, it intervenes 
                                                 
37 The Muslim Rashtriya Munch (MRM) is also BJP’s initiative for reaching out to Muslims through 
cultural interventions. It was started under the aegis of RSS leader Inderesh in 2002 after the Gujarat 
pogroms, and aimed to attract Muslim support as the party’s official minority wing had been unsuccessful 
in doing so. For details see http://www.muslimrashtriyamanch.org/ 
38 Navsarjan is a grassroots organisation working in the state of Gujarat against caste-based discrimination 
and the practice of untouchability against Dalits, as well as other human rights related activities. For 
further details see https://navsarjantrust.org/. 
39 An extension of the Navsarjan Trust, Dalit Shakti Kendra (Dalit Empowerment Centre) is primarily a 
vocational training centre for the youth of the Dalit community. For further details see 
https://dalitshaktikendra.org/. 
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in Dalit symbolism and the politics of statues by their demand for Ambedkar’s statue to 
be the tallest in India. Second, the campaign was a cogent challenge by the Dalit 
community in the state to Modi’s ‘Gujarat model’, despite the fact that the mainstream 
media did not cover it. Although it had not been part of my initial fieldwork plan, after 
due consideration I decided to follow the campaign and document it. These three civil 
society groups enabled my access to the participants in the massive anti-Patel statue 
campaigns that had started in December 2013. The sample consisted of Dalits of the 
Rohith caste40 from the villages of Padra and Jaspur (Vadodara) and Bhat (Daskroi 
Taluka in Ahmadabad) which were strongholds of the campaign. I led focus group 
interviews both with the leadership and the participants. 
But it was not just the Dalit story; I also got a sneak peek into the unofficial 
version of being a Muslim in Gujarat. The Muslim minority ghettos of Behrampura, 
Juhapura and Jamalpur were chosen as they represented the underbelly of the Gujarat 
model. For instance, apart from being Muslim-dominated spaces, Behrampura has the 
famous kabadi (scrap) market and Jamalpur is where the kites are manufactured for 
Gujarat’s famous International Kite Festival. Kites are made by Muslim artisans but 
sold by Hindus; the contrast between the alleys of Jamalpur with its lack of 
development and the relatively gated Hindu-dominated localities reflected this deep-
seated hierarchy. My analysis is based mainly on participant observations and short 
interviews; these were not facilitated by the BJP.  
Varanasi was the last fieldwork site and Modi’s second constituency for the 
general election of 2014. As a field, it was different on two counts. First, unlike 
Vadodara, Varanasi was a more contested terrain. The saffron flags were in competition 
                                                 
40 The Scheduled Caste (SC) community in Gujarat are referred to as Rohiths. Their caste status is similar 
to that of Jatavs in Uttar Pradesh. 
62 
with AAP’s topis,41 both on the campaign trail and visually. Second, the sample 
composition was different. My respondents for in-depth interviews were mostly middle 
and lower class Hindus and all were young first-time party activists, both men and 
women. This time, official access and permission to follow the campaign was easily 
obtained from the BJP Varanasi local headquarters. The bustling junction of Benaras 
Hindu University (BHU) was the nerve centre of all activities.42 Campaigning aside, the 
alleys of Lanka and Kamaccha represented the syncretism underlying the Hindu 
heartland. As the sun set over the ghats (steps leading down to the river), they 
transformed into deliberative forums where chai-pe-charchas (discussions over a cup of 
tea) were in session deciding the fate of India. This was an opportunity not to be missed 
for focus group discussions with mostly middle aged/old Hindu lower class men.  
My initial visits to the bunker (weaver) colony in Jaitapur (a Muslim ghetto), were 
quite unwelcoming and, because of the election, it was difficult to make a breakthrough. 
It was only gradually, and off the record, that some talked about the dying power loom 
industry, shortage of electricity and looming unemployment for their next generation, 
but there was reluctance to talk about their preferred party/candidate in the election. 
Gradually, visible Muslim support started emerging and spilled onto the streets for AAP 
rallies and jan sabhas closer to the voting day. My analysis of the Muslims in Varanasi is 
based more on participant observations and short interviews. I did follow up on the 
AAP campaign in a limited manner to sense the shift in their symbolic narrative and to 
investigate whether the presence of a strong alternate symbolic universe for the masses 
had translated into rejection of Modi’s Vikas agenda.43 
                                                 
41 After his success in the Delhi Assembly election in 2014, Kejriwal decided to contest the Lok Sabha 
election of 2014 from Varanasi. In the absence of a credible contest from Congress led by Rahul Gandhi, 
BJP’s strongest opponent was now the AAP. 
42 Staying at the BHU guesthouse facilitated not just following campaigns but meeting a wide range of 
people and supporters from across the political spectrum. 
43 As a case study, the anti-corruption protest was studied from August 2012 to December 2013. The 
relevance of the AAP for my study is only until it decided to contest the Delhi Assembly Election of 
2013. 
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The recording of decisions, permissions and observations began before starting 
the official fieldwork. “An ethnographic record consists of field notes, tape recordings, 
pictures, artefacts, and anything else that documents the social situation under study” 
(Spradley, 2016, p. 63). I maintained three small notepads (condensed) and notebooks 
(elaborate) for each case study to record my written field notes. Most of my field notes 
were written using a combination of English and Hindi. During my fieldwork in 
Gujarat, some of my respondents mixed Hindi with Gujarati, so many translations and 
meanings were written in Hindi, for easy recollection later. I also drew small 
flowcharts/idea grids to make immediate theoretical links while making field notes for 
future reference. The small notepads were used for recording immediate observations in 
the field and included innumerable observations, contact details and flowcharts and the 
notebooks to further develop and make expansive observations after each field session. 
Sometimes, I ended up doing them weekly because of hectic campaign trailing or 
extended travelling. All my interviews were recorded with a small recorder which, 
because of its non-descript nature, did not make respondents uncomfortable. I also 
maintained a field journal, recording my experiences as a researcher, some confusions 
and fears, hiccups, awkward encounters, breakthroughs and dates of all the case study-
related travelling and events. At the end of my fieldwork, I had 150 recordings of 
interviews in all, and field notes and expanded notes that had to be organised before I 
started to write. I first analysed my field notes and flowcharts and developed a broad 
thematic grid for classification. The broad themes for discussion in the chapters are 
based on these uniform idea grids. That was followed by the transcription of interviews 
and political speeches (translating some from Gujarati–Hindi–English). 
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2.4 En-route: ‘Visual’ in Ethnography 
In my initial research design, I had not considered using a camera but as I 
started following my respondents for the first case study (the AAP in Delhi), I realised 
that there were moments during the time spent in the party office, interviewing and 
campaigning, which would be reflective of varied subjective positions which would be 
more effectively captured by an image and might be left unarticulated in a verbal 
interview. This made me contemplate methodologically the value and use of visual 
methods, in this case photos/images from the field, to examine the range of possibilities 
for ethnographic research and analysis. These first few photographs assumed new 
connotations for my approach and, unexpectedly, the tool of visual research became 
part of the project. The visual research methods applied here permeate the broad 
ethnographic outlook of the overall project. The following discussion outlines the 
reasons, theoretical framework, practical and ethical concerns when using visual 
research methods. 
Visual ethnography as a method questions whether everything that an 
ethnographer wishes to study is verbal or exists in discourse.44 “In ethnography images 
are as inevitable as sounds, smells, textures and tastes, words or any other aspect of 
culture and society” (Pink, 2006, p. 21). A reflexive approach to the visual in 
ethnography rather than the scientific-realist informs this study. The scientific-realist 
approach considers images as being subservient to the written word whereas the 
reflexive approach emphasises their potential to create new ethnographic knowledge 
(Pink, 2001). Locating the visual in the ethnography would mean considering a 
                                                 
44 Instead, the ethnographer tries to also pay attention to the visual/affective aspect of culture as part of 
her ethnography using visual tools. “Visual ethnography uses photography, motion pictures, hypermedia, 
the web, interactive CDs, CD-ROMs, and virtual reality as ways of capturing and expressing perceptions 
and social realities of people”(Given, 2008, p. 934). 
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photograph becoming a field text in itself (I refer only to photographs taken by me - as 
researcher/ethnographer- during the fieldwork). 
The pertinent reason for using visual methods for my research was primarily 
dictated by the fact that it facilitated the uncovering of the habitus of the symbolic 
universe. Bourdieu’s conceptual framework of the habitus is difficult to examine 
because “it is class-culture embodied” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 175) so dispositions within a 
symbolic and cultural field are often non-verbalised. Here I am referring to how 
photographs can be used as an effective tool for accessing the unarticulated and 
embodied experiences of individuals and groups in a symbolic mobilisation. These 
photos contribute to enhancing “ethnographic knowledge” (Pink, 2001, p. 17) and 
“represent those aspects of the experience that are visible” (p. 24). Bourdieu himself has 
elaborated on photographic practice and used photographs in his research on Algeria. 
For my project I decided to use visual methods with a collaborative approach as this 
assisted in “revealing or illuminating aspects of practice that are difficult otherwise to 
recognise or articulate” (Sweetman, 2009, p. 506). 
Situating my fieldwork photographs reflects a subjective collaborative approach. 
The framing of an image is a power-laden exercise; “even when the production of the 
picture is entirely delivered over to the automatism of the camera, the taking of the 
picture is still a choice involving aesthetic and ethical values” (Bourdieu & Whiteside, 
1996, p. 6). Thus, I felt that a collaborative approach45 was the most effective manner of 
negotiating the various power hierarchies between researcher and subject, female 
researcher and male subjects and, class and caste equations. Collaboration was 
important “both on ethical grounds and as a way of recognizing the intersubjectivity 
that underlines any social encounter” (Pink, 2003, p. 190).All the images were produced 
collaboratively and with consent. 
                                                 
45 “A collaborative method assumes that researcher and informant are consciously working together to 
produce visual images” (Pink,  2001, p. 40).  
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Additionally, for the Dalit case study, I used the method of photographic 
survey46 to illustrate the Ambedkar memorial and statues. This was a conscious decision 
based on two considerations. First, because of limited or near absence of Dalit 
architecture and memorials in mainstream visual culture in general and the discipline of 
politics in particular: “[r]esearchers may often find that the photographic dimension of 
the culture they are working in has been virtually undocumented” (Pink, 2001, p. 50). 
Second, and following on from this, the invisibility is because the Brahmanical mode of 
perception dominates visual practice. As argued by Bourdieu and Whiteside, visual 
practices are embedded in dominant group norms: “the group places this practice under 
the collective rule, so that the most trivial photograph expresses, apart from the explicit 
intentions of the photographer, the system of schemes of perception, thought and 
appreciation common to the whole group” (1996, p. 6). Dalit architectural culture 
therefore has been pushed to the periphery, making it imperative for this thesis to bring 
it into analytical focus. 
From a reflexive approach, the link between the production of images and the 
technologies used to produce them is important. The choice of technology/equipment 
is crucial as it “will be part of the research context and an element of the ethnographer’s 
identity” (Pink, 2001, p. 38). Therefore I used two different cameras – a semi-
professional one for public events and a small digital camera for interview settings. I 
realised early on that a big (and thus inherently expensive) camera attracts undue 
attention and is intrusive/obstructive in one-to-one interview settings. Also, in a 
collaborative setting, one has to be attentive to the element of technology, class and 
access. The use of expensive devices had the potential to affect the social relationship 
and trust between me and my respondents, especially in the context of Dalit 
                                                 
46 I used photographic surveys from a reflexive ethnographic perspective. Representation of physical 
environment or events can be embedded within a reflexive framework if it is not depicted in a fixed 
manner but as “aspects of culture” (Pink, 2001, p. 38). This intention informs the use of the photographic 
survey approach in the thesis.  
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respondents, where it could be seen as flagging huge economic inequality despite the 
fact that my respondents did have access to a reasonable level of technology and made 
use of mobile phone cameras (they showed me photos of various events on their 
phones during the interviews). I felt it was essential to take into account the power 
hierarchies involved both at the caste and class levels in this ethnographic encounter. 
Being aware of the local visual practices was also equally important; for example, while 
Varanasi and Lucknow are camera-friendly field sites as they are tourist places, the same 
could not be said of the rural Dalit villages in UP where an outsider with a camera 
would be viewed as invasive. 
Seeking permission was an important part of the planning process. During my 
first weeks, I had to negotiate official permissions with the institutional gatekeepers of 
all three case studies. This involved not just official permission to attend rallies and 
campaign events of both the BJP and AAP, but also the right to photograph their 
events and activists (along with individual permissions). I met with the local 
constituency-level party leadership of both political parties and got approval for the 
same before I started following their campaigns. Similarly, with regard to Dalit 
respondents, individual permission was sought. 
2.4.1 ‘Framing’ the Field  
By applying a combination of the theoretical and practical guide offered by Pink 
(2001; 2003) and extending the interpretive approach for visual images formulated by 
Drew and Guillemin (2014), I evolved my own approach to analysing the images. By 
advancing the meaning-making and interpretive approach to visual images, Drew and 
Guillemin’s framework provides an effective framework to analyse visual images. 
However, their approach was with reference to participant-generated images rather than 
researcher-produced images as is the case here. While drawing on their ‘interpretive 
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framework’s three stage-based approaches,47 I adapted it considerably for the relevance 
of this project to go with collaborative image-making in the following three stages: 
Stage 1: Collaborative Framing  
Images were taken after interviews with the permission of the respondents for 
each of the case studies. Photographs were collaboratively produced to capture 
moments, events and occasions as part of the larger ethnographic project. Framing as a 
technique was used by focusing the camera to capture a moment of the everyday life of 
my respondents.48 I use the term ‘collaborate’ to imply they were framed by working 
together with the informants.49  
Stage 2: Classifying and Interpreting 
The images taken were classified at the end of each day of fieldwork; they were 
labelled and grouped, making field notes with reference to significant images. At the 
end of each case study, the broad themes were identified and the images organised into 
specific files. This resulted in a significant number of photographs and so I introduced 
an additional round of screening. This involved a further process of making a 
distinction between ethnographic moments and eliminating images that reflected more 
of a spectacular outlook, especially with reference to images of public events which had 
the potential of being more photojournalistic and spectacular. Through subsequent 
drafts of the thesis I made further additions/deletions based not so much on the 
content of the image itself, but on how much it added to the meaning of the project.  
 
                                                 
47 “The ‘interpretive engagement’ framework comprises three stages of meaning-making; these are 
meaning-making through participant engagement (Stage 1), researcher-driven engagement (Stage 2), and 
re-contextualising (Stage 3)” (Drew & Guillemin, 2014, p. 53). 
48 “Ethnographic investigation assumes active looking, most obviously demonstrated in self conscious 
decisions about framing’’ (Harper, 2003, p. 260). 
49 “If photographs are produced ‘collaboratively’ they combine the intentions of both the 
ethnographer/photographer and informant and should represent the outcome of their negotiations’’ 
(Pink, 2001, p. 58). 
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Stage 3: Ethnographic Representation 
The most difficult stage was that of ethnographic representation and navigating 
the debate around the hierarchy between the image and text. Most interdisciplinary 
attempts at including visual images in texts end up being a visual extension of written 
texts: for example, engagement with the images to analyse identity politics have been 
predominantly to do with the study of Hindutva politics, and in most of these cases 
‘images’ have been ‘an extension’ to discourse. I attempt in this thesis, following 
Mitchell (1996), Pink (2001) and Pinney (2003) to show that images can have their own 
narrative and the potential to make visible hitherto hidden narratives. The point here is 
not to establish that the visual is a superior tool, but to consider it an additional 
ethnographic register, alongside the verbal. As pointed out by Mitchell, “pictures want 
neither to be levelled into a ‘history of images’ nor elevated into a ‘history of art’ but to 
be seen as complex individuals occupying multiple subject positions and identities” 
(1996, p. 82). By using these images from my fieldwork, I aim to visualise certain 
ethnographic experiences and ideas which are sensory or affective, unarticulated but 
expressed. “While images should not necessarily replace words as the dominant mode 
of research and or representation, they should be regarded as an equally meaningful 
element of ethnographic work” (Pink, 2001, pp. 4–5). Following this perspective the 
images have been presented along with the text “to explore the relationship between 
visual and other (including verbal) knowledge” (p. 96). 
The strategy pursued in the thesis therefore places images before text. There are 
also instances of deliberate non-captioning of images, informed by the reflexive 
understanding that the ethnographer’s (my) representation is only one way of 
interpreting the ethnographic moment and the image and captioning has the potential 
to text-frame the image. The attempted practice is to make an analytical link between 
two equally important ethnographic materials – interviews and photographs. 
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2.5 Limitations 
I was aware that interviews can be a rehearsed performance on the part of 
respondents: “[t]he subject often says what s/he wants to be heard and present 
themselves the way they want to be represented” (Jacoby, 2006, p. 162). Thus, 
triangulation between methods (Denzin, 1978; Flick, 2004; Jick, 1979) was used as a 
technique to check validity and to overcome the limitations of each method of data 
collection used here – in-depth interviews, focus groups and photographs. Beyond the 
test of validity, which has a larger positivist connotation, triangulation also contributes 
to enhance the interpretive aspect by capturing “alternative and multiple perspectives 
on social realities” (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010, p. 52). In addition to interviews, field 
observations and photographs, secondary sources such as newspaper reports were used 
to corroborate evidence.  
2.6 Ethics: Ethnographic Encounter 
Qualitative research raises ethical issues, especially in ethnographic fieldwork. 
The encounter between the researcher and the respondent is power-laden, and the 
power of representation unquestionably lies with the ethnographer whose interpretation 
is necessarily embedded in specific disciplinary contexts (Asad, 1973). Both Geertz 
(1973) and Schatz (2009) alert us to the fact that ethnographic sensibility is not just 
about respondents but also involves recognising the position, privilege and power of the 
researcher vis-à-vis the interlocutors. Self-reflexivity towards my own identity as a 
researcher would influence my interactions in the field. I sought to analyse my position 
along the lines of my religious, caste, class, gender and political positions. 
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2.6.1 Positionality and privilege: the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’50 
My positionality – middle-class, English-speaking, and Delhi-educated with an 
activist outlook – gave me an ‘assumed insider’ access to two groups, the BJP and the 
AAP. My Hindu religious and middle-class identity facilitated making inroads into these 
groups quite effortlessly. 
Assumed ‘Insider’  
Doing fieldwork with BJP party workers and their activists made me realise how 
having a ‘seemingly upper caste Hindu name’, speaking ‘good Hindi’ and being a ‘single 
middle-class woman from London’ made me a comfortable insider within the Hindu 
nationalist group. After the organisational level scrutiny from both BJP headquarters in 
Vadodara and Varanasi, I had an uncomfortably smooth transition into being an 
‘insider’. Despite personally being hugely uncomfortable with their ideology, I was able 
to get, to an extent, an insider view of the Hindu Right.  
Similarly with the AAP and JM, I had an easy access, as a ‘middle-class Delhite 
doing research’. Meeting with a few leaders at the Connaught Place main office and 
activists was enough to get permission. Since the AAP was a young political party with a 
seemingly liberal ideology there was less scrutiny than from the BJP. Also, the AAP had 
women activists at many levels, so it offered a comfortable working space to navigate. 
Constant ‘Outsider’ 
Being a non-Dalit was a constant identity that I had to negotiate as I interacted 
with my research participants belonging to the Dalit caste for my second case study. 
Despite being alert to the caste dynamics at play in this encounter, I was caught off 
guard during one of the initial meetings in Ambedkar Bhawan in Lucknow. In the midst 
of a conversation, an activist confronted me explicitly with the question “aap Dalit hai 
                                                 
50 Insider/outsider terminology is used only for representative convenience.  
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kya?” [Are you a Dalit?] On hearing my response in the negative, he asked “phir aap kya 
research karengi?” [Then what research will you do?], implying that, since I am not one of 
them, I cannot understand them or their experiences enough to represent them. This 
was an upfront and timely reality check and caused me to take corrective measures. 
There were two overlapping power equations that needed to be balanced in this 
particular encounter – non-Dalit/Dalit and researcher/respondent – and in order to 
establish trust, it was essential to strike a balance between caste-based positionality and 
sensitivity. 
2.6.2 The only woman with a camera: media enclosures 
In the fieldwork context, when utilising visual images and technologies as part 
of the research project, gender plays an important role. The gendered power relations 
translated in two ways for me in the field – the skill to handle technology and defining 
access. The assumed masculine control over technology led to unwanted attention and 
advice by male camerapersons in the media enclosures of various public events 
organised by the BJP and AAP. Attending various political rallies and meetings involved 
getting permission to be in the media enclosures during these events. While there were 
many female journalists in the media enclosure as reporters and anchors, there were 
none as camerapersons; both print and television media had male camerapersons. As 
the only woman with a camera that, too, was not using a tripod, I often encountered 
questioning looks – who is she? I felt as if I was intruding on their terrain and invariably 
received patronising advice about my positioning of the camera – “shot aise lo!” [you 
should take the shot like this!]. Media enclosures are not only good spots for media 
persons; they are also policed spaces: journalists/camerapersons are not allowed to 
mingle with the crowd. However, being a female researcher, albeit with a camera, I was 
perceived as non-threatening by the security establishment. While attending Modi’s rally 
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in Uttar Pradesh, after initially failing to negotiate with a junior police constable who 
was stopping me from moving among the crowd, a senior policeman told his colleague 
“arre ladies hai. jaane do!” [Let her go. She is a woman!]. Gendered assumptions in this 
situation helped me navigate through the audience in the rally and gave access to 
subjects to produce collaborative photographs of political rallies/events.  
2.6.3 Academic representation of images: safety of subjects 
Although I used collaborative photography to produce fieldwork images with 
research participants, I made the decision to not photograph Muslim neighbourhoods 
or Muslim respondents in Gujarat and Varanasi with the sole exception of one shot 
taken from the back in Varanasi which does not reveal the identity of the subjects. As 
Pink (2001, p. 135) writes: “When ethnographers use photographs to make academic 
points they should also consider the personal, social and political implications of the 
publication of these images for their subjects’’. This decision was informed by three 
considerations. First, safety concerns of my respondents who belong to the minority 
community and have been victims of state-sponsored persecution: images revealing 
their front profile have the potential to expose them. Second, the constant fear with 
which minorities live in Gujarat makes it difficult for them to collaborate in such 
activities. I felt the unease, fear and discomfort when I first visited the Muslim ghetto of 
Behrampura. After experiencing such violence, it is unfair to expect the community to 
trust outsiders. Although eventually I did manage to gain their trust and some agreed to 
be clicked, I finally decided not to use them. Finally, their visual absence is symptomatic 
of the actual absence of the Muslim community from the “system of schemes of 
perception” (Bourdieu and Whiteside, 1996, p. 6) in the state of Gujarat. 
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2.6.4 Researching the Right: the ‘reflexivity of discomfort’51 
My research involved detailed and lengthy interactions with the members and 
activists of the right wing party, the BJP, whose political ideology I oppose. I attended 
events and rallies whose content I disagree with and not confronting their various 
sexist, casteist and communal comments, activities and behaviours often pushed me 
into a zone of discomfort. More pronounced was the discomfort inherent in the 
situations when I accompanied the BJP activists in Muslim ghettos where I experienced 
and shared the fear, intrusiveness and majoritarian imposition, especially in Gujarat. 
Also, my ‘insider position’ within BJP made it difficult to negotiate situations of 
simultaneous interactions with other groups because of strict surveillance – the 
upcoming election made it risky to be seen with members of oppositional political 
parties or activists as that would lead to access being denied. I had to be very careful 
when scheduling my meetings/interviews in Vadodara and Ahmadabad with Dalit 
activists or accompanying the AAP in Varanasi. I was also concerned that I might not 
represent my respondents/research participants fairly and might perpetuate stereotypes. 
The discomfort of dealing with my own biases for this case study translated into the 
most difficult chapter to write.  
This chapter therefore outlines the methodological and ethical dimensions 
underpinning the research. The next chapter elucidates the analytical framework guiding 
the complex dynamics of symbolic politics.  
 
  
                                                 
51 Hamdan’s (2009) terminology to describe the complexities involved in occupying multiple subjectivities 
as a researcher. I use the term because it helps me to capture the dilemmas of researching and 
representing the Hindu right and the balancing of ethical research with my own subjectivity. 
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3 Political Performativity: Identity, Symbols and Democratic 
Subjectivity 
Symbolic politics combined with performativity constitutes the nature of 
practical politics today. Performative political action comprises many aspects – symbolic 
formations, spectacular performance and wielding culture to stake claims. People’s 
participation in symbolic mobilisations can be a crucial axis of political subject 
formation. Political actors emerge in the public sphere as claim-makers for their rights, 
recognition and identity. Symbolic assertion is representative of a contested public 
sphere, a site for agitation, claims and contestations, creating an emergent political field 
by advancing a political voice. 
In recent times, from the Egyptian revolution to the Occupy Movement, most 
protest/social movements have demonstrated performative political action as a critical 
constitutive force. The Egyptian revolution in January 2011 popularly referred to as the 
“18 days of people’s power”,52 brought political and socio-economic disgruntlement 
against the Mubarak regime onto the streets. The powerful image of demonstrators 
praying in front of army tanks and clashing with riot police in Tahrir Square displayed 
the common man’s defiance against the coercive power of the regime. From Tahrir 
Square in Cairo to Zuccotti Park in New York, people occupied public spaces to assert 
their rights and make claims against injustice. Fighting against corporate power and 
financial inequality, demonstrators camped near New York’s financial district in 
September 2011; one of their slogans read “Wall Street is our street”!  
Similarly, in India many groups have taken to symbolic and performative 
protests, for example, the case of the tribal Jal Satyagraha that was held in Goglegaon in 
Khandwa district for seventeen days in Madhya Pradesh. In this instance, villagers 
                                                 
52https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution 160124191716737.html 
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immersed themselves in the chin-deep waters of their flooded fields to protest against 
the state government’s decision to raise the water level of the Omkareshwar Dam. Their 
protest demanded that the water level of Omkareshwar Dam53 should be returned to its 
original height. In another recent example, villagers went on an indefinite fast in protest 
against the Indian government’s nuclear project at Kudankulam, fearing nuclear disaster 
in Tamil Nadu. A sea-based protest was organised by the fishermen with around 700 
boats (Sudhakar, 2012). My study seeks to analyse this sort of performance in politics, 
its impact on political subjectivity, and the visual practices established through symbolic 
and spectacle creation, asking ‘what is the nature of political subjectivities that get 
constituted through symbolic mobilisations?’ 
In her study of political corpses, Verdery argues,  
They help us to see political transformation as more than a technical process—of 
introducing democratic procedures and methods of electioneering, of forming political 
parties and non-governmental organizations, and so on. The “something more” 
includes meanings, feelings, the sacred, ideas of morality, the non-rational…Through 
dead bodies, I hope to show how we might think about politics, both as strategies and 
manoeuvring and also as activity occurring within cultural systems. (Verdery, 1999, p. 
25) 
Verdery activates the role of symbolism in politics and, by focusing on ‘something more’ in 
political analysis with her discussion around dead bodies, she links the past and the 
future in the post-socialist European context. Her incisive work mainstreams the deeply 
symbolic nature of politics. Following on these lines of political analysis, I aim to 
examine the politics of symbolism, co-constitutive meaning-making and their impact on 
subject formation. The political intersection of identity, symbols and performance is 
assumed to be democratically not substantial enough to withstand political scrutiny, due 
to its symbolisms and passionate subjectivities. The thesis aims to deconstruct this 
perspective. The social processes and practices that it may entail – making claims 
                                                 
53 An interesting photo essay on the plight of the protestors can be seen at 
http://www.newindianexpress.com/galleries/2012/sep/08/jal-satyagraha-in-narmada-1339.html 
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outside of institutional spaces, group-based collective bargaining and the negotiation 
between legal and cultural citizenship could signal democratic subjectivity. My work 
thus examines symbolic politics and embodied performative political action and the 
possibilities for a new or altered form of individual subjectivities, democratic 
community formations and their limits.  
The analytical frame of the thesis outlined in this chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first charts two dominant types of symbolic participation – performative 
political action and spatial assertion. Contextualising this encounter, the second section 
takes up the issue of symbolic representation, focusing on its two main dimensions – the 
symbolic habitus and the types of political action it can activate. Finally, the third 
section explores the theoretical debates around what can be considered as a ‘democratic’ 
political subjectivity constituted in the context of symbolic mobilisations. 
3.1 Symbolic Participation: Performative Identities and Spatial Claim-making 
Participation in any symbolic mobilisation, at whatever moment or location can 
be seen as public presentation of the self. Isin points out that what is important is not 
only that “citizenship is a legal status but that it also involves practices of making 
citizens – social, political, cultural and symbolic” (2008, p. 2). During the 2011 anti-
corruption protests in New Delhi, crowds occupied the Ramlila Maidan, alleys, streets 
and parks of housing localities and made claims on their political representatives. By 
activating the performative power of the aam aadmi (common man), these protests 
brought hitherto apolitical sections of Indian society in different parts of the city onto 
the streets and transformed the practice of political claim-making. This social protest is 
an example of the kind of performative political action, which I intend to analyse. Also 
it has political implications as members of a political community redefine their city. As 
an embodied practice, performance translates such participatory political activities into 
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agential spatial assertions. The following two sub-sections therefore weave in the 
theoretical framework to decipher performative political action and spatial claim-
making. 
3.1.1 Political performativity: identity, performance and symbolic power 
Political performativity comprises, in other words, the construction of images and 
spectacles, forms of speech, dress and public behaviour that promotes the identity of a 
movement or party, defines its members, and promotes its cause or worldview. 
(Hansen, 2004, p. 23) 
Political performativity imagines political action beyond its status as spectacular 
and event-making. The representational dimension of symbolic public spectacles acts as 
a definitional frame, grounding political ideologies, images and symbols, framing the 
way people see or imagine themselves as political subjects. I use the term performativity, 
rather than performance to demonstrate that political action is, in a sense, beyond 
theatrics, notwithstanding the fact that dramas and staged performances have been 
integral to politics as Edelman (1988) points out.  
The distinction between performance and performativity is of significance 
because it is important to delineate whether identitarian political participation in a 
symbolic mobilisation can be reduced to enactment. One of the schemas used for 
analysing social relations in the context of institutional settings, state and identity 
creation is the political performance framework elaborated by Rai (2015). Deploying 
‘performance’ as the analytical tool she explores “whether a focus on performance 
allows us to ask different questions about political legitimacy, claim-making and 
representation” (p. 1181) in the context of Indian parliament. She emphasises that 
‘performativity’ as the analytical lens does not account for ruptures, and applies 
performance instead to unpack the study of political institutions and dynamics of 
representation and its reception. For her, political performance involves enactment, in 
this case by MPs (Members of Parliament) and their mode of reaching out to a broader 
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audience involves theatrics and conscious gestures. However, the prism of performance 
is a limited frame for analysis and has the effect of abstracting an act out of its structural 
embeddedness.  
In the context of identity politics, the conceptual frame of performativity is 
more constructive and productive because it contributes to uncovering different layers 
of identification. “In contrast to theatrical metaphors of performance, the idea of 
performativity here is that the actions performed are intrinsic to, not separate from, 
daily life” (Wedeen, 2009, p. 87). Hansen (2002), in his analysis of the Shiv Sena54 and its 
highly visible investment in political spectacles, demonstrates that a co-constitutive lens 
contributes to analysing both aspects of positionality and agency inherent in 
performance, arguing that: 
the Sena’s spectacles of public violence are neither an effect of the movement’s intrinsic 
nature nor of the social environment out of which it grew. It is the very generative and 
performative core of its being. It is through the ritualized destruction of property, the 
attacks on the police, the hurling of stones, the shouting of slogans that sainiks are 
produced, their identities affirmed and stabilized. (Hansen, 2002, p. 65) 
The focus only on ritualised performance tends to view communal behaviour as an 
aberration or a deviation. A Hindu self embedded in majoritarian nationalism can be 
accessed more substantially and effectively by the interpenetration of performance with 
performativity; this also enables the uncovering of embodied practices and political 
action in identity politics. As Wedeen perceptively argues, “performatives refers to a 
structural logic while performance refers to an event” (2008, p. 16). In this thesis, 
performativity is employed to analyse identitarian claim-making. Performative lens to 
analyse identitarian assertion enables us to situate the constitutive nature of 
performance and also explore the possibilities to account for representation of identity 
and subversive social change. 
                                                 
54 Shiv Sena (Army of Shivaji), is an extreme right wing regional political party of Maharashtra (Mumbai). 
Founded in 1966 by Bal Thackery, its ideology is a combination of regional chauvinism and Hindu 
nationalism. Members of the party are referred to as Shiv Sainiks.  
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Performativity is a conceptual tool emphasising the political and embodied 
aspect of performance coined by post-structuralist feminist theorist Butler. The term 
‘performative’ was first conceptualised by Austin, according to whom an utterance is an 
intentional act in itself. He defines this as “performative sentence or performative 
utterance” (1962, p. 6). Within his conceptualisation, speech acts are more than just 
sentences, they are also actions. Butler (1993, 1997, 1999), in relation to gendered 
subject formation, extended his conceptual frame beyond its linguistic application:  
Gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to 
be. In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might 
be said to pre-exist the deed. (1999, p. 25) 
With reference to theories of subjectivity, identity and performance, a key theoretical 
point advanced by Butler above is that there is no performer with a pre-existing identity 
behind a performance (Salih & Butler, 2003). Consequently, gendered identity is 
something that one does, rather than something one is. She argues further that, 
gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which 
various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted 
in an exterior space through a stylized repetition of acts. (Butler, 1999, p. 179) 
Through repeated acts, she suggests, cultural and gendered norms of feminine and 
masculine identities are reinforced, normalised and performed. A repeated performance 
of gendered practices contributes to the constitution of a specific form of a subject.  
Furthermore, performance theorists extend Butler’s intervention interlinking 
performativity and social relations, Langellier (1999) and Conquergood (1991, 1998) 
highlight the notion of identitarian experience and the political import of convergence 
of performance with performativity. 
In performativity, narrator and listener(s) are themselves constituted… Identity and 
experience are a symbiosis of performed story and the social relations in which they are 
materially embedded: sex, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, geography, religion, and so on. 
This is why personal narrative performance is especially crucial to those communities 
left out of the privileges of dominant culture, those bodies without voice in the political 
sense. (Langellier, 1999, p. 129) 
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It follows that, the potential for subversion is always present because internalised 
hegemonic norms can be challenged by groups on the margins. “Subversive 
performativity can disrupt the very citations that hegemonic performativity enacts” 
(Madison, 2005, p. 165). Decoding the potentials of subversive subjectivities, Butler and 
Athanasiou (2013) dissect dispossession (outside the neo-liberal logic of possession) to 
highlight the spate of performative resistance that has materialised in people’s protests 
against authoritarian regimes and neo-liberalism.  
This offers a cue to explore and problematise the ways in which the habitus of 
symbolic identification becomes a site for performative political action. Political 
performativity situates individuals in symbolic frameworks that sometimes sustain and 
other times challenge existing narratives. In this thesis the analytical frame of 
performativity is deployed to examine identities of religion, caste and civic citizenry 
within symbolic mobilisations in India. 
3.1.2 Spatial claims: city, counter-space and subjectivity 
We can also track how these multi-sited aggregations might serve not to reinvent a 
nostalgic communitarian politics of place, but rather to displace conventional 
conceptions of the “public sphere”. (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013, p. 194) 
Performative political actions utilise public spaces to make them-selves visible. 
Symbolic participation activates spatial location and hence investigation of the latter 
becomes immanent. The relationship between symbols and identitarian assertion is 
mediated by space as spatial practices weave physical spaces into concrete discourses of 
the social world. The use of physical spaces is shaped by political objectives and logic, 
hence the importance of space in explaining, criticising and justifying social practice. 
Spatial strategies are “meaningful itineraries for public displays of force, as use of 
emblematic monuments, locales, or buildings in dramatization of demands, [and] as 
struggle for control of crucial public spaces in validation of claims to political power” 
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(Tilly, 2000, p. 137). Spatial mappings are crucial to understanding social practices in 
contemporary politics, especially in the context of social construction of these spaces, 
boundaries and the types of subjectivities constituted in or inhabiting these spaces. 
Drawing on Lefebvre (1999), this thesis examines how symbolic politics are 
spatially experienced, transformed and shape collective action. I employ his theory of 
spatial practice to understand the encounter between symbolic mobilisation and spatial 
transformation. Lefebvre (1991, 1996), in his two incisive works on spatial practices and 
cities, deconstructs the different layers of subjective spatial location. Spaces are not 
“neutral” (1991, p. 36) or predefined by geography, he argues, rather they have to be 
examined for the spatial practices that they constitute and hence his emphasis on 
“production of space” (1991). Lefebvre’s most important theoretical contribution in 
understanding space is his formulation of “production of space’’ rather than focusing 
on “things in space’’ where he emphasises that in order to study space our focus should 
be on disentangling how it is produced rather than what lies within it (Lefebvre, 1991, 
pp. 36–37). 
The focus in the thesis is twofold. First, it explores the material nature of 
physical spaces as symbolic places: whenever a place becomes defining for a group it 
contributes to giving an identity to the specific group; in that context, that physical place 
can be considered as ‘symbolic’. As D. Mitchell puts it, “Public space, meanwhile, is 
material. It constitutes an actual site, a place, a ground within and from which political 
activity flows” (1995, p. 117). The aim here is to demonstrate the scope provided by the 
spatial lens to analyse the construction of collective identities through spatial assertion 
whereby a portion of space is identified with certain values and meanings. Second, the 
thesis aims to explore the nature of the subjectivities that inhabit or are constituted 
within these symbolic places, as cityscapes are re-inscribed with new practices and 
values. 
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During the Arab revolution, Tahrir Square evolved as one such symbolic site. 
The Square emerged as a global symbol of protest and became infused with anti-
authoritarian and revolutionary connotations. For 14 days it was the symbolic centre, as 
protesters refused to leave until the authoritarian and undemocratic President Hosni 
Mubarak abdicated his political position. “Withstanding repeated attacks by thugs and 
Mubarak supporters, they created what came to be called the ‘Republic of Tahrir’, a 
thriving micro-cosmos of a different vision of society” (Gunning, 2013, p. 2). In the 
centre of the city of Cairo the creation of this ‘space’ by the people’s spatial assertion 
symbolised the movement and its objectives to the rest of the world. Similarly, the 
Ramlila Maidan, nerve centre of the anti-corruption crusade in 2011 was occupied by the 
people for 13 days to protest against the political corruption and unaccountability of the 
political classes, transforming the political ambience of New Delhi. Cities are redefined 
as “spaces of contention” (Tilly, 2000) when the spatial practices employed by symbolic 
mobilisations entangle politics and space to produce new or modified symbolic 
meanings for both the material space and the altered subjectivities it instantiates. 
The city as a spatial location or the site of political activism is of symbolic and 
political significance. Lefebvre (1996) saw the city as a political space for social groups 
to claim their rights. For him, the logic of capitalism has reduced and suppressed the 
city as oeuvre (participation). The “right to the city” signifies the “constitution or 
reconstitution of a spatial-temporal unit” (p. 195) as people assemble collectively rather 
than as individualised subjects (notwithstanding the fact that contention and conflict 
persists). 
[T]he right to the city … in the most ‘positive’ of terms signifies the right of citizens and 
city dwellers, and of groups they (on the basis of social relations) constitute, to appear 
on all the networks of communication, information and exchange. (Lefebvre, 1996, pp. 
194–195) 
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To disrupt the everyday intentionality in the city, it follows, is to engage in an act of 
being political (Lefebvre, 1996); the political force of the Occupy Wall Street movement 
or Ramlila Maidan signified disruption of the street and inheres visibility for the claim-
making subject. Locating my conception of symbolic mobilisation within cities 
necessitates observing power relationships outside of institutional spaces or official 
bodies, for instance, in people’s interaction with the collector’s office, or in the form of 
protest to influence policy-making. I focus on the ‘outside’ or the ‘unofficial politics’ 
and the political action involved in claim-making in the streets and squares. Moving 
beyond the emphasis on conventional forms of political participation, this thesis aims to 
analyse how space is appropriated by groups or collectives for political action, 
expanding spaces for political participation and re-signifying cities.  
Identity and spatial assertion exist in a mutually constitutive relationship. 
Geography and community are linked and so is public space and democracy. “Public 
space is a place within which a political movement can stake out the space that allows it 
to be seen” (D. Mitchell, 1995, p. 115). The Arendtian perspective, becomes important 
here, because her ideas of “spaces of appearances” (1958, p. 198) and “act in concert’’ 
(p. 179) complicate the relationship between public space and power. Both denote the 
expression of freedom, combined with space being imperative for claiming political 
freedoms. She highlights “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, 
where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things, but to make their 
appearance explicitly” (pp. 198–99). Emphasising on ‘being seen’ by members of the 
political community, these acts can be viewed as both subjectively and politically 
empowering. Communities therefore use varying spatial strategies to be visible and to 
challenge and reshape the representation of space in the city.  
For instance, symbolic performances by identity groups have constructively 
utilised spatial strategies to gain cultural capital. Street performances by hijras (eunuchs) 
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are more than symbolic deconstructions of phallocentricism; they are aggressive claims 
on the heavily gendered nature of the public sphere (Lal, 2003). Similarly, Hindu 
nationalists have made popular the interpenetration of urban space through pilgrimage-
styled rath yatras (chariot processions) to capitalise on their religious support base and 
demonstrate majoritarian dominance (Deshpande, 1998). On the other hand, Dalits 
have relied on installing Ambedkar statues on village land and squares to claim access to 
land and visibility to counter caste-based exclusion and discrimination (Jaoul, 2007). 
These spatial strategies, mapping localities and neighbourhoods, aim to capitalise on in-
built intimacy and convert these into areas of political action and symbolic capital. 
Political subjects, through these spatial assertions, instantiate notions of participatory 
politics that have the potential to powerfully intervene in the neo-liberal imaginary of a 
passive ‘consumer’ subject. In this view, an act of performative citizenship displays 
freedom in its enactment and by ‘appearing’ disrupts the regimentation of this 
‘consumer citizen’55 (Ong, 2006). By creatively interrupting administered ordered spaces, 
these spatial assertions by groups activate ‘counter-spaces’ (Lefebvre, 1991) which 
challenge the homogeneity of the city.  
Lefebvre outlines counter-spaces as a powerful mediating spatial strategy, 
interrupting not just the established socio/spatial order, but also the field of perception. 
Subjects produce counter-spaces in opposition to statist allocation of an active space 
into an ‘abstract space’.56 These spaces emerge as alternate claim-making sites. In the 
case of symbolic mobilisations, they emerge as sites for collective claim-making or 
                                                 
55 Ong (2006) points to the intersection between citizenship practices and neo-liberalism, and how market 
rationalities define the domain of politics. The idea of a political citizen whose political rights have to be 
honoured by the state is reduced to a consumer citizen, who is further put under market rationalities and 
technologies of surveillance and control.  
56According to Lefebvre, ‘abstract spaces’ signify spaces that reify alienation both for the subject and in 
themselves yet also maintain some specific social relations such as state-constituted spaces which are 
bounded by instrumental manipulation. “It concerns the silence of the ‘users’ of this space” (Lefebvre, 
1991, p. 51). 
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political action, outside of institutionalised spaces, such as state institutions, and spilling 
into the streets, parks and squares.  
We can see how a counter-space can insert itself into a spatial reality: against the Eye 
and the Gaze, against quantity and homogeneity, against power and the arrogance of 
power, against the endless expansion of the private and of industrial profitability: and 
against specialised spaces and a narrow localization of function (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 
382). 
Through his conceptual framework of the counter-space, one can explain how occupation 
as a spatial strategy contributes to the creation of new political subjectivities. Spatial 
practices of occupying physical spaces disrupt the existing spatial and social hierarchy. 
Lefebvre highlights the relationship between “political projects and the obstacles they 
run into; that is to say, those forces that run counter to a strategy and occasionally 
succeed in establishing a counter-space within a particular space” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 
367). Zuccotti Park in the United States can also be considered a counter-space: it was 
occupied on 9th September 2011 by supporters of the Occupy Wall Street protest, which 
questioned the existing global economic order and the socio-economic inequalities that 
it perpetrates. Similarly, the occupation of the Ramlila Maidan by the supporters of the 
anti-corruption movement in 2011 in India emerges as a counter-space against the state 
and the political ruling class. 
Spatial strategies in symbolic mobilisation constitute new subjective positions, 
because it allows them to identify with a collective identity, make claims and re-signify 
the place. According to Lefebvre, individuals or groups cannot constitute themselves 
unless they produce their space; “trial by space’’ (1991, p. 416) is immanent. Explaining the 
political significance of space, he highlights that space represents the contradictions in 
the political arena, running in opposition to both the state and political parties which he 
termed ‘trial by space’. 
Ideas, representations or values which do not succeed in making their mark on space, 
and thus generate (or produce) an appropriate morphology, will lose all pith and 
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become mere signs, resolve themselves into abstract descriptions, or mutate into 
fantasies. (Lefebvre, 1991, pp. 416–417)  
As I show in the next chapter, Modi’s developmental politics agenda underwent ‘trial by 
space’ in his two constituencies of Vadodara and Varanasi. 
3.2 Symbolic Representation: Identity, Habitus and Political Action 
Performative actions have to ensure “equivalential logic” (Laclau, 2005, p. 70) to 
attain cohesiveness. Symbolic representation enables a link to be forged between 
identity and political action by working towards a uniform symbolic universe. Concerns 
of sameness/otherness between groups are forged through repertoires to establish a 
chain of equivalence. “The perpetuation of a threatened order can no longer rely on a 
purely differential logic; its success depends on the inscription of those differences 
within an equivalential chain” (p. 121). As Laclau argues, to bridge the difference 
between particularity and universalism the chain of equivalence is imperative; “It is 
because a particular demand is unfulfilled that with other unfulfilled demands a solidarity 
is established, so that without the active presence of the particularism of the link, there 
would be no equivalential chain” (2005, p. 120). In the political field, each group aims to 
create this chain of equivalence with its own repertoires to ensure cohesiveness. 
However, sometimes the repertoire tends to alienate rather than create 
cohesiveness. For instance, despite fasting as a mode of political action being strongly 
embedded in the Gandhian mode of protest, Mohanty (2011) argues that Anna’s fast 
during the anti-corruption protests was alienating for many sections of the Indian 
masses who were engaged at different levels of social movements and civil society 
mobilisations. The dominance of the right-wing and middle class aesthetics excluded 
many from its ambit. Thus the repertoire weaves in the ‘particular’ which motivates and 
appeals to few individuals, thereby instigating political action only amongst them and 
alienating the rest. The political field thus becomes a site of contest between multiple 
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repertoires constituting their respective dispositions and habitus. The following sub-
sections discuss theoretically the two crucial grids of symbolic representation – the 
symbolic habitus and the nature of political action. 
3.2.1 Political field: symbolic habitus 
The equivalence established in the political field is materialised within the 
symbolic habitus. From a symbolic politics perspective the conceptual lens of the 
habitus enables the decoding of symbolic identification, social practices and 
performative participation. The performative presence in the public sphere through 
grand spectacles and repertoires should be analysed for the nature of embodiment, 
dispositions and the overall habitus it activates. 
The habitus comprises shared symbols and their attendant dispositions. I 
employ symbolic habitus in a Bourdieusian sense to denote that, culturally, citizens and 
identity-based groups are constituted and structured by a symbolic universe which 
determines their dispositions, representations and respective symbolic capital. “The 
habitus is not only a structuring structure, which organizes practices and the perception 
of practices, but also a structured structure” (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 170). It can therefore 
be claimed that habitus not only allows the decipherment of possible patterns but also 
determines/conditions social practices. 
Because the habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products—thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions and actions—whose limits are set by the historically and 
socially situated conditions of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom 
it provides is as remote from creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from simple 
mechanical reproduction of the original conditioning. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 55) 
Dispositions within the habitus, according to Bourdieu, are not finite or bounded; there 
is scope for reshaping, orienting or challenging. For instance, performative acts of 
veiling/unveiling by Islamic women are significant shifts in the secular symbolic habitus 
(Mahmood, 2005; Secor, 2002; B. S. Turner, 2008).  
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Altered or creative use of symbols can be considered as a self-reflexive 
reinterpretation of the habitus or what Turner describes as “performative reflexivity’’,57 
implying a relative autonomy from the assumed determinism of the habitus. Applying 
Bourdieusian habitus to religious/race/caste identities allows the interrogation of their 
respective dispositions (symbols, bodily comportment and affiliations) and their varying 
complexities. The wearing of the headscarf is symbolic of Islamic faith and its visibility 
in a secular domain displays an assertion of faith. It also clearly demarcates spatial 
realms between the religious private and that of the secular public sphere. The 
performative act of veiling/unveiling is a powerful symbolic intervention demonstrating 
the complexity and reflexivity of dispositions within a secular habitus. The religious 
habitus of all faiths have their respective symbolic repertoires that rupture the secular 
dispositions. Göle (2002), interestingly, discusses the Kavakçi case in Turkey, wherein 
her decision to appear in Parliament wearing a headscarf was seen as a violation of the 
secular public sphere. “Kavakçı’s Islamic covering challenged the unwritten laws of the 
Parliament and enraged the deputies as well as (secular) public opinion” (p. 178). But 
Kavakçi’s act is also indicative of the possible reconfiguring of the religious habitus. In 
another context, the adoption of Buddhist symbolism by Dalits who have converted 
outside of Hinduism demonstrates the challenging of the religious/caste habitus. By 
adopting Buddhism, Tartakov (1990) highlights that Mahars58 and others inherited the 
vast repertoire of Buddhist imagery to assert their non-identification with Hinduism and 
its attendant casteist social order.  
                                                 
57 Performative reflexivity, according to Turner, is “a condition in which a sociocultural group, or its most 
perceptive members acting representatively, turn, bend, or reflect back upon themselves, upon the 
relations, actions, symbols, meanings, and codes, roles, statuses, social structures, ethical and legal rules, 
and other socio cultural components which make up their public ‘selves’” (1988, p. 24). 
58 Mahars are a Dalit community categorised as Scheduled Caste in Maharashtra, Mumbai, India. 
Following Ambedkar, a major section of the population converted to Buddhism. 
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The reflexivity within the existing symbolic habitus is explored for each of the 
three case studies in this thesis. The next section interrogates the degree of relative 
autonomy and self-reflexivity within a symbolic habitus in the political field.  
3.2.2 Political field: elite manipulation or co-constitutive representation? 
In existing scholarship, the relationship between politics and symbols is divided 
broadly between instrumentalists and constructivists. Instrumentalists perceive symbolic 
representation to be a top-down approach and manipulated, wherein the elites/leaders 
contrive to garner support for their agenda against the ‘other’ identity group. On the 
other hand, constructivists consider it to be a co-constitutive meaning-making process, 
with scope for enhanced subject formation. The instrumentalist perspective has some 
purchase but I use the constructivist approach to highlight its limitations. 
It will be useful to begin the discussion with the instrumentalist perspective as 
represented by the scholarly works of Lasswell, Edelman, Brass and Kertzer. The 
instrumentalists perceive symbolic participation to be contrived and regard political 
subjects as passive participants and consumers guided by the political elites. They are 
thus seen to lack agency in shaping the symbolic habitus. This perspective is often based 
on two fundamental guiding principles: first, identity as an essentialist and a bounded 
category, with rigid symbols and identity markers. Second, politics is understood as 
management of interests translating into a clear distinction between elite leaders and mass 
followers, wherein the elites contrive to produce a consensus.  
Political symbolism as a unit of analysis within politics was scientifically analysed 
by Lasswell (1932, 1950, 1971, 1977, 1986). Applying a psychoanalytical approach to 
politics, he opines that the “tripartite principle”59 can be an “extended analysis of 
policies and practices, doctrines, myths and legends. It is particularly promising when 
                                                 
59According to Lasswell (1932), psychoanalytically an individual’s personality exists on three levels – id 
(impulse), super-ego (conscience) and ego (reason), and these divisions correspond to individual, 
institutional and occasional relationships. 
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applied to the problem of social dynamics” (1932, p. 525). A person’s reaction pattern 
can be divided into “impulse, conscience and reason” and therefore the individual 
association with political institutions or cultural practices will be based on arousing 
these affective correlations. “The principle of tripartite division implies the principle of 
triple appeal as a method of political management” (p. 525). Especially in the context of 
political institutions and practices, the role of elite manipulations is paramount because, 
according to him, political symbols in actuality are alien to lived experiences of people 
and political movements are a result of the “displacement of private affects into public 
objects” (1986, p. 173). Consequently, the management of symbolism requires 
bifurcation of a symbolic universe into a matter of enlisting support or opposition. 
Thus, for the ‘master-symbols’ to come into existence in the political field, the role of 
elites becomes crucial because “this reinforcement and facilitation of the symbol 
involves the use of men of prestige in its advocacy, the assimilation of special economic 
and other group aims, and the invention of appeals to unconscious claims’’ (p. 189). 
Therefore, the role of the elite is to manipulate affect around a symbol so that its appeal 
reaches out to maximum number of members of the political community. 
Similar to Lasswell’s political management perspective, Edelman (1964, 1971, 
1988) highlights symbolism in politics by referring to political spectacles and ‘mass 
acquiescence’ and the role of elites in circulating them. He discusses mass acquiescence 
by distinguishing between ‘condensation symbols’ for the masses and ‘referential 
symbols’ among the elites. In his view, political elites create symbolic meanings by 
employing their power which ultimately limits the range of political discourse, 
manipulates public debate and manufactures whatever consensus emerges (1964). His 
argument that political elites are in a position to privilege one meaning over another can 
be applied to right-wing politics in India, but is limited. Specific symbols have marked 
the symbolic field for different phases of Hindutva mobilisation. The shift in their 
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agenda, from the emphasis on the construction of the Ram Temple at Ayodhya during 
the 1980s–1990s to the ‘trishul diksha’ campaign (Farooqui, 2003)60 in 2002 after the 
Gujarat pogrom, illustrate the point: the political elite brings into the political field those 
symbols and narratives which, according to them, would generate political mileage. 
It is the theory of elite competition as the basic dynamic which precipitates 
ethnic conflict for Brass (1991). He argues that an instrumentalist rather than 
primordialist approach serves to better explain the rise of Muslim separatism in South 
Asia. He describes how the symbol of the cow, Muslim personal law61 and the Urdu 
language were brought into mainstream political discourse by the Hindu and Muslim 
political elite for the self-definition of their respective groups and the rigid drawing of 
the boundaries for their communities. They became symbols of identity because, 
several elite groups, with the aid of the government, promoted them as such in their 
conflicts with each other. [For example,] [t]he cow was a symbol that could be used 
equally by orthodox Hindus defending traditional religious practices, by revivalist 
Hindu leaders who wished to promote a specifically Hindu form of Indian Nationalism. 
(Brass, 1991, pp. 78–79) 
Muslim political elites utilised the anti-cow slaughter movements to demonstrate that 
Muslims were being oppressed by the Hindu majority. Brass argues that the elite groups 
within an ethnic group play an important role in determining linguistic and cultural 
narratives to motivate relatively excluded masses. With his later work (1997), one could 
classify him as a constructivist. Through a rich ethnographic account of five events, he 
challenges the primordialist explanation of Hindu-Muslim violence.  
Shifting the focus from ethnic identity, Kertzer’s incisive work on the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) emphasizes political parties and their symbolism. Arguing 
                                                 
60 Post-Godhra Gujarat, distribution of trishuls (tridents) were undertaken by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP) in Gujarat and gradually spread to other states as part of their larger majoritarian politics. 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/ahmedabad/Trishul-diksha-to-continue-in-Gujarat 
VHP/articleshow/44105680.cms 
61 Muslims in India are governed by their ‘personal laws’ according to the Shariat – The Muslim Personal 
Law (Shariat) Application Act 1939. This law outlines matters governing marriage, succession, inheritance 
and charities among the community. 
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against rational choice, he states that “political perceptions...are symbolically 
constructed” (1998, p. 8). Despite tracing the role of the PCI’s symbolism, with the 
overemphasis on engineering from above, his analysis omits how people perceive, 
reinterpret or dismiss injunctions from above and discounts the possibility of the 
masses rejecting or accepting another symbolic universe.  
The dominant frame of the instrumentalists discussed above foregrounds elite 
manipulation and political management of the audience represented in the context of a 
symbolic mobilisation. This assumed passivity of symbolic representation echoes 
Pitkin’s formulation and approach to symbolic representation. Pitkin’s classic work is 
one of the earliest theorisations of the link between symbolism and representation. She 
emphasises that symbolic representation is guided by an ‘existential’ logic. 
Since the connection between symbol and the referent seems arbitrary and exists where 
it is believed in, symbolic representation seems to rest on emotional, affective, irrational 
psychological responses rather than on rationally justifiable criteria. (Pitkin, 1972, p. 
100) 
Symbolic representation is considered irrational and discussed within the framework of 
‘standing for’.62 She argues that, unlike descriptive representation, creating symbols is a 
matter of working on the minds of the people who are to accept it rather than on the 
symbol itself. Representation is reduced to a process of symbol-making, which is not “a 
process of rational persuasion, but of manipulating affective responses and forming 
habits” (1972, p. 101).  
Pitkin’s perspective underestimates the fact that representation is a two-way 
process involving the represented and that symbolic mobilisation creates the possibility 
for an identity to be constituted or enhanced. By contrast, Bourdieu and Laclau 
emphasise that the two-way nature of symbolic representation needs to be 
acknowledged to foreground the constituted nature of identities. “It is because the 
                                                 
62 In Pitkin's (1972) formulation, symbols ‘stand for’ as they are not actually there but yet claim to 
represent, differentiating from ‘act for’. 
94 
representative exists, because he represents (symbolic action), that the group that is 
represented and symbolized exists and that in return it gives existence to its 
representative as the representative of a group” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 204). Pitkin had 
raised an important question with reference to symbolic representation: “it is equally 
important to ask when they have good reasons for accepting a leader’’ (1972, p. 111), 
but it was based on an unidirectional understanding of representation. Therefore to 
highlight the inherent limitation of this enquiry Laclau poses a counter question, further 
probing whether the “validity of reasons precede representation or are constituted 
through representation” (2005, p. 160). By raising the aspect of new identities being 
constituted through symbolic representation he highlights the significance of the 
audience. Laclau is able to assess symbolic encounters with constitutive agential powers; 
which also effectively intervenes in the dominant discourse through symbolic 
participation and political action (see section 3.3). 
The constructivist perspective followed in this work can be credited with three 
important interventions. First, it operationalises the concept of identification rather than 
an essentialist understanding of ‘identity’. This assumes that cultural assertions, whether 
through symbols or otherwise, are not fixed and top-down but more complex with 
potential avenues for bottom-up subversive assertions. Second, by adopting a meaning-
making approach to symbols it dismantles the dichotomy between 
producers/consumers or elites/followers, thereby focusing on the co-constitutive 
nature of a symbolic habitus. Finally, the constructivist perspective also shifts the focus 
from the rational to the visceral and emotional in politics.  
For instance, drawing on the Indian anti-colonial legacy, civil disobedience 
mobilised millions, comprised a vast repertoire of symbolic leadership and 
representations and yet it was bottom-up in its evolution. Gandhi became, literally and 
metaphorically, the symbol of the anti-imperialist crusader embedded in bodily 
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enactment. Symbolic performative acts of fasting and civil disobedience became 
impactful tactics used by Gandhi during the nationalist struggle and part of the 
commonsensical mode of anti-colonial protests among the masses. “The fast was 
terribly public and deeply private, both a spectacle of suffering and a disciplinary 
mechanism to vanquish desire” (Rao, 2009, p. 164). However, by using press reports 
from the early 1920s, Amin (1984) reconstructs the peasant perception of Gandhi at 
that time. Here, one can see the agency of people in defining their leader and having an 
autonomous existence outside of the control of elite manipulation. The political 
subjectivity of the participants in accepting a particular narrative is equally crucial 
because certain discourses are empowered or sanctioned in the public arena while 
others are not. 
Constructivists Wedeen and Hansen challenge the idea that spectacular politics 
constitutes misled or duped subjectivities. This points to the limitations in the 
“framing’’ literature63 (Benford & Snow, 2000). Highlighting the relevance of frames, 
they emphasise the “degree of resonance”64 factor (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). 
Foregrounding performative politics, they both complicate compliance within a 
symbolic mobilisation and claim that it is a complex encounter with potential for 
subversion and transgression, thus giving more agential powers to the subjects. The 
everyday acts of transgression in the Syrian state under Asad’s regime are highlighted by 
Wedeen. Asad, she claims, uses “[s]pectacles such as opening festivals, referendum 
celebrations, and state holiday rituals [which] are orchestrated and attendance is 
generally enforced by regime officials” to instil obedience in the Syrian people (Wedeen, 
1999, p. 2). The ruled use varied forms of significations including films, jokes and plays 
                                                 
63 “Social movement scholars conceptualize signifying work or meaning constitution by employing the 
verb framing” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614)  
64 “The concept of resonance is relevant to the effectiveness or mobilizing potency of proffered framings, 
thereby attending to the question of why some framings seem to be effective or ‘resonate’ while others 
don’t” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 619). 
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to create “a transgressive counter culture that plays with the parameters of national 
membership” ( p. 89). 
Hansen (2002), analyses a series of violent public spectacles by Shiv Sainiks in 
Mumbai, India. He argues that by their actions they were able to assert plebeian 
subjectivity against the organised political order. Even more crucial is to understand the 
exercise of agency by communal subjects; by dismissing them as contrived, we are 
undermining both political practices that constitute these subjectivities and their 
experience of being self. Thus complicating the temporal and stable nature of 
subjectivity in the context of probing communal politics, he points out that “[o]ne 
needs to recognize that communal identities are not just effects of poisoning of the 
people by manipulators or criminals” (Hansen, 1999, p. 203). He implies thereby that 
Hindu communal subjects are the product of a particular majoritarian narrative that has 
been dispersed in the Indian public sphere historically since the nationalist struggle, 
along with the everyday encounters between Hindus and Muslims which are layered 
with mutual mistrust and misperceptions.  
The constructivist perspective asserts that subjectivity is not passive compliance, 
but a complex and dynamic process involving participation based on active identification. 
In my three case studies, I draw on the constructivists’ interpretation of subjectification 
as identification in the context of the symbolic mobilisations. More specifically, in these 
mobilisations, what we observe is subjects reclaiming and renewing their subjectivity, 
crucial to which is a bodily enactment within the public sphere which has implications 
for both cultural and political citizenship. Performative political action within 
identitarian politics has a potential for agential subject-formation. The next section 
analyses the extent to which this negotiation of the self through embodied participation 
and performance in symbolic mobilisation contributes to a ‘democratic’ political 
subjectivity. 
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3.3 Democratic Subjectivity, Performative Political Action and Symbolic 
Political Field 
The construction of a chain of equivalences out of a dispersion of fragmented demands 
and their unification around popular positions operating as empty signifiers, is not 
totalitarian but the very condition for the construction of a collective will which, in 
many cases, can be profoundly democratic (Laclau, 2005, p. 166). 
The decisive moment described by Laclau, is demonstrated effectively in 
Wedeen’s work on how the cult and spectacle both produce political power, yet also, 
paradoxically, invite transgressions. Performative political participation within a 
symbolic habitus (identity politics or social movements) raises vital questions for 
democratic theory. For instance, how does one account for the nature of subjectivity 
constituted through such participation? Can these identitarian assertions or claim-
making be considered democratic? My intention here is to outline what can be 
described as ‘democratic’ political subjectivity.  
For the purposes of this thesis, my account of democratic subjectivity applies 
Laclau’s conceptualisation of ‘identification’ in subject-formation to analyse political 
action within symbolic mobilisation. It is based on two foundational principles that 
guide this research. First, a non-essentialist understanding of identity enables the 
factoring in of space for the emergence of new claims and assertions. Laclau’s radical 
democratic theory involves the questioning and rupturing of the existing order; 
emphasising the importance of ‘dislocation’ within a social structure: “...rather it is 
merely a freedom of a structural fault which can only construct identity through acts of 
identification’’ (1990, p. 60). Second, the lens of ‘identification’ enables us to tease out 
democratic practices that lead to transition, sustenance and the renewal of political 
subjectivity. 
Returning to the earlier discussion around Pitkin’s uni-dimensional approach to 
symbolic representation, Laclau provides an alternative conception ascertaining the 
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importance of acts of political identification. While Pitkin’s view collapses all symbolic 
mobilisations with fascistic tendencies, Laclau’s conceptualisations of empty signifiers 
and chain of equivalence provide an empowering alternative. Detailed in his 1996 work, 
in the chapter on ‘Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics’ he explains that empty 
signifiers are the centre point around which the whole system revolves, leading to 
hegemonic stability or a unification that is overpoweringly dominant in the political 
field. Moreover, outlining the relevance of empty signifiers, he also identifies the two 
steps or phases in representation essential to symbolic representation, negating thereby 
passive subjectivity. The first movement (represented to representative) is established 
when the chain of equivalence enables identification. However this link cannot be 
autonomous: the empty signifier “is what constitutes that totality, thus adding a 
qualitatively new dimension” (2005, p. 162) leading to the second movement 
(representative to represented). Laclau’s two-way approach to symbolic representation 
corresponds therefore to the struggles of subjects with the lack in existing structures 
forcing them to re-identify them-selves.  
The potential for breakdown of signification occurs when hegemonic symbolic 
significations are challenged, allowing an alternative symbolic register to come into 
existence. Therefore, the contestation in the symbolic political field helps to discern 
shifts not only with reference to subjectification, but also overall democratic politics. 
Norval’s approach to Laclau’s theory of identification simplifies and breaks down the 
process into two phases: “[t]he first consists of the initial ‘take up’ of democratic 
subjectivity while the second emphasizes subsequent iterations of that ‘take up’, the 
repeated processes through which we reassert our identities as democratic subjects” 
(Norval, 2007, p. 15). The essential point being underscored here is sustaining 
democratic identification through reiteration.  
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Following Laclau, Hansen considers democracy as an exercise in political 
commensuration that provides equivalence between unlike persons, objects or qualities. 
For instance participation in symbolic performances by subalterns often is considered as 
counter-public assertion and therefore has potential for constituting democratic 
subjectivities. Hansen (1999, 2002) suggests that the extension of the language of 
democracy allowed the assertion of new and plebeian identities in the cases of the 
Hindu Right and the Shiv Sena. Both movements are illustrative of how the resultant 
subaltern subjectivities emerged as a counter to the older political culture and capitalised 
on the assertion of plebeian subordination combined with a strategy of political 
performance. Hansen (1999, p. 134) argues that multiple factors contributed to the 
emergence of the rise of the Hindu right wing forces including “majoritarian 
democracy”, “populist governmentality’’ and the generation of “new identity claims’’’ as 
a by-product of democratic interventions.  
The emergence of plebeian subjectivities may be considered as democratic to 
the extent that the assertion opened up claim-making to hitherto marginalised groups. 
Symbolic performative mobilisation thus brings hitherto depoliticised/apolitical groups 
into political engagement and activism thereby inculcating a potential for an empowered 
self with democratic consciousness. Performative action is representative of 
embodiment, a call to action reflecting political acts of identification, spatial assertion in 
non-institutionalised spaces along with presentation of self and claim-making. But, is 
this subaltern assertion enough to claim democratic subjectivity? According to the 
conception of the nature of subjectivity considered democratic as outlined so far, would 
the reiteration of violent and exclusive nationalism be considered problematic to a 
democratic conception of claim-making? For political analysis therefore, it is important 
to also make a distinction regarding the nature of political acts of identification, as both 
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democratic and undemocratic elements exist in a symbolic habitus complicating the 
nature of political subjectivity that is constituted.  
Therefore, the conception of ‘democratic’ political subjectivity views forging of 
demands as only the first aspect of identification (the first step). The political 
expression, reiteration and fostering of democratic values is also equally crucial (second 
step) for a ‘democratic’ political subjectivity, a distinction not sufficiently made in the 
constructivist scholarship. This framework also enables us to analyse subject-formation 
within symbolic mobilisation as having scope for reassertion, re-articulation or 
transgression from within the existing power relations. This understanding of 
democratic subjectivity is used to analyse the three cases of symbolic mobilisation 
chosen for the study.  
The following chapters analyse specific types of symbolic habitus and the nature 
of political subjectivity they constitute. The first case study in the next chapter 
scrutinises Modi’s mobilisation as Vikaspurush during the election campaign of 2014. 
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4 Performing Development: Modi as Vikaspurush (Development 
Man) 
4.1 Introduction 
“I bow before the people of Varanasi for having so much faith in me” (Modi, quoted in 
Rashid, 2014). 
Modi said this in his thanksgiving speech, delivered from a makeshift stage at 
the ghats. He performed the grand Ganga Arti65 at the famous Dashashwamedh Ghat in 
Varanasi after winning with a huge majority in the Indian general election of 2014 
(Rukmini, 2014).66 The prime minister-elect of a secular democracy expressing gratitude 
to the voters from a site of religious significance to the Hindu majority transformed a 
secular practice of oath-taking into an act of political ritual. At the culmination of a 
political campaign his gesture can be claimed to be symbolic action embedded in ritual.67  
The success of the ‘Modi wave’ is credited to the aggressive media campaigning 
and corporate financing. Scholars such as Jaffrelot (2013, 2015a, 2015b), Roy and 
Chakravortty (2015) and Ravinder Kaur (2015) point out that the overly personalised 
campaign, mediatised imaging and slogans underscored that the electorate were 
massively influenced by the campaign. Notwithstanding mediated populism and the 
corporate backing, the 16th May 2014 mandate and the campaign should be examined 
for other equally cogent factors such as its symbolic habitus and the BJP’s 
organisational foundations which ensured that support is translated into actual mandate.  
                                                 
65 An aarti is a spiritual Hindu ritual ceremony performed every evening on the banks of river Ganga. The 
prayer ceremony is performed with lit lamps and vocal chants from scriptures. 
66 On 16th May 2014, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition led by the BJP comfortably won 
282 Lok Sabha (LS) seats without depending on any allies, a gain of 166 seats. After Rajiv Gandhi’s win 
of 414 LS seats in 1984, this was the largest win by a single political party in a general election. It was also 
the first time that a party other than Congress had won a simple majority on its own; the 1997 Janata 
Party coalition was the first non-Congress political formation after the 1975–77 State of Emergency 
imposed under Indira Gandhi’s leadership because of ‘political instability’. 
67 Turner (1967) understood ritual as formal behaviour having reference to mystical beliefs and power 
wherein symbols reveal crucial social and religious values as well as playing a transformative role in 
impacting human attitudes and behaviour. I contextualise Modi’s symbolism within Turner’s conceptual 
framework of political rituals and pilgrimage in the construction of communitas. 
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The chapter argues that the political symbolism of Modi’s surajya (good 
governance) is embedded in the traditional political rituals of pilgrimage or yatra 
(procession) politics. The darshan visual practices accompanying it intervene in 
constituting a sacralised political field of perception and ethno-religious subjectivity. 
Despite mobilising embodied political participation, the mobilisation prevents 
transgressions, negotiations or challenges to a democratic subject formation, 
constituting instead an embodied ‘infantile’ subject. The analysis is divided into four 
sections. The first section on mapping spatial developmentalism discusses Modi’s politics of 
development and the construction of heterotopias of ‘real spaces’ in Vadodara and 
Varanasi. The next, on developmental matrix, analyses the symbolic habitus of Modi’s 
campaign in defining a techno-sacred turf. The discussion around the nature of political 
subjectivities constituted through this mobilisation is taken up next. Finally, the section 
on ‘Statue of Unity’ discusses symbolic contestation around Modi’s Patel statue 
campaign and the rupturing of Modi’s surajya narrative by Dalit counter mobilisation for 
an Ambedkar statue in Gujarat. 
Considerable scholarly research exists that investigates the relationship between 
Hindutva politics and its inherent symbolism in identity formation specifically 
concentrated around the Ram Janmabhoomi (Ram’s birth-site) campaign and the political 
subjectivities that the campaign constituted. The Hindu nationalist project has been 
explored incisively by scholars such as (Basu et al., 1993; Corbridge, 2000; Gopal, 1993; 
Jaffrelot, 1996; Ludden, 2005; Pandey, 1993), these works, though focusing on the 
communal subject formation, considered symbolism as a secondary phenomenon. By 
locating symbolic mobilisation as an inherent aspect of being political, this work 
mainstreams symbolic politics and participation as a primary unit of analysis.  
Building on them, but differing from instrumentalist approaches to communal 
self-formation, I follow Hansen (1999, 2002).The most influential analyses insightful for 
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this research were Davis’ 1996 Iconography of Rama’s Chariot and Kapur’s 1993 Deity to 
Crusader: the changing iconography of Ram. My work extends the meaning-making approach 
adopted in these texts. Since the late 1990s, many scholars have analysed Hindu 
nationalism outside of political strategies and communal politics, exploring the ideology 
as a mediating discourse, having a logic of diffused performative practices (Fuller, 1992; 
Hansen, 1999, 2002; Raminder Kaur, 2003). Fuller’s and Kaur’s work, for instance, 
analyse Ganesh Chaturthi (Ganesha’s Birthday) celebrations in Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra respectively to demonstrate the circulation of Hindu nationalist discourses 
and inscribe meaning to the festival’s practices. By analysing the performative essence 
of Hindutva politics in Modi’s election campaign and its practices, my work extends the 
scholarship of this academic re-orientation. Most crucially, my work extends and 
contributes to the analysis of the post-liberalisation phase of Hindutva practices 
(Fernandes, 2006; Rajagopal, 2001) that combines performative political action with 
visual practices to analyse the new phase of Hindu nationalism. 
On 26 May 2014, Narendra Modi became the prime minister of India. He is one 
of the rare chief ministers from the non-Congress party who have been re-elected twice 
in Gujarat. A Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) pracharak,68 he joined the ranks of the 
BJP in 1985. In 1998 he was promoted to the post of general secretary of the state BJP 
until he became the chief minister of the state in 2002. After years of being a political 
pariah because of his government's complicity in the 2002 pogrom against the Muslim 
minorities in the state of Gujarat, the eventual makeover to Vikaspurush (Development 
Man) transformed him into BJP’s candidate for the top post. There are two aspects to 
his electoral campaign.  
                                                 
68 The Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh (RSS) is the ideological and cultural mentor of its political wing, 
the BJP. Pracharak means a member/propagator of the organisation responsible for disseminating its 
ideology among the masses. There are clear established norms between the RSS and the party; members 
of the organisation are not supposed to interfere with party organisation unless required and appointed to 
do so. Modi was the regional organiser for the RSS from 1978 to 1985, and was overseeing areas of Surat 
and Vadodara, when he was officially moved and inducted into the BJP. 
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First, the agenda: this was the first big campaign for the BJP after the 
unsuccessful India Shining campaign of 2004, where politics of development and 
growth was emphasised with the tagline of “ache din aane wale hai” (Good days are 
coming). The combination of neo-liberalism and Hindutva has been a tried and tested 
formula for the BJP. The 2004 India Shining election campaign of the BJP was of a 
similar format – corporate money, high technology, catchy buzzwords and ‘feel good’ 
slogans. In the realm of formal electoral politics, the India Shining campaign gave much 
visibility to the new middle class consumer-citizen. “It represents an important instance 
of the ways in which the everyday practices, representations and the discourses of the 
new middle class can shape the more traditional realm of democratic and electoral 
politics although with unpredictable consequences” (Fernandes, 2006, p. 192). The 
election results, however, demonstrated that the voters clearly rejected the agenda and 
the idea of a shining India because they saw a deep discrepancy with their lived 
experiences: “[a]s with many of the early overestimations of India’s ‘200 million strong’ 
middle class, the BJP’s campaign in effect mistakenly cast the shine of the new Indian 
middle class dream as a national reality” (Fernandes, 2006, pp. 86–87). 
The clear rejection of the economic dream bubble aside, it was also a mandate 
against the divisive and communal politics of the BJP. After the Gujarat pogrom of 
2002, the general election of 2004 was the first test case with regard to going to people 
to seek votes. The misfit of ‘India Shining’ was combined with the backdrop of the 
state-sponsored attacks on the Muslim minorities in Gujarat. The 2004 people’s 
mandate was applauded for the fact that they chose pluralism and democratic ethos and 
rejected divisive politics and the symbolism of a shining India. However, in 2014, the 
agenda of an all-inclusive ‘sabka saath sabka vikas’ (together with all, development for all) 
and a floating signifier in Modi as the harbinger of hope and change had an appeal 
among the masses. At the level of political subjectivities, as the chapter will 
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demonstrate, the 2014 mandate reflected an acceptance of Moditva’s everyday 
symbolism and practices deeply rooted in majoritarianism and neo-liberal aspirational 
politics.  
Narendra Modi claimed that he would replicate at the national level what he had 
achieved in Gujarat in terms of development (vikas), and began his campaign for the 
prime ministership soon after he won the state election for the third time in December 
2012. (Jaffrelot, 2015a, p. 151) 
Second, the specific nature of the 2014 campaign itself, which was personality 
driven. Jaffrelot’s (2013) scholarship has argued that Modi’s election campaigns have 
followed a certain pattern of high tech populism within Gujarat, and 2014 was an 
extension of the same strategies at the national level. I demonstrate, based on my 
fieldwork, that while there was some continuity, Modi had to significantly alter his 
agenda of Vikas for a pan-India audience, starting with his first decision to pick two 
Lok Sabha constituencies – Vadodara and Varanasi – to contest the elections. The 
analysis in this chapter uses the analytical frame of yatra politics and darshan visual 
practices to scrutinize Modi’s Vikaspurush campaign. The next section maps the spatial 
dimension of Modi’s politics of development across the two parliamentary 
constituencies. 
4.2 Mapping Spatial Developmentalism: From Vadodara to Varanasi 
This section analyses the spatial dimension of Modi’s politics of development by 
reformulating Hindutva’s spatial strategies of pilgrimage and yatra politics69 (Davis, 1996; 
Deshpande, 1998; Jaffrelot, 2009); it argues that both sites unfold as ethno-religious 
heterotopias70. With respect to politics of development, these sites emerge as counter-
                                                 
69 Jaffrelot (2009), applies Turner’s anthropological analysis of pilgrimage to the analysis of Hindutva 
politics to argue that Hindu nationalism has used both the dimensions of ‘communitas features’ and 
‘territorial symbolism’ as a spatial strategy for its communal agendas. 
70 Foucault defines heterotopias as “such spaces that have the curious property of being in relation with 
all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the set of relations that they 
happen to designate, mirror, or reflect” (Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986, p. 24). 
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sites of real spaces – with Gujarat becoming ‘India’s development hub’ and Varanasi 
evolving as a ‘heterotopia of compensation’71 – a site to be made as perfect as Gujarat. 
4.2.1 Developmental rituals: Vadodara, of spectacular summits and the yatras 
Bhayion aur behno…desh aazad hua toh hamein swarajya mila…itne saal ho gaye lekin 
yeh desh surajya ke liye taras raha hain…Desh ko surajya kahin nazar nahi aa raha 
hain....’72 
[Brothers and sisters, when the country became independent we got self-governance, 
but it has been so many years and we are still craving for good governance, the country 
cannot see any good governance around.] 
In Modi’s public meeting held at Pavi Jetpur, he described his 2014 election 
campaign as ‘Surajya nu Andolan’ (Movement for Good Governance).73 In the narrative 
above he compares ‘surajya’ and ‘swarajya’ (self-rule) to draw a parallel between the 
British colonial rule and Congress. He asserted that India achieved swarajya when the 
colonisers left, but good governance was yet to be attained and that would be possible 
only by getting rid of Congress. His contention was based on Congress’s indictment in 
various corruption scandals in its last term in office, along with absence of successful 
policy making. On the other hand, Modi’s claim to fame was the success of the Gujarat 
growth model, based on his idea of Surajya (good governance), which transformed the 
state of Gujarat into the most sought after state for investment. Therefore, the agenda 
of good governance dominated Modi’s 2014 election campaign. 
In the post-liberalisation era, the investment-friendly image of any federal state 
has become the symbolic reference point for claims to a growth-led economy. The most 
obvious example is Chandrababu Naidu, former chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. In 
the heydays of liberalisation Naidu became the representative face of new federal 
leadership in attracting foreign capital which played an important role in Hyderabad 
                                                 
71 According to Foucault, “Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another 
real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled. This 
latter type would be the heterotopia, not of illusion, but of compensation” (Foucault & Miskowiec, 1986, 
p. 27). 
72 Field notes: Modi’s speech, Vikas rally, 29th September 2013, Rohini, New Delhi. 
73 Field notes: Modi’s speech in the public meeting, 26th April 2014, Pavi Jetpur, Gujarat. 
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evolving into an IT (Information Technology) hub both nationally and globally. It is 
this trend that is mainstreamed and magnified with Gujarat under the leadership of 
Modi. The most crucial turnaround for Gujarat as a safe haven for investments 
nationally took place during the controversy over the Tata plant in Nandigram (West 
Bengal).74 Tata Motors was immediately provided with an alternative site in Sanand 
(Gujarat) to set up its Nano car manufacturing facility by the then Chief Minister Modi 
in 2008. “Praising Modi for speedy allocation of about 1,100 acres of centrally located 
land, Tata said the company had a great deal of urgency in having a new location and 
was driven by the reputation of the state” (PTI, 2008). Gujarat’s investment-friendly 
reputation can be traced back to specific economic policies that were undertaken by 
Modi from 2001-2014. The neoliberal economic policies combined with Gujarati sub-
nationalism enabled the state of Gujarat to establish itself as the developmental hub of 
India (Jaffrelot, 2015b; Sud, 2012, 2008). 
The reputation building involved politically and culturally projecting Gujarat as a 
state which prioritised economic growth. After 2002, the symbolic universe of Gujarat’s 
politics was ‘Modi-fied’ on two axes – first, Modi’s christening as Vikaspurush and second, 
the narrative of Gujarati asmita (pride) (Jaffrelot, 2013, 2015b, 2016; Sud, 2012). The 
enmeshing of ethno-religious identity with neo–liberal politics became the foundation 
for Modi’s ‘theatre state’75 as the developmental agenda was implemented through yearly 
rituals. These statist political rituals involve practices and programmes of performing 
development through material and welfarist redistribution. Further, by evolving 
demarcated repertoires for different social classes, the bureaucratic rational machinery 
of the state under Modi’s developmental politics is made visible and operational for the 
                                                 
74 The issue relates to the withdrawal of the land allotted to Tata Motors (for the Nano Car Plant in 
Singur) by the CPI (M) government in 2006 by the Supreme Court on the charges of illegal acquisition. 
Further details can be found at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/Singur-land-
acquisition-issue-timeline/article14599981.ece 
75 A term coined by Geertz (1980) to describe the nature of the state in Balinese Negara that relied on 
spectacular performances and rituals. 
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citizen-subject to see. They are the ritual idioms through which the relationship between 
the state and its subjects are forged symbolically, as the reliance on the spectacular 
defines the hierarchy of power of the state seeing and being seen by its subjects. 
The spectacular rituals of the developmental state, ranging from the ‘Vibrant 
Gujarat’ summits to the various yatras and melas (fairs), accomplish two important 
objectives. First, they serve the purpose of the regeneration and dispersal of the idea of 
the success of the Gujarat Model. Second, they enabled the circulation of the narrative 
of a unified Gujarati community. The reiteration of yearly rituals by showcasing a 
preferred reading and vision of development ensured the constant presence of the 
Gujarat state apparatus’s bureaucracy in the public sphere amongst the people, forging 
continuity in the encounter with the state structures, beyond elections. Furthermore, 
they diffused Modi in people’s every day, making him and the state dominate the 
political visual field. The presence of the state machinery (all bureaucrats) for all state 
events across different levels – block, district or state with the presence of the Chief 
Minister made development an active happening. 
Instead of a fundamental shift from state-led development orientation to market-led 
liberalisation, Gujarat demonstrates thwarted developmentalism giving way to 
politicised liberalisation, with an embedded state providing continuity between the 
phases. (Sud, 2012, p. 10) 
The embedded state outlined by Sud above is performed by organising large-scale 
spectacular public events to make the masses aware of different government 
programmes. For instance, the appeal of the Vibrant Gujarat summits, Garib Kalyan Melo 
(Fair for the Welfare of the Poor), Krishi Mahotsav (Farmers’ Fest) and Shala Praveshotsav 
(Annual School Enrolment Drive) lies in their symbolism, spectacularity and visibility. It 
also merges sacralisation with ethno-religious values of Hindutva and Gujarati sub-
nationalism with these developmental practices.  
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The Vibrant Gujarat summits, held biannually since 2003, aim to create a 
business-friendly atmosphere within the neoliberal framework which, it was hoped, 
would transcend the ‘riot-prone’ image of Gujarat after the 2002 pogrom. The six 
summits held so far have played an important role in creating Gujarat’s transition from 
the investor-friendly to India’s developmental hub. As advocated by the government itself, 
“the brand ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ [which] began as an ‘investors’ summit’ has now evolved 
into an ideal platform for knowledge sharing, social and business transformation’’ 
(Investors’ Ready Reckoner, 2015). Under this regime, the pattern for economic 
planning shifted to private capital and investment-led growth in an effort to showcase 
the state as the best and safest place to invest capital. “The largest Indian companies 
have all invested in Gujarat more than before under Modi and their CEOs have been all 
praise for him during the recent meetings of ‘Vibrant Gujarat’, an annual function he 
had initiated” (Jaffrelot, 2013, p. 81). This strategy was premised on a state-guaranteed 
package including good governance, benefits and concessions for investors in terms of 
a fiscal and infrastructural support base, combined with capitalising on the mercantilist 
ethos of Gujaratis.  
However the practices and values underlying the buoyancy of Vibrant Gujarat 
summits are enmeshed in an innate Gujaratiness of mercantilist ethos and Hinduness. 
Nirankar, a middle-class financial advisor who deals in the share market, describes his 
experience with and explanation for the success of the Gujarat model: “Jahan pe risk ka 
appetite zyada hoga vahan pe Gujarati zaroor hoga that is a fact hamare yahan risk ka appetite bahut 
zyada hai particular to Gujarati people”76 [Wherever there is an appetite for risk-taking, there 
you will surely find a Gujarati; that is a fact. Here, there is an appetite for risk-taking and 
it is particular to Gujarati people]. The state also adheres to the convention of following 
the Hindu calendar when planning major events. Both the hallmarks of the Gujarat 
                                                 
76 Interview with Nikhil Nirankar, 8th June 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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model, the Vibrant Gujarat summit and the International Kite festival, are held during 
the Uttarayan season.77 Sud (2012) also highlights that the marketing of the Vibrant 
Gujarat summit and other such events is premised on the mercantile Hindu traditions 
of religious blessings for wealth creation. Both events are marketed on a large scale and 
organised spectacularly, weaving in the local with the global, economically and 
culturally. In a similar vein, Mehta and Mehta (2013) draw attention to the mobilisation 
around the Narmada Dam project during the 1990s when special garbas78 were written 
during the popular festival of Navratri79 in support of the dam.  
The Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as exclusive enclaves of neoliberal sites 
became the spatial location for this growth model, redefining visually the representative 
shift from Nehruvian townships to zones. The combination of sub-nationalism and 
Hindutva transformed Gujarat as a spatial site, representing what I term as Hindu-
Gujarati exceptionalism. On one hand, these summits and events are part of performing 
the growth story for the elite, aspirational urban middle classes in Gujarat; on the other 
hand, one observes that schemes and programmes initiated for the rest of the masses 
have a different format altogether, although they are still defined by spectacularity.80 For 
instance, Modi started the Garib Kalyan Melo in (2009), a yearly re-distribution fair 
wherein beneficiaries of various government schemes, including Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) and Above Poverty Line (APL) members, widows, students, farmers and tribal 
populations are given aids such as bicycles or LPG gas cylinders depending on the 
provisions of each government schemes/programme from a stage set up for these 
events in each identified locality (Narendra Modi, 2012). The intention is to remove 
                                                 
77 Uttarayan, a Sanskrit term, is considered an auspicious period in the Hindu calendar for good health and 
wealth creation.  
78 Garba (womb) is a folk dance form from Gujarat; it represents life. 
79 Navaratri (Nine Nights) is a Hindu festival. 
80 Field note: 3rd June 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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middle-men and check corruption by ensuring people get benefits directly and are 
updated on different government schemes.  
However, observing two of the schemes (Krushi Mahotsav and Shala Praveshotsav) 
in action during the fieldwork deconstructs the narrative of Gujarat’s vibrancy.81 At the 
inauguration both events required the full state administration, from the chief minister 
to the district administration, to be present to deliver the incentives directly to the 
people. The Krushi Mahotsav was held in Chhota Udepur district inaugurated by 
Anandiben, the current chief minister of Gujarat.82 Under this programme, a mobile 
exhibition, ‘Krushi Rath’, which involves a van customised into a chariot format, visits 
every village.83 Experts accompanying the Rath cater to issues concerning farming 
problems and also advise and assist farmers by distributing free kits and giving 
technology-related training. On the other hand, the Shala Praveshotsav was introduced to 
counter the problem of school drop-out rates among children; aimed at encouraging 
parents to send their children to primary school every year, it takes place for three days 
in June across localities and villages. Attending one of these praveshoutsavs events at a 
primary school in Behrampura, one observes that the administrative wing of the 
government and the political wing of the BJP party work together to build confidence 
among the people.84 It is interesting to observe this public function at a lower middle 
class Muslim locality. Solanki, a member of the BJP, commented on the relevance of 
holding such events in areas like Behrampura:  
When we go to programmes like praveshoutsav, along with Indian IAS (Indian 
Administrative Service), IPS (Indian Police Service) officers and MLA (Member of 
Legislative Assembly), there is an atmosphere that gets created. The government gives 
gifts to small kids, school bags and books are given and some toys are also given. 
                                                 
81 Field note: 3rd June 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
82Field note: 3rd June 2014, Chota Udepur, Gujarat. Modi started the practice of organising the annual 
Mahotsav in 2005. 
83 Rath yatra: a strategy used by the BJP during their overtly religious Ayodhya campaign in 1990. In 
Hinduism, the term rath yatra stands for “processions with chariots that punctuate the life of all sacred 
places” (Jaffrelot, 2009, p. 11).  
84 Field note: 20th June 2014, Behrampura, Ahmadabad. 
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Before, kids use to cry while coming to school but now they come with a smile. Most 
of the people in this area are lower middle class, so for them it is good; now more kids 
come to school, now the condition for education is much better than before.85 
Solanki’s explanation above highlights two aspects – the nature of governmental 
benevolence and correspondingly the nature of need-based subjectivities that are 
constituted through such redistributive schemes. While some parents appeared to be 
exhibiting both a feeling of awe and assurance and the children were excited at receiving 
gifts (new school bags, notebooks and toys), the school administration appeared to be 
alert and occupied in ensuring that the function went well and as planned. Conversing 
with the teachers in charge of organising this annual function, I detected a general lack 
of enthusiasm for the initiative. The audience consisted of a few parents and some 
senior students as spectators, seeing the state performing development.86 The patronage-
based redistributive model is not new to the country’s existing overall developmental 
paradigm or to Gujarat. However, what is specific to the Gujarat model are the 
sacralised spectacular dimension-reiterating yearly rituals combined with raths (chariots), 
yatras and utsavs (celebrations).87  
The spatial strategy adopted by the state for rural material redistribution also 
engulfs the secular state’s bureaucratic realm of development. A quick glance at the 
Gujarat government’s websites and various flagship programmes and policies targeting 
different social groups reveals a universe of utsavs and melas, Sanskritised naming 
practices combined with incorporating Hindutva spatial strategies of pilgrimage for their 
dissemination (Deshpande, 1998; Jaffrelot, 2009). For instance, through the Krushi Raths 
discussed above, they capitalise on yatras (processions) as a spatial strategy for 
developmental politics. Unlike the BJP strategy of exploiting the politics of pilgrimage 
for the communal agenda (i.e. the Ayodhya agitation), under Modi’s Gujarat we see the 
                                                 
85 Interview with Arjunbhai Solanki, 20th June 2014, Behrampura, Ahmadabad. 
86 Field note: 20th June 2014, Behrampura, Ahmadabad. 
87 For instance, during the Narmada Dam mobilisation perform the ‘Mahasangam’ [confluence] and a puja 
of the Saraswati and the Narmada rivers with some 1500 sadhus (saints) (Dasgupta, 2005). 
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reverse. Pilgrimage spatial strategies are employed with two objectives – first, making 
the material-need satisfaction performative for the masses as part of visualising the 
growth story. Second, capitalising on the urban lower classes and rural neighbourhoods 
and giving these groups an impression that they, too, are being taken care of by the 
state. Behrampura and Chhota Udepur are performing the ‘dotted line effect’ 
(Deshpande, 1998), of being those sites where the vibrancy of the neo-liberal economic 
growth has not reached. The rural and urban divide coincides with the class dynamics 
underlying BJP electorates. The discriminatory nature of the differing performance of 
developmental practices across urban and rural areas helps the state to bridge the gap 
between the social classes. The urban vibrant model ensures that the interests of “upper 
caste dominated middle class and the OBC dominant ‘neo-middle’ class” (Jaffrelot, 
2015b) are fulfilled, whereas, the rural and semi-urban areas are pulled into the growth 
story through the dotted line approach mainly targeting Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims.  
In Gujarat, I argue, Modi re-interprets the yatra spatial strategy so deeply 
entrenched in religious and communal politics for the secular realm of development. 
Moreover, these sites of authoritative state presence and yearly reiteration of 
developmental rituals also circumscribe spaces of claim-making, discursively and 
visually. Modi’s idea of good governance is beyond contestation and hence makes an 
alternative narrative to the Gujarat model invisible in its discourse while also defining 
the citizen-subject that the state benefactor is willing to see. The Narmada Dam 
mobilisation88 and the anti-Muslim pogrom in 2002 display these blind spots – the 
Gujarat model’s refusal to acknowledge dissent and non-Hindus. The surajya model 
                                                 
88 The Sardar Sarover Dam project on the Narmada River was claimed to be beneficial for Gujaratis on 
the grounds that it would provide water for drinking and irrigation purposes. However, there were issues 
of tribal displacement, environmental violations and funding as raised by the NBA (Narmada Bachaco 
Andolan) (Movement to save Narmada) led by social activist Medha Patker. It is also interesting to note 
that the foundation for this dam was laid by Sardar Patel, during his time as the deputy prime minister in 
the 1960s. https://indianexpress.com/article/research/a-short-history-of-the-sardar-sarovar-dam-on-
river-narmada-4847807/ 
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premises itself on the ‘state seeing and being seen by the citizens’, in the process reducing 
citizen-subjects to mere need-based consumers. The performative imperative of these 
developmental rituals gives the impression of an all-providing benevolent state, but 
activates the participation of people as sacralised spectators. Gujarat, spatially, 
discursively and symbolically, represented a heterotopia of sacralised developmental 
zone by reiterating the growth story and ensured unity between the social classes 
through spectacular ethno-religious rituals. Post-election Modi’s model of development 
was the archetype for pan-India but its most immediate roadmap was for Varanasi.  
4.2.2 Replicating the smart city: Varanasi – of sacred geography and the 
Gujarat model 
I hope God grants me the power to serve this city and the tehzeeb (culture). I hope it 
[Varanasi] attains the status of the spiritual capital of the world. (Modi, quoted in 
Ramachandran, 2014) 
When I took over as CM [chief minister] in 2001, the condition of Sabarmati was 
similar. Switch to 2014 and things are very different! We have brought water from the 
Narmada and now water flows through the Sabarmati. A world-class Sabarmati River 
Front was created, which has emerged as a popular recreation and cultural spot in 
Ahmadabad. This is what we intend to replicate in Varanasi. (Modi, quoted in Jishnu, 
2014) 
Varanasi, as Modi’s second constituency, both in its turf and tasks was a 
different site to Vadodara. For Modi, besides making a comeback for the BJP into the 
electoral race of UP, it involved appropriating Varanasi to mirror the Gujarat model. 
Modi’s agenda for Varanasi, aimed to transform the spiritual capital of India into a 
‘smart city’. After filing his nomination, Modi said he envisioned “the holy city as a 
‘World Heritage Site’ that is able to draw both devotees and those who wish to 
understand and absorb India’s culture” (Kumar, 2014). The Hindutva spatial strategy 
informing the economic design of the smart city was to exploit the cosmic and darshan 
practices deep-seated in Varanasi.  
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The BJP’s separate manifesto for Varanasi (Varanasi Ghoshna Patr) clearly 
outlined the economic roadmap for revamping it into a smart city focusing on “revival 
and development of sarv-vidya (all kinds of knowledge); sarv kaushal (all types of skills); 
paryatan (tourism); improving weavers’ lot and, roads and sewers in the city” (ENS, 
2014b). The manifesto aimed to reach out to all interests and sections of the local 
population, including striking a balance between spiritual and economic needs. The 
responses from the people wove the satisfaction of material needs with one’s divine 
duty. Most of my Hindu respondents raised issues of roads, electricity, tourism and 
cleaning the Ganga (River Ganges) as their main concerns.89 Manisingh, a resident of 
Benares working in the BHU, who joined the BJP campaign in their IT cell pointed out: 
Employment needs to be created here: weavers need to be given facilities, the condition 
of electricity is very bad, tourism needs to be promoted and there is also a matter of 
faith…We don’t refer to Ganga as just Ganga, we say Mother Ganga and so there are 
lots of rites associated with it – prayers, recitals, fasts and festivities… There are many 
aspects of faith here…Banaras [Varanasi] is at the height of filth, so the first thing that 
needs to be done is the cleaning of Mother Ganga – so livelihood, employment, 
tourism and cleaning of Mother Ganga.90 
Varanasi is interruptive of ordinary time and everyday space as it combines 
sacred space and rituals with the politics of development. This time, the spatial location 
selected by Modi and the BJP was real and actual unlike the utopian spatial ideal in 
Ayodhya during the Ram Temple campaign. The cultural-temporal timelessness and 
pilgrimage politics combines in a concrete sense here. Highlighting the significance of 
Varanasi as the centre of Hindu tradition, Eck (1983, p. 6) wrote, “There are few cities 
in India as traditionally Hindu and as symbolic of the whole of Hindu culture as the city 
of Benaras [Varanasi]”. Going beyond the religious and the cultural, the city also has 
implications for the kind of visual practices embedded in it. “Hindus, however, the city 
they see is not only the city that meets the eye; it is also the city that engages the 
                                                 
89 Field note: 3rd May 2014, Varanasi, UP. 
90 Interview with Drighvendu Manisingh, 6th May 2014, BJP office, Varanasi, UP. 
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religious imagination” (p. 22). By invoking Varanasi the sacralised Hindu subjects are 
being invited to a developmental cosmos and thus also constituting a sacred political 
subject. The riverfronts, and the practices of ritual bathing and cremation gave this site 
an exclusive Hindu claim based on “sacred sightseeing” (p. 20). Just before filing his 
nomination papers on 24 April 2014 Modi said, “First I thought the BJP sent me here, 
then I thought I am going to Kashi, but after I came here, I feel Maa Ganga has called 
me. I feel like a child who has returned to his mother’s lap” (Modi, quoted by 
Ramachandran, 2014). The reverence to the Ganga as the mother and the goddess plays 
a unifying role amongst all Hindus; “the Ganges carries an immense cultural and 
religious meaning for Hindus of every region and every sectarian persuasion” (Eck, 
1983, p. 214). Although capitalising on Varanasi as a Hindu cosmic land underscored 
the narrative around the smart city project, the road show (campaign parade) clearly 
exhibited the overt caste-based consolidation. 
The stated developmental objective of transforming Varanasi into a high-tech 
smart city seemed to be completely sidelined as Modi’s road show began, after the 
filling of the nomination papers, from BHU. The city was painted in the typical saffron 
hue, marigold garlands, party flags, Modi masks and caps. A spectacular pilgrimage 
journey, Modi garlanded statues of Congress leaders along the pre-decided route, 
appropriating them into his majoritarian discourse. The performativity and symbolism 
of this usurpation unmasked the veneer of political balance that the BJP was trying to 
project – that they were centrist, while continuing to be hardcore national chauvinist 
and targeting a social unity along caste lines. The statues of leaders who were chosen to 
be part of this rally were hard-line Hindu chauvinist leaders whose legacy Modi wanted 
to appropriate. The road show mainstreamed the historical opposition lineage on the 
Hindu right that challenged the dominance of the Nehru-Gandhi leadership in India’s 
political historiography. 
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Starting from BHU, the first statue that Modi garlanded was of Madan Mohan 
Malviya, the founder of the university. Malviya, “the principal opponent of the Nehrus 
in the United Province” (Jaffrelot, 2003a, p. 54) belonged to an upper caste Brahmin 
family and was instrumental in the creation of an aggressive Hindu political identity 
during colonial rule. Malviya established BHU in 1915 in reaction to the establishment 
of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). He had initiated a campaign for a Hindu 
university to be set up with Hindi as its medium of instruction, against the backdrop of 
the campaign establishing Hindi as the national language. “Malviya was unequivocally 
committed to the promotion of the formula ‘Hindi, Hindu, and Hindustan’ and the 
assertion of Hindu culture” (Hansen, 1999, p. 76). He activated a Hindu political 
identity and played an active role in ultimately setting up with Lala Lajpat Rai the Hindu 
Mahasabha in 1915. From honouring an aggressive Hindutva nationalist in Malviya, the 
next two leaders in line to be garlanded evidently displayed BJP’s perspective towards 
the Muslim ‘other’.  
Vallabhbhai Patel’s statue has had multiple levels of signification; known as the 
Sardar (supremo), he played an important role in the national integration of the country 
and thereby earned the title of the ‘Iron Man of India’. He worked to convince the 
princely states to be part of the Indian union and, without his negotiations it was 
entirely possible that the three states of Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad would not 
have joined. Hyderabad’s unification had a crucial dimension with regard to the Nizam’s 
(the monarch of the princely state of Hyderabad) defeat and the climax of Patel’s 
victory. “It was also the culmination of the process of history that brought Muslim rule 
over a Hindu majority to an end” (R. Gandhi, 1990, p. 485). Through the lens of 
Hindutva politics, Patel is revered for his role in ensuring an undivided India – the 
Akhand Bharat (Integrated India). As the deputy prime minister, Patel was a strong critic 
of Nehruvian socialistic developmental strategy on land redistribution, property rights 
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and planning. He supported individual rights, private property and “opposed the 
creation of the planning commission” (Jaffrelot, 2003a, p. 45). He is also representative 
of the Hindu-Gujarati exceptionalism that Modi capitalised on to galvanise the upper 
caste Patel community to support him. The implication of appropriating Patel for his 
ethno-religious and caste-oriented benefits will be taken up in detail (see section 4.5). 
This was followed by the statue of Vivekananda, who was known for his 
interfaith awareness and dissipating Hinduism onto the world stage. His writings were 
influential in positing the spiritual superiority of Hinduism over all other faiths. 
“Vivekananda’s philosophy and practice thus represented a step toward the 
transformation of Hinduism from a signifier of religious faith to one of nationalist 
ideology” (Hansen, 1999, p. 70). Besides according a superior position to Hinduism, his 
ideas of tolerance and cultural syncretism showed an upfront disdain to Islam. 
Tolerance and inclusiveness were portrayed as the essence of true Hinduism whereas 
Vivekananda perceived Islam to be “doctrinal and intolerant” (p. 70). Weaving in 
Vivekananda thus represents an abstraction and the dispersal of Hinduism as a spiritual 
and cultural faith rather than a majoritarian religion. This was similar to Modi’s practice 
in Gujarat of making Gujarati-Hindu exceptionalism the standard norm while reducing 
the Islamic faith and its followers to second-class citizens. Finally, having symbolically 
co-opted the upper castes and signalling assimilation to Muslims, Ambedkar was next in 
line. It is imperative for Hindutva politics and the BJP to reach out to the Dalit 
constituency to ensure a Hindu unity against the Muslim ‘other’. However, the 
discussion on the controversy around the Patel vs. Ambedkar statue politics in Gujarat 
(discussed in section 4.5) spells out the upper caste rigidity of the Hindu right. The 
performative act of garlanding statues symbolically represented a tightrope walk 
between Sanskritisation and social engineering for the BJP. Modi’s developmental 
cosmos gains the strong Hindutva foundation of social engineering by this subtle 
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balance between caste and class pushing aside the politics of development. Moreover, 
all the statue of leaders chosen for appropriation, despite belonging to the Congress 
party of the post-Independence era, had challenged the Gandhi-Nehru legacy.  
However, despite all the efforts by the BJP and Modi’s show of strength 
through the carefully routed road show to capitalise on sacredness and pilgrimage 
politics, Varanasi, with its syncretism and its politics challenged the appropriation 
symbolically and politically. The emergence of political opposition in the AAP under the 
leadership of Kejriwal provided an alternative symbolic register and discourse for the 
masses. BHU, the hub of political mobilisation during the campaign, was transformed 
into a contested terrain; it was not only where Modi’s mobilisation started but was 
equally vigorously utilised by the AAP to provide an alternate agenda of good 
governance and secularism. Visually, the saffron wave was challenged by the AAP 
rallies, jan sabhas, jhadoos and topis on the streets and alleys of Varanasi. Besides the field 
of perception, the visible Muslim minority presence in the AAP campaigns was 
demonstrative of this possible political option, an opportunity that was absent in 
Vadodara. The BJP agenda and their manifesto did try to target and attract the bunkers 
(weaver community) who are predominantly Muslim into their fold, but despite Modi’s 
attempts, the Muslim population asserted their antipathy towards him electorally and 
symbolically in Varanasi as I discuss later. Varanasi as a sacred site was assumed to fit 
comfortably into the BJP’s electoral plan; interestingly, existence of an oppositional 
symbolic mobilisation by the AAP made it a more contested site by challenging the 
rather circumscribed nature of Hinduism represented by the symbolic habitus of Modi 
and the BJP. Unlike in Vadodara, the AAP nurtured the syncreticism of Varanasi to 
enable political subjectivities on the margins to assert themselves. 
The next section takes the discussion forward by analysing the symbolic habitus 
that defines Modi’s election campaign. 
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4.3 Developmental matrix: Of darshan, it’s all about seeing 
 
Figure 4.1: Vijay Shankhnand Rally, Lucknow, UP91 
Modi at Lucknow rally:  
Mein Vikas ki rajniti ka paksh le raha hun…mein desh ke netaon aur rajnataon se keh 
raha hun ki votebank ki rajniti chodo aur vikas ki rajniti par aao…Uttar Pradesh ke 
logon se mein puchana chahta hun …kya aapko bijli mili? [The crowd answers with a 
resounding Nahi!] Netaji zara Gujarat jaake dekho 24 ganthe/365 din bijli milti hai!’92 
[I am taking the side of the politics of development. I am saying to all leaders and 
politicians that give up vote-bank politics and adopt the politics of development. I 
would like to ask the people of Uttar Pradesh, did you get electricity? [The crowd 
answers with a resounding no!] Netaji, please go and see Gujarat gets 24 hours/365 
days electricity.] 
At the Kalol rally: 
Ki gaya trees varsh thi ekaj emne record vagadeli …Secularism…Garibi…aa tu badu 
chaliya…arey aa vakte emne nathi padti kiya...Modi toh rozgar ni vaat karu chu , hu 
karu chu; Modi paani pahunchadvani baat kare chu, hu karu chu.93 
[For the past thirty years they have been playing the same record of secularism, poverty. 
It would no longer work now, Modi talks about employment, Modi talks about 
providing water.] 
                                                 
91 Image taken by the author 2nd March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
92 Field notes: Modi’s speech 2nd March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
93 Field notes: Modi’s speech, 23rd April 2014, Kalol, Gujarat. 
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Modi’s rallies and jan sabhas, as the above narratives show, are all about the 
‘development talk’ – roads, electricity and water. On the ground, the analysis of the 
campaign depicts a rather sacred turf, going beyond the spatial geographies of assertion 
as discussed in (see section 1.2). The campaign slogans of ‘Acche Din aane wale hai’ [Good 
days are on their way] and ‘Abki baar Modi Sarkaar’ [This time, Modi’s government] did 
for Modi what the “Yes, we can” campaign did for Obama but the resonance of these 
slogans were felt more in the mediatised sphere. On the field, the ambience, rally names 
and stage set-up resembled a sacred war ritual. 
 
Figure 4.2: Maha Shankhanad Rally, Lucknow, UP94 
Modi’s election rallies were like clarion calls before waging a war. Even the 
survey of their names reflect this – from Hunkar rally (loud war cry) (Bihar) and Vijay 
Sankhanaad (rally to announce victory) (Lucknow) to Dilli Vijay (rally to win over Delhi) 
(Delhi). The Vijay Sankhanaad rally at Lucknow resembled a war ritual being 
performed.95 As Figure 4.1 shows, huge portraits of Modi were wrapped around the 
four pillars of the stage and Vajpayee in the background welcomed the audience to the 
                                                 
94 Image taken by the author, 2nd March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
95 Field notes: 2nd March 2014, Vijay Sankhanaad Rally, Lucknow, UP. 
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rally. Modi’s arrival on stage was preceded by the saffron-clad sadhus (saints) sitting in 
the audience chanting ‘har har modi; ghar ghar modi’ accompanied by conch calls. The 
chant, which is a modification of ‘har har mahadev; ghar ghar mahadev’, equates Modi with 
the mythological warrior king, Mahadev. Figure 4.2 displays the ‘Modi sena’ (Modi’s 
army) in the audience: a pantheon of Modi supporters, all young men, wearing Modi sena 
caps completed the call for an awakened political action. This ritual was performed and 
repeated at all big Modi rallies although some aspects were tweaked to fit into specific 
local contexts.96 For instance, in Lucknow, the image of Atal Bihari Vajpayee was used 
as the backdrop on the stage to legitimise Modi’s own position organisationally and also 
to capitalise on Vajpayee’s upper caste position, legacy and statesmanship. This 
developmental cosmos of the pervasive Vikaspurush and the sacred war rituals was 
combined with tech-savvy chai-pe-charchas to achieve the definitive microcosm which is 
unpacked in the following section  
4.3.1 ‘Marut’97 Purush: transition from a divisive to a decisive leader 
Vikaspurush, as Modi is famously known in Gujarat, became the theme around 
which he organised his campaign for the 2014 general election, staking claim on the 
national scale. It is, however, important to unpack what this idea of a Vikaspurush entails 
and that involves disentangling the man (purush) from development (vikas) to 
understand what Modi signifies. 
To begin with, an aggressive masculine leader who is unabashed and 
unapologetic about his religious identity, i.e. Hinduness, is what Modi embodies. His 
refusal to wear the skull cap during the Sadbhavna rally in 2011 (PTI, 2011a) or to 
apologise for the 2002 riots (TNN, 2014b) represented a Marut virility – the Gujarati 
term used by Jaffrelot (2008) to describe someone who refuses to atone for or regret his 
                                                 
96 Field notes: All the big rallies that I attended in Delhi, Lucknow and Gujarat had the same sequence 
and format similar to a war-like preparation. 
97 Gujarati term used by Jaffrelot (2008) to refer to somebody who refuses to atone for or regret his acts. 
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acts. Modi’s outright defiance stands out in comparison to other political leaders who 
have taken political and moral responsibility for any political violence against minorities 
under their regime. For instance, Singh’s apology to the Sikh community on behalf of 
the Congress party for the anti-Sikh riots held in Delhi in 1984 (Saroor, 2011). Even 
Advani, who belonged to the BJP, expressed remorse after the demolition of the Babri 
Masjid (PTI, 2005). Modi, on the other hand has always expressed an obdurate denial. 
This masculine arrogance combined with his assertion that “Yes, I am a Hindu 
Nationalist” (“Yes, I am”, 2013) is what is definitive about Modi, and has no parallels in 
Indian politics. It is the transmission, circulation and reception of this ‘Modi-
masculinity’98 which underscores the politics of Vikaspurush. 
Accompanying this masculine virility is Modi’s paternalistic protectionism 
exemplified in the reference to his chappanese chhaati (56 inch) chest, in his election 
speeches. Modi thus plays a ‘fatherlike’ protector of Gujarat against the government at 
the centre as Jaffrelot (2013) points out in his analysis of the Gujarat assembly level 
campaign in 2012. This translated into seeing the people as subjects in need of protection 
rather than considering them as citizens to whom the political leadership should be 
accountable. Even in the 2014 campaign, Modi used the analogy of the chowkidar 
(watchman) to claim:  
Bhayion aur Behno, mein UP ki janata ko bharosa dena chahta hoon…mein dilli mein 
ek chowkidar ke roop mein hoon…dilli ki tijori par..Desh ki tijori par mein kisi ka 
panja nahi padne donga.99 
[Brothers and sisters, I would like to assure the people of Uttar Pradesh, I would be like 
a watchman in Delhi. I would not allow anybody’s claw on Delhi’s vault; on India’s 
vault.] 
He also projects himself as an all-pervasive leader who will ensure safety and security 
for all his people under his leadership unlike, he claims, his contemporaries. In this vein, 
                                                 
98Term formulated by Shrivastava (2015). 
99 Field notes: Modi’s speech, 2nd March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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he juxtaposes Singh’s Sikh identity with his Hindu masculinity and virility wherein Singh 
is portrayed as an effeminate, weak and ineffective leader. At his Vikas rally Modi said, 
“Dilli mein pradhanmantri Sardar hai…lekin asardar nahi”100 [Delhi has a Sardar (Sikh) prime 
minister…but not an effective one].  
[S]ome idea of the newness (and peculiarity) of Modi’s mediated image can be derived 
from the fact that his masculinity was, in fact, counterpoised to that of a political 
opponent, incumbent Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, whose ethnic identity as a Sikh 
positioned him in the ranks of the ‘martial races’. (Srivastava, 2015, p. 333) 
In a “traditionally non-martial culture”, as Suhurd (2008) also highlights, Modi’s hyper-
masculinity creates an atmosphere of unease and is also reflected in his ideas of 
patriotism, nationalism and manliness in politics. 
The identification that he generates is a personal one with his supporters who 
perceive Modi as a member of their family. This filial affiliation was reflected the most 
when many of my respondents shared their grief at Modi leaving Gujarat once he had 
won the election.101 Ganesh, one of my respondents, a school attendant belonging to 
the lower class, described his sense of loss after the result had been announced. 
Although he was elated that Modi had won, he said, “Hamare main karta-dharta the…aisa 
lag raha hain ki Gujarat anaath ho gaya hain”’102 [He is our main doer…it feels as though 
Gujarat has been orphaned]. Ganesh’s affinity and affection reflects the overall feeling 
that people in Gujarat have towards Modi along with his image as a ‘full-time chief 
minister’, sacrificing his life to public service. Such dedicated public life is perceived to 
be ascetic-like as there is appreciation for renunciation within the Hindu worldview. It 
also contributes to papering over his non-acknowledgement of his marriage officially. 
Unifying RSS pracharak style asceticism with nativism defined his leadership style in 
Gujarat.  
                                                 
100 Field notes: Modi’s speech, 29th September 2013, Vikas rally, Rohini, New Delhi. 
101 Field notes: June 2014, Gujarat. 
102 Interview with Ganesh, 20th June 2014, Behrampura, Gujarat. 
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However, his journey to Delhi demanded a shift from the pracharak style to a 
Brand Modi outlook. The native Gujaratiness had to be adjusted to consolidate his image 
outside Gujarat. Therefore during the election campaign one of his approaches was to 
accompany the ‘Modi Kurta’ with changing headgear to reflect/acknowledge specific 
regional and ethnic contexts. The kurta (ethnic shirt), one of the essentials of his brand, 
should be deconstructed beyond the sartorial as it represents certain continuities of 
political culture besides a much needed repackaging of his image. Modi therefore draws 
on the Nehru-Gandhi legacy on two counts. One, on the idea of popularising a sartorial 
choice as a brand; much like the Nehru jacket there is a parallel in the Modi kurta as an 
international brand. Modi with his kurta was referred to as a fashion icon by 
international press including the New York Times (Friedman, 2014) and Time magazine 
(Jenkins, 2014). Even Obama claimed that he wanted to wear one when he raised a 
toast at the banquet hosted in his honour by President Mukherjee (PTI, 2015). Branding 
aside, even the choice of experimenting with headgear was popularised by Nehru who, 
“put into practice his favourite maxim ‘unity in diversity’, and wore a variety of things 
on his head…. To this end he generally retained his sherwani pyjama, adding some foreign 
appendage to his dress, and it was often the headwear of the other that he chose’’ 
(Tarlo, 1996, p. 125). 
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Figure 4.3: Garvi, Gujarat State Emporium, New Delhi103 
On the election trail in Delhi, I encountered a poster which read ‘Modi Kurta & 
Pyjama are available here’ (Figure 4.3) that welcomed visitors to Garvi, the Gujarat 
Emporium. Utilising the regional centre for distribution of these kurtas demonstrates 
how the sartorial choice of Brand Modi outside of Gujarat was disseminated. The linear 
correlation between Modi’s ethnic identification with Gujarati sub-nationalism was 
played out through the Gujarat Emporium. Second, drawing on Gandhi, Garvi the 
Gujarat Emporium played a similar role to that of the All-India Spinners Association 
[AISA] in spreading khadi and swadeshi politics during the nationalist struggle. In a 
similar vein, the Gujarat emporium can be considered as an effective approach to 
connect with non-Gujaratis. Garvi, the hub of Gujarati pride along with conveying the 
narrative of the success of the Gujarat model was also propagating and circulating its 
favourite chief minister’s sartorial choice – the Modi kurta. 
                                                 
103 Image taken by the author, 15th January 2014, Baba Khadak Singh Marg, New Delhi. 
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This strategy forged by Modi reveals the precision that goes into creating his 
brand. Chauhan, the owner of Jade Blue and Modi’s tailor, has been associated with him 
since he was a pracharak and has trademarked this style.104 Chauhan described with much 
excitement Modi’s transition from a humble party worker wearing white trousers with 
khadi tunics to the chief minister of Gujarat wearing cotton or silk kurtas with short 
sleeves. Elated by Modi’s victory, Chauhan elaborated on the Modi kurta’s reception 
amongst the youth, increase in production due to international demand and new plans 
for the next venture planned, the ‘Modi Jacket’. 
I had registered this name around two and a half years back. Now it has been 5-6 years 
since the label was started. From that time I felt that the name carries some power! 
Now the ‘Modi Jacket’, the one Modi sahib wears will also be launched. Now there is 
both national and international demand; people buy it as a souvenir. In the beginning, I 
remember only those aged 40 years and above used to wear it, but now everyone wears 
it – especially after the election. We used to make only big sizes 45-46, but now we also 
produce 38-40 and their demand has also increased105 
The popularity of Modi kurtas amongst the upwardly mobile middle classes and men 
across age groups reflects not only the neo-liberal subject’s consumption satisfaction 
but also their appreciation and awe of, and assertive allegiance with the masculinity and 
leadership symbolised by Modi. “Modi-masculinity stands at the juncture of new 
consumerist aspirations, the politics of Indian traditions and gender, and the re-
fashioning of masculine identities’’ (Srivastava, 2015, p. 333). His ‘masks’ and ‘tattoos’ 
were the other repertories worn by his supporters during Navratri as a prelude to the 
election in Gujarat. “It is interesting to note that these were completely based on 
individual initiatives, rather than political party led” (Banerji, 2013). 
The hyper-masculine Hindutva ‘Marut Purush’ aligns with ‘Brand Modi’, the flag 
bearer of the neo-liberal growth model exemplified by the Gujarat model. It instantiates 
the process of dismantling practices of development embedded in state planning and 
                                                 
104 Interview with Bipin Chauhan, 18th June 2014, Jade Blue store, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
105 Interview with Bipin Chauhan, 18th June 2014, Jade Blue store, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
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redistribution foregrounded by the Nehruvian model of development. ‘Modi-
masculinity’ was the antithesis to the nature of political leadership previously associated 
with the ‘Five-Year Plan Hero’ (Srivastava, 2015). The Gujarat model’s dictum under 
Modi – ‘minimum government; maximum governance’ – resonated well with the middle 
classes due to their upward eco-social mobility and consequent non-dependence on 
state services in favour of private enterprise. This shift therefore also informs the 
practice of doing politics, as matters of policy-making are reduced to management-
inspired governance.  
aisa humko national level pe bhi dekhne ko milega aur neat and clean politics hoga aisa 
hamara khud ka manana hai. The success of the Vibrant Gujarat Summits also gave 
him the name of ‘CEO of India’ – CEO ki tarah Gujarat chalate hain…toh India ko 
bhi chala sakte hain.106 
[One would see that at the national level also; now there would be neat and clean 
politics. The success of the Vibrant Gujarat summits also gave him the name of ‘CEO 
of India’ – he ran Gujarat as a CEO, will be able to run India like that as well.] 
The narrative above highlights that with corporate backing as the mainstay of the 
Gujarat model Modi has earned the title of ‘CEO’ of Gujarat. His mantra of ‘minimum 
government’ has meant that it is about competence and performance in matters of 
resource management and service provision by the state.  
One of the reasons for the middle class and the subaltern support being 
extended to Modi has to do with the rising insecurity among the masses. Neo-liberal 
economics has placed larger populations in a constant state of precariousness and 
marginalisation. Therefore a leader who represents sternness in decision-making himself 
becomes a reason to be valued rather than the nature of that decision-making or the 
subject matter itself. “Decisionism is an outcome of a deep craving for firm decisions 
by the political authority in a situation where things are perceived to be adrift’’ (Pandian 
& Roy, 2014, p. 30). This becomes all the more crucial when the incumbent 
                                                 
106 Interview with Nikhil Nirankar, 8th June 2014, Baroda, Gujarat. 
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government is displaying lack of leadership and poor governance. The policy paralysis 
of the UPA government had to be countered by a more visible and proactive 
performance of development. Hence, as discussed in the case of Gujarat, one of the 
most effective courses of action by which Modi has ensured that the narrative of 
development and the success of the Gujarat model is kept alive is through constant 
reiteration practices which give the impression that things are moving and progress is 
believed to be considerable and in sight. The success of the Gujarat model and its 
possible applicability on a pan-India level impose faith in him and his decisionism 
against the policy paralysis of the then leadership at the centre led by the Congress 
party.  
The faith in Modi’s leadership was not restricted to matters of growth and 
governance, but also extended to his capacity to check internal discord such as ‘riot 
control’ and ensuring security. Viswanathan (2013) argues that, in Modi, the middle 
class sees a problem solver who engages with their day-to-day anxieties in relation to 
minorities, economy or security, thereby converting these masses into a loyal support 
bank. Modi therefore appears to people as somebody who is in control of a situation 
and achieved social mobility, a quality that they believe themselves to be lacking.  
This technique of mediation suggests that a more sophisticated style of politics is taking 
shape when Modi invites his supporters to identify with him by wearing the same shirt, 
masking their face with his, and suggesting that he is ubiquitous. (Jaffrelot, 2015a, p. 
349) 
Consequently, the Modi kurta, Modi masks and chai wallah gained smooth 
acceptance across the classes. As the masses felt a sense of connection, Modi achieved 
visibility which also enabled him to dominate the field of perception, contributing to his 
aura of omnipotence. A complex mixture of subalternity, decisionism and aspirational 
politics underscores Modi’s support base. His omnipotence has also had its fall outs. 
Modi’s leadership and management within the BJP and state government was one of 
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authoritarian decision-making based on a near absence of a second tier of leadership. 
The personalisation of the campaign around Modi led to the BJP’s organisational 
structure being sidelined, a practice unknown to a party that is strictly organised around 
cadres. Moreover, the organisational hierarchy was ignored, with senior leaders such as 
L.K.Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and Jaswant Singh not being involved with the 
election-related decision making within the party. The issues within the party aside, a 
problem with this type of authoritarian leadership is that it leads to acceptance of one-
upmanship in terms of decision making in governance related matters as also translating 
into tacit consent; most evident in the case of Gujarat during the majoritarian violence 
against Muslim minorities in 2002.  
The acceptance of Modi’s leadership is thus representative of a majoritarian 
consensus in which the citizen-subject that is represented through his leadership is a 
despondent, insecure consumerist and sacralised subject, who is gratified by seeing their 
leader and seeing themselves in him. 
4.3.2 Chai-pe-charcha: absence of charcha...only darshan 
One of the themes besides the deep-seated ethno-religiousness dominating the 
campaign was the emphasis on Modi as a chai wallah (tea vendor) and his journey far 
from his humble background: 
BJP ka loktantra dekhiye ki mujh jaise pichdi jati mein paida hua, garibi mein pala, chai 
bechte bechte zindagi chalane wale ek naujawan ko BJP mein pradhan mantri padd ka 
ummidvar bana diya.107 
[Look at the democracy within the BJP that a person like me, who belongs to a lower 
caste, lived in poverty and somebody who lived by selling tea has been made a prime 
ministerial candidate by the BJP.] 
tumhare maathe garibi ek nayi jaat che; hamare maathe garibi ek parijaat hai…bhayion 
aur behno maari garibi jeeva jayo prayog na thi..hu garibi ma janmo chu…hu garibi ma 
jeevyu chu…railway na dabba ma cha vechta agand vadhiyo chu.108 
                                                 
107Field notes: Modi’s speech, 2nd March 2014, Lucknow rally, UP. 
108Field notes: Modi’s Jansabha, 24th April 2014, Pologround, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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[For you poverty may be a new category; we have known poverty. Brothers and sisters, 
my poverty is not an experiment. I was born in poverty, I have lived through poverty, 
have moved ahead by selling tea in railway compartments.] 
Modi positioned his struggles against the dynasticism of the political opposition 
led by Congress. As the two narratives above capture, by targeting the political eliteness 
of Rahul Gandhi, his main opponent in the elections, he wanted to demonstrate that 
both the BJP and Modi were a common man’s party, an identification usually associated 
with the Congress party in its earlier days after independence. Even during the 2007 
election campaign the account of Modi as a tea vendor appeared in the public sphere as 
pointed out by Jaffrelot (2008); however, it did not then evolve into a full blown 
campaign strategy of ‘chai-pe-charcha’ as it did in 2014. In response to a classist snide 
remark made by Congress leader Aiyar (TNN, 2014a) an independent non-profit 
strategist group called Citizens for Accountable Governance (CAG) gave it a creative 
spin. Consequently, Modi used this image of a tea vendor to counter the aristocratic 
background and political legacy of the Congress party: 
emne aa takleef ye; emne takleef a che…ki aatla varsho thi amaru rajvada 
chaleche…amara dadi pradhanmantri, amara dada pradhanmantri, hamara nana 
paradhanmantri…aane aa ek chaiwalon ..na na chaiwalon aamne parkhand kare109 
[But the problem; they are distressed that for so many years our kingdom was running; 
our grandmother prime minister, our grandfather prime minister, our maternal 
grandfather prime minister, this is a tea vendor , no, no, we cannot face a tea vendor.] 
This strategy falls in line with brand Modi’s strategy of ‘techno-populism’ since 2007; 
for instance Jaffrelot (2015a) discusses his use of 3D technology in 2012 to make his 
hologram appear on stage to audiences across different sites simultaneously. The charcha 
formula combines his image of lower caste and class identity with technology-infused 
techniques in an effort to reach out to all sections of the masses.  
Chai-pe-charchas were launched in February 2014 (PTI, 2014b) as part of the poll 
campaign and were organised around issues of good governance (IANS, 2014), 
                                                 
109Field notes: Modi’s Jansabha, 24th April 2014, Pologround, Vadodara Gujarat. 
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women’s empowerment (Narendra Modi, 2014b) and agrarian crisis (Narendra Modi, 
2014a) in collaboration with the volunteers of CAG. An impromptu tea stall with a pair 
of TVs set the stage for the charcha. The Gujarat chief minister used a combination of 
various mediums such as satellite, internet and mobile as part of the campaign to 
directly interact with people across 30 locations of the 1000 in total. People could also 
exchange their opinions about and suggestions for the BJP election campaign through 
video conferencing. It was seen as the most technology-driven strategy organised at the 
pan-India level by the BJP organisers as they could manage discussions across many 
states simultaneously. 
 
Figure 4.4: Chai-pe-charcha, R.K.Puram, New Delhi110 
‘Issues’ as tea leaves have been brewed; solutions have been added as sugar; this tea 
vendor is quite amazing; drink this delightful cup of tea! Whether we wish to be served 
or ruled; we will think it over today; with the tea stall in the corner.’111 
Just as the first few lines of the theme song above, as Figure 4.4 depicts, a 
makeshift NaMo Chai Çhaupal (meeting place) was set up in the middle of a market 
                                                 
110 Image taken by the author, 8th March 2014, Sector 3, R.K.Puram, New Delhi. 
111 The full Hindi version of the campaign song can be found at: (CAG India, n.d.) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tf97Kw5t_Ic  
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square in two middle class housing localities in Sectors 3 and 4 in R.K. Puram.112 
Attending one of the charchas (discussion) organised on the occasion of Women’s Day 
(8th March 2014), Modi addressed questions from different regional centres regarding 
women’s education, security and economic well-being.113 His responses were based 
within the broader theme of what he described as “women from homemaker to 
nationmaker”.114 The aim was to establish direct contact with the masses and to involve 
them as equal participants in his future vision for India. By organising these charchas on 
issues of some specific importance – good governance, women’s empowerment and 
agrarian crises – Modi also reached out to the three sections of voters across the rural 
and urban divide – upper/middle classes, women and farmers respectively. 
Discussion over a cup of tea; no expenses, no leaflet; it’s the moment to do something. 
Let's discuss over a cup of tea. Along with a sip of tea with NaMo, we will discuss 
India’s well-being. It’s the turn of the masses; our brother has come to hear.115 
The rest of the verses from the theme song above highlight that by replacing the 
traditional mode of campaigning such as distributing pamphlets, the use of technology 
aimed to create an accessible and accountable leader in Modi. He referred to these tea-
stalls as ‘footpath parliaments’ as he aimed at transforming them into spatio-discursive 
spaces. The use of television sets made him ubiquitous; much like holograms, these 
sessions were telecast simultaneously across different locations.  
This circulation, however, interrupted the temporal and spatial dynamics of a 
usual campaign. “Television yokes together different temporalities in one 
communicative event” (Rajagopal, 2001, pp. 4–5). Employing television and darshan 
iconography has been the mainstay of Hindutva mobilisation since the Ayodhya 
movement (Brosius, 2005; Ludden, 2005; Rajagopal, 2001). However, the paradigm 
                                                 
112 Field notes: 8th March 2014, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. 
113 Field notes: 8th March 2014, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. 
114 Field notes: Modi’s introductory speech in the Chai pe Charcha session on Women’s Empowerment.  
115 The full Hindi version of the theme song can be found at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tf97Kw5t_Ic  
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shift in this campaign is that this time it is for an actual leader in Modi and not the 
mythical character of Ram’. While on one hand, television as a medium gives a break 
from the interactions that individuals have to deal with in everyday encounters and 
provides a space devoid of the liabilities of such social relations, “[o]n the other hand, it 
evokes feelings of closeness and reciprocity to unknown participants who may exist 
only in imagination” (Rajagopal, 2001, p. 5). This tendency is experienced effectively in 
the case of campaign strategies such as chai-pe-charcha in drawing participation from 
supporters. There was thus reasonable participation in two corresponding venues in 
R.K. Puram Sectors 3 and 4, which I attended in order to gauge the attendance and the 
nature of participation.116  
In general, expecting people in middle class localities to come out for an event 
such as this is unusual, especially in New Delhi. However, it should be acknowledged 
here that the upper and middle classes are BJP’s support base and in a government 
housing locality their presence is almost guaranteed. The local BJP supporters and 
office-bearers aside, there were a considerable number of non-party affiliated people in 
the crowd.117 They had come to attend the charcha sessions mostly to see and hear Modi, 
although the free tea was certainly not unwelcome! In Sector 3, a group of residents 
waited patiently for the programme to commence, which was disrupted due to a 
technical snag. After about ten minutes of waiting, Prakash, a middle class government 
employee said to me “Modiji ko dekhne aur sunanne ke liye aaye hai, wait karenge” [I have 
come to see and hear Modiji, I will wait].118 There were curious spectators as well, who 
did not continuously sit through the session but were interested to know what was 
going on and dispersed after a while. Hence a campaign like this certainly gave the BJP 
and Modi visibility on the city streets and market squares.  
                                                 
116 Field notes: 8th March 2014, R.K.Puram, New Delhi. 
117 Field notes: 8th March 2014, R.K.Puram, New Delhi. 
118 Field notes: conversation with Prakash, chai-pe-charcha session, 8th March 2014, Sector 3, R.K. Puram, 
New Delhi. 
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However, due to technical problems many sessions of charchas were disrupted – 
‘Farmers come with cups of woes, return dejected after no ‘interaction’ with Modi’ ran 
one article headline in the Indian Express on 21 March 2014. These technical glitches 
reproduced the “liminal character of the technology” (Rajagopal, 2001, p. 25); although 
momentarily these settings spatially and socially constitute an affinity among the 
participants, it also demonstrates that for the masses, the medium of technology is only 
an additional way of seeing their leader; these failures disappoint them but do not affect 
their affiliation or identification with their leader. Much along the lines of Prakash’s 
response, they are satisfied enough in just being recipients of what Modi has to say. 
Despite the theme of the campaign strategy emphasising charcha and an exercise in 
participatory democracy, the strictly controlled agenda and absence of discussion or 
space for vexing counter questions did not bother the participants, embodying thus, one 
could claim, non-discursive and non-critical political subjects.  
The drawback of campaigns such as chai-pe-charcha is when the fundamental ideas 
informing vibrant discussion are lacking. The value of tea stalls lies in mutual dialogic 
exchange and participation – an organic discussion hub. As one observes, in an actual 
tea stall the active give and take of views is the essence of it as an adda (place of 
socialisation). There are passive participants, too, who do not contribute vocally to the 
conversation, but nod in approval or disapproval. Tea stalls become spatial discursive 
enclosures and social equalisers – a place for ordinary people from different socio-
economic backgrounds to make sense of their everyday and being political, whether in 
the village or in the city. For a tea stall at the Varanasi ghats, for instance, it is part of the 
everyday, to have a chai-pe-charcha. However, here chai-pe-charchas ended up being 
monologues with Modi expressing his opinion on pre-decided themes. Even when 
questions were allowed, they were mostly pre-approved. However, when one observes 
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the fervour of a charcha carried over to an actual tea shop or in small groups in the 
market square, one can see the success of the chai-pe-charcha campaign strategy.  
The practices of tea drinking and tea stalls are part of everyday socio-political 
life and have been utilised for various political agendas in the past. Bhadra (2005) traced 
the historical practices of tea drinking and also pointed out that it was equally embedded 
in social rituals and a referent of social refinement during the British Raj, along with 
being part of social opposition.119 The Americans used the Boston Tea Party of 1773 to 
launch their War of Independence. Similarly, Gandhi in his chapter on ‘Key to health’ 
(1948) highlighted the ill-effects of tea and during the nationalist struggle there were 
strong instructions by him to not to drink tea. It is within this already existent socio-
political milieu that the ‘chai-pe-charcha’ ‘chai-wala’ and the ‘namo chai’ need to be located. 
However, the practice of tea drinking in India is deep-seated in caste and class dynamics 
and hence cannot be easily passed off as a universal drink. “The habit grew differently 
according to the distinct caste and class positions of tea drinkers” (Bhadra, 2005, p.17). 
The caste and class positionality defines not only the choice between alternative options 
(such as coffee) but also what type of tea is preferred and who can afford that choice. 
For instance, Narayan (2014b) points out how older people of the upper caste in 
Bhojpur were the only people that could afford tea with milk and sugar. Going by the 
homogenising tendency in Modi’s agenda, the campaign too conveniently overlooked 
this socio-economic embeddedness associated with tea and the practice of tea drinking. 
Overall, though the campaign made Modi visible enabled by mediatised intervention, 
ultimately these make-shift tea stalls turned out to be non-discursive spaces, the absence 
of a real dialogic charcha or interaction reducing even this exercise to an extension of 
darshan politics in constituting passive subjects.  
                                                 
119 Bhadra (2005) highlights that during the height of the campaign against oppression of plantation 
labourers in 1880s, renowned doctor Sunadri Mohan Das and nationalist leader Krishna Kumar Mitra 
gave up drinking tea in an act of protest.  
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Therefore the overall symbolic habitus of the campaign created uncritical 
passive supporters. The next section further interrogates the nature of these political 
subjects across different sections of supporters in Modi’s two constituencies.  
4.4 Political Subjectivity: Modi’s Management of Hindutva Idioms and 
Parochial Ties 
The election campaign of 2014 epitomised CEO Modi’s approach to Surajya – 
project management of voter mobilisation. The strategy adopted balanced the 
traditional RSS organisational structure of targeting voters along with the event 
management approach provided by Prashant Kishore and his non-profit organisation, 
CAG. Modi’s dependence on the RSS and adoption of the page pramukh (head of one 
electoral roll) strategy was instrumental in exploiting primordial ties based on caste, 
regional and religious affiliations. As discussed in previous sections, the visibility of 
Modi and the developmental cosmos combined with visual practices of darshan was 
strongly backed up by the organisational machinery of both the RSS and the BJP to 
ensure Hindu consolidation and successfully translate support into actual votes. The 
limitations of ‘mediatised populism’ therefore become more evident here; my own 
fieldwork with various campaign groups of BJP both in Vadodara and Varanasi 
depicted that while the social media campaign might have provided more visibility and 
data analysis, it was the traditional methods based on organisational campaigning and 
Hindutva symbolism that ensured Modi’s victory.  
RSS’s organisational network, Narayan (2014a) argues, provided a systematic 
mechanism of feedback on Modi’s rallies to electoral polling booth level management, 
running parallel to the BJP’s. Many of the campaign strategies were replicated; for 
instance, the tried and tested page pramukh strategy was first used effectively in the 
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Gujarat assembly election, and had ensured Modi’s victory three times, said Dalal,120 the 
BJP leader from Vadodara. As a means of voter mobilisation, Dalal added that each 
pramukh was entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that voters on the ‘page’ of 
the electoral roll were engaged effectively at least a month before voting. It was also 
their responsibility to ensure that they came out and voted on the date of polling. This 
strategy was forcefully spearheaded by RSS in Varanasi (Jha, 2014; Narayan, 2014a). In 
the field therefore, the campaign group used a combination of traditional knowledge 
with modern techniques. The RSS pracharaks, BJP party workers, were accompanied by 
the CAG tech-savvy volunteers known as the ‘Blue Brigade’. CAG worked in tandem 
with the BJP and the RSS during the campaign across different states. The CAG 
officially introduced the project management approach to Indian elections in Modi’s 
campaign, thereby extending the marketing and business strategy to political 
campaigning; this technique at the state level was successfully employed by the AAP in 
its electoral debut in 2013. “The CAG’s job in the Modi campaign encompassed 
analytics, social media, technology and campaign management” (Sruthijith KK, 2014). 
They were also responsible for two innovative campaigns the chai-pe-charcha and the Run 
for Unity (see section 4.5) campaigns, thus reiterating my point that the basic 
framework for mobilisation on the ground was the traditional organisational 
campaigning based on caste and class dynamics.  
For instance, the ensemble of people who were chosen to be Modi’s 
nominators, both in Vadodara and Varanasi, represented the caste and class dynamics 
that the BJP had aimed to consolidate. In Vadodara, all the proposers were party 
loyalists and represented a balanced combination of classes from the royal Rajmata 
Shubhangini Raje Gaekwad to the lowest, Kiran Mahida, a tea vendor; Varanasi also 
followed in a similar vein combined with the cultural backdrop of the holy city. Madan 
                                                 
120 Interview with Ghanshyam Dalal, 16th June 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat.  
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Mohan Malviya’s grandson, Giridhar Malaviya a retired judge of the Allahabad High 
Court, proposed Modi’s candidature. He was accompanied by Padma Vibhushan 
Chandu Lal Mishra, a noted classical singer from Varanasi, boatman Virbhadra Nishad 
and Asok who represented the dominant weaver community. Literally, all four 
proposers were also representing the four dominant cultural aspects of Varanasi – the 
Ganga, Literacy, music and bunkars (the dominant weaving industry) with the 
caste/religious identity embedded in it. Following the campaign, both in Vadodara and 
Varanasi, gave a sense of how Moditva was being operationalised.  
It has also emerged as the much-publicised contentious field upon which the interplay 
of collective desires, aspirations, and perceived obstacles to those takes place. Along 
with that, the idea of the possibility of change and a better future promised by Modi 
inspired a younger generation that was largely not interested or alienated from the 
world of politics (Ravinder Kaur, 2015, p. 324). 
The idea of ‘good times’ had become part of the normal discourse for people, 
especially the aspirational youth, who believed in the idea of Modi’s vikas.121 Therefore, 
despite the absence of any effective oppositional force in Vadodara, the nature of 
campaign was very effective because of a huge youth contingent. The base of the 
campaigning comprised of committed BJP activists and workers. The real story was 
Varanasi because it was a more contested site than Vadodara. The first-timers, not just 
the youth, took to campaigning and politics because of Modi, across class, caste and 
professional backgrounds. Manisingh, an assistant professor at BHU who was in charge 
of the IT cell during the campaign at the BJP office in Varanasi, describes the 
composition of the ‘war room’ as the IT cell was known:  
Most of the volunteers who are working are here and joined because of Modiji; they are 
so spirited for Modiji and against corruption. Here the IT cell is being led by somebody 
from BHU IT. The rest of them are from different backgrounds – advocates, university 
teachers, professors, RTI activists and some NRIs as well have come to extend support. 
                                                 
121 Field note: 10th April 2014: many of my young respondents, who were first timers from the Akhil 
Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) were mostly in active campaigning because of Modi. 
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Some people from the south and Delhi have also come. All of them are volunteers and 
have so much angst that in today’s context they can only see Modiji.122 
Manisingh’s account shows the range of middle class professionals who were actively 
involved at different stages of campaign management in Varanasi. He himself was a first 
timer, as he said: 
I myself joined because of Modiji; until now I was also just a sympathiser. I have never 
worked as an active member, but now looking at the condition of the country, I 
decided. If Modiji was not the candidate, I doubt whether I would have taken up 
campaigning.123 
Varanasi was an interesting site, because the supporters I was following had 
come from other states to campaign for the first time. Besides assessing the receptivity 
of the campaign amongst the people, I could also observe how these first-time political 
activists were learning and improvising as they went, from pamphlet distribution to 
interacting with groups of people along the ghats or parks, about Modi and his vikas 
agenda.124 One, Joshi, software engineer who came down from Mumbai to campaign in 
Varanasi, told me: 
As a person I have always been apolitical…Although I would always cast my vote, I 
never actively tried to understand what the political system is…I sit on the internet a lot 
so was reading about what has been happening…I felt that if I was in Varanasi I could 
contribute in a more holistic manner so I decided to volunteer and got in touch 
through the BJP website…If Modi was not the candidate I would not have come. I 
don’t know much about the BJP as a party but I am here for Modi.125 
Joshi became a BJP volunteer by just giving a missed call on the mobile number 
mentioned in the BJP website. From the many young men volunteers from Andhra and 
Gurgaon to the young women who were part of the campaign teams, all displayed 
similar traits, being non-political or anti-politics until Modi’s candidature.126  
                                                 
122 Interview with Drighvendu Manisingh, 6th May 2014, BJP office, Varanasi, UP. 
123 Interview with Drighvendu Manisingh, 6th May 2014, BJP office, Varanasi, UP. 
124 Field note: 5th May 2014, Varanasi, UP. 
125 Interview with Chetan Joshi, 4th May 2014, BJP office, Varanasi, UP. 
126 Field note: May 2014, Varanasi, UP. 
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Mere saath team mein youngsters zyada hain ,yeh alag baat hai ki voh itna politically 
judi hui nahi hain aur inn cheezon ke bare mein unko zyada andaza nahi hai …lekin 
unme ek utsah hai aur dikhta hain Modiji ke liye.127 
[I have more youngsters in my team; it’s a different matter that they are not so 
politically involved and don’t know many of the aspects, but their motivation for 
Modiji is very evident.] 
Sulekha, the leader of the women’s wing, highlights above, the lack of political 
knowledge amongst the young girls who became volunteers and were part of her 
campaign team. But it was not just limited to youngsters who became more politically 
active. In general, the female support base for Modi has been strong and extremely 
visible. 
4.4.1 ‘Vadil’128 – the paterfamilias 
The gendered nature of political participation for women reflects the affinity to 
the idea of Modi’s resolute masculinity, both with regard to developmental politics and 
political mobilisation. In Hindutva politics gender roles are constituted within 
hegemonic notions of femininity and motherhood. The conceptual frame of 
“Matrishakti” (R. Kapur & Cossman, 1993, p. 100) becomes the overarching lens to 
assess women’s participation. Matrishakti (maternal power) within Hindutva politics is 
based on essentialist gender-based roles for women that emphasise their role as mothers 
and caregivers. Even their perception as beneficiaries of developmental programmes or 
as political participation is within the same framework. In addition to analysing the 
gendered nature of the mobilisation, it is also necessary to analyse the relations between 
men and women in this case (Chhachhi, 1989; Srivastava, 2015). Vikaspurush’s success 
story is therefore based on the complementary feminine identity that enhances a 
particularised masculine identity.  
                                                 
127 Interview with Sulekha, 5th May 2014, BJP office, Varanasi, UP. 
128 I owe this term of reference to one of my respondents. During her interview she referred to Modi as 
‘ghar ke vadil’ – the head of the family through the conversation. I am using this term to describe the 
overall nature of affinity that women supporters have towards Modi. 
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“Gujarat ka nagrik agar PM bane toh Gujarat ke Nagrik ko samarthan dena chahiye; 
pehle matdan behno phir rasoi”129 [If a Gujarati citizen is staking claim to become the PM 
then its citizens should support him; sisters vote first, then kitchen]. The appeal to vote 
made to women supporters during the Mahila Morcha (women’s wing) meeting outlines 
the linear correlation between Modi and Gujarati asmita. The emphasis on ‘matdan’ 
(vote) is crucial with reference to women subjects as a constituency here because the 
stress is on the ‘duty to vote’; it does not invoke the other aspect of rights claiming as 
equal women citizens. Modi, as the representative of Gujarati pride, and women 
supporters as custodians and repositories of sub-national Gujarati culture were expected 
to perform the role of ensuring that he won in Vadodara (by voting), and hence 
preserve the honour of the state. Women supporters experience an acknowledgement 
of the worth of their political franchise in the service of their state, its honour and its 
leader. They are called upon to perform their role as a ‘Gujarati voter’ and set aside their 
home-maker role to perform this function for the larger benefit of the state/nation, but 
the expectation being that the gendered role will be reverted back to once the 
state/nation has sufficiently capitalised their ‘mandate’.  
Narendra Bhai ek sher che; apna bhai ek sher che; aapna bhai apna raksha karen che. 
Apna mukhyamantri aapna behno ki raksha karuchu ki nahi? Karu chu [women in the 
audience respond]130  
[Narendra Bhai is a lion, our brother is a lion; our brother protects us. Our chief 
minister protects his sisters, doesn’t he? Yes! [women in the audience respond]. 
The enthused response from the crowd as well as representing the genuine 
adulation for their chief minister who respects women also reveals a particular kind of 
women’s subjectivity which believes the role of an ideal man in a household to be that 
of protecting ‘his’ women. The same analogy is extended to Modi and the role he plays 
                                                 
129Field notes: Vadodara Mayor, Bharat Dangar, during the women’s meeting, 20th April 2014, Sayyajiganj, 
Vadodara, Gujarat. 
130 Field notes: Vidyaben, president, BJP Mahila Morcha, during the meeting, 20th April 2014, Sayyajiganj, 
Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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as the ‘patriarch’ of the Gujarati family, safeguarding the interests of women as if they 
were his mothers, sisters and daughters. The narrative of masculine protection/security 
is extended to the pan-India level as we shift from Gujarat to Lucknow. 
mein bharat ki saari mahilaon ko kahungi aapka sabse bada samman agar desh mein koi 
rakh sakta hai toh voh Narendra Modi hai..aap unko apna ashirwad dijiye…agar desh 
ko bachana hai toh Narendra Modi ko PM banana hai aur usme koi kasar nahi chodna 
hai’ 
[I would like to say to all the women of India that if there is anyone who can ensure 
your respect in this country that is Narendra Modi. You should give him your blessings. 
If the country has to be saved then Narendra Modi should be made the PM and no 
stone should be left unturned to achieve this.] 
Bharti’s131 call for women’s support above is embedded in Hindutva’s conception of 
nationalism which symbolically identifies the nation as the Bharat Mata (Motherland), 
but invariably denigrates the feminine while reinforcing the masculine (Bachetta, 2004). 
Furthermore, the narrative of ‘saving the country’ again calls on women’s role to play 
their part in protecting the interests of the nation. 
                                                 
131 Uma Bharti: a female renunciant (sadhvi) and is prominent member of the Sangh Parivar. Bharti came 
to prominence during the Ayodhya mobilisation with her fiery speeches and was present during the 
demolition of the Babri mosque along with prominent BJP leaders such as Murli Manohar Joshi and 
L.K.Advani in 1991. She has been the Minister for Drinking Water and Sanitation since 2014.  
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Figure 4.5: BJP women supporters at Lucknow rally, UP132 
sabhi ladies ke haath mein Kamal lagane ka…hamare BJP ka Kamal ka jo nishaan 
hain..toh Modiji ne kaha bhai haath uthega toh panja dikhega ..toh panja nahi dikhna 
chahiye kamal hi dikhna chahiye..lekin ab haath mein kamal lagaye kaise ..toh Mehndi se 
shaadi mein jaise karte hai Kamal haath mein bana do …toh jab tak mehndi rahegi tab 
tak kamal bhi rahega ..toh idea unka bahut badhiya tha aur usme bhi Ladies samne se aa 
kar bol rahi thi ki apne ko kamal lagao..itna response tha.133 
[To have the lotus imprinted on every palm; our BJP’s symbol is the lotus. Modiji said 
when we raise our hands, the palm is shown, but the palm should not been seen; only 
the lotus should be seen. But now the question was how to get the lotus on our hands. 
So this is how it is done at weddings; you draw the lotus by using henna and so as long 
as there is henna the lotus will stay. This idea of his was very good; the response was 
such that ladies would come up by themselves and get the lotus drawn on their hands.] 
Figure 4.5 displays middle class women supporters of BJP with kamal mehendi. A 
clever BJP strategy to visualise its symbol, the kamal (lotus), by applying the 
ceremonially auspicious mehndi (henna) was popular among women supporters. BJP 
capitalises on female solidarities that are embedded in familial and ritualistic networks 
and re-contextualised and abstracted the henna ceremony for political action from its 
entrenchment in Hindu/Islamic marriage rituals. The bride’s henna ceremony is an 
integral part of the marriage ritual which symbolises notions of patriarchal purity, social 
                                                 
132Image taken by the author, 2nd March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
133 Interview with Jaishreeben, 5th June 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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hierarchy and rites of passage. However, the sacred dimension of the mehendi ritual has 
been de-contextualised both from its gendered and Hindu ritualistic frame due to 
commercialisation of religious rituals leading to its sacredness being dispersed into the 
secular realm. Furthermore, the hegemonic electronic media representations in popular 
films and drama series of such sacred rituals have led to them being reduced to practices 
of leisure, auspiciousness and enjoyment, bereft of any religious connotations. 
Stretching the practice to the political realm, the BJP employed an embodied campaign 
strategy, which used the henna cone to write ‘NaMo’ and draw the BJP lotus symbol on 
women’s palms. Apart from giving more visibility to the lotus it was a strong counter to 
the rival Congress party’s symbol, the palm.  
toh sabke haath mein hamne Kamal Mehndi rakhi thi, jaise Narendra Modi sahib ki 
shaadi hai aur humein tayyari mein jana hai , hum aise prachar karte the ki apke ghar 
mein shaadi ho toh hap kaise tayyari karte ho…vaise hi Narendra bhai bhale hi shaadi 
nai kiye …lekin aap aisa maan lena ki yeh tareek hai..Modi sahib ki shaadi hai toh apka 
jaana hai aur uss din Kamal ka batan dabana hai134 
[So we embedded the lotus by using henna on every hand, as if it was Narendra Modi 
Saheb’s wedding and we had to do the preparations. We used to campaign as though if 
there is a wedding at your home, then how would you do all the arrangements…in the 
same way even though Narendra Bhai is not married ...but you think that this is the 
date. Its Modi sahib’s wedding and you have to go and press the button for the lotus.] 
The sheer excitement with which women activists would engage in this campaign action 
reflected their affection for Modi as a ‘member of their family’ – as if they were 
preparing for the wedding of their ‘brother’.135 It is interesting to note that Modi’s 
‘official’ unmarried status is tacitly accepted and appreciated as Sonalben’s narrative 
above highlights “Narendra bhai bhale hi shaadi nai kiye” [even though Narendra Bhai is 
not married]. The fact that Modi never acknowledges his marriage or his wife in the 
public realm is left unquestioned and disregarded as a matter of concern.  
                                                 
134 Interview with Sonal, member of Mahila Morcha, 10th June 2014, Chhota Udepur, Gujarat. 
135 Field notes: 15th April 2014, attending one of the henna sessions during the campaign, Vadodara, 
Gujarat. 
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The kamal mehndi campaign reached out to Hindu women across classes and 
castes. During the fieldwork in both Vadodara and Varanasi, while following the 
women’s wing in their campaign, I observed that the women who agreed to have the 
lotus hennaed on their hands were all Hindus, both lower and upper caste. As far as 
class connotations were concerned, lower class women viewed the practice as part of a 
socio-cultural ritual, whereas for upper class women it was like a tattoo to flaunt.136 The 
campaign thus resonated strongly with Hindu women supporters. The ceremonial 
enactment of rituals is a familiar Hindutva strategy through which the distinctions 
between the public and the private, the political and the religious are erased. Sarkar and 
Bhutalia (1995) argue that Hindutva strategy involves presenting their cause as 
something that Hindu women should identify with across caste or community. An 
assessment made in the context of women’s participation during the Ayodhya campaign 
can be extended to the case of the Modi campaign wherein women are situated within 
the intersection of Hindu rituals, political role and agency. The kamal mehndi campaign 
can be situated within the same framework of mobilising women through the analogy of 
family-oriented marriage rituals. 
Whether at his rallies or campaigns, women supporters were the backbone of 
the Modi wave; many were in the audience just to see and hear him and were 
determined to make Modi the next prime minister. Most of them were not members of 
the BJP, but had decided to support or volunteer for him because they believed that 
Modi could deliver, especially in matters of women’s safety.137 Many were housewives 
and had organised themselves in groups, coming from as far away as Gandhinagar. 
Savitriben elaborated on her reason for coming to the rally: “Narendra Modi ko sunane ke 
liye aaye hai…party ke member toh nahi hai lekin Modi ke liye aaye hai…Modi Sahab ko PM 
                                                 
136 Field notes: 15th April 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
137 Field notes: 23rd April 2014, Kalol rally, Gujarat. 
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banana ke liye”138 [We have come to hear Narendra Modi; we are not members of the 
party but have come for Modi, to make Modi Sahib the PM]. The female support base 
identified with Modi on the ground of developmental benefits that have trickled down 
to them, enhancement of women’s security and his personality. As voters, many of the 
respondents claimed what they appreciated most about Modi’s governance was his 
success in developmental programmes, both in terms of overall growth and the starting 
of specific policies and programmes such as a women’s helpline, Kanya Kelavani (Girl’s 
Education), Anganwadi programmes that targeted women and above all a ‘safe’ 
environment for women in the state of Gujarat.  
If I say with regard to Baroda, the Navaratri festival is Baroda’s identity. Then women 
roam around until late at night, until 3 or 4. It is safe. That is why they are able to roam 
around. Second is the Ganapati festival; in that, too, women with their families can go 
and see the Ganapati, so our Gujarat and Baroda is safe for our women. Also, there are 
small jobs made available for women, which have also been taken up by women. And 
since it is safe, the family also feels that since you are safe you can go out and work.139 
Yameniben’s account above highlights the immense sense of security that 
women feel in Gujarat; many of them further emphasise that the sense of security 
comes from the fact that the Modi government has ensured that the law and order 
system is effective and accountable.140 However, Gujarat’s hallmark of safety, protection 
and mobility for women should be further probed for the nature of ‘paternalistic 
protection’ that it entails. During fieldwork in Gujarat, both in Vadodara and 
Ahmadabad, I observed during the daytime a lot of young girls who dominate the 
streets with their Kinetic Honda scooters and at night out with their families. In general, 
there is a considerable female presence in the public sphere. My own experience in the 
field made this ‘safe’ space easier to navigate.141 However, the point of concern is the 
idea of this safety is entrenched in the patriarchal narrative of protecting ‘our women’. 
                                                 
138 Field notes: One of the women supporters who had come to attend Modi’s Kalol Rally, Gujarat. 
139 Interview with Yaminiben, 9th June 2014, Baroda, Gujarat. 
140 Field notes: 23rd April 2014, Kallol Rally, Gujarat. 
141 Field notes: 2nd April 2014, Gujarat. 
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At night, most of them would be usually accompanied by a male. Furthermore there is 
an aspect of familial consent that underlies ‘allowing’ women to work or enter the 
public sphere, hence the emphasis given to parental permission and obedience that 
determines any female mobility, whether economic or social. The visibility of women in 
the public sphere is entrenched in filial benevolence conferred on those obedient 
women who toe the line according to patriarchal norms.  
mahila suraksha sabse pehli baat, beti bachao, berozgari door hui hai, Narmada ka paani 
saurashtr tak milne laga hai, brashtachar kam hua hai aur sarkar ka kaam systematic ho 
gaya hai.142 
[The first important thing is safety of women, save the girl child, unemployment has 
reduced, Narmada’s water is now available until Saurashtra, corruption has reduced and 
government’s work has become more systematic.] 
At the Kallol rally, on being asked to list what, according to them, would be the 
highlights of Modi’s chief ministership in Gujarat they claimed the above ranging from 
issues of girl child protection to checking corruption. Modi is thus perceived by women 
voters as somebody who is capable of effectively taking care of their interests and also 
under whose leadership the institutional structures would be made to take care of them. 
Most of them identify directly with his personality and leadership skills. 
Jab se Modi sarkar aayi hai tabse kaam thoda badne laga hai..hamein ek role model bana 
diya hai aur ek nai pehchan de di hai..ek uniform diya hai, award bhi diya hai..hamari 
izzat bani, society mein samman diya hai aur kaam karne ka ek utsah aata hai aur sakhi 
mandal mein hum regularly meeting bhi karte hai143 
[Since Modi’s government has come, work has increased; we have been given role 
models and we have a new identity, we have new uniforms, new awards… also, we 
have been given some honour. We get more respect from society and there is more 
motivation to work and we regularly organise our Sakhimandal meetings as well.] 
Echoing the voice of all the others in her group, Jituben summed up in her 
narrative above how Modi’s intervention has contributed to enhancing their status, 
profession and everyday life as anganwadi workers. It was interesting to note that of the 
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thirty anganwadi workers in this meeting, there were only two Muslim women.144 The 
respondents expressed a sense of self-worth with the visibility that the adoption of a 
new uniform sari brought, as all of them were enthused about being referred to as 
‘madam’ and having an identity of their own.145 Along with government initiatives such 
as sakhi mandals,146 they all claimed that they have learnt to talk to other women and also 
in public spaces about health and nutrition, open bank accounts and manage their own 
savings. Modi is considered in high regard, because he is seen as honouring and 
respecting anganwadi workers for their selfless work, as the Mata Yashoda award was 
instituted by him, to be given annually to the best anganwadi worker. 
However, an anganwadi worker draped in the uniformed sari signified Matrishakti 
juxtaposed with development. The identity enhancer award, Mata Yashoda, exhibits the 
Hindutva choice of female symbols, to set as the standard to be aimed for by all 
women. Yashoda is the foster mother of Krishna according to ancient Hindu texts and 
thus signifies women as the epitome of love and sacrifice and as natural caregivers –the 
sub-text being, of course, that anganwadi workers should take care of all children just as 
Yashoda did of Krishna. The programme ‘call to women to make Gujarat a malnutrition 
free state’ wherein women are trained to better manage child nutrition, household 
resources and food provisioning, absolves men of all these responsibilities whether 
within the household or the larger community. Celebrating and honouring women as 
mothers and caregivers is the most potent way of policing women’s roles, even if they 
are out in the public sphere. 
The flagship development programmes for women in Gujarat have been 
anchored in their role as ‘homemakers’. Beti Bachao (Save the Girl Child), Kanya Kelavani 
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145 Field note: 11th June 2014, focus group interview/interaction with anganwadi workers, Vadodara, 
Gujarat. 
146 Sakhi mandals is a Gujarat government initiative for women belonging to the BPL category and helps 
them to have financial savings and also helps in micro-financing small-scale business initiatives.  
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(Educating the girl child), Sakhi Mandal Yojana (rural women’s credit scheme) and the 
anganwadi schemes – the emphasis is on their traditional role in intra-family/intra-
community preservation. While each one targets core issues such as protecting girl 
children, girls’ education, financial savings, health and nutrition, they are couched in the 
gendered and patronising understanding of the role of Hindu women in the society. So 
even when the nutritional intake of young girls becomes part of the ICDS programme, 
the focus on young girls is mainly because of their gendered role as ‘future mothers’. 
This patriarchal lens denies the value and well-being of female children outside of these 
prescribed roles. The spectacular performative aspect of these schemes resonates with 
the nature of developmental yatras and utsavs. The two aspects of motherhood and 
honour are deeply problematic gendered roles because they perform the purpose of 
elevating women to a higher status of ‘sacrifice’ and godly footing. Just as the presence 
of men in uniform such as the police represents that the state is there to ensure the 
safety and security of its citizens, an anganwadi worker wearing a uniform sari signified 
circulating Modi’s growth story. 
Moreover, many of the young girls and women who participated in the Modi 
campaign as activists for the first time in Varanasi felt empowered as they were out of 
their homes, outside of domestic roles and doing political work were mostly lower 
middle and middle class in composition; this was also the case in Vadodara and 
Ahmadabad. But as Basu (1998) argues, women’s activism within Hindutva politics does 
not change or challenge patriarchal hierarchy either at home or outside. In this vein, 
women’s participation and visibility in the Modi campaign seems to reproduce filial and 
feminine subjectivity without disturbing hierarchies. 
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4.4.2 Turning a blind eye: invisible Muslims 
“Netaji aapke ek saal mein 250 dange hue hai…Gujarat mein das saal mein ek bhi 
danga nahi hua .kahin curfew nahi laga hain…aap hamari tulna kar rahein ho?!”147  
[Netaji, under your one year rule there have been 250 riots; for the past ten years there 
has been no rioting in Gujarat, there has been no curfew…are you trying to compare 
yourself to us?!]  
Thus Modi compared the situations in Gujarat and in UP at the election rally 
against the incumbent Samajwadi Party (SP) rule, and juxtaposed his politics of 
development as that of securing material and physical security for Muslims. In tandem 
with the BJP’s critique of the mainstream understanding of secularism as ‘appeasement 
of minorities’ and ‘vote bank’ politics, Modi struck at the opposition in UP. Gujarat, as 
a laboratory of Hindutva politics (Anand, 2016; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012; Shani, 2007; 
Spodek, 2010; Sud, 2012) and yatra politics, has been perpetrating fear and insecurity 
against the Muslim minorities in the state. “Politically, 2002 was a landmark for the 
Hindu Right’s twin projects of nation as well as state building” (Sud, 2012, p. 176). The 
discourse of security underscored in Modi’s narrative above, works as a two-edged 
dictum: protecting the Hindu self against the Muslim ‘other’ was the dominant 
interpretation for the majority Gujarati Hindus while, for the Muslim minorities, it 
translates into the hyper-masculine protection extended to them under Modi’s gaze of 
surveillance and segregation. After the 2002 pogrom, the symbolic violence of yatras 
such as the Sadbhavana rally and the Gujarati-Hindu exceptionalism of Vibrant Gujarat 
resulted in making and normalising the Muslim minorities invisible as citizen subjects.  
A visit to Muslim ghettos in Juhapura, Behrampura, Jamalpur and Yakutpura 
revealed spatial segregation, marginalisation and dehumanisation.148 “Political action 
including political violence is a multifaceted phenomenon and imaginative practices are 
one of the many contributing dynamics” (Anand, 2016, p. 153). It is these practices that 
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have dispersed and become normalised in the forms of spatial segregation and 
vegetarianism (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012) which results in Muslim subjects and their 
way of life disappearing from Modi’s ‘Developmental Blueprint’. Urban planning and 
spatial segregation has accomplished ghettoisation, effectively rendering Muslim 
subjects invisible spatially and economically: “not only did violence create an alibi for 
enhanced ghettoization, it thus also provided opportunities to remove Muslims as 
economic competition, in addition to rendering them socially vulnerable” (Rajagopal, 
2011a, p. 81). These Muslim ghettos are then, ‘blind spots’ in the mapping of Modi’s 
developmental success stories. Spatially and visually these pockets clearly stand out 
from the ‘Vibrant Gujarat’ model. Vadodara and Ahmadabad with their broad roads, 
BRTs, IIM and gated communities are starkly different from these ghettos – which are 
more like areas under constant construction – with clusters of small houses and jhuggis 
(slums), small shops and open drains. The sheer absence of Muslim life in the rest of 
the city demonstrates that the idea of Modi’s surajya is based on turning a blind eye or 
‘not seeing’ the non-Hindus. 
The Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM) was set up by the BJP after the 2002 
pogroms to win over the Muslims within the state under the auspices of the RSS leader 
Sudarshan (Dahat, 2014). For electoral gains and to demonstrate the success of the 
developmental story, Modi and the BJP went back to the fundamental cultural 
organisational base of the RSS and the MRM to garner Muslim votes, this despite 
having a minority wing Laghumati Morcha (LM) for Muslim representation within the 
party’s organisational structure. Gani Bhai Qureshi,149 explaining the relevance of the 
organisation, explained that since the Muslims were not coming out in support of the 
BJP in Gujarat, the RSS thought of this parallel cultural organisation. Qureshi, a Muslim 
himself, has been involved with the right wing groups since Jan Sangh said: 
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It has been ten years since MRM started off. The BJP party has a cell that deals with the 
minorities but there isn’t much work done with the Muslims by them, which is why 
Sudershanji and Indresh Kumarji thought since Muslims won’t come in BJP’s name, 
perhaps they will come under the banner of the Manch.150 
Ganibhai’s narrative itself displays the politics of fear and marginalisation that Gujarati-
Hindu exceptionalism confers on Muslim subjects and forces them to defy any 
assimilation, refusing outright to affiliate with the BJP. Conversations with a few 
Muslim supporters who were part of the BJP’s minorities’ forums such as the MRM and 
the LM in Vadodara and Ahmadabad seemed to suggest a rather pragmatic decision to 
extend support given the lack of a viable political alternative in Congress as far as 
Gujarat was concerned. Also, it should be noted that although I encountered few Modi 
supporters among the Muslim community through the official party channels, their 
visible absence from rallies or campaigns that I covered in Vadodara and Ahmadabad as 
part of the fieldwork revealed the cynicism and despondency that the community feels 
overall, despite a few of them acknowledging that some development had benefitted 
them.151 As I will discuss later, the presence of a viable alternative in the AAP clearly 
enhanced Muslim assertion and visibility in Varanasi.  
All the Muslim responses through official channels in Vadodara mostly 
elaborated upon construction of roads, electricity connections and water supplies being 
initiated by the government in ‘their’ areas, but they did not discount the Godhra rioting 
and violence and their after effects.152 These responses could also be read as re-
negotiating or getting by the everyday as opposed to holding on to past experiences, 
wherein day-to-day survival and satisfaction of basic material needs become the priority. 
However, the spatial analysis of the votes polled for the BJP in Vadodra and Varanasi 
revealed that overall the community as a whole preferred to assert their will against 
them and vote for an alternative political force, whichever was available. In Gujarat 
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then, it implied extending support for Congress as Susewind and Dhattiwala 
demonstrate in their analysis of spatial distribution of Muslim votes: “the relevance of 
Muslims’ electoral choices as well as the strength of ‘vote bank’ politics and thus an 
almost uniform rejection of the BJP and strong support of the Congress by Muslims 
across the state” (2014, p. 103).  
Alternatively, the existence of another more acceptable symbolic repertoire 
provided by the AAP in Varanasi enabled an open and visible assertion by the Muslims 
of UP, even though the BJP tried to reach out through the MRM here as well. The 
strategy adopted by the BJP was quite different in Varanasi; it involved neutralising 
Modi’s image as someone who presided over large-scale violence against Muslims by 
emphasising an inclusive growth story of prosperity for Muslims in Gujarat. Ganibhai 
led a team of around 40 Muslims for seven days to campaign for Modi.153  
Banaras mein poori team ko leke gaya tha sab Musalman…dekha ki Banaras ke andar 
Muslim samaj mein jana hai toh Kutch se, Qureshi, Dharam guru aur pathan log sabko 
leke gaya..hamne campaign kiya rasoolpura, badi bazaar aur madanpura mein kiya aur 
bhi bahut se elake the…aur Modiji aur Gujrat ke bare mein jo galat fehmi thi woh 
hamne door karin. 
[We had taken a whole team of Muslims as we had gone to the Muslim community in 
Benaras, they were from Kutch, Qureshis, religious leaders and Pathans – everybody 
was taken along. We campaigned in Rasoolpura, Badi Bazar and Madanpura and many 
other areas and whatever misgivings they had regarding Modiji and Gujarat we tried to 
remove them.] 
The mission to change mindsets in Varanasi was based on Modi’s effective role in ‘riot 
control’, he continued:  
quami fasad hua hai hamara 2002 mein hamara inkar nahi hain…lekin uske baad 
Gujarat ke andar koi danga nahi hai, koi fasad nahi hai…aaj tak koi bhi bande ko 
curfew dekhne ko nahi mila hai…pehle kya tha koi bhi mehman ko aana hota tha woh 
pehle phone karta tha ki mahual kaisa hai aapke wahan ..aaj aadmi ko phone karne ka 
nahi , poochna nahi…aadmi aata hai aur chala jata hain…yeh mahual aaj ka hai.154  
[We are not denying the communal riots of 2002 but after that there has not been any 
strife inside Gujarat – no riots, nobody has seen a curfew since then. Earlier, if a guest 
had to come he would phone and check to find out what the situation was here, but 
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today nobody has to make a call to find out. They come and they go, that is the 
situation now.]  
However, this security discourse did not win much support in UP for two reasons. 
First, the political culture of the state is relatively more democratic and secular 
discursively and culturally, as a political community in itself, as opposed to Gujarat; 
hence the politics of fear was not a determining factor for the Muslim community. 
Second, despite the Hinduness of Varanasi as a political site, as discussed earlier, its 
syncretism was capitalised by the AAP mobilisation both in its agenda and symbolism. 
Ghani Bhai also acknowledged the response by Muslims in Varanasi that MRM was not 
exactly welcome and the people were not convinced, “logon ke response mein rosh tha ki ‘aap 
paise leke aye ho’; ‘aap bikey hue musalman ho!”155 [Some people were agitated, “you have 
taken money and come’; ‘you are a sold out Muslim’!]. 
 
Figure 4.6: AAP supporters outside the Benaras Hindu University (BHU), UP156 
One of the striking aspects of the AAP election campaigning on the streets of 
Varanasi was, as Figure 4.6 displays, the appearance of AAP topis worn by its Muslim 
supporters, replacing the Muslim skull caps. Interestingly, the AAP topis’ slogan ‘mein 
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hoon aam aadmi’ (I am a common man) was also customised in Urdu script, having earlier 
been limited to Hindi and English.157 The decision by Muslims in Varanasi to put their 
weight behind a secular alternative in the AAP translated into their visible participation 
in the election campaigning after few weeks it was started, thereby illustrating two 
aspects: first, an overt and forceful Muslim assertion against Modi and the BJP and 
second, the emergence of the AAP as a non-sectarian political force and a challenge to 
the Modi wave.  
Indeed, the strong rejection of Modi and the BJP by Muslims in Varanasi (an estimated 
loss of 0.49 votes for each additional Muslim voter) led them almost exclusively to 
support the AAP, while SP, BSP and Congress fared much less well (Susewind & 
Dhattiwala, 2014, p. 105) 
The Muslim subjects situated in Modi’s developmental cosmos with its attendant 
inherent symbolic violence seem to be negotiating and asserting themselves in the 
interests of their community and everyday existence both in Vadodara and Varanasi. 
Despite the symbolic dominance and power of the Hindutva forces under Modi and 
their concerted effort at invisibilisation, it is being contested democratically and 
symbolically by the Muslim citizen-subject.  
4.5 Statue of ‘Patel’ Unity – Of Contestations, Interlude and Resurrection 
Sardar Patel nu je adhura kaam che pura karvanu muaka...varsho pachi Gujarat na haat 
ma aavi gayo che Sardar Patel na sapana sakaar karvanu ek su avsar aavi gayo che158 
[This is an opportunity to complete the unfinished work of Sardar Patel. After so many 
years Gujarat has got this opportunity to achieve Sardar Patel’s dream. We have got an 
opportunity.]  
Modi modelled himself as the chotte sardar’ (junior supremo). If Patel was 
Gujarat’s sardar (supremo), Chimanbhai Patel159 modelled himself as his junior chotte 
sardar; and now “Narendra Modi has adopted this mantel” (Sud, 2012, p. 42). One item 
on Modi’s agenda when he staked claim to the office of the prime minister was to 
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redress the past injustices meted out to the other son of Gujarat, Sardar Vallabhbhai 
Patel. He was of the view that the political history of the country had denied political 
space and acknowledgement to the contributions of Patel. Hence, weaving in the hurt 
sentiments of Gujarati asmita, Modi was “convinced that official history had been unfair 
to Gujarat which had produced both Sardar Patel and Mahatma Gandhi” (Visvanathan, 
2013). 
He belongs to Gujarat, that is why. The first man in India who got all the princes 
together, which is why he is called the Iron Man of India. He told all the kingdoms that 
it can’t continue like this. One country, unity in diversity, as it’s said in Gujarat. He 
never thought of the partition of India/Pakistan, strength in integrated India, which 
Narendra Bhai will show to the rest of the world. Now America has called on him, 
Narendrabhai has that impact!160 
Drawing a linear correlation between Patel and Modi, one of the BJP party 
members, Dalal, explained the reason for building Patel’s statue in the narrative above. 
Modi lauds Patel for using a coercive strategy against the princes of the princely states at 
the time of independence to materialise the idea of an Akhandh Bharat (Integrated 
India).  
Sardar Patel brought the nation together. But gradually his memories are fading away. 
To reinvigorate his memory and as a fitting tribute to the Iron Man of India, we are 
building this statue, which will be double in height than the Statue of Liberty in New 
York (“Tallest statue order”, 2013) 
The mobilisation for achieving a consensus around the statue building was 
aimed at bridging the rural urban divide and predisposed to realise a Hindu unity. Six 
months before he was elected prime minister in May, “Modi launched the project to 
build the bronze-and-iron statue – which aims to be twice the height of the Statue of 
Liberty at 182 metres”.161 Yatra politics in two different formats were launched targeting 
different sections of the Gujarati population – a ‘run’ for the urban cosmopolitan crowd 
and a ‘Loha (Iron) campaign’ for the rural masses. Modi started his election campaign 
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with the ‘Run for Unity’ inaugurated in Vadodara, on 16th December 2013, with the BJP 
organising simultaneous runs in other parts of the country (Desai, 2013).  
Patel is the Iron Man, he was to become the prime minister of India, and it was his 
dream of an integrated India otherwise Congress would have divided it. Like in 
America people go to see the Statue of Liberty, why can’t we have a Statue of Unity 
here?! The main point is to boost tourism; his vision is to develop the infrastructure of 
India.162 
Jitenbhai, an upper middle class Hindu and an ardent supporter of Modi, 
elaborated on his support for Patel’s statue and why he participated in the Run for 
Unity in the above narrative. He echoed the sentiments of most of the middle class 
Gujaratis who perceived the campaign to be about Gujarati pride and the Patel statue as 
serving the aesthetic and touristic interests of the state. The ‘Run for Unity’ was 
followed by launching the Loha (iron) collection campaign. As part of this campaign, 
people were urged to collect from farmers small pieces of iron which would eventually 
be used to build the proposed Patel statue. A strategy akin to the collection of bricks 
during the Ayodhya campaign,163 people from different organisations across the state 
and volunteers collectively contributed to collect iron.  
“This run is being organised with a determination to unite the people, unite the 
villages and unite the nation,” Mr. Modi said, claiming it was all about ‘patriotism’” 
(Modi, quoted by Desai, 2013). Patel signified in his leadership a ‘unifying force’ and 
hence the BJP campaign narrative aimed at building unity across regions and social 
classes on a pan-India level. However, as one interrogates the caste politics in Gujarat 
and the overarching Hindu unity that BJP aims to engineer, it appears that there is more 
to this ‘unification’ than just unifying the nation. Besides being a staunch nationalist, 
Patel also believed in the Hindu unity, similar to Gandhi, and opposed separate 
electorates for the lower castes. According to him, they were part and parcel of Hindu 
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unity and hence compatible with the BJP’s agenda. Also, as a national leader belonging 
to the dominant Patel caste, he wielded much power amongst the community. In 
Gujarat, the second largest and particularly influential caste group are the Patidars 
(Shani, 2007). They became politically dominant in Ahmadabad and well entrenched in 
the Congress party under the leadership of Vallabhai Patel (Hardiman, 1981). The 
politics of unification as expressed through the Patel statue outlines the underlying caste 
dynamics within Gujarat.  
Modi’s lower caste status ruptures the linear correlation between Sardar to Chotte 
Sardar; he belongs to the Ganchi164 caste (Sud, 2012; Visvanathan, 2013). Modi’s lower 
caste status makes him an outsider to the political corridors of Gandhinagar. His 
meteoric rise within the party did not go well with the Patel community within the BJP 
leadership, leading to open rebellions by this dominant section under the leadership of 
Keshubhai Patel.165 “Within the BJP, savarnas [upper castes] especially the Saurashtra 
Patels under Keshubhai, have been unhappy at being upstaged in the leadership stakes 
by the OBC Modi” (Sud, 2012, p. 37). The Patels are divided into two main groups, 
Leva Patel and Kadva Patel, the former being considered higher in the status hierarchy 
(Kohli, 1990; Shani, 2007); “Keshubhai Patel represented the Patidar lobby, particularly 
leva patidar from Saurashtra” (Shah, 1998, p. 260). In 2007, Modi faced open public 
revolts from the Patidar-dominated farmers’ wing of the Sangh Parivar, from his own 
party’s men because the Keshubhai Patel camp refused to cooperate during the 
campaigning for the Assembly elections (Sud, 2012). The final jolt came before the 
Assembly elections of 2012, when the Leva sub-sect section of Patels under the 
leadership of Keshubhai Patel walked out of the BJP to form a new political party, the 
Gujarat Parivartan Party (GPP). The after effects of this break-up, in the name of 
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injustice to Patidars led by Keshubhai, and had the potential to alienate both the Leva 
and Kedva Patels. When Modi laid the foundation for the Patel statue, the support of 
both Patel groups had been won over and ensured. Thus, the pitch for a Patel statue 
project also influenced the balance of the caste hierarchy and pacification of the Patel 
community within the internal dynamics of Gujarat politics. By 2013, at the time of 
Modi’s nomination for prime ministerial candidature, this internal rebellion had started 
to fizzle out in the interest of Gujarati asmita. 
However, on the actual election campaign trail in Vadodara, the mobilisation 
around the ‘Patel Statue’ disappeared from the symbolic political field as a counter-
mobilisation by the Dalits demanded that Ambedkar’s statue in Gujarat be not only 
taller than Patel’s but also the tallest statue in the world.166 Barely days after a mammoth 
‘Run for Unity’, some 3000 Dalits planned to take to the streets across Gujarat 
demanding a similar statue for Ambedkar. The rally was to be held at Badharka, a village 
10 km from Dholka on 25th December 2013; the day Ambedkar burnt the Manusmriti 
(Hindu code of laws by Manu) in 1927. 
The details of this particular Dalit mobilisation and the nature of symbolic 
contestation that it initiated with the demand for the Ambedkar statue will be taken up 
in the next chapter. But the important dimensions this demand brought to the 
mainstream discourse was the visibility of contestation based on caste in Gujarat. The 
caste coalition that the BJP was trying to engineer and unify around the Patel statue 
began to experience roadblocks on two levels with this parallel mobilisation: first, 
fissures started appearing not just in the attempt to constitute a ‘Hindu unity’ but also in 
Modi’s narrative around the politics of Surajya and the Gujarat model. Second, the 
symbolic contestation that thus ensued between the two statues is not about parallel 
statue-building competitions, but the two leaders’ political and ideological standpoints 
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on the question of caste. The Constituent Assembly debates between Ambedkar and 
Patel reveal the crucial reason behind the significance of these leaders to their respective 
communities. 
Ambedkar’s proposal for separate electorates for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) 
and Scheduled Tribes (STs) as the chairman of the drafting committee of the 
Constitution was rejected by Hindu traditionalist leaders including Munshi, Das, Prasad 
and Patel (Jaffrelot, 2003a). “For Patel it is up to the scheduled castes to regain the trust 
of the upper castes. The problem is psychological: the scheduled castes must erase their 
inferiority complex” (p. 95). The symbolic contestation by the Dalits was to counter the 
symbolic violence that Patel’s statue and his politics signified which was based on upper 
caste arrogance and paternalistic assimilation. The Gujarati-Hindu upper caste 
exceptionalism had ensured that the history of relationship between the upper and 
lower castes within Gujarati civil society was violent and conservative, especially with 
regard to any redistributive policies like reservation of quotas “The riots in Ahmadabad 
in 1985 erupted over the decision of the Gujarat government to increase the quotas 
reserved for backward castes in educational institutions and government jobs” (Shani, 
2007, p. 57). The practices of untouchability are dispersed spatially on a routine level. 
Furthermore, a recent study conducted by the Navsarjan Trust in Gujarat (2007-2010) 
revealed widespread practices of untouchability in rural Gujarat.167 Highlighting this 
discrimination and marginalisation of Dalits within Gujarat, a memorandum by 
members of the community across the state, titled ‘Ek Awaaz, Ek Morcha’ (One Voice, 
One Front) expressing their anguish against the state government was also recently 
submitted to the state’s chief secretary (Sharma, 2014). The memorandum contained the 
thumbprints of over a thousand Dalits, fracturing the success of the Gujarat model. 
                                                 
167 The Navsarjan Report can be found at: 
http://navsarjan.org/Documents/Untouchability_Report_FINAL_Complete.pdf 
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As the Dalit mobilisation around their demand for Ambedkar’s statue became 
assertive, visible and successful, the consensus building and campaigning around Patel’s 
statue became invisible. The impact of Dalit mobilisation forced the BJP and Modi to 
withdraw the symbol of ‘upper caste pacification’ in the fear that such an open and 
powerful contestation would reveal the caste equations which had been thus far 
concealed under the narrative of Gujarati pride and assertion. The assertion by the 
Dalits, through Ambedkar statue campaign, ruptured the Gujarati-Hindu-upper caste 
exceptionalism visually, discursively and politically during the entire campaign. The 
discourse around the Patel statue re-emerged in the symbolic political field only after 
Modi became prime minister. The so-called ‘Statue of Unity’ was allocated Rs. 200 
crore, from the Union budget (M.P. Singh, 2014). This case will be further analysed in 
the next chapter. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Modi’s political success challenged the political system based on dynastic politics 
represented by the Congress party. His rise was symbolic of social and political mobility, 
aspirational politics and decisionism against the backdrop of the weak and corrupt 
incumbent government led by Congress. However, the symbolism of Modi’s 
Vikaspurush campaign as discussed here constituted a sacralised political field of 
perception. It activated a spatial assertion embedded in ethno-religious tradition in both 
Gujarat and Varanasi. The instrumentalist and non-discursive nature of the mobilisation 
not only constituted passive subjects but also invisibilised those who were not part of 
this Gujarati-Hindu exceptionalism. Also, Modi’s campaign for the tallest Patel statue 
brought to the fore the inherent caste dynamics underlying his politics of development. 
While mobilising embodied political participation, it prevents transgressions, 
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negotiations or challenges to the majoritarian self, thus constituting an embodied 
‘infantile’ subject. 
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5 Performing Defiance: B.R. Ambedkar Samajik Parivartan Sthal 
and Statues 
 
Figure 5.1: Haathi Deergha (Elephant Gallery), Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow, UP168 
 
  
Figure 5.2: The Bahujan Samaj Party’s (BSP) party symbol169 
                                                 
168This image was taken by the author in March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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5.1 Introduction 
At the Parivartan Sthal, a row of sixty elephants known as the Haathi Deergha 
welcomes visitors to this massive memorial at the heart of Lucknow city (see Figure 
5.1). In the context of the UP state assembly elections in 2012, the visibility of these 
elephants in the public sphere was interpreted as ‘BSP’s elephants’ causing the Election 
Commission (EC) to issue an order to cover Mayawati’s statues and her political party’s 
- the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) symbol – the elephant, both in Lucknow and Noida 
(A. Khan, 2012). What becomes vital here is to account for the caste Hindu response to 
the appearance of Dalit symbols in the public sphere.  
The Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Quraishi is reported to have justified 
the order thus: 
All statues of the CM and the elephants installed on government expenditure would be 
covered. This is standard procedure while the model code of conduct is in force in 
order not to disturb the level playing field (Quraishi, quoted in Naim, 2012). 
The mainstream political parties in UP, such as the Samajwadi Party (SP) and Congress, 
celebrated the EC’s decision for ensuring a fair competition between all political parties. 
It is interesting to note the BSP’s response to the EC’s order: 
Warning of adverse popular reaction, Mishra came out with counter-questions. One of 
them was whether the EC would consider covering statues of elephants from various 
temples, President House, North and South Block and even the Lok Sabha Speaker’s 
chair when elections in Delhi are held. He also wanted to know if all lotus flowers 
(BJP’s symbol) would be plucked from lakes in poll-bound states and cycles (Samajwadi 
Party’s symbol) barred from the roads (Mishra, quoted in Naim, 2012) 
Mishra’s (BSP’s General Secretary) counter questions outline the entrenched casteist 
bias exposed by the EC’s decision against the BSP, a Dalit political party. The EC’s 
decision signified the ‘manuwadi gaze’170 through which the Indian political and 
                                                                                                                                          
169 Image source: BSP’s official website http://www.bspindia.org/ 
170 I use ‘manuwadi gaze’ to imply the caste Hindus’ field of perception which is embedded in a 
Brahmanical belief system. Manuwadi literally translates into proponent of the ethos of Manusmriti which is 
considered the divine code of law defining the Hindu self. The text not only codifies the caste-based 
occupational hierarchy but addresses all facets of life. Governed by the norms of purity and pollution, 
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bureaucratic structure perceived Mayawati’s intervention in the dominant 
Brahmanical/nationalist political field.  
The official response of the BSP highlights the fact that the BSP’s election 
symbol and the Haathi Deergha (Elephant Gallery) in the Parivartan Sthal are different in 
their iconopraxis. Mayawati argued that the “[s]tatues of elephant [sic] were installed as 
per the Indian culture and not because of being the BSP symbol. These statues have 
been installed to welcome the visitors” (“Mayawati attacks EC”, 2012). The BSP 
pointed out that the elephant’s trunk in the party symbol is lowered whereas in the Sthal 
elephants’ trunks were in the welcome posture and so the argument of a ‘level playing 
field’ should not arise. “This is not fair and against natural justice”, claimed Mishra 
(ENS, 2012). The BSP’s explanation and the images of the two contrasting postures of 
the elephants (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2) lays bare the anxiety and the perplexity of the 
dominant Brahminical/nationalist order at encountering Dalit symbolic repertoire and 
thus seeing BSP’s elephants where none exist.  
The EC’s performative act of covering these elephants with plastic sheets and 
the ever present narrative of corruption around the construction of these memorial 
demonstrates what Mayawati’s intervention through memorial building projects and 
mainstreaming of Dalit symbols entails visually. She was accused of merely investing in 
the symbolism of statues and memorial building rather than ensuring material benefits 
for Dalits by building schools, universities, hospitals and roads. Her investment in 
symbolism within Dalit politics is perceived as a case of “misplaced symbolism” (EPW 
Editorial, 2009, p.7). The EPW editorial sums it up as a case of material priorities of the 
Dalits being side-lined as a result of ostentatious spending on memorial construction. 
Her critics say that this, combined with Mayawati’s attempt to place her own statue 
within the pantheon of Dalit leaders, takes this symbolism too far. 
                                                                                                                                          
these codes prescribed separate and discriminatory practices between the caste Hindus and Dalits 
outlining human interactions and eating habits as well as their perceptions/ways of looking.  
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Contrary to the mainstream analysis, this chapter argues that the intersection 
between Dalit politics and symbolism, rather than being a case of misplaced priorities, 
redefines the habitus of a Dalit subject by transgressing the manuwadi field of perception 
and enabling Dalits to assert themselves by being seen discursively, spatially and visually. 
Symbolic intervention therefore constitutes a defiant embodied visible Dalit citizen 
subject. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section on spatio-material 
assertion discusses the construction of the B.R. Ambedkar Parivartan Sthal by Mayawati 
and the resultant spatial assertion by Dalits. Through this anti-Brahmanical counter-
space the sthal also transforms the politico-symbolic field of the city of Lucknow. The 
second, Statues of Dis-order, analyses the politics of statues with reference to Ambedkar 
and Mayawati statues and the circulation of the normative, temporal and symbolic 
values that they manifest. Shifting the focus of Dalit symbolic politics from UP to 
Gujarat, the third section on symbolic contestation analyses the anti-Patel statue 
campaign in the context of Modi’s general election campaign of 2014. It traces the 
powerful Dalit mobilisation around building the tallest statue of Ambedkar instead of 
Patel in Gujarat. The discussion maps the altered practices of iconography and 
symbolism emerging within the Dalit community. 
This work intends to contribute to the study of the politics of symbolism and 
performativity in Dalit political subject formation.The dominant literature on Dalit 
politics in relation to UP can be divided into two broad categories. The first maps the 
political evolution of the anti-caste movement and the role of Ambedkar (Keer, 1971; 
Omvedt, 1994, 1995, 2004; Zelliot, 1969, 1996) while the second studies the rise of the 
BSP as the political party of the lower castes (Chandra, 2004; Jaffrelot, 2003a, 2005a, 
2005b; Pai, 2002, 2013). These scholarships effectively trace the emergence of Dalit 
party politics; however their engagement with Dalit subject formation and its inherent 
symbolism has been limited. This thesis aims to mainstream the performative essence, 
168 
extending the work of Kumar (2006), Lynch (1969) and Rao (2009), thereby pursuing 
the performative politics of Dalit assertion through the perspective of a “roaring 
revolution” (Kumar, 2006) rather than a “silent revolution” (Jaffrelot, 2003a). It aims to 
analyse how performative defiance of Brahmanical Hinduism and the practices of 
untouchability has been integral to Dalit politics since long before political 
Independence from the British and thereby instrumental in constituting an assertive 
Dalit subject (Kumar, 2006; Lynch, 1969). For instance, Lynch discussed the role of the 
Jatav Youth League (JYL) in the 1930s in organising a defiant act against the Poona 
Pact171 in Agra where the main attraction in the protest was a model of a wolf signifying 
the pact.  
The Poona Pact was like a Brahmin wolf that had run wild and was devouring the SC. 
The wolf was publicly burned, and the heat of the Jatav anger was not lost to the eyes 
of the Agra upper castes who saw themselves symbolically consumed in the flames of 
long smouldering resentment. (Lynch, 1969, p. 88) 
Applying the Dalit performative defiant lens to the analysis of the politics of 
statues and memorial building project, this analysis aims to bridge the gap between the 
political and cultural analysis of Dalit politics, which has also been the thrust of 
Ambedkar's politics. Extending the existing scholarship on Dalit symbolism, visual 
practices and imagery by Jain (2014), Jaoul (2006), Loynd (2009), Lynch (1969) and 
Tartakov (1990, 2012) my work contributes to understanding Dalit counter publics 
(Ciotti, 2010; Narayan, 2011; Rege, 2008) and the politics of visual imagery in Dalit 
politics. 
At the outset, this study deviates from the dominant frame of analysis employed 
in relation to symbolism in Dalit politics. The two prominent binaries that dominate 
                                                 
171 The Poona Pact refers to an agreement reached between Gandhi and Ambedkar in 1932 on the issue 
of separate electorates for the Depressed Classes in provincial legislatures in British India. Gandhi 
objected to this allocation on the grounds of this decision leading to divisions of Hindus and went on fast 
to death in Yerwada Jail in Poona. Ambedkar, however, argued for separate political representation for 
the depressed classes. Finally an agreement was reached and a consensus on the number of seats arrived 
at between leaders of caste Hindus and Depressed Classes. 
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analysis of Dalit symbolism are those of dignity/class and symbolic/material. First, for 
instance, Jaoul argues: 
While symbolic politics has played a significant part in democratization, today this 
seems a convenient motive for the Dalit middle-class leadership to push issues of class 
under the carpet and to talk exclusively about issues of dignity. (Jaoul, 2006, p. 122) 
The dichotomy between class and dignity is based on the assumption that these are two 
distinct aspects of a Dalit identity. However, as Ambedkar argues, this dichotomy 
between class and dignity does not exist for a Dalit. In Annihilation of Caste (1990 [1936]) 
he writes that the first thing to be urged against this view is that the caste system is not 
just about division of labour based on occupational status hierarchies; it is also division 
of labourers based on caste-based hierarchies. “Caste was classlike, but also a form of 
embodiment; stigma carried upon the body was the perverse legacy of the Hindu 
juridical order” (Rao, 2009, p. 134). Rao (2009) further elaborates on Ambedkar’s 
understanding of the caste structure as an embodied experience for a labourer: 
Unlike workers in western nations who could become visible as labour, Dalit structural 
negativity arose from their extraneous position in a system of symbolic labor. They 
could creatively make this visible only in the political arena: the emancipation of the 
minority subject was culturally specific, even if it resembled the trajectory of proletarian 
conscientization. (p. 137)  
Hence, based on the above, analysis of caste, class and questions of dignity are more 
complex and entangled in Dalit identity than in that of the labourer in the western 
context, located outside the caste structure. Therefore issues of dignity and class cannot 
be abstracted for a Dalit. Following on from this, the distinction between symbolic and 
material therefore also becomes artificial because the structural violence inherent in the 
caste system ensures that Dalits are excluded from access to or control of means of 
production. “Ambedkar theorized caste as a doubled structure of symbolic and material 
dispossession” (p. 129). Therefore the Dalit embodied both repugnance and 
exploitation. 
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Of the many incidents of everyday atrocities and violence committed against the 
Dalits in India, the 1996 massacre of 21 Dalits in Bathani Tola (Bihar) stands out.172 In 
this case, the Ranvir Sena murdered Dalit landless labourers because they were being 
more assertive against the upper-caste landlords. The sena is an upper caste (Bhumiar) 
militia supported by the Rajputs in Bihar, who often engage in mass killings of Dalits 
with impunity. I highlight this massacre to point out that if the nature of upper-caste 
Brahmanical discrimination, exclusion and violence is re-signified on Dalit bodies both 
symbolically and materially at the same time, then to expect Dalit assertion to make a 
distinction between the two is unwarranted. Thus, for Dalit politics this dyad does not 
hold forth as Rao (p. 188) also emphatically argued: “there was thus no easy distinction 
between the symbolic and the real in the Dalit politics”. The question that needs to be 
raised is why should Dalit politics have to choose between the two binaries to assert 
their Dalit self and citizenship? For instance, evoking Ambedkar’s name for government 
policies illustrates that his symbolism and legacy has produced materially consequential 
benefits for Dalit politics.  
Dalit political assertion has had three phases in UP. The first was the formation 
of the Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF) during the late colonial period (Duncan, 
1979), followed by the establishment of the Ambedkarite Republican Party of India 
(RPI) in 1956 which had brief success before it was absorbed by the Congress party 
(Lynch, 1969). The formation of the BSP constituted the third phase in the 1980s (Pai, 
2002). BSP’s core political ideology lies in challenging entrenched manuwadi practices 
and activating the political category of the bahujan (majority). Through the conceptual 
political group of bahujan, Narayan (2011) explains that Kanshi Ram, the founder of 
BSP, was trying to arouse the desire of the oppressed group to transform existing social 
norms and to take control of the political scenario. The symbolic and the performative 
                                                 
172 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/For-residents-of-Bathani-it-is-a-horror-they-
cannot-forget/article12967259.ece 
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relevance of the term bahujan were based on the concept of opposing Brahmanism. 
Narayan (2011) also points out that the main aim was to counter the self-assumed 
inheritance by the upper castes as original inhibitors of India and consequently their 
dominance and superiority. The path to attain equality that was visualised by Dalit 
ideologues was through the right to representation and the right to hold public offices 
of the state.  
In UP, at least sixty-six castes constitute the texture of (SCs) Dalit Community. 
Chamar, Pasi, Dhobi, Bhangis, Khatik, Kories and the like, are numerically as well as 
politically, the major groups. Tatawa, Rangrej, Nai, Dhanuks, and many other small 
lower castes also come under the Dalit section of society in UP. (Narayan, 2011, p. 
xviii) 
Emerging from a lower middle-class trade union organisation of government 
employees, the Backward and Minority Classes and Employees Federation (BAMCEF), 
in 1976 led by Kanshi Ram it became the starting point for a subaltern political 
imagination (Jaffrelot, 2003a; Pai, 2002). The trade union’s extension set up in 1981 was 
called the DS4 (Dalit Shoshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti) and was more aggressive in its 
approach. Eventually the DS4 and its activities was subsumed with the formation of the 
BSP in 1984, with the objective of emancipation of the marginalised by seizing political 
power through democratic representation. The performative impact of the BSP slogan 
‘Tilak Taraju aur talvar isko maro joote char’’173 targeted symbolically and discursively the 
symbolic power of the caste Hindus and challenged their political dominance by the 
counter power of the lower caste majority. Their slogan is a symbolic retort to the caste 
Hindus’ ritual purity which uses the slippers/shoes to show Dalits ‘their place’ in the 
caste hierarchy and to humiliate them. In the 1990s, Mayawati coined the slogan ‘jo 
zameen sarkari hai, woh zameen hamari hai’ (The land that belongs to the government 
                                                 
173 “The tilak [emblem of the sectarian affiliation of the Hindus which is applied to the forehead and 
symbolises the Brahmin], the balance [symbol of the merchant castes] and the sword[(the symbol of the 
warrior castes], hit them with your shoes [symbol of the Chamars, the principal Scheduled Caste of North 
of India, who are leatherworkers])” (Jaffrelot, 2003a, p. 397). 
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belongs to us) to define the spatio-political Dalit challenge to practices of untouchability 
and ghettoisation inherent in the Hindu caste order.  
Tracing the BSP’s politics under Mayawati thus begins with her strategy of 
installing statues, renaming public spaces and glorifying the leaders of the Dalit struggle. 
This project was implemented in all the four terms of the BSP rule in UP under the 
chief ministership of Mayawati (1995, 1997, 2002-3, 2007-12). Ambedkar statues were 
set up across the state as part of government intervention as noted by Jaffrelot (2003a) 
and Pai (2002).  
It is commonplace to find statues of Dalit heroes at various public squares (chauraha) of 
UP—be it small qasbas, townships or big cities like Lucknow, Noida and Allahabad. It is 
estimated that there are some 20,000 statues of Ambedkar in the state, not to speak of 
local Dalit heroes. (Narayan, 2011, p. 112)  
The spectacular culmination of this symbolic intervention was the construction of the 
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Samajik Parivartan Sthal in Lucknow. The following section 
discusses the spatio-material assertion made by these commemorative structures and the 
resultant Dalit subjectivity that is constituted through this symbolic intervention. 
5.2 Spatio-material Dalit Assertion 
This section analyses specifically the memorial building project initiated by 
Mayawati which led to the construction of the Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Samajik Parivartan 
Sthal and Parivartan chowk in Lucknow. It argues that the sthal and the chowk emerge as 
anti-Brahmanical counter-spaces174 and, by disrupting the manuwadi sanitised gaze, make 
a spatio-material Dalit assertion. It extends the scholarship on the sthal and spatial 
assertion done by Jain (2014), Jaoul (2006) and Loynd (2009) along with the additional 
lens of the practices of iconography involved (Tartakov, 1990, 2012). It also aims to 
analyse the visual practices involved therein and highlight the limitation of the use of 
the dominant framework of sacred seeing (darshan) (Eck, 1985) to Dalit politics. This 
                                                 
174 Using Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of counter–space. 
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work contributes to the analysis of the commemorative structure as not just a grand 
architectural structure but as a spatio-material historical marker of caste struggle in 
India. 
The Hindu caste order has ensured that Dalits remain, as Guru (2004) describes 
it, ‘bahishkrit’ (outcaste, ostracised, ghettoised and socially boycotted), rendering both 
Dalit subjects and their worldview invisible to the political field of perception both 
socially and spatially. By building these commemorative memorials Mayawati forces non-
Dalits to see the stigmatised invisible citizen-subjects and their worldviews. Writing on 
untouchability, Ambedkar says: 
It is not a case of social separation, a mere stoppage of social intercourse for a 
temporary period. It is a case of territorial segregation and of a cordon sanitaire putting 
the impure people inside a barbed wire into a sort of cage. Every Hindu village has a 
ghetto. The Hindus live in the village and the Untouchables in the ghetto. (Ambedkar, 
1990, p. 266) 
The norms of purity/pollution inherent in the Hindu caste system not only have an 
impact in defining social interaction, but also ensure permanent ostracism. Guru (2009) 
incisively describes the humiliation underlying the practice of purity and pollution; in 
India it involves the rejection of the untouchable to be complete, suggesting a 
concentrated expression of repulsion. It not only makes the untouchable invisible, but 
unimaginable. The ideology of purity/pollution removes a vast section of people from 
social interaction, both in terms of time and space. The caste system and the ideology of 
purity and pollution produces a kind of total rejection which seeks to push a person or 
the entire social group in question beyond the civilisational framework, rendering them 
completely unseeable, unapproachable and untouchable. As Rege argued, “space and 
spatial strategies of appropriation, deployment and control have been of crucial 
significance in maintaining hierarchical relations of caste” (2008, p. 17).  
Mayawati’s project of building the Parivartan sthal and chowk challenged this 
pollution line entrenched in Hindu caste and political order. These structures in the 
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middle of the city of Lucknow have altered the imputed meaning of the city and also, 
more crucially, exhibit the spatio-cultural assertion and claim making by the Dalits, 
while also attempting to invert the code of social interaction across time and space. 
 
Figure 5.3: Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow175 
                                                 
175 Image taken by the author, 4th March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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Figure 5.4: Parivartan Chowk, Lucknow176 
5.2.1 Disrupting the manuwadi sanitised vision: Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Samajik 
Parivartan Prateek Sthal, chowk and statues 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 exhibit the lateral rather than vertical extent of these 
structures.177 Besides their inherent anti-Brahmanical foundations, they are also 
representative of extending the Dalit political agenda of spatial assertion on public land. 
The Ambedkar sthal was inaugurated in 2005, spread over 123 acres in Gomti Nagar in 
Lucknow; “the inauguration involved Mayawati and six Buddhist monks performing 
ceremonies according to Buddhist tradition” (Loynd, 2009, p. 474). By following 
Buddhist practices at the inauguration, Mayawati was effecting rejection of Hinduism, 
following Ambedkarite politics. As Jain opines, “the sensibility here is necessarily 
cosmopolitan because it refuses to be Hindu, conjoining the BSP’s anti-Hindu cultural 
imperative” (Jain, 2014, p. 53). Against the backdrop of Hindu social order, the claim 
                                                 
176 Image taken by the author, 4th April 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
177 Field notes: 4th February 2014, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP. 
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on land cogently depicts assertion by countering the binary of purity/pollution that 
defined the expulsion and marginalisation of Dalits from access to land, resources and 
personhood (Jain, 2014; Loynd, 2009; Narayan, 2011).  
By building this expansive memorial on public land, Mayawati activates Dalit 
assertion materially, symbolically and discursively. As Jain noted, “the seeming archaism 
of this form of the claim to territory speaks back, in part, to the archaism of the 
spatialized modes of caste exclusion that have continued into the present” (2014, p. 
155). Mayawati, by enabling this spatial assertion on public land, also extends 
Babasaheb’s (as Ambedkar was popularly called) rationale; “Ambedkar derived the 
concept of public access from the definition of a public utility” (Rao, 2009, p. 85). The 
earlier forms of Dalit activism and spatial outreach focused on access to common water 
tanks and temple entry by making the claim that these spaces are ‘public spaces’ with 
equal access for everyone, including Dalits. Geetha and Rajadurai (1998) highlight that 
various public spaces became points of contention as people, through caste 
associations, sought equal access to schools, temples and water. “The Dalit demand for 
public access was efficacious because it created equivalence between different practices 
of caste segregation and across sites of exclusion” (Rao, 2009, p. 87). Beyond the 
material, Mayawati, through these memorial projects, mainstreams the anti-caste 
struggle: the narratives below describe the sense of empowerment this engendered: 
Mayawati has provided representation to the ‘Backward’ leaders….jaise Samata Mulak 
chowk mein Periyar ki murti hai….isliye prateek bahut zaroori hai…Dalit history koi 
hai hi nahi…symbols used here are anti-Brahmanical...yeh Brahmanwad ke khilaaf 
sanskritik andolan ka center hai…agar vahin paison ko mandir mein lagate toh koi 
criticism nahi hota.178 
[Mayawati has provided representation to the Backward leaders…for example, there is 
Periyar’s statue at Samata mulak chowk…hence, symbols are very important…there is 
hardly any Dalit history…the symbols used here are anti- Brahmanical…this is the 
centre for cultural revolution against Brahmanism…if the same money had been used 
for building a temple there would have been no criticism.] 
                                                 
178 Field notes: Meeting with Rajkumar, Associate Professor, Dyal Singh College, Delhi University, 6th 
February 2014, New Delhi. 
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An inspiration centre and a place for social transformation…every person who enters, 
irrespective of their social background, feels mesmerised because of its hugeness, 
beautiful construction and its substantial content....Up to now the community has been 
forced to live in ghettos…it is like reclaiming the public space and instils a sense of 
empowerment and collectivity.179 
Described as a spectacular centre of “cultural revolution”180 and anti-
Brahmanical counter space, the Sthal greets its visitors with the welcoming elephants. 
The elephant has multiple interpretations in Indian society, within both Hinduism and 
Buddhism. The posture of the elephants that we see inside the Sthal, as mentioned at 
the beginning of this chapter is different from that of the elephant symbol of the BSP. 
It is this ambiguity and multiple interpretations that make them a matter of political 
controversy. Ambedkar chose the elephant as the symbol of the RPI because of its 
“physical and mental strength, as well as responsibility and earthiness within Buddhism” 
(Choskyi, 1988). He went on to say that the elephants symbolise mental strength, 
meaning that the initial years of practicing Buddhism are associated with a grey elephant 
which, when brought under control, is represented by a white elephant. Narayan (2011) 
points out that the third meaning which the elephant symbol carries is associated with 
the acquisition of Ambedkar’s political legacy by the BSP.  
However, returning to the initial discussion, the frenzy that visibility of 
elephants can create for caste Hindus becomes more evident when seen in the historical 
context of Lynch’s (1969, p. 186) analysis of Ambedkar Jayanti in Agra:  
The main symbol of protest was Ambedkar’s bust mounted on a whitewashed and 
decorated elephant, resembling the deity Indra’s elephant, Airavat, an auspicious steed 
meant in Hindu tradition only for kings, deities and holy men. In the Ambedkar Jayanti 
procession, Airavat is appropriated and re-contextualised into a democratic, secular 
socialistic India.  
The result of this appropriation was that “stones and insults were apt to be 
indiscriminately thrown at the bust” (p. 188) by the caste Hindus. What Airavat (Indra’s 
                                                 
179 Interview with activist Ram Kumar, Dynamic Action Group (DAG), 4th March 2014, DAG office, 
Lucknow. 
180 Term of reference used by Ram Kumar, 4th March 2014, DAG office, Lucknow. 
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white elephant) represented and withstood in those days is what the Haathi Deergha 
experienced in 2012 – through the manuwadi gaze the revulsion and fear of socio-
political transgression by a party of untouchables translated into seeing the BSP’s elephant 
where none existed.  
Dalit spatial assertion is usually associated with two main sites, the Ambedkar 
funeral pyre (samadhi) at the Ambedkar Memorial Shrine in Bombay and the Diksha 
Bhumi (the site of mass conversions) in Nagpur. Both these sites commemorate the 
alternative route that Ambedkar charted for the Dalit community by converting to 
Buddhism: “Dalit conversion marked a new temporal order outside Hindu history and 
cultural hegemony” (Rao, 2009, p. 184). His conversion also produced a distinctive 
Dalit culture inspired by the Buddhist cultural repertoire. Therefore, architecturally, by 
opting out of Hindu temple art, these sites visually deconstruct caste and the inherent 
hierarchy.  
The temple not only represents caste, it enacts it. As a set of handsomely proportioned 
and elegantly articulated architectural forms, the temple rationalizes and, thus 
legitimizes, the supposed symmetries, reciprocities, and interconnections of varna and 
jati. (Tartakov, 2012, p. 37)  
However these spatial sites, as is the case with Dalit political subjects, have been 
spaces for only Dalits and they alone know of them. Brahmanical/nationalist spatial 
segregation has ensured that these sites remain segregated and on the margins. 
Mayawati’s intervention has led these commemorations to be mainstreamed outside of 
the caste Hindu spatial ghettoisation and patronage and so caste Hindus have to 
encounter Dalits outside of their volition, time, space and sanitised city surroundings. 
Buddhist influence is pursued here as well, in adoption of practices such as performing 
certain rituals and the architectural patterns throughout the construction of the 
parivartan sthal and chowk.181 The construction of the sthal outlines the Dalit challenge to 
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the dominant Brahmanical/nationalist field of perception in three significant ways. 
First, by adopting a Buddhist architectural pattern and confronting the norms of darshan 
ingrained in the Brahmanical temple architecture. Second, by tracing and installing the 
statues of anti-caste leaders and social reformers, it makes the history of anti-caste 
struggle visible. Finally, it powerfully targets “structure of feelings”182 in re-signifying the 
city of Lucknow. 
 
Figure 5.5: Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow, UP.183 
Figure 5.5 shows a stupa, one of the many such Buddhist motifs adorning the 
landscape of the sthal. The Buddhist architecture rejecting the graded inequality of 
temples is the first aspect that the manuwadi gaze encounters in the memorial. The 
adoption of stupas (domes with rounded roofs) and viharas (gathering spaces) display the 
deliberate intention of opting out of the fold of Hinduism, ritualistic order and temple 
                                                 
182 Rao (2009) uses the conceptual tool of “structure of feeling” to analyse the overlap between sacred 
and civic. According to her, the important aspect of the two temple satyagrahas (1928-35) was the 
conflation of sacred and civic space by caste Hindus wherein the sacredness of the temple was extended 
to ensure the non-access of water tanks to the Dalits. “This constituted a ‘structure of feeling’, if you will, 
that enabled touching property to be redefined as touching persons identified with the property” (p. 87).  
183Image taken by the author, 10th February 2014, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP. 
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art. “In many ways all non-narrative temples art is a display of hierarchy before it is 
anything else” (Tartakov, 2012, p. 3). The political potential of this choice lies in the fact 
that “as the locus of Brahmanical authority, the temple was a symbol of Dalits’ 
exclusion from religious worship and the most potent site of Dalits’ denigration by caste 
Hindus’’ (Rao, 2009, p. 88). Abdicating temple architecture and adopting construction 
based on Buddhist formations reflects the intention from within the community to 
redefine its identity outside of the Hindu fold.  
If the traditional Buddhist forms allow the community to signal its identification with 
that of tradition and to legitimize itself through this prestigious connection, the creation 
of new imagery allows it to explore its interests and destiny as a modern Indian 
community struggling for its place in the contemporary world. (Tartakov, 2012, pp. 
184–85) 
Tartakov’s analysis above points to the inherent critical thinking that the 
community engages in to redefine itself outside of, not just assimilationist tendencies 
within Hinduism, but also their informed civic political subjectivity. For instance, if we 
deconstruct the nature of the interaction that takes place within these structures, the 
distinction between sacred and circumspect becomes more profound. Viharas are 
different in structure to the sanctum sanctorum in temples; they are more open 
gathering spaces and contain commemorative imagery rather than deities. As a human 
space, people coming to the sthal do not make vows since they are memorials, as 
opposed to a divine space predefined by ritualistic purity. As they walked around, nearly 
all the Dalit visitors felt and expressed a sense of awe, pride and assertion.184 Thus the 
architectural choice is significant in constituting a rational civic political subject in 
opposition to a sacralised devotional subject. 
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Figure 5.6: Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow185 
Figure 5.6 displays the statues of Dalit leaders placed in a semi-circular 
formation inside the sthal. The leaders of anti-caste struggle and political mobilisation 
from pre-Independence to the present are the second encounter for the manuwadi gaze. 
The statues are of leaders who spearheaded the struggle against caste-based oppression 
and marginalisation and worked towards social transformation. It is also interesting to 
note that the pantheon brings together leaders from across the north and south of 
India, mapping the anti-caste struggle from throughout the country.  
inn mahapurushon ki ladai kisi vyakti se nahi thi…unki ladai samajik parivartan ki 
thi...jisme jaat path oonch- neech ka koi sthan nahi tha, manav-manav ek saman 
ho...insaniyat ke adhaar par sabko aage badhne ka mauka mile.186 
[These great men’s fight was not aimed at targeting any individual; their fight was to 
bring in social transformation wherein there was no place for caste-based 
discriminations. Each human being is equal…everyone has the right to move ahead on 
the grounds of humanity.] 
The statues installed in the interiors of the Parivartan Sthal range from Dalit icons who 
thought about society’s social order and aimed to transform it during different epochs 
                                                 
185 Image taken by the author April 2014, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP. 
186 Interview with Khushilal Maurya, BSP Leader of Opposition, UP Assembly, 18th June 2014, Vidhan 
Sabha, Lucknow, UP. 
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in history such as Gautam Buddha, Sant Kabir, Sant Ravidas, Sant Guru Ghasi Das, 
Mahatma Jyotiba Phule, Savitri Phule, Shri Narayana Guru, Shahuji Maharaj, Birsa 
Munda, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Manyawar Kanshi Ram and Mayawati. The choice of these 
icons demonstrates Mayawati’s intension to mainstream the struggles of social 
reformers who challenged hierarchies based on caste, practices of untouchability and 
the discrimination embedded within ritualistic Hinduism. The overarching agenda at the 
entrance states the objectives informing the construction of the Dr. B.R. Ambedkar 
Samajik Parivartan Sthal – to recognise, honour and commemorate the struggle for social 
transformation led by the sants (saints) and mahapurush (great people) born into the 
community. I take up the discussion around Ambedkar and Mayawati’s statues 
specifically in the next section, but it is crucial to note here the intent of this 
visualisation – by recording Dalit history and the anti caste-struggle, this 
commemorative memorial as a material structure also temporally and spatially 
establishes the constancy of caste and the struggle against it, a part of the everyday 
experience of being a Dalit.  
itihaas se kuch seekha jata hai…agar itihas hi nahi hoga toh kya seekenge…itihas kaun 
banata hain..ya kaun batata hai…padh kar batane vale toh bahut kam hai…poora itihas 
toh Dalit pratik hi batata hai…Babasaheb ne toh bahut kuch kiya hai…toh jo 
babasaheb ki pratimayein hongi…toh ek chotha bacha bhi poochega ki kaun 
the...samvidhan ke nirmata hain…apne hi desh mein daliton ke liye kuch kiya tha...itihas 
manobal badhata hai…aaga jaane ka raasta dikhata hai…itihas se seekhte 
hai…prateekon se seekhte hai.187 
[One learns from history…if there is no history how can one learn…who writes 
history…or who imparts history?…There are not many who can read…most of history 
is depicted by Dalit symbols…Babasaheb has contributed so much …so if there is a 
statue of Babasaheb…then even a small child will ask who he was…He wrote the 
constitution…did some things for the betterment of Dalits of our country…History 
increases morale…shows the way forward…history teaches…symbols teach.] 
Pushpa’s narrative above highlights the relevance of these memorials to the 
Dalit community in documenting their history. Interestingly, for somebody who 
belongs to the Balmiki caste, her acknowledgement of the relevance of these symbolic 
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interventions for the entire Dalit community draws attention to the equivalential role 
that these memorials play, irrespective of the internal power dynamics and hierarchy 
that may exist between the sub castes within the Dalit community or the political 
affiliations that they may or may have not towards the BSP as a political party.  
The continuum that Mayawati’s memorial project takes forward is the practice 
of spatial assertion at the village level. Dalit communities erect Ambedkar statues in 
squares or households to counter the pollution line in the villages. The pollution line 
ensured that, whether in cities or villages, Dalits are marginalised, pushed to the 
outskirts and ghettoised into enclaves. But by setting up Ambedkar busts and claiming 
control over public land, they make a strong spatial assertion. “Shaadi, baraat, meeting ke 
liye hai babasheb ki jagah”188 [Babasaheb’s place is meant for marriage purposes, 
processions and meetings] claimed Pyarelal, an agricultural labourer from the village of 
Khaprela in Barabanki. Most of my respondents have articulated this space around 
Babasaheb’s statue, no matter how big or small as ‘their space’ – for marriage 
processions, holding meetings and gatherings and as their arena for socialisation and 
civic engagement.189 Further to spatial assertion and control over public land, it can be 
attributed as democratic claim making by Dalit citizen-subjects. Jaoul (2006) 
demonstrated through his incisive work that for Dalit villagers, whose experiences of 
everyday life is reflective of violation of rights and dignity, erecting a statue of a Dalit 
statesman holding the constitution translates into an experience of ‘emancipated 
citizenship’ and the faith that law will be enforced to enhance and protect their lot.  
The village-micro-level spatial strategy adopted by the community at the village 
level is extended by Mayawati to the city macro-level but with much added grandeur. As 
pointed out earlier, she has employed state political power to pursue the Dalit political 
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189 Field notes: 20th March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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agenda of spatial claim-making, reflecting the bottom-up approach that exists within the 
Dalit movement wherein the political leadership advances a blueprint for assertion that 
is already present among the Dalit public. I argue, based on my fieldwork, that from the 
rural Dalit villages in Barabanki to the middle and lower/middle class Dalits in the cities 
of Lucknow and Delhi, that their identification with these memorials is that of pride 
and assertion. A few middle-class Dalits who raised issues of corruption and wasting 
money in relation to the memorials did so mostly due to their growing disaffection with 
the BSP and Mayawati, rather than symbolism per se.190 I claim this based on their 
celebration of Ambedkar Jayanti: the same set of respondents enthusiastically 
participated in organising the Ambedkar Jayanti celebrations in Delhi and Lucknow.191 
Omvedt wrote that “the earlier Dalit middle class fought against casteism, but were 
often concerned with personal survival to do much. The new generation is now coming 
into their own and discovering a new pride in being Dalit” (2004, p. 27). Therefore, the 
symbolic habitus seems more autonomous and democratic within the Dalit community: 
the civil society groups and NGOs have their own creative space to determine the 
representation of their identity, as does the BSP, their political party representative.  
The continuum of identification among the rural poor and urban educated 
Dalits in relation to the worth of memorials and statues as being self-empowering 
demonstrates a disjuncture between the dominant narrative and the voices from within 
the community. The media’s standard narratives of corruption, wasted money and 
misuse of public funds needs to be further probed. These voices echo the savarna 
(upper-caste) unrest and can be considered as one of the most potent means by which 
caste antagonism against the memorials in particular, and the statues in general, is 
constantly circulated. This is not to deny the fact that there are internal differences and 
                                                 
190 Field notes: 10th April 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
191 Field notes: 15th April 2014, New Delhi. 
185 
opinions that are critical of Mayawati’s intervention within the Dalit community,192 but 
for the savarna media to speak on behalf of Dalits reveals their discomfort because 
these memorials interrupt not just their sanitised gaze and mind but also the unquestioned 
and self-assumed claim and access that caste Hindus have had over state, land and 
public resources.  
The fact that Mayawati got the memorial built with certain objectives are paying 
dividends in multiple ways. It’s a conspiracy to mingle it with corruption and to let 
down through the means of corruption. If corruption has to be discussed, then why 
only in the context of Mayawati and the Dalits? Then you should talk holistically and 
also decide who is doing it in percentage terms and for how long, and then you will 
realise that Dalits hardly feature.193 
Consequently, the inherent bias against the BSP and the anxiety of caste Hindus 
translates into politics of accusation despite the fact that most of the national political 
establishments are up to their ears in corruption. As Teltumbde (2010b) argues, 
whatever she is accused of by the elitist media is nothing new in its essentials. Caste 
Hindus’ domination of media houses as proprietors and editors of newspapers has 
meant that the media has been a source for perpetuating caste-based stereotypes and a 
complete blackout of Dalit assertion. The structural violence of Dalit exclusion from 
the composition of the media demonstrates institutionalisation of caste-based 
discrimination. “The vast majority of journalists and editors who are in the mainstream 
media are not Dalits” (Jeffrey, 2001, p. 226). The manuwadi gaze then prefers to tell 
stories that satisfy their caste-based privileges and prefers to depict Dalits as only 
victims. Dalit subjects can only be victims of violence or beneficiaries of state patronage 
through reservations; Dalit contestations, assertions and victories are blind spots 
(Jeffrey, 2001; Loynd, 2008; Vardarajan, 2006). Hence, Mayawati’s powerful Dalit spatial 
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assertion through the Sthal or political victories of the BSP is trivialised to wasteful 
aggrandisement whereas the voices from within the Dalit community say otherwise. As 
Sehdev, an agricultural labourer said, “Paise ki barbadi kaisi hui…jab banaya hai toh barbadi 
kaisi hui…bahut kharab lagta hai’’194 [How is it a waste of money? If it has been built, then 
how is it a waste? It feels very bad]. On the other hand, a middle class Dalit student, 
Bhasker, justified the Sthal as contributing to development by revenue collection along 
with the political assertion therein: 
jo log kehte hai ki paise pheke gaye hai woh galat hai…bahar se log aate hai , paryatak 
aate hai hai Lucknow mein usko dekhne ko…itna saara paise aata hai sarkar ko..Behenji 
ne ek imaarat banwai hai rajnaitik taur pe aur woh zinda rahega 
[People who claim that money has been wasted are wrong. People come from outside 
of Lucknow to see it and there is so much money that comes to the government. Behenji 
got the Sthal built and politically it will continue to be alive.] 
Bhasker’s response above on the political significance of the Sthal underscores that, 
irrespective of Mayawati’s or the BSP’s political fortunes, the political purpose for 
which it was envisioned continues to be gratified within the community. 
Applying the lens of ‘structure of feeling’ (Rao, 2009) to the analysis here 
implies that Mayawati’s commemorative sthal and chowk intervene and strike at the core 
of manuwadi politics – the pollution line – by finally destabilising the entrenched overlap 
between sacred and civic. In addition to interrupting the Brahmanical gaze and their 
perception that it permeates, these memorials also tamper with the essence of 
interaction that takes place between a public space/material structure and the type of 
bodies – in the form of visitors – that it aims to encompass or attract. My fieldwork in 
the confines of the Sthal demonstrates that its features, from the entry prices to the 
open expanse of the complex, target a particular kind of body – the labouring and 
stigmatised Dalit-Bahujan body – who can withstand wide shadeless spaces, take direct 
heat unhindered and can afford only a meagre sum to see their space. The demeanour of 
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the architecture exhibits how Dalit bodies have always been treated according to the 
caste codes whose regulation of time and space for the twice-born only allowed Dalit 
bodies to be visible during the scorching heat of the afternoon because at other times 
their shadows could be polluting for the upper castes.  
Asked “How does it feel to be here?,’’ the identification and affective response 
of one of the visitors to the Sthal, a railway employee from Punjab who had come to 
Lucknow for a rally organised by their trade union, evidently brought out a moment of 
a strong identitarian assertion of awe, respect and pride: 
Bahut acha laga yahan pe aake.mein SC hoon! kisi ne hamare liye kabhi aisa nahi kiya, 
Mayawati ne yeh bahut acha kaam kiya hai...koi galat nahi kiya itna paisa lagake..!’195 
[It felt very nice coming here...I am a SC! Nobody has done anything like this for us; 
Mayawati has done a very good thing. She has not done anything wrong by putting in 
so much money.]  
His response represents what can be described as ‘performative meaning-making’;196 it 
reiterates and re-circulates the Dalit caste based assertion with every Dalit visitor. By 
having a place of their own that represents their history, leaders and struggles and which 
is accessible to them on their own terms; these memorials are changing the nature of 
access, participation and spatial claim making on mainstream public land for Dalits. 
Furthermore, by daring to see, the Dalit gaze is looking back at power and refusing to be 
invisible.  
The spatial strategy adopted by Mayawati also effectively transformed the Sthal 
into a tourist attraction. The spectacularness and the grandeur of the memorial have re-
signified the spatial landscape of Lucknow. It has gone beyond being only a Dalit space 
and has been transformed into a place of leisure for ‘everyone’. Non-Dalit bodies visit it 
as a tourist site, a space for recreation and relaxation. Furthermore, because of its 
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196 Freitag (2014, p. 433) modifies Pinney’s formulation of performative productivity to imply that “actors 
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grandeur and white marble, it is now being used as a backdrop for commercial and 
regional cinema by filmmakers. Non-Dalits are now seeing and experiencing it both 
physically and visually through electronic media and hence it is becoming a part of 
savarna entertainment package as well. By mainstreaming it, Mayawati has brought caste 
dynamics into the symbolic political field; by getting caste Hindus to visit for leisure she 
has turned the binary of ‘purity-pollution’ on its head.  
I therefore contest the argument made by Loynd (2009, p. 479) that the sthal 
institutionalises identity politics and hence is an exclusionary site. She argues: 
Its low public exposure in the mainstream press, along with its forbidding high gates, 
suggest that the Kendra is not designed to be particularly inviting to the broader, non-
Dalit, public – it is not a centre designed to influence the upper castes. In other words, 
it represents and caters to a specific sector of the population to the exclusion of others.  
On the contrary, I argue that the success of the Dalit symbolic and spatial strategy has 
been that, despite it being a symbol of powerful identitarian assertion and exclusive in 
terms of targeting Dalits by all means just as manuwadi spaces are upper-caste centred, it 
has been able to extend beyond its caste-based enclosure/abstraction by forcing the 
upper caste/upper/middle classes to acknowledge its existence on Dalit terms. Altering 
the terms of intimate interaction, as both Dalit and non-Dalit bodies come to inhabit 
the same space and time, is the most potent threat to the pollution line both physically 
and psychologically. As well as altering the dynamics of the interaction inside the Sthal, 
these monuments are also redefining the visual-scape of Lucknow city.  
It is symbolic of assertion...Lucknow ke busy sadkon ke beecho – beech…it is 
representative of Bahujan history…symbolic ko representation mil raha hain.197 
[It is symbolic of assertion…just in the centre of very busy roads of Lucknow…it is 
representative of Bahujan history…the symbolic is getting representation here.] 
By building the memorial at the centre of Lucknow, Mayawati transformed the 
sensibility of the city by infusing a new ‘Bahujan’ meaning and socio-political 
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imagination as the narrative above by a middle-class Dalit city dweller explains. 
Lucknow is dominated by “monumental buildings such as imambaras (shrines) and 
palaces [which] were remarkably consistent in vision, motifs and exuberance, if eclectic, 
in their references and inspiration” (Freitag, 2014, p. 431). This visual repertoire of the 
nawabi (Islamic) culture that has dominated the landscape of the Lucknow city has been 
redefined with Mayawati’s memorial project. Besides imputing new social meaning to 
space, the memorial also translates into Dalits’ space as it symbolically transgresses the 
pollution line, conferring on the invisible Dalit subjects their ‘right to the city’ 
(Lefebvre, 1996). The practice of the caste system ensures that Dalits are imperceptible 
by all networks of social interaction and exchange, but through the memorial, the 
untouchables’ history, worldview and embodied experience becomes part of Lucknow; 
as they are networked into the centre they are not only made visible but also seen as 
claim making subjects on the state’s land and resources. 
By visiting the Sthal and making their own Ambedkar statues Dalits are asserting 
their presence and transgressing the manuwadi gaze spatially, temporally and visually. 
5.2.2 Inverting the pollution line: re-naming and redistributive justice 
Dalit bastis (slums) are spatial caste enclaves carved out on the basis of the 
pollution line. They are situated on the outskirts of cities and villages and invisible to 
the networks of social interaction. Spatial exclusion of these sorts perpetuate socio-
economic cleavages because of their proscription from modes of exchange and this, 
combined with practices of untouchability, leads to Dalit exclusion from resourceful 
economic opportunities. Mayawati’s spatial strategy not only involves building sthals and 
chowks but also influences policy making to ensure economic redistribution.  
One way of influencing people’s consciousness and (re)claiming history is by 
renaming streets, buildings and institutions as they constitute an everyday collective 
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experience. Recognising that spatial segregation “only reinforces the overlap between 
the pollution line and the poverty line” (Guru, 2004, p. 760), her strategy was to name 
or rename districts, parks, educational institutions and development policy programmes 
after Dalit leaders and social reformers. Mayawati started with a series of name changes: 
“Agra University was re-named Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar University. New districts were 
carved out and renamed after Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar and Mahamayana, the mother of 
Buddha” (Jaffrelot, 2003a, p. 415).  
Mayawati inverted the Dalit bastis (spaces of ghettoisation) into spatial enclaves 
for extending material benefits and transformed them through welfare programmes. 
BSP leader Maurya pointed out, 
esi samman deneke tehat bahut saare jila banwaye gaye…ek toh mahapurushon ko 
sammaan mila aur dusra azadi se lekar abhi tak jo vikas se achut the ab mukhyadhara 
mein aa gaye...vishwavidyalayon ki bhi sthapana hui…jan jan tak hamare 
mahapurushon ka naam bhi pahucha aur doosri aur vikas aur shiksha ke kshetra mein 
anootha udaharan diya behen Mayawati ne.198 
[Through this process of naming...many new districts were created…on one hand great 
people were honoured and on the other hand since Independence the Dalits, who were 
left out of development, have been brought into the mainstream…New universities 
were also set up…the names of our great people also reached out to the masses, setting 
new examples in the field of development and education.] 
Spatial claim making led to transforming Dalit subjects into citizen benefactors of state-
led economic development and redistribution; the symbolic and the performative 
overlaps when such strategies are adopted. The most effective illustration of this intent 
can be seen in the focused implementation of the Ambedkar Village Plan (AVP). The 
AVP was initiated by the Mulayam Singh government in 1991 (Jaffrelot, 2003a; Pai, 
2002) but from 1995 onwards Mayawati infused more energy with focused 
implementation; “the AVP came to symbolize the changed relationship between the 
Dalit and the state” (Pai, 2002, p. 199). There was particular attention to infrastructure 
building and other social parameters which included roads, hand-pumps, houses and 
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pensions for widows and the elderly. Bhasker, a student at the intermediate level, 
recounted the developments that were implemented once Balsinghkheda was declared 
an Ambedkar village:  
badlav toh bahut hua...RCC bani hai, pakki road, bijli aur naliya…Ambedkar gauv hain 
kyunki…esa nahi hai ki abhi kaam nahi ho raha hain...abhi lekin repairing ka kaam hota 
hai...kuch bigadta hai hain toh sudharenge hi.199 
[There have been lots of changes…new roads, houses, electricity and drains...because it 
is an Ambedkar village…It is not that work is not happening now…but now it is 
mostly repairs…if something goes wrong, then of course they will at least repair it.] 
It started by first targeting villages that had 50% SC population and gradually was 
phased out to villages with 25-30% SC population (Jaffrelot, 2003a). Most of the 
villages that came under the scheme benefitted materially in relation to getting access to 
basic resources. In the two villages of Samesi and Balsinghkhedha in Nagram district, 
which came under the AVP, villagers expressed their satisfaction when asked about the 
work done during Mayawati’s era and felt a sense of pride and ownership associating 
her rule as that of their ‘own’.200 These spatial interventions have also established the 
primacy of the state as the main arbiter, since it has claim over public land. However, 
villagers from non-AVP zones, such as Barabanki, felt dejected at not being included in 
the programme. Despite that, it is interesting to note that non-inclusion did not 
translate into withdrawal of their support for the BSP or Mayawati; in fact, the 
identification grew stronger as they also felt empowered by having their own bust of 
Ambedkar within their villages and so with the Sthal.201 Therefore, based on my 
fieldwork, I argue that Mayawati’s intervention unsettled the binary between the 
material and the symbolic, both in relation to material spatial assertion and economic 
redistribution. Jaoul’s (2006) assessment that, because concerns of dignity are 
considered more immediate, the material question is postponed is based on the artificial 
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dichotomy between the symbolic and material. As I have discussed and demonstrated, 
this split does not exist for the Dalit subject. Even their identification and expression of 
material needs/satisfaction is because of their symbolic affiliation with both Ambedkar 
and Mayawati.  
By being so central to the city’s visual landscape every ‘body’ experiences the 
encounter with this structure visually, materially and discursively. As an anti-
Brahmanical counter space, the Sthal emanates alternative social meaning by rejecting 
temple architecture with its hierarchy, makes a materialist spatial claim for Dalits on 
public land and forges Dalit subjects and their history to be part of Lucknow’s oeuvre. 
Just as a Dalit body in their everyday encounters caste, so does now every non- Dalit 
body; caste antagonism and the resultant anxiety continues to be activated through this 
symbolic register. Mayawati’s spatial strategies have contributed to making the Dalit-
citizen subject and their worldview visible.  
The next section discusses the symbolic habitus of the politics of statues in Dalit 
politics. What does the appearance of statues of Dalit leaders in the Brahmanical field of 
perception imply? Do they disrupt the religio-sacred space? 
5.3 Statues of Dis ‘order’ 
This section discusses the symbolic habitus of Dalit politics which is epitomised 
by the politics of statues. The acts of symbolic violence by caste Hindus against Dalit 
icons – either Ambedkar's or Mayawati’s statues are usually carried out by either 
damaging them or garlanding them with slippers/shoes (Tripathi, 2012), demonstrating 
the normative order that these statues aim to unsettle and transgress.  
Because political order has something to do with both landscape and history, changing 
the political order no matter where, often means changing the bronzed human beings 
who both stabilize the landscape and temporally freeze certain values. (Verdery, 1999, 
p. 7) 
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Verdery brings attention to the role of statues and its impact in changing or influencing 
political order. She argues that a shift in the political order often translates into altering 
those statues that entrench certain political and social norms. In this vein, therefore, the 
appearance of statues of Dalit leaders in the public sphere aims to impact the existing 
political order, landscape and history. Applying Verdery’s and Tartakov’s perspectives 
on statues and practices of iconography respectively, I argue that the appearance of these 
civic statues in the symbolic political field, unlike the religious deities, challenges the 
symbolic power exhibited by caste Hindus and their unquestioned appropriation of 
space with roadside Hindu temples. The discussion, while extending Jaoul’s and Lynch’s 
work on the analysis of Ambedkar statues, also contributes by analysing Mayawati’s 
statue’s impact on Brahmanical patriarchy. By disturbing the 
Brahmanical/nationalist/patriarchal vision, statues of Dalit leaders visualise secular and 
civic norms of equality and justice and, most crucially, the Dalit citizen-subject’s gaze.  
 
Figure 5.7: Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh202 
 
                                                 
202Image taken by the author, 12th March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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5.3.1 Ambedkar statues: of Mahar203‘Manu’204, Dalit assertion and the defiant 
gaze 
Figure 5.7 displays the ownership, affection and identification that my 
respondents had towards their Babaseheb’s statue – built by them, with their own 
money.205 Long before Mayawati started erecting Ambedkar’s statues as part of her 
political and ideological strategy after gaining political power, the Dalit community 
themselves were organising, collecting chanda (voluntary contributions) and building 
their own Ambedkar statues to assert themselves. 
iss desh ka yeh bhi ek sachh hai..Mahatma Gandhi ke jitney bhi prateek hai voh 95% 
pratimaye sarkar ne lagaye hai...lekin Gandhiji ke pratimayon se badhkar kam se kam 
sau guna pratimaye iss desh mein Dr. Ambedkar ki lagi hai…aur unki murtiyon mein se 
lagbhag 95% murtiyan samaj ne lagvaye hain…Dalit varg ne lagayi hai...206 
[It’s a truth of our country; of all the statues of Mahatma Gandhi, around 95% have 
been built by the government. But, compared to Gandhiji’s statue, there are around 
100% more statues of Dr. Ambedkar; and of them more than 95% of those statues 
have been set up by the community. The Dalit community has built them.] 
Dalit subjects’ agency and collective assertion thus is not bound by political 
leadership, alerting to the existence of a critical community who are deeply aware of 
their positionality and the need for constant struggle to assert it independently. For 
instance, Gautam recounted their struggle in the village to erect a taller than normal 
statue of Babaseheb: 
hamari babsaheb ki murti hain…6 foot ki...lekin adha hi banwa rahe the...poori biradari 
khadi ho gayi…jail jane ko tayyar ho gayee thi..chaar din ka sangharsh chala 
tha…hamari logon ki bhavna rahi hai ki hum Babasaheb ki murat hum 
lagvayenge…hum logon ke naam pe koi zameen nahi hai…humne zameen li…murat 
lagai taki samajik zameen pe apne chamar ka bhi hak ho…lagaya hai ek utsah ke liye ki 
                                                 
203 The Mahars are a Scheduled Caste community in Maharashtra (Mumbai). They are mostly Ambedkarite 
and had converted to Buddhism following him. 
204 Manu is the author of Manu-Smiriti, the Hindu code of law. I use it here in relation to appointing 
Ambedkar as the chairperson of the committee to draft the Indian Constitution. It exposes the irony of 
the process since a Dalit was framing the code of law for an Independent India based on the principles of 
equality for all, thus striking a large blow to the inequalities Manu institutionalised through the graded 
hierarchy of the caste system.  
205 Field notes: June-July 2014, UP. 
206Interview with Arun Khote, 10th May 2014, PMARC office, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP. 
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Babasaheb ki murat Samesi mein hain…itne bade majre main honi hi chahiye...unhone 
itna bada samvidhan likha hai toh kya hum itni badi murat nahi laga sakte?!207 
[We have a six foot tall statue of Babasaheb…But they [upper caste 
villagers/bureaucrats] were only allowing three feet tall…The whole community stood 
up …were even ready to go to jail… We struggled for four days…it was our wish that 
we would have a Babasaheb statue built…There is no land in our name… but we got 
the land and built the statute so that we Chamars also have a claim on public 
land…Also, for the enthusiasm that there is a Ambedkar statue in Samesi…Should be 
there in a big town like this?…He has written such a big constitution, can’t we make a 
big statue for him?!] 
His narrative captures two dimensions of Dalit assertion. First, a Chamar spatial 
assertion208 – that they were denied permission by the upper caste villagers and the 
administrative bureaucratic structure, stories of struggle that were repeated during my 
fieldwork in all three Dalit rural villages.209 Second, they were all beaming with pride 
because they had succeeded in building a tall statue for the author of India’s 
constitution. As one of them commented, “unhi ki vajah se khatiya mein baithe hai, varna 
zameen pe hote”210 [It is because of him that we are sitting on the cot otherwise we would 
be on the ground]. Babasaheb is perceived as a statesman, man of action and a reflective 
thinker, different from idol worship based on blind faith. The respect and the 
identification that the community has towards Ambedkar are because he played a 
crucial role in constituting a non-Hindu Dalit political identity and hence is rightly 
perceived as their political representative. This understanding informs both the nature 
of iconographic practices adopted by the community and the type of critical and 
reflexive subjectivity that is constituted with the first influential Dalit political leader in 
India’s history. 
The iconographic practices display uniformity in the style and the normative 
order that is aimed at establishing Ambedkar as a man and not as a deity. “The name 
Ambedkar was a fetish object circulating through diverse arenas and accruing signifying 
                                                 
207Interview with Naumi Lal Gautam on 19th July 2014, Samesi village, Nagram, UP. 
208 Chamar is a Dalit caste classified as Scheduled Castes in UP. According to the Hindu caste-based 
division of labour, they are engaged in tanning activities and also denied access to land. 
209 Field notes: June-July 2014, UP. 
210 Focus group interview respondent, 19th July 2014, Samesi, UP. 
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power, as was his iconic representation” (Rao, 2009, p. 188). Through the Dalit gaze, 
Ambedkar is seen as ‘one amongst them’, a highly educated and enlightened scholar 
from within their community and the father of the Constitution. Two aspects of this 
depiction should be paid attention to; first, at the level of identity and second, the 
message underlying this depiction. Ambedkar statues follow a standardised form of 
representation because his identity as a learned man is always embedded with his caste; 
as Zelliot describes “alongside the stereotype of the Mahar” (1992, p. 57). To challenge 
caste-based stereotyping, his identity as an educated member of the community could 
be only reinforced through clothes and mannerisms. Ambedkar’s political life elucidates 
that despite his educational achievements and socio-economic mobility, he was never 
seen beyond his caste identity of being a Mahar. 
While Gandhi’s saint-peasant garb reinforced the identity he sought with the 
Indian masses, Ambedkar’s western dress and his independent critical temperament 
underlined the new identity he sought for the Mahar (Zelliot, 1992, p. 61). Scholars who 
have analysed the politics of Ambedkar’s statue in UP such as Lynch, Jaoul, Pai and 
Tartakov outline the uniformity in the iconographic depiction. 
Ambedkar is presented as a man in a blue business suit, white shirt and red tie, with a 
fountain pen in his pocket and a book in one hand. He is bare headed, his dark hair 
neatly combed down, and wears a pair of black rimmed spectacles, standing in a square 
‘samabhanga’ or no bends position. (Tartakov, 2012, p. 21)  
In the context of India’s traditional imagery this figure makes three points: that he is 
learned, belongs to the city and has no godly connotations. “The blue suit indicated a 
rational message of salvation from caste hierarchy” (Lynch, 2012, p. 185), therefore it 
represented a source of enlightenment and civic identity for the community. 
It is interesting to note that Ambedkar’s suit also symbolised a challenge to the 
established nationalist leaders. The western and modernist outlook that Ambedkar 
symbolised in his attire set him apart from the existing western-educated, elite and 
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upper-caste Nationalist leaders – Gandhi’s loincloth or Nehru’s sherwani (knee-length 
coat). Ilaiah, for instance, invokes this westernised image of Ambedkar and claims that 
“[u]nlike Gandhi and Nehru, Ambedkar wore a suit throughout his life without facing 
any problem from his community. Gandhi had to struggle a lot to de-westernise 
himself,” (Ilaiah, 2003) thus claiming that the Dalit community did not place any 
pressure on him based on any rigid ideas around ‘authentic’ Indian culture. In fact, on 
the contrary for Dalit politics, western exchange has enabled, claimed Ilaiah to confront 
the Brahmanical code of culture regarding food, knowledge and dress. However, 
Ambedkar’s modernist outlook did not create uncritical acceptance of his attire and 
demeanour within the movement. For instance, Teltumbde (1997), discussing the post-
Ambedkar dynamics within the Dalit movement, highlights that this western image 
contributed to “petty bourgeois-ize the entire Dalit movement” thereby leading to a 
crisis in leadership after his death. Gaikwad, the next mass-based frontrunner to 
succeed Ambedkar was more of a kurta-clad activist, rustic and not university educated 
and hence considered less suitable by the broader community to take up the leadership: 
“This mould was based on the contemporary middle class cultural norms that 
Ambedkar displayed in his attire and general demeanour” (Teltumbde, 1997). Despite 
these fallouts, Ambedkar’s attire was symbolic of his enlightened rise in opposition to 
presumed privileges of the Nationalist leadership of those times. 
Just as much as with his blue suit, there are multiple interpretations of the book 
in his hand and the posture. The book is interpreted as the Constitution, signifying 
rejection of orthodox texts such as the manusmriti, vedas (scriptures) or the shastras. The 
practices of caste hierarchy and untouchability implied that Dalits could not hear, see or 
touch these Hindu religious texts. By privileging the secular Constitution over the 
sacred texts, Ambedkar thus laid the foundation for delineating the sacred from civic. In 
some statues, the book is identified as Bharat (India); more generally, it is agreed to 
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emphasise the role of education and civic identity provided by the Constitution in 
creating a subversive and critical community.  
Ambedkar emerged as a powerful symbol in the campaign to link Dalits with education. 
Even during the colonial period, many Dalit communities started moving ahead by 
acquiring education through the numerous Ambedkar libraries and Ambedkar trusts set 
up in Dalit colonies across India (Narayan, 2011, p. 78). 
Ambedkar’s posture in the statues is that of usually standing with one leg slightly 
advanced as if walking, his arm raised and index finger pointing upwards, generally 
understood across the range of signification, from oratory to teaching (Lynch, 1969; 
Rao, 2009; Tartakov, 2012). Babasaheb and the varied interpretations of him by sections 
of the Dalit community depict the diverse ways his contributions are perceived and 
keep the hope of empowerment alive. Guru (2008) identifies at least three images of 
Ambedkar that the Dalit community endorses: ‘Maha Manav’ (a great man), messiah, 
and a modernist. The modernist image of Ambedkar in particular is over-determined in 
the cultural landscape and the community articulates this image through iconography, 
narratives and folk culture. The modernist depiction is cogent on two levels: first, from 
within the Dalit community, norms of rationality and equality are deeply valued and, 
second, it underscores defiance of the Hindu social order. Ambedkar’s modernist 
outlook was a powerful opposition to the assimilation aimed for by Gandhi: Dalit 
political subjectivity within the Gandhian framework infantilised and de-politicised the 
lower castes by referring to them as Harijans (Children of God).211 Ambedkar articulated 
a separate political identity for the Dalits, transgressing the fold of Hinduism and 
negating its social order of caste. 
                                                 
211 Gandhi rechristened the Untouchable castes as Harijans or children of god, just after the signing the 
Poona Pact. He believed it was a more indigenous term ans less dehumanizing than being called 
Untouchables or Bhangis. Ambedkar and the Dalit movement found Gandhi’s coinage unacceptable and 
consider it an effort to side step the issue of the caste system. 
https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/labelling-dalits-%E2%80%98harijans%E2%80%99-how-we-
remain-ignorant-and-insensitive-dalit-identity-35486 
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The Constitution in his hand, therefore, is of immense significance symbolically 
and discursively. Unlike religious tenets, it represented the resolve to an equal 
democratic political community. Most importantly, post independence, Ambedkar an 
untouchable, as head of the drafting committee played an important role in constituting an 
equalised political community and gradually came to be referred to as the ‘New Manu’. 
For the Dalit gaze it meant that Ambedkar is not just their enlightened leader but also 
the father of Indian Constitution. He gave “Dalits a new identity as a citizen with equal 
rights as well as the means of a new and powerful praxis, the universal franchise within 
a democratic political system” (Lynch, 2012, p. 185). As one of my respondents noted, 
the “Brahmanical order believes in hierarchy and is anti-development and anti-equality 
whereas Ambedkar believed in samata, samanta aur bandhutva212 (parity, equality and 
brotherhood)”. 
Ambedkar was rechristened as the ‘New Manu’ as he was appointed chair of the 
committee that drafted the Indian Constitution. This possibly was the most ironic title 
in the political history of India as he was dubbed after Manu, the author of the 
Manusmriti; “this was rather piquant given that in 1927 Ambedkar had set fire to this 
very text during the Mahad Satyagraha” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, p. 106). The performative 
impact of Ambedkar as the ‘New Manu’ implied a challenge to the manuwadi social 
order and to the triumvirate Gandhi-Nehru-Patel led nationalist politics and their 
upper-caste worldview. His strategy was to deconstruct graded inequality and to evolve 
a politico-ideological counter offensive to create an alternative Untouchable tradition 
and identity. Ambedkar was of the opinion that “the real cleavage among Hindus was 
not between Brahmins and Non-Brahmins, but between ‘touchables’ and 
‘untouchables’” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, p. 53). Omvedt points out that Ambedkar followed 
                                                 
212Interview with activist Ram Kumar, 4th March 2014, DAG office, Lucknow, UP. 
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the tradition propounded by Phule and Periyar in creating an alternate standpoint. Their 
thought represents: 
the effort to construct an alternative identity of the people, based on non-north Indian 
and low caste perspectives, critical not only of the oppressiveness of the dominant 
Hindu caste society but also of its claim to antiquity and to being the major Indian 
tradition. (Omvedt, 2000, p. 132) 
The caste lines were clearly drawn between Ambedkar and the rest of the Nationalist 
leaders and exposed overtly on the issues of the Communal Award and the Hindu Code 
Bill. Ambedkar was the only political leader seen by Gandhi as a political and ideological 
opponent and so he adopted the strategy of fasting in 1932 to protest the introduction 
of separate electorates for Dalits in provincial legislatures under the Communal Award 
proposed by the British in that year. Gandhi objected to the provisions on the premise 
that it would divide ‘Hindu society’. Gandhi’s understanding of unity was underscored 
by upper-caste patronage and assimilationist stand towards the Untouchables. 
Ambedkar, however, perceived these provisions as a means to enhance the lot of the 
Untouchables and supported them but, faced with Gandhi’s protest fast, reluctantly 
agreed to the Poona Pact which removed the clauses that Gandhi opposed. 
Similarly, he ideologically opposed Nehru, despite both sharing a modern 
secularist worldview, Ambedkar felt defeated in the context of the Hindu Code Bill213 
and tendered his resignation from the cabinet. Nehru entrusted a committee headed by 
Ambedkar to draft a new Hindu code to reform the personal laws. Ambedkar’s 
opposition to the final version of the Hindu Code Bill should be seen not just as 
political opposition but an expression of his commitment to annihilate regressive caste-
based norms and also to institutionalise equality between men and women in personal 
laws. In his draft the committee had suggested some significant changes concerning 
                                                 
213 The British had initiated the process of reforming the Hindu personal laws but were unable to 
institutionalise them; the process was then taken up by the post-Independence government led by Nehru. 
The Hindu Code Bill refers to several laws introduced to reform the Hindu personal law.  
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categorisation of the ‘Hindu’ category, practices of marriage and divorce, issue of 
property and inheritance. By allowing divorce and inheritance rights to daughters and 
widows, Ambedkar was seen as destabilising the foundations of the Hindu family. The 
draft was opposed by many lawmakers, including the obvious conservatives from the 
Hindu Mahasabha to even Congress liberals such as Rajendra Prasad.214 Beyond 
thwarting caste, his proposals were also aimed at ensuring gender parity. “Ambedkar 
considered that he had not been supported enough by the Prime Minister and he 
rendered his resignation from his government on September 27” (Keer, 1971, pp. 435–
436). He also disagreed with Nehru on Kashmir: “ he thought the territory should have 
gone to Pakistan” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, p. 117). Hence, Ambedkar’s political vision was 
based on certain norms of equality and justice. 
Ambedkar ki murtiyon ke saath ek vaicharik soch bhi aati hai [There is an ideological thinking 
that comes along with Ambedkar’s statue]…like a moral code of conduct to be 
followed in one’s personal life whereas when it is ‘godly’ following then it involves 
hierarchy and patriarchy.215 
The political choice by Dalits to erect busts or statues of Ambedkar is informed 
by his political vision and the normative norms that he stood for. Naresh’s account 
above demonstrates self-reflexivity, critical questioning and sometimes transgressing 
outside of the Hindu way of life. Ambedkar was a floating signifier associated with a 
diverse range of social practices and political demands that brought them all into a 
unified domain of action and visibility. In Dalit politics, Tartakov argues, “the 
Ambedkar statues indicate the presence of people who have chosen to transform their 
lives through his teachings” (Tartakov, 2012, p. 85). Babasaheb is a signifier of moral 
conduct and behaviour for the villagers as people try and abide by the moral codes that 
were laid down by him. The underlying motive involves not just thwarting the 
                                                 
214 In a letter to Patel, Prasad had written, “new concepts and ideas are not only foreign to Hindu laws 
but are susceptible to divide every family” (Jaffrelot, 2003b). 
215 Interview with Naresh, 15th July 2014, Saemsi, Nagram district. 
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oppression inherent in Brahmanism but transgressing hierarchies of all kinds, from 
patriarchy to inter-community divisions.216  
This is most evidently visible in the case of Dalit women and their position both 
within the family and in the community. During fieldwork, especially in rural UP, it was 
obvious that Dalit women’s sense of identification with Ambedkar and his thoughts and 
the feelings of pride and ownership of his statue are quite strong.217 Contrary to 
women’s role in Hinduism wherein their participation, both in the private and public 
realm, is ritualistically defined by religio-social norms which translate their demeanour 
to be submissive and bounded by patriarchal control, Dalit women are more assertive 
of their identity and aware of the ideas that Ambedkar inheres. During fieldwork in one 
of the villages, the women of the community took me to ‘their Babasaheb’s statue’, a 
visible empowerment and assertion because of their belief in his views on gender 
equality.218  
swachkar samuday jo daliton mein bhi ati-Dalit; pat-Dalit sthithi mein hai…unchi 
jatiyon ne toh brahamnvaadi varna vyavastha ke tehat hannan kiya hi lekin upjati 
vibhajan bhi mayane rakhta hai…jo Dalit jatiyaan mein SC caste thi unhone bhi oonch- 
neech aur bhed bhav ki bhavana rakhte hai…woh bhi bahishkrit samaj ke saath khana 
peena, baithana, rishta karna pasand nahi karte …Babsahab toh poore Dalit samaj ke 
muktidata hai219 
[The community of sweepers (Balmikis) are the ultra-Dalits among the Dalits…The 
upper castes have made use of the Brahmanical caste order to abuse [us] but inter-caste 
divisions also play a role…even within Dalit castes the SC castes have maintained 
discriminations. They also would prefer not to eat, drink, sit or make alliances with the 
outcastes…Babasaheb was the liberator for the whole community.] 
Pushpa Balmiki’s narrative above explains Ambedkar’s symbolism playing an 
equivalential logic among the sub-sects of Jatavs, Pasis and Bhangis within the larger Dalit 
community. Heterogeneity, hierarchy and differing political influences exist between the 
different sub-castes. Dalit identity is thus rife with contestation; in fact, the dominant 
                                                 
216 Field notes: 18th March 2014, Barabanki, UP. 
217 Field notes: 20th March 2014, Barabanki, UP. 
218 Field notes: 20th March 2014, Barabanki, UP. 
219 Interview with activist Pushpa Balmiki on 18th July 2014, Adharshila Office, Lucknow. 
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Dalit identity of Chamars and Jatavs cuts both ways. Smaller groups amongst the SCs 
such as Jogi (monkey and bear circus owners), Nat (street circus performers), Rangrej 
(people who dye clothes), Manihar (bangle sellers), Valmiki and Hela (sweepers), Pasi 
(pig rearers), Dhanuk (vegetable growers), Dhobi (washerman), Kori (weavers) and Kanjar 
(people who weave mats) do not always identify with the dominant group. The power 
dynamics between the sub-castes causes them to align with different political parties, 
not always supporting the BSP. “Balmikis and Pasis instead vote for other parties, partly 
to distinguish themselves from the Chamars, whose hegemony they fear, – the former 
for the BJP, the latter for the party of Ram Vilas Paswan” (Jaffrelot, 2003a, p. 454). But 
despite these inter-community imbalances, Babasaheb consolidates the divisions within 
the community as a unifying icon. The most evident manner in which both the fact that 
Babasaheb stands for a normative order and a unifying icon is displayed on 14th April 
each year when jayanti (anniversary) celebrations of his birth are held.  
 
Figure 5.8: Parliament Street, New Delhi220 
Figure 5.8 displays the playing of a bigul (drum) in Parliament Street on 14th 
April in New Delhi to welcome the crowds who have come to celebrate their 
                                                 
220 Image taken by the author, 14th April 2014, Parliament Street, New Delhi. 
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Babasaheb. Talking to Khushilal, a gazetted officer beating the bigul at the jayanti 
celebrations in Delhi one could hear, see and feel the pride and assertion as he 
drummed while chanting slogans. 
Babasaheb ki khushi mein bajaya jata hai…Babasaheb ki awaz sab jagah sunai de…jaise 
jang ke liye elan kiya jaata hai …vaise hi Babasaheb ka jo janam hai usko sachet karne 
ke liye aur agah karne ke liye ki …hum shikshit ho, sangathit bane aur sangharsh ke 
liye…jo bigul baj raha hai...yahan pe khade hua logon ko bata rahe hai ki aaj hum kitne 
sampan hue hai voh Babasaheb ke nirdesh se.221 
[It is played to celebrate Babasaheb…It should be heard everywhere like during the 
beginning of a war, like a war cry…similarly to announce, alert and make people 
conscious of Babasaheb’s birth…We should educate ourselves, organise and struggle, 
ourselves...This drum beating is to tell the people who have assembled here that we 
have prospered because of Babasaheb’s directions.] 
Many of the participants who came were lower and middle class government employees 
and young university students who explained their reason for coming and identifying 
with Babasaheb was based on his motto of Educate, Agitate and Organise.222 Lynch, in his 
study of the Ambedkar jayanti in Agra noted that “the Ambedkar Fair replaced the Kans 
Fair223 and has been celebrated on 14th April ever since” (Lynch, 2012, p. 14). The 
assumption of a new enlightened political identity by Dalits in Agra signified the 
substitution, thus rejecting the caste hierarchy and celebrations dictated by Hindu 
mythology. The mass presence at the jayanti on the New Delhi streets implied that his 
ideas have enabled and empowered them as political subjects and continues to inspire 
them as a community to fight for their self-respect and assert their identity through 
political action. 
                                                 
221 Interview with Khushilal, gazetted officer, Ambedkar Jayanti Celebrations, 14th April 2014, Parliament 
Street, New Delhi. 
222 Field notes: 14th April 2014, Ambedkar Jayanti celebrations, Parliament Street, New Delhi. 
223 Lynch, in his incisive work on the origins of the Kans Fair, has highlighted its Brahmanical embedded 
nature based on the Hindu mythological story around Krishna and his uncle, Kans.  
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Figure 5.9: Sansad Marg, New Delhi224 
Figure 5.9 displays the symbolic-spatial assertion by the celebrations; Sansad 
Marg (road) leads to the Parliament and it was Ambedkar who included political 
recognition of the Untouchables as equal citizens of the political community with an 
equal right of representation in Parliament in the Indian Constitution. The street is 
transformed into a Dalit counter public,225 replete with symbolism of Babasaheb in all 
shapes and sizes. On 14th April, Dalits from all class dispositions congregate to celebrate 
Babasaheb. At the jayanti Indu, a young college student, described her experience of 
being part of the celebrations: “[t]here is no other community which gives their ideal 
respect with so much intensity. Where in the world would you see so many people 
gather to pay respect to a great man as on 14th April?”226 
The repertoire ranged from posters of Ambedkar and other Dalit leaders, 
calendars, framed photos of all Dalit icons, Jai Bhim (Hail Bhim) key chains, caps, 
badges and statues of Buddha. There were long queues to collect Ambedkar calendars, 
                                                 
224 Image taken by the author, 14th April 2014, Parliament Street, New Delhi. 
225 Fraser’s understanding of a subaltern counter public. 
226 Interview with Indu, Delhi University student, 14th April 2014, Sansad Marg, New Delhi. 
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published by various groups, which trace Dalit history and icons in visually appealing 
ways; “each of these calendars is a documentation of history in that while marking the 
days, each day is represented as a day in the history of Dalit doing” (Rege, 2008, p. 16). 
Also prominent were book stalls set up by small publishing houses and non-
governmental organisations such as the National Confederation of Dalit Organisations 
(NACDOR) highlighting the community’s emphasis on education. The bookstalls 
aimed to disseminate Dalit literature, biographies of Dalit icons and pamphlets 
propagating the lives and teachings of Buddha, Ambedkar, Ravidas, Kabir, Jotiba Phule, 
Savitri Phule and Periyar. The books and pamphlets are reasonably priced to make them 
accessible and extend their reach which “helps create a Dalit socio-political and socio-
economic awakening and awareness amongst them” (Narayan, 2011, p. 11). Most of the 
stalls were managed by trade union groups from the public sector – demonstrating the 
continuing dependence of Dalits on the public sector for jobs and economic security. 
This also shows that caste-based unionisation is an effective coalition in bargaining and 
negotiating with government institutional structures which are still deeply enmeshed in 
caste-based discrimination in relation to appointments and promotions of Dalits in the 
public sector.  
On display were also Buddhist repertoires symbolising the politics of conversion 
adopted by Ambedkar and which inspired many to reject Hinduism. By converting to 
Buddhism, people were asserting their Dalit identity. Omvedt (1994, 1995, 2004) writes 
that with conversion to Buddhism Ambedkar achieved what Phule and Periyar for all 
their resistance to Hinduism had failed to achieve – the constitution of an alternate non-
Hindu identity. Conversion was used as a tool for social emancipation. Ambedkar 
“gives up reforming Hinduism” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, p. 121) and implicitly shifted the 
debate away from faith towards other issues – social, economic and religious – 
concerning Hinduism and religion in general. The strength of his politics was visible on 
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the streets after his death: “Ambedkar died on December 6, 1956, the funeral 
procession was the biggest Bombay had ever seen and the cremation was the occasion 
for a new wave of mass conversions numbering some 100,000 people” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, 
p. 136). The alternate repertoire of Buddhism and people buying all kinds of artefacts 
shows that the community does believe in the alternate path he proposed: “B.R. 
Ambedkar’s definitive and moving final gesture, his public conversion out of Hinduism 
together with almost half a million people, became the symbolic core of a liberated 
Dalit identity” (Rao, 2009, p. 118).  
Ambedkar’s conversion to Buddhism on 14 October 1956 in Nagpur showed 
his rejection of the existing Hindu order with its inherent caste hierarchy. However, 
Jaffrelot (2003) highlights that Ambedkar’s conversion could be considered a pseudo-
remedy. He is supposed to have said to Gandhi that he would choose only the least 
harmful way for the country thus implying that conversion to Buddhism could be seen 
as falling within the fold of Hinduism. Ambedkar’s adoption of Buddhism, from this 
perspective, was hardly anti-structural and this probably explains the ambiguity 
regarding Buddhism among Dalit masses. While the symbolism of Buddhism dominates 
the Dalit public sphere, conversion is not an option for many, although, for some, it is a 
complex and creative mixture of practices of Hinduism and Buddhism.227 
                                                 
227 Field notes: 7th July 2014, UP: When visiting many Dalit localities, one would encounter a strange 
combination of photos either outside or inside homes. For instance, one house had the following 
sequence of pictures: – the goddess Lakshmi (a Hindu deity), Ambedkar and Buddha. 
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Figure 5.10: Sansad Marg, New Delhi228 
Figure 5.10 demonstrates the celebration of one’s identity and the inherent 
expressivity at the jayanti; what is made visible here is not just the wearing of symbolic 
attire (blue turbans) and the production and consumption of merchandise, posters and 
other symbolic objects, but the performance by the body, the visible presence, by being 
in that space. The gayan (singing troupe) party’s performance to a packed audience at the 
All India Dalit Mahapanchayat organisation’s stall, began with the unveiling of the copy 
of originally written constitution brought in by the Valmiki association, the Akhil 
Bharatiya Valmiki Dharam Samaj, and put on display amidst chants of ‘Babasaheb 
Ambedkar Amar Rahein! (Long Live Ambedkar!); ‘Dalit Shakti Zindabad’! (Hail Dalit 
Power!). One of the recitals was as follows: 
Babasaheb ka yeh tha sapna; apna mission padhai ho; Dalit kaum ke tan pe hamesha 
suit, boot aur tie ho! Suit boot aur tie aksar sahib log lagate hai; Esi roop mein Bhimrao 
bhi aksar sabko nazar bhi aate hai! Esi roop mein dekhe kaum bhi; behan ho ya bhai! 
Dalit kaum ke tan pe hamesha suit, boot aur tie ho! 
                                                 
228 Image taken by the author, 14th April 2014, Parliament Street, New Delhi. 
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[Babasaheb’s dream was that our mission should be education. The Dalit community 
should always wear a suit, boots and a tie. Suits, boots and ties are usually worn by 
sahibs; Bhimrao is also usually seen in this form. The community should also be seen in 
this form, sister or brother. The Dalit community should always wear a suit, boots and 
tie.] 
Echoing the sentiments that Babasaheb envisioned for the Dalit community, “[t]he 
printed booklet and music perform considerable ideological labour in sustaining the 
heterotopias” (Rege, 2008, p. 17). They bring together and visualise embodied practices 
and the affective intensity of the Dalit subjects. Non-Dalit spectators gaze at posters 
inquisitively, wanting to know what is going on and then pass by; the Dalit gaze, 
however, is mostly introspective, engaging and proud.229 A day of massive participation 
by young and old alike, 14th April celebrates Babasaheb’s teachings, values and 
emancipatory struggles across the country. Rege (2008) argues that mass gatherings on 
significant Ambedkarite dates are the days when Dalit history is remembered and 
reinterpreted. These annual gatherings can be considered as counter publics of Dalit 
assertion which map the interconnections between the symbolic and the expressive 
aspect of the Dalit self. The complete absence of this assertion in the print or electronic 
media outlines the nature of manuwadi media; by its invisibilisation the savarna media 
assumes that the power of Dalit assertion can be discounted. Ambedkar jayanti, at the 
heart of the capital city, is an annual civic celebration, a counter-public which publicly 
represents, enacts and celebrates Ambedkar. I define it as civic because, besides its non-
religious significance, it is also the commemoration of the Constitution drafted by him.  
Ambedkar statues, therefore, manifest an assertive Dalit subject follower of his 
thoughts and one appreciative of his contribution to a civic culture of equality and 
justice signified by the Constitution. 
                                                 
229 Field notes: 14th April 2014, Ambedkar Jayanti, Parliament Street, New Delhi. 
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Figure 5.11: Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow230 
5.3.2 Mayawati’s statue: Behenji’s non-conformist defiant gaze 
Figure 5.11 exhibits the iconography of the ‘infamous’ Mayawati statue located 
inside the Sthal. It should be noted that when this statue was put up, a) she was (and is) 
still alive, b) in the statue depiction she is carrying a handbag and wears slippers.231 By 
building her own statue, she has redefined and challenged the Brahmanical male gaze, 
practices of iconography and Dalit women’s assertion in the political landscape of India. 
Mayawati ne mahilaon ke liye galat soch rakhne walon ko dikhaya…iss se pehle kisi 
Dalit ki beti ne kisi purush ka antim sanskar nahi kiya tha…parantu Mayawati ne 
Kanshi Ram ka antim sanskaar kiya …line tod kar kaam kiya Behenji ne.232 
[Mayawati has demonstrated to people with a conservative outlook regarding women… 
Until now a Dalit’s daughter had never performed the last rites of a man…but 
Mayawati performed the last rites of Kanshi Ram…Behenji broke the stereotype.] 
The crucial part of the narrative above is that “line tod ke kaam kiya behenji ne” [Behenji 
broke the stereotype]: from lighting Kanshi Ram’s pyre (“Mayawati to embrace 
                                                 
230 Image taken by the author, 13th March 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
231 Field notes: April 2014, Parivartan Sthal, Gomti Nagar, Lucknow, UP. 
232Interview with activist Pushpa Balmiki, 18th July 2014, Adharshila Office, Lucknow, UP. 
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Buddhism”, 2006) to constructing her own statues, Mayawati, a woman Dalit leader is a 
vital threat because of her performative non-conformist essence to the 
Brahmanical/nationalist male gaze. “Mayawati, unlike Ambedkar, is an entirely 
homespun Dalit, without the benefit of the latter’s education in the US and his 
deliberately more modulated and cultivated speech and appearance” (Nigam, 2010, p. 
255).  
Thus while advocating conformity all the detailing of norms for women in the 
Brahmanical texts are a powerful admission of the power of non-conformist women, or 
all women who have the power to non-conform, to break the entire structure of Hindu 
orthodoxy (Chakravarti, 1993, p. 580). 
As Chakravarti, points out, the greatest threat to Brahmanical patriarchy is a non-
conformist woman; viewed through that lens, Mayawati is definitely a threat as a Dalit, 
Ambedkarite, successful political strategist, efficient administer and single woman 
without male ‘protection’.  
Mayawati, Dalit ki Beti (daughter of a Dalit), by becoming the first chief minister 
of Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in India, unsettled the dominant caste equations of 
the state. Furthermore, by constructing her own statue in the Sthal along with all the 
other Dalit leaders she made her non-conformity visible, discomforting not just the 
Brahmanical/nationalist political dynamics but also their field of perception. The title of 
‘Behenji’ (sister) is used to address Mayawati and situate a ‘single’ woman leader within 
the patriarchal political system. Similarly, ‘Didi’ (elder sister) is used for Mamata 
Banerjee, (chief minister of Kolkata and another single female politician). On the other 
hand, ‘Amma’ (mother) is famously used for J. Jayalalithaa, the former chief minister of 
Tamil Nadu. These names of reference for single female political leaders in India 
demonstrate that it is difficult for patriarchal power structures to comprehend, locate 
and define women who are not bounded by patriarchal/male anchors. Mayawati refuses 
to be tamed – from using her first name without any surname (which reflects one’s caste 
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position in Indian society) to her defiance of political conventions to perpetuate a Dalit-
Bahujan political agenda. She has been subversive and defiant both visually and 
discursively. Performing excess, for instance in relation to her birthday celebrations or 
sartorial choices, may be considered as her symbolic assertion and retort at the same 
time; “by her very appearance ridiculing that attempt much like Ambedkar’s Western 
suit did”(Nigam, 2010, p. 255). 
Rege argued from an Ambedkerite theoretical legacy to point out that, 
“Brahmanical patriarchy fashions sameness, intersections, discreteness, and 
interdependent differences along a gradation of ascending reverence and descending 
contempt” (2013, p. 20). Therefore the caste and gender antagonism gets combined in 
the constant circulation of contempt with narratives from ‘megalomaniac Mayawati’ to 
‘charges of corruption’ as she disturbs Brahmanical patriarchy.233 By engraving herself, 
Mayawati uses practices of iconography to visually disturb the socio-political 
Brahmanical hierarchies. It is imperative to acknowledge that historically the 
representation of women leaders in iconographic history has been mostly due to male 
benevolence/patronage of women activists/political leaders who fit the patriarchal 
stereotypes, for example, Rani Lakshmi Bai or Indira Gandhi.234 It would be rare that 
the mainstream patriarchal iconographic practices/gaze would give/allow space for a 
female political leader who is Dalit. Through her own statues, Mayawati disrupts the 
visual landscape on two axes. 
First, the statues of Mayawati are tailored for the Brahmanical male gaze and not 
for the sexualised male gaze as she wears a shalwar kameez (as opposed to the traditional 
                                                 
233 Chakravarti (1993) explains that the Brahmanical social order survives through the caste and gender 
hierarchy. It is the basis for suppression of upper caste women by ensuring effective sexual control to 
maintain caste purity. 
234 Both these women were leaders in their own right. However, their acceptance and praise comes from a 
particular gendered lens that the patriarchal worldview appreciates. Lakshmi Bai was a warrior who 
fought to save her son’s kingdom and is lauded because she fought ‘bravely like a man’. Again Mrs 
Gandhi, on the other hand, despite all her skills is known for her leadership skills, because she was 
considered ‘more like a man’. 
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sari), slippers and carries a handbag. This targets the caste Hindu dominated political 
parties and their gaze which only sees her as ‘the Chamar woman’.235 Often the upper-
castes’ technique of disrespecting Ambedkar takes the form of hanging slippers on his 
statue, a symbolic violence embedded in caste hierarchy.236 By adorning her own statue 
with two leather items – the handbag and the slippers – she transforms caste 
humiliation into pride and reverses the narrative into the positive aspirational mobility 
and potential of her caste identity. Despite this, and the power that her political party 
wields, they have yet to gain social equality with and respect from the upper castes.  
Perhaps she knows only too well that the manufacture of handbags, footwear and other 
leather goods has given Chamars (like herself and Kanshi Ram) economic means – 
leather has been one of India’s major exports since the mid-nineteenth century and has 
often meant substantial economic gains for the community – but even after a century 
and a half that has not been enough to give them social equality. (Jain, 2014, p. 150) 
By visualising caste pride and mobility, as also in the context of the Ambedkar memorial 
project, she activates both the rise of Dalits as a community, their assertion and 
symbolically contests the caste Hindu repertoire.  
                                                 
235 Bose’s account of the mob attack by Samajwadi Party (SP) party workers on BSP workers and 
Mayawati, after she made a claim to forming the government. During the attack, the mob – which 
included other legislators – shouted to ‘drag the chamar woman out from her hole’ (Bose, 2008, p. 98). 
This incident highlights the fact that Mayawati could never rise above her caste identity, just like 
Ambedkar. They were never given the credence of being a worthy political opponent by the upper caste-
dominated Indian political party system. 
236 In India the production of leather goods and the politics of caste are interlinked in complex ways. The 
majority of tanning activity is sanctioned to the lowest castes of Dalits because it is considered a polluting 
activity. Also, according to caste practices, while Dalits could make slippers (shoes) for other castes, they 
did not have the right to wear them; they were expected to go barefoot.  
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Figure 5.12: Parivartan Sthal, Lucknow237 
Figure 5.12 shows the two life-size statues of Mayawati and Kanshi Ram which 
welcomes everyone at the entrance of the sthal. By placing herself next to Kanshi Ram 
she depicts her commitment to the Dalit agenda and the role that she sees herself 
performing in pursuing it further. 
Her second disruption of the visual landscape is that by establishing statues of 
women leaders amongst the pantheon of male Dalit icons Mayawati makes a pivotal 
space for the representation of women leaders who are part of political struggles. She 
acknowledges them and makes them visible as agents of change in their own right, 
outside of patriarchal benevolence. Guided by this intention, Savitri Phule’s statue238 is 
part of the pantheon, to begin with, followed by Mayawati’s statue being the second 
Dalit woman leader. Thus, Mayawati gives visibility to all flag bearers of the anti-caste 
struggle, male and female, within the Sthal. Placing herself besides Kanshi Ram not only 
                                                 
237 Image taken by the author in 13th March 2014, Lucknow, India 
238 Savitri Phule was a social reformer who fought against caste and gender based discrimination during 
the colonial period. She was instrumental in setting up the first school for girls in Pune (Maharashtra), at a 
time when both caste oppression and gender discrimination made it difficult for girls to attain education. 
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reflects the political camaraderie that existed between Saheb (as he was called) and 
Behenji, but also disturbs the existing Brahmanical patriarchal lens of viewing all such 
relationships as between mentor and protégés.  
Finally, the most hard-hitting rupture caused by Mayawati’s statues has been that 
of disturbing temporalities; she is still alive and arranged their construction herself, 
despite the fact that the practice of making statues is done usually posthumously. By 
interrupting time her statues are also challenging the practices of statue building. Thus 
the mainstream ire, unrest or agitation is all against the transgression of power at 
multiple levels by a Dalit woman chief minister. The recourse adopted by the manuwadi 
political parties and media is to label her as a ‘megalomaniac’, ‘opulent leader of the 
outcastes’ and ‘transfer rani’239 and accuse her with an array of corruption charges.  
Bose (2008) argues that Mayawati’s appeal amongst the Dalits is symbolic and 
emotional. I argue, however, based on my fieldwork in both rural and urban areas that 
Mayawati symbolises political power for her community; that the Dalit masses 
acknowledge and identify with her beyond symbolic resonance – as an able 
administrator and a political strategist.240 She has made the political constituency of the 
Dalit community stake political claims on their own terms; “[t]he fact that unlike other 
past scheduled caste leaders, Mayawati no longer depends on the patronage of upper 
caste leaders and parties, provides a special appeal that even Ambedkar did not possess” 
(Bose, 2008, p. 6). Furthermore, the balancing of issues of dignity and economic 
interests defined by the Ambedkarite vision explains the continued mass support that 
both she and the BSP garner. Asked about the relevance of Mayawati and her regime 
one of my respondents replied: 
                                                 
239 Mayawati, during her regime, besides keeping the bureaucracy on its toes, often transferred and 
relocated IAS officers quite frequently, hence the name. Yet she is not the only one to do this; it is an 
established pattern in the Indian government structure. 
240 Field notes: Many of my respondents, across classes, lauded Mayawati as an effective administrator. 
26th April 2014, Lucknow, UP. 
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hamesha haathi pe jayega hamara vote..chahe voh jeete na jeete ...chamar hain chamar 
hi ko dein..Behenji ko phir se aana chahiye…unke shasankaal mein shasan toh tight 
hota hai’241 
[Our vote will be for the elephant always, whether it wins or does not win. We are 
Chamars and will give to a Chamar; Behenji should come again. Under her regime, 
governance is tight]. 
Her core Dalit community persists because by renegotiating the boundaries of 
what can be said in the public domain she created a space for the narrative of Dalit resistance 
against caste Hindu humiliation.242 Humiliation has a particular vocabulary which 
decides the depth and intensity of the practices of Untouchability. In fact, the language 
of humiliation introduces a certain economy of scale that bears on the impact the 
tormentor intends to produce. “The words that carry and communicate humiliation can 
achieve a huge impact with less investment” (Guru, 2009, pp. 17–18). The strict 
institutional implementation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention 
of Atrocities) Act 1989 allowed her to legally counter the violent narrative agenda of the 
dominant upper caste.  
The earlier legislation which aimed to cover the aspect of atrocities as opposed 
to offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Protection of Civil Rights Act 
(PCRA) was found inadequate to deal with the atrocities, gross violation of dignity and 
offences against the SCs and STs. There were some marked improvements in the 
effective implementation of the 1989 Act. The constant gaze of state law and order 
machinery under Mayawati ensured a check on upper caste brazenness and that 
translated into a sense of fearlessness for the Dalit citizen subjects. At a subjective level 
this could be considered as a power to counter/reject humiliation. As argued by Guru 
(2009), two conditions provide a formative context for the definition of humiliation: 
first, an element of comparison generates within a person the capacity of self-reflexivity 
                                                 
241 Interview with Chanda, 50 years old and a focus group respondent, 20th July 2014, Balsinghkedha, 
Nagram, UP. 
242 Field notes: 5th July 2014, Samesi, UP. 
217 
necessary for gaining insight into oneself and others and, second, the emergence and 
articulation of the language of rights make the assertion against humiliation possible. 
Thus, Dalits felt a sense of empowerment and assertion under Mayawati’s rule to claim 
their constitutional rights as citizens against the state machinery: 
Behanji ke sarkar mein niyam kanoon ache the, log nidar hoke nikalte the …abhi darr 
ke mar log nahi nikalte…ab log bolte hai…Behenji ki sarkar nahi hain jo aap log pehle 
ki tarah soch rahe ho...ab koi nahi darta…Behanji jab thi tab hamara saashan 
tha…usme adhikari bhi darte the...ab har yojanao se SC walon ko peeche chodh diya 
gaya hai.243 
[During Behenji’s government, law and order was effective; people would venture out 
fearlessly...Now people don’t, out of fear...People [upper castes] say that it is not 
Behenji’s government any more that you all are thinking of...We [upper castes] don’t fear 
it now…It was our [lower caste] rule under Behenji…Even the authorities were 
scared…Now, the SCs have even been left out of various policies.] 
During interviews/focus groups many respondents, as the narrative above shows, 
affirmed that the system of law and order and the administrative establishment had 
become attentive and alert to their interests.244 A general sense of improved law and 
order situation was even felt by non-Dalits. “What the middle class intelligentsia in 
Lucknow do concede, however, is that the law and order situation has shown a definite 
improvement after Mayawati took over” (Bose, 2008, p. 8). Hence the ‘Iron Lady’ tag is 
not a misnomer if one looks at her success in securing effective checks against caste-
based violence and humiliation. “Developing an insight into humiliation is an 
epistemological act while communicating it to the tormentor is political” (Guru, 2009, 
p. 217). By drawing a line for upper caste behaviour in UP, Mayawati’s rise to power led 
to churning of a sociological character, as she mainstreamed the aspects of Dalit dignity 
and selfhood in the public sphere.  
Mayawati also challenged the untouchability exercised in the political realm and 
capitalised on the Bahujan identity beyond the existence of a Dalit subject as a mere 
vote-bank category in UP. She reinvented the rules of the political game through 
                                                 
243 Chandravati, 45 years old, focus group respondent, 20th July 2014 in Balsinghkedha, Nagram, UP. 
244 Field notes: especially during interviews in the villages, Barabanki and Samesi, 15th July 2014, UP. 
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coalitions and alliances; the BSP unsettles the caste equations as the political party of 
the Untouchables. The ideological shift from Bahujan samaj to Sarvajan samaj245 has been 
criticised by political analysts and labelled political opportunism. The two-fold political 
strategy of forming coalitions and giving tickets in elections to upper caste Hindus has 
led scholars to argue that the BSP is “no longer a Dalit party” (Jaffrelot, 1998, p. 35). 
However, the ideological strategy of targeting Brahmins and Banias is a blueprint that 
reverses the established trend of mainstream political parties such as Congress and the 
BJP trying to win over the Dalit vote banks. The tactic of targeting caste Hindus, 
‘Brahman jodo’ (Add Brahman) and ‘Brahman Samitis’ (Brahman Committees), hits at the 
Hindu social order and political parties like the BJP whose social base depends on these 
alliances. In 2005, the BSP under the leadership of Mayawati organised Brahman jodo 
sammelans (meetings) and Brahman Maha rallies across UP. Around 60 such sammelans 
were held in 2005, and many more were proposed throughout the state (Verma, 2005). 
Targeting the caste groups rather than going into coalitions with upper caste 
mainstream political parties, she is making the 10% of the population (caste Hindus) 
take part in the political patronage system on the terms set by the Bahujans (the non-
caste Hindu majority); the performative essence of Mayawati’s ideological and political 
strategy and intent to mainstream the majority.  
Mayawati’s statue thus visualises an assertive Dalit female body which disrupts 
the Brahmanical patriarchal perspective of seeing a Dalit woman. As a Dalit woman 
political leader she embodies defiance of political, social and patriarchal conventions 
and norms. It is this assertion and the defiant gaze that she instils amongst young Dalit 
women as she deals with upper-caste men and their worldview every day and this is 
most evident in the visible presence, participation and identification of thousands of 
women with her as their leader and the BSP as their political party.  
                                                 
245 Electoral strategy adopted by Mayawati in 2007 to expand the ambit of ticket distribution to include 
upper castes such as Banias and Thakurs and not just limit it to core Dalit members. 
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The appearance of statues of Dalit leaders such as Ambedkar and Mayawati is 
disruptive of the religio-sacred turf and values of caste Hindu representation, both in 
the nature of icons and spatial assertion. The normative order that Dalit statues inhere 
signifies norms of challenging graded inequality, transgression of the pollution line and 
assertion of a defiant self. The next section shifts the discussion of Dalit politics and 
symbolic mobilisation from UP to Gujarat to map the anti-Patel statue campaign 
spearheaded by Dalit groups and the impact of this symbolic contestation on Modi’s 
Patel statue campaign in the general election of 2014, Dalit symbolic politics and the 
resultant Dalit citizen subjectivity. 
 
Figure 5.13: Dalit Shakti Kendra, Ahmedabad, Gujarat246 
Figure 5.13 displays the statue that I encountered on my visit to the Dalit Shakti 
Kendra in Ahmadabad, kept within the compound after the Shobhyatra event. It 
                                                 
246 Image taken by the author, 16th June 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
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captures the shift in the iconopraxis deployed so far in the style of Ambedkar statues. 
The pose – he is sitting and writing the Constitution – deviates from the standing pose 
discussed in the earlier section. The 12 foot statue with the new posture was made by 
Reena Badalbhai, a young Dalit girl, in Botad for the campaign which demanded that if 
the tallest statue is constructed in Gujarat, then it had to be one of Ambedkar (S. Khan, 
2013). 
The following section maps the symbolic mobilisation around the anti-Patel 
statue campaign led by Dalit civil society groups in Gujarat. By targeting the manuwadi 
nationalist gaze the mobilisation reinforces the symbolic significance of Ambedkar and 
the Constitution to reclaim visibility for Dalit citizen-subjects in the visual landscape of 
Modi’s Surajya and also, in the process, denting the symbolic power of Hindutva forces 
led by the BJP. 
5.4 Symbolic Contestation: Ambedkar vs. Patel Statue – Beyond ‘Dalit’ 
Iconopraxis in Gujarat 
A statue of Ambedkar stands in a Dalit locality of Padra in Vadodara—robbed of its 
pride of place in the town square. It was 17 years ago, say locals that the civic body 
allowed its erection at a prominent spot but dominant caste groups scuttled the move 
by installing a Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in its place. (Gaikwad, 2014) 
Reading the above story during my fieldwork in Vadodara confirmed that the 
symbolic contest between the statues of Ambedkar and Patel and the attendant spatial 
assertion by the respective castes have been part of the Gujarati socio-political milieu 
and have a much longer history than Modi’s election campaign of 2014.247 He proposed 
to build the world’s tallest statue of Patel, the details of which were discussed in the 
previous chapter. The emphasis in this chapter is to map the anti-Patel statue campaign. 
The Dalit counter-mobilisation demanded that Ambedkar’s statue deserved to be the 
tallest statue rather than Patel’s (Bhan, 2014). 
                                                 
247 Field notes: 20th April 2014, Vadodara, Gujarat. 
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There are two interesting aspects of the Dalit demand for Ambedkar’s tallest 
statue in Gujarat. First, this movement aimed to change the Dalit iconopraxis of 
Ambedkar’s statue and reworking of the Ambedkarite calendar. Gujarat mobilisation, as 
opposed to the earlier discussion based on Dalit symbolism in UP, becomes a 
stimulating contrast because of the fundamental transition that this movement activates 
and extends. The repertoire of iconography aside, it is also reflective of critical self-
reflexivity amongst Dalit citizen-subjects of the Rohith caste in the Dalit villages of 
Padra, Jaspur and Bhat in Gujarat. Second, the campaign bursts the myth of Modi’s 
‘Gujarat model’ bubble and the symbolic violence inherent in it for those who are 
outside the purview of Gujarati-Hindu exceptionalism, both in relation to Hindu caste 
unity and the socio-economic progress it projects. The campaign highlights the everyday 
practices of Untouchability and marginalisation experienced by Dalit citizen-subjects in 
Gujarat.  
On enquiring with one of the organizers of the anti-Patel statue campaign on 
the motivations behind the mobilisation, Macwan responded by saying the following: 
The reason I raised was how are you going to get 2500 crores for the Patel statue? This 
has not been debated in the Assembly; this has not been in the budget; so I wanted a 
debate on it. The issue I raised was that Ambedkar’s statue should be one foot taller 
than the Patel statue because he was a tall man. Historically, if you look at the 
contribution, both were great, but looking at what he suffered – and he gave the 
Constitution to the country, he civilised the country, so why not his statue? Give 
reasons? If you have sufficient reasons for Sardar Patel, then also give sufficient reasons 
why Ambedkar does not deserve this honour? We don’t want Ambedkar’s statue to be 
the tallest in the world but we want it to be the tallest in India.248 
His narrative above highlights that apart from the caste dynamics that exists between 
Patels and Dalits in Gujarat as discussed in the previous chapter – the background for 
symbolic contestation; there is also an equally crucial aspect which the campaign targets 
– the manuwadi nationalist gaze.  
                                                 
248 Interview with Martin Macwan, 16th June 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
222 
The campaign demanding Ambedkar’s statue is not led by any political party; 
Gujarat lacks a political party that is representative of Dalit interests like the BSP is in 
UP. Dalit concerns have been furthered by civil society groups who have taken on the 
task of, for instance, checking practices of social discrimination and exploitation in the 
absence of a political party that represents the Dalit agenda. Also, opposition parties 
(such as Congress) in Gujarat are less of a viable option in the face of the BJP’s political 
domination in the state. This campaign was led by three main civil society groups in 
Gujarat, Dalit Shakti Kendra (DSK), Navsarjan and the Samata Sainik Dal (SSD), and 
the main motive was to reclaim Ambedkar as a nationalist leader to counter the 
bracketing of him as a ‘Dalit leader’ only. Its aim was to dismantle the manuwadi 
nationalist gaze which acknowledges only upper caste Hindu leaders (e.g. Gandhi, 
Nehru and Patel) as the flag bearers of nationalism. The political landscape of national 
politics is also visually saturated with state-sponsored rather than community-driven 
statues of the triumvirate.  
Indian nationalism was, from its early days, by the very nature of its historical 
development an upper caste and class phenomenon, taking forward the interests and 
aspirations of its members (Gaikwad, 1998). Ambedkar’s rise as a leader from the lower 
caste disrupted the dominant control by the upper caste and elites as he contested and 
struggled against these narratives and worldviews. Locating him in the midst of Gandhi 
and Nehru, Omvedt (2004) argues that they could sacrifice for the nation because of the 
privileged caste and class background they came from and foregrounds Ambedkar’s life 
experiences based on caste discrimination which defined his politics against 
Untouchability and Brahmanism. By raising the contradictions of the Hindu social 
order, Ambedkar challenged and contested the existing nationalist discourse.  
Guru (1998) argues that Ambedkar’s refusal to be part of the national 
movement led by Congress was based on the dichotomy between the political and the 
223 
social, wherein the former only was concerned with the political. “There were two 
parallel trends in Ambedkar’s political attitude, his growing opposition to Congress and 
his rejection of patriotism as an ideology” (Jaffrelot, 2005a, p. 94). His opposition was 
based on his understanding of freedom to be of more substantive value, not just getting 
rid of foreign rule. His argument was that in the absence of any comprehensive critique 
of the caste system and Hinduism the political is bound to suggest that the 
local/indigenous tyrants are preferable on “patriotic grounds” (Guru, 1998, p. 157). 
Moreover, the nature of the nationalist mobilisation had a biased Hindu religio-cultural 
repertoire which excluded the minorities – both the Dalits and Muslims. It was the 
entrenched casteist ghettoisation in the nationalist discourse that Ambedkar signified, 
and which was being challenged by the present campaign. Ambedkar, as the 
representative and the spokesperson for the Dalit community, as discussed in the 
previous sections, defined the dominant iconographic practices for his statues. It is the 
third perspective of seeing him as a national statesman that is highlighted through this 
mobilisation.  
Congress had to first deal with Babasaheb as the representative of the Dalits and 
then gradually with a visionary statesman. From institutionalising affirmative action for 
the backward castes to intervening in different aspects of developmental policy (for 
instance, labour rights or laws in general), Ambedkar contributed immensely in 
furthering rights for every section of Indian society, not just for Dalits.  
Babasaheb is a National leader, then why are we calling him a Dalit? Look at his entire 
life’s work! He was the first man who got the legislation that women should get 
maternity leave on paid wages; was it made only for ‘Dalit’ women? As a Labour 
Minister he brought in the Provident Fund and the Gratuity Act and he resigned as the 
Law minister because the Hindu Code Bill with his revisions that aimed to guarantee 
equal rights to property and inheritance for women could not be passed. He never took 
up only the caste issue.249 
                                                 
249 Interview with Martin Macwan, 16th June 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
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The attempt of the campaign, as the above narrative claims, was to focus on 
expanding the understanding of nationalism to include the contribution of nation 
building based on the principles of equality and justice which Ambedkar enshrined in 
the Constitution, going beyond the leadership of the Nationalist movement. For him, 
nationalism did not stop at freedom from colonial rule but entailed a larger vision based 
on building an inclusive and equal national community devoid of caste hierarchies and 
social discrimination. His stature was more of a national statesman. Despite Ambedkar’s 
contribution in writing the constitution which guarantees citizenship rights to all, not just to 
Dalits, he has been always perceived as a Dalit leader. The mobilisation aimed to rupture 
the casteist prism mentally, spatially and visually.  
It is because of Babasaheb’s Constitution that India is known in the world. But his 
identity is that of a ‘Dalit’ leader and even the community believes that he is ‘our’ 
leader… The government also erects Ambedkar statues in Dalit localities…the rest of 
the statues of other leaders are put up in public spaces but Ambedkar’s statue is always 
in the middle of a Dalit locality..That is why there is a thinking among the non-Dalits 
that he is ‘yours’…So in order to change this perspective …Babasaheb is the leader of 
the country, leader of the nation…people of the nation should pay respect to him.250 
The intent expressed above by one of the activists from SSD translates into the 
shift in Ambedker’s statue posture discussed in the beginning of the section. The focus 
was to capture that both Patel and Ambedkar are national leaders and have contributed 
to the nation, but considering Ambedkar’s contribution in writing the Constitution he 
has an equal, if not superior, claim to be commemorated. The campaign targeted non-
Dalits as much as it reached out to Dalits.251  
The significance of this mobilisation was also to challenge the temporal 
ghettoisation by the nationalist calendar and also to expand the Ambedkarite calendar.252 
For non-Dalits the most important date for Dalit celebrations is 14th April (Ambedkar 
                                                 
250 Interview with Dineshbhai, activist with the SSD, 21st June 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
251 Field notes: 26th January 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
252 The Ambedkarite calendar refers to those published annually by several Dalit groups which are visually 
distinct in style and include establishing the historical lineage to also documenting history (Rege, 2008, p. 
16). 
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Jayanti) mostly because it is a civic holiday. The other two important dates – 6th 
December (at Chaityabhoomi253) and 14th October (at Nagpur254) are only 
commemorated by Dalits. For non-Dalits these dates are a cause of inconvenience and 
obstruction (that too only if they live in one of those two places) but otherwise invisible. 
“The usual middle class ‘common sense’ reading of the Ambedkarite gatherings is that 
these events are irrational/emotional and cause civic problems related to traffic and 
hygiene” (Rege, 2008, p. 16). The campaign aimed to educate and expand the calendar 
for the non-Dalit mainstream and to signify Ambedkar’s vision which was for everyone, 
emphasising his historical battles to extend rights and equality to all. It was an effort to 
educate everyone (Dalits and non-Dalits) equally about Ambedkar, the National leader 
who ensured equality for all through the Constitution. 
The campaign chose three alternate dates which were historically relevant. 
Sobhayatra (March for Equality) was launched at the Ambedkar Jayanti on 14th April 2013 
with the slogan ‘Samanta na Sangharsh ni Sobhayatra’ (March to celebrate struggle for 
equality). The yatra was designed on the lines of an Independence Day parade with large 
numbers of youth, women and children participating. Organised to celebrate the 
struggle for equality in Ahmadabad,255 it used floats of Ambedkar’s statue to highlight 
the other struggles that he waged and the contribution of all other Dalit reformers. It 
also crucially raised the issue of the rampant persistence of untouchability in Gujarat; 
“[d]uring the programme, 100,000 balloons symbolizing freedom from manual 
scavenging, were released in the skies to draw the attention that Gujarat, a ‘progressive’ 
state, has 64,000 manual scavengers out of a total of 7.5 lakh in the country” (“Unique 
Shobhayatra” 2013). This was followed by the celebration of ‘Manusmriti Dahan Din’ 
                                                 
253 Chaiytyabhoomi at Nagpur has the memorial of Dr. Ambedkar and 6th December is observed as his 
Death Anniversary. 
254 Deekshabhoomi is where Ambedkar converted to Buddhism at Nagpur, Maharashtra on 14th October 
1956. 
255 More information regarding the march can be found on the Navsarjan official website at: 
https,//navsarjantrust.org/?s=shobhayatra 
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(Commemorating burning of Manusmriti) on 25th December 2013, at Badarkha village, 
Dholka Taluka. Ambedkar, during the Mahasangharsh of Mahad satyagraha, publicly burnt 
the Manusmriti on 25th December 1927, symbolically releasing the community from the 
shackles of the oppressive caste structure and its norms thus symbolising enlightenment 
for the community.  
Babasaheb’s burning of the Manusmriti led to some light…The youth of the community 
are now studying, doing good jobs. That is why he is symbolic of light. That is why at 
Badarkha we built a candle that was five feet tall and distributed one lakh boxes of 
matches…We distributed boxes of matches because they would be used at least for a 
month…and for that one month Babaseheb’s thoughts will be with them.256 
As part of the campaign “nearly one lakh Dalit families from across 3500 villages lit 
lamps at home at 9pm” (Paul & Chavadal, 2013). The final addition to the calendar took 
place in 2014 when 26th January was celebrated as commemorating the adoption of the 
Indian Constitution written by Dr. Ambedkar; the initial event was organised in the 
village of Bhat, Daskroi District, Ahmadabad. According to Macwan, the movement’s 
leader: 
On January 26, a 183-metre banner will be unfurled. It will give the message of 
Ambedkar’s contribution to the nation through the Constitution that abolished 
untouchability, child labour, bonded labour while giving right to liberty, equality along 
with reservations for Dalits, OBC, women and minorities. The tricolour banner 
carrying the message — ‘Bharat desh ni sauthi unchi pratima, adhunik Bharat na gadhvaiya, 
Ambedkar ni, ej emnu sachu samman’ (India’s tallest statue, Gadhvaya of modern India, 
Ambedkar’s, is his true honour) (Macwan, quoted in Parmar, 2014).  
For the first time in the community, in a thousand villages throughout Gujarat, Dalits 
have in their villages, at various points in the public space, hoisted the National Flag. It 
was a realisation for us and the community that on 26th January we became a republic 
and Babasaheb made a big contribution to that. But still none of the officials, 
politicians or social leader acknowledges Babasaheb’s name on this day, despite the fact 
that when we look back historically Babasaheb has contributed a lot. And because of 
him we have experienced real freedom, because the Constitution that he wrote got 
implemented.257 
All three events organised by the movement had massive participation and support 
from both Dalits and non-Dalits. By re-indexing and re-interpreting the Dalit calendar, 
                                                 
256 Interview with Dineshbhai, activist with the Samata Dal, 21st June 2014, Ahmadabad, Gujarat. 
257 Interview with Jayesh, activist with the Samata Dal, 21st June 2014, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. 
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the self-reflexivity of the Dalit citizen subjects becomes evident and that the Dalit 
public sphere is organic in its nature. 
The spatial strategy of yatra and use of floats were distinct in this mobilisation 
apart from the new posture for the statue of Ambedkar. Shobha yatra entailed the 
transgression of non-Dalit spaces and claim making on the streets and alleys of 
Ahmadabad visually and discursively. Non-Dalit spectators would have experienced 
‘seeing and moving on’ but for the Dalit self it was twofold: to disperse their way of seeing 
Ambedkar as a Nationalist Dalit leader and, most crucially in the context of anti-Patel 
statue mobilisation, to assert their visibility as Untouchable citizen-subjects of Gujarat.  
By mainstreaming Ambedkar, the Constitution and the prevalence of 
Untouchability, this campaign visualised an alternative regressive Gujarat and the 
fissures that exist in Modi’s growth story embedded in Gujarati-Hindu exceptionalism. 
The symbolic power and control of the media by the manuwadi forces ensured that the 
anti-Patel counter-mobilisation was not shown on any news channels; in fact, there was 
a complete media blackout. The fear and anxiety around even a demand for an 
Ambedkar statue led to the agenda of the Patel statue being relegated to the backburner 
during Modi’s election campaign. As discussed in the previous section, the normative 
order that an Ambedkar statue represents and fixes demonstrates the power of Dalit 
symbolism and assertion, forcing the BJP to revert back from its campaign for a Patel 
statue. The mobilisation also displayed the more constructivist and autonomous 
character of Dalit mobilisation. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Dalit politics, by intervening in the symbolic political field, converts social caste 
consciousness into a political consciousness, unsettles the established social order and 
deepens democracy. The Dalit self is not just able to reclaim their sense of history, space 
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and identity but also defy the dominant mainstream – the Brahmanical/nationalist order. 
It also highlights that symbolic mobilisation within the community has an autonomous 
existence outside of the instrumentality of a political party, depicted in the existence of 
statue politics before the BSP came to power and also in the absence of one, in the case 
of Gujarat. The community emerged as a self-reflexive critical mass that, with their 
symbolic interventions, evolved as assertive transgressive Dalit citizen-subjects gazing 
back at the manuwadi social order.  
Mayawati’s Sthal and chowks give the world a history and an iconography of the 
anti-caste struggle in India. By doing this, she not only makes visible the history of 
struggles waged against the caste system but also requires the Indian political order and 
the world to acknowledge ‘caste’, the power configuration therein which has hitherto 
been invisible. By initiating a memorial structure of this kind Mayawati challenged the 
symbolic violence of the Brahamanical/nationalist perception which not only rejects 
questioning of the upper caste dominance by leaders like Ambedkar but also the 
Gandhian understanding of the Dalit political subject – as an adjunct to the Hindu 
social order. By setting it in stone, the aim is to make the Brahmanical/nationalist 
history acknowledge both the practices of Untouchability and the attendant repugnance 
of the Dalit political subject in the dominant political discourse. Caste is no longer an 
abstraction; it has a real materialistic form as well as symbolic composition now. 
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6 Performing Dissent: The Anti-Corruption Crusade 
6.1 Introduction 
Aaj dilli ke har aam aadmi ne mukhyamantri aur mantri ki shapath li hai…aaj aam admi 
ki jeet hui hai!258 
[Today every common man has taken the oath of the chief minister and a minister…it’s 
the victory of the common man today.] 
At the swearing-in ceremony as chief minister of the National Capital Territory 
(NCT) of Delhi Arvind Kejriwal proclaimed the victory of the common man from the 
Ramlila Maidan on 28th December 2013. Under Kejriwal’s leadership the Aam Aadmi 
Party’s (henceforth AAP) taking over the political mantle of New Delhi signified the 
symbolic full circle of what had started off as a movement against corruption at the 
same venue in 2011 and the ultimate assertion of the people’s victory. However, the 
anti-corruption crusade has been referred to as a ‘mediatised event’ in the mainstream 
discourse because of the middle class embeddedness both in its nature of leadership and 
participation: “[f]or the electronic media, this story was tailor-made – a fixed location, 
colourful crowds, a 74-year-old Gandhian-type figure on fast, and a campaign against 
something as generic as ‘corruption’ that had universal appeal” (EPW Editorial, 2011). 
This chapter analyses the anti-corruption mobilisation from outside the prism of 
the ‘visual trap’ (Rajagopal, 2011b), arguing on the contrary that the anti-corruption 
movement with its symbolisms intervened in the ‘sanitised’ political field and culture of 
New Delhi, disrupting it discursively, spatially and visually. The movement, by 
invigorating hitherto apolitical and anti-political citizen-subjects into sustained political 
activism transgressed the neoliberal disciplining gaze while also visualising the neo-
liberal civic citizen. The discussion is divided into three sections. The first examines the 
nature of the spatial assertion that this mobilisation activated, creating counter-spaces of 
                                                 
258 Field notes: Kejriwal’s swearing-in ceremony speech, 28th December 2013, Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi. 
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dissent and violating the neoliberal and state-authorised spatial segregation. The second 
section takes up the symbolic habitus that traces the transition of the anti-political phase 
of the movement under the India Against Corruption (IAC) campaign to the formation 
of the anti-political establishment party – the AAP. Finally, the discussion on political 
subjectivity in the third section elucidates the constitution of a neo-liberal civic citizen.  
Contextualising my discussion through the conceptual framework of the new 
middle class (Fernandes, 2006) and anti-political establishment parties (Abedi, 2004) 
leads to what I describe as the emergence of a neo-liberal civic citizen. While the 
assertion of the “people” (Menon & Nigam, 2011b) cannot be denied and it activates 
“citizens making claims on the state through the assertion of ownership right” (Roy, 
2014, p. 53), I argue that this insurgent citizen subject assertion and activism is the 
predefined nature of a politics embedded in post-liberalisation and the resultant nature 
of the new consumer citizen. Extending the analysis of the anti-corruption movement 
by Menon and Nigam (2011a) and of the AAP by Roy (2014), the chapter aims to add 
to the scholarship by analysing the nature of political subjectivity that this mobilisation 
constitutes.  
Discourses on the corruption of political elites and criminalization of politics in 
particular form a significant thread in the construction of such class based anxieties. 
These attitudes are not isolated examples but are also manifested in middle class 
community based activism. (Fernandes, 2006, p. 185) 
As argued by Fernandes above, the construction of the new consumer citizen 
rests on a perceived corruption of the Indian elite. She argues that when these 
consumer citizens transform into the new common man, they convert themselves into 
victims of ineffective governance and unions. In this articulation and representation 
both the government and the unions embody the corrupt ‘other’. This also translates 
into a narrative of the entire political system being inefficient and corrupt. This explains 
the large support amongst the middle class professionals (Sitapati, 2011) and corporate 
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houses (Ravinder Kaur, 2012) (see section 6.4.1). This stated embeddedness of the new 
middle class, however, does not efface the transgressive and reconstituted citizenship 
that this mobilisation inheres. Hence, claiming that the movement was a media creation 
takes away from the impact it has had on re-constituting new political subjectivities in 
two ways: first, the non-sectarian based mobilisation activated a neo-liberal civic subject 
identity contesting the neoliberal regimentation of a ‘consumer citizen-subject’ (Ong, 
2006) by speaking back to the power of the state and the political class. Second, the 
movement led to the emergence of an anti-political establishment party in the AAP 
which disconcerted the complacency and symbolic capital of the existing political 
parties such the Congress and the BJP by the performative essence of the aam aadmi 
(common man).259 
The Anna Hazare movement grew up against the backdrop of the alleged 2G 
spectrum scam260 and the corruption in the Commonwealth Games (CWG)261 which 
triggered public outrage. This was arguably the most powerful political mobilisation on 
the issue of corruption in mainstream politics that the country had witnessed since the 
Jay Prakash (JP) movement in 1974.262 As highlighted by Gupta (1995), one of the 
crucial ingredients of discourses of citizenship in a populist democracy such as India has 
been that public sector employees are considered accountable to ‘the people’. Hence the 
movement was directed at making the bureaucratic and political establishment 
                                                 
259 The Indian party system has been dominated by two national parties, Congress and the BJP. Unlike 
other states where regional parties have electorally challenged the might of these two parties, New Delhi’s 
politics has historically been focused on the electoral contest between these two. 
260 In the 2G Spectrum scam the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government led by the Congress 
party was accused of under charging mobile companies for the frequency allocation licences which were 
used to create 2G spectrum subscriptions for mobile phones. The Supreme Court judgments in 2012 held 
that the telecom minister, A. Raja, wielded the ultimate authority over allocations and cancelled the 
licences.  
261 India had hosted the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi. However, it was marred by allegations of 
corruption and financial irregularities. The organising committee chaired by Suresh Kalmadi was accused 
of and charged with favouring a Swiss company when buying equipment, leading to expansive budgeting 
and cheating the government.  
262 In 1974, Jay Prakash Narayan spearheaded a people’s movement against the authoritarian Congress 
regime, gaining momentum from the Navnirman movement in Gujarat and the student unrest in Bihar, 
both of which raised issues of corruption and price rises. This movement is considered to be the first 
powerful mobilisation against corruption in independent India. 
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accountable to the people. The movement’s demand was for the passage of the Jan 
Lokpal Bill (People’s Ombudsman Bill)263 as a strong anti-corruption instrument and 
brought into focus the indispensability of an ombudsman, an area of legislation that 
Parliament had resisted for decades. The movement began as a coalition of non-
government organisations (NGOs) and independent activists united under the India 
Against Corruption (IAC) banner which, when negotiations with the incumbent 
Congress government failed, branched into a new political party, the Aam Aadmi Party 
(Common Man Party) in 2012. 
A coalition of civil society groups, IAC, had been active in initiating the 
campaign against corruption since 2010. It gained momentum in 2011 when Hazare 
went on an indefinite hunger strike in Jantar Mantar, demanding a joint committee of 
civil society members to draft a strong anti-corruption bill and the introduction of a 
stronger version of the Jan Lokpal Bill. His protest soon attracted support in New Delhi 
and spread to other cities as well. Anna called off his fast on 9th April 2011 after 
receiving an assurance from the government that their version would be introduced in 
the parliament. This was followed by an indefinite fast by Baba Ramdev, a self-styled 
godman264 with a popular mass base, at the Ramlila Maidan on 4th June 2011, whose key 
demand was to recover black money265 stashed up in foreign countries by India’s elites 
such as politicians, industrialists and actors. The enormous pressure by various civil 
society groups led to police action and the forcible removal of Ramdev and his 
supporters. To protest the police action against Ramdev, Hazare gave 15th August as the 
deadline for parliament to pass the Jan Lokpal Bill, and threatened another hunger strike. 
                                                 
263 The Jan Lokpal Bill: was the civil society version of the Anti-Corruption Bill to appoint a Jan Lokpal 
(ombudsman) to investigate corruption cases. It differs significantly from the government’s version of the 
Lokpal Bill in its functions and composition. Most importantly, the Jan Lokpal includes within its ambit 
the sitting prime minister, judges and all government officials whereas the government’s version only 
brings in the PM after he/she leaves office, does not include the judges and leaves out lower-level 
government employees. 
264 A type of charismatic guru. 
265 That is, money earned on the black market. 
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The fact that the government’s approved version of the Jan Lokpal Bill excluded the 
office of the prime minister and higher judiciary as outside the purview of the bill 
deepened the rift between the government and Team Anna. However, Hazare was 
arrested on 16th August 2011 before his threatened next fast. This pre-emptive coercive 
action by the Congress led Central government changed the course of the political 
culture of New Delhi in a phenomenal manner as it triggered massive dissent on the 
streets of Delhi. 
6.2 ‘Sanitised’ Delhi to an Aam Aadmi’s Dilli 
The following section links the aspect of spatial assertion with corporeal 
experiences as people, by occupying spaces whether parks, squares or streets, make 
themselves heard and seen. Political subjects as interfering bodies use their bodies as 
instruments of political agenda, affecting their sociality and ‘making an appearance’ 
(Arendt, 1958) and, most crucially, enabling and constraining the structural 
environment. By creating counter-spaces of civic activism and counter-publics of 
alternative discursive articulation of the Jan Lokpal Bill as opposed to the government’s 
version, the movement activated the spatial dimension of the city. By performing the 
aam aadmi on the street they disrupted and unsubscribed to the neo-liberal 
regimentation and the state’s spatial regulations. In protesting, they risked physical 
assaults and arrests and thereby constituted an insurgent citizen subject with a 
confrontationist gaze. 
Political power is central to the demeanour of the city of New Delhi and the 
underlying statist bureaucratic ambience and routine defines it. Its field of perception 
casts an ‘official statist’ or ‘political capital’ outlook wherein the visual field is saturated 
with historical monuments and government buildings. The monumental legacy of the 
Mughals coexists with that of the British architect, Lutyens. “A Republic needs a 
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symbol of pride; and Lutyens’ New Delhi makes precisely that statement, establishes 
precisely that symbol for the Republic of India” (Buch, 2003, p. 29). It is not just the 
architectural landscape that is visualised through the Red Fort, Raisina Hill and the 
Rajpath – they reverberate as centres of political and bureaucratic power. It is this idea 
of dominant power that continues to inspire Delhi’s politicians and bureaucrats and 
disperses as the aura of the city. Political assertion or claim making is confined to party 
headquarters, parliament or stretched a bit further to Jantar Mantar; the rest of New 
Delhi is spatially cordoned off and ‘sanitised’ of any political activism. It is this sanitised 
perception and decorum which was churned up by the anti-corruption movement and 
the formation of the AAP; politically, discursively and visually, this field is unsettled.  
The anti-corruption movement redefined the ‘symbolic geography’ (Tilly, 2000) 
of the city of Delhi and the resultant civic community activism. Delhi is spatially 
demarcated on the basis of economic activities, partition patterns and occupational 
affinities with a visible lack of social cohesion and an overarching civic identity. 
Compared to Mumbai and Calcutta (Kolkata), New Delhi has been described as an 
‘unloved city’ by Dupont, Tarlo, & Vidal (2000); they argued that no equivalent loyalty 
and affection is found amongst the inhabitants of New Delhi who are either mostly 
indifferent or actively dislike the city in which they live. It is both this apathy and 
interweaving of different social classes across dispersed spatial locations that the 
movement tends to galvanise. 
6.2.1 The ‘counter-space’ and the politics of visibility: Ramlila Maidan, streets 
and alleys 
The mobilisation of the IAC followed by that of the AAP was able to make 
effective inroads into mapping both aspects of the city – the spatial geography and an 
identity based on civic entitlement and duties. The spatial practices used by the 
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movement entangled politics with space, hence the ‘city’ is redefined as the site of 
contention itself. The most striking factor of the anti-corruption movement was the 
visibility of the people coming out on the streets. Huge masses of people occupied 
grounds and parks or marched through the alleys and streets making claims against their 
political representatives. During the anti-corruption movement, protesters claimed 
urban spaces as sites of resistance starting from the moment when Anna was jailed by 
state authorities, as protesters gathered outside Tihar jail to various sit–ins that were 
eventually organised outside offices and homes of members of parliament and the then 
chief minister of New Delhi, Sheila Dikshit’s, residence thus reclaiming their ‘right to 
the city’ (Lefebvre, 1996).  
Applying Lefebvre’s conceptual triadic analysis of space to public squares such 
as the Ramlila and Azad maidans can contribute in understanding how representation of 
public squares can be subverted by people; occupying the maidan continuously in 
opposition to the coercive apparatus of the state administration. The struggle for rights 
brings out the dialectics between abstract and differentiated space. The Ramlila Maidan 
emerged as a powerful counter-space for the creation of a new community of citizen 
subjects, becoming a site for spontaneous mobilisation, public deliberation and 
politicisation of the masses aimed at transformation of the political community. 
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Figure 6.1: Delhi Police Advertisement266 
Figure 6.1 exhibits the anti-systemic potential of counter-spaces such as Ramlila 
Maidan and Jantar Mantar, which becomes evident with this recent Delhi Police 
advertisement issued on 7th February 2014. Its significance lies in the appeal made by 
state agencies such as the Delhi police to control and manage popular protest in the 
present context of post-anti- corruption mobilisation. The advertisement told the 
protesters that if they were more than 50,000 in number they would need to seek 
permission to organise a dharna (protest) at Ramlila Maidan (Delhi Police Advert, 2014b); 
a second advertisement stated that gatherings of no more than 5000 were allowed in 
Jantar Mantar (Delhi Police Advert, 2014a). The notification issued by the Delhi Police is 
worth mentioning and highlighting here because they reflect that these protests sites 
were making the political establishment weary of mass protests and spontaneous sit-ins 
                                                 
266 Source: Delhi Police, (7 February 2014) Indian Express retrieved from 
epaper.indianexpress.com/225534/Indian-Express/07-Febuary-2014#page/2/1 
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by the general public. Reinstating these spaces with counter-systemic potential has thus 
been one of the spatial dynamics that first, the anti-corruption movement and then the 
AAP, activated. 
The Ramlila Maidan was a crucial site for political opposition and mobilisations 
until the 1980s. It began with state-led gatherings, as in the backdrop of victory against 
Pakistan, to its complete antithesis in the 1970s during the state of emergency when it 
emerged as the ‘site of opposition’, first led by Jay Prakash Narayan and later by the 
political leaders who launched the Janata Party. However, over time protestors were 
forced to move to first the Boat Club and then to Jantar Mantar as the state-authorised 
space for protests. Though the Maidan continued to be used by political parties of all 
persuasions for their respective rallies, for many people in Delhi it was mostly an alien 
space in their ‘everyday’ existence. However, the launching of Anna’s fast in 2011 from 
the Ramlila Maidan transformed the ‘impersonal urban space’ into the centre of all 
activity and interaction, a counter-space267 of spontaneous masses as opposed to 
‘mobilised’ supporters of specific political parties. Replacing the Jantar Mantar as the 
lexicon for a state-authorised space for protests and demonstrations on a large scale, 
Ramlila Maidan re-emerged as Delhi’s Tahrir/Tiananmen Square as people occupied the 
ground for 12 days and vowed to make India free of political corruption. By occupying 
the Maidan, the protesters created a physical and political space for reasserting the 
power of the people against corruption: “for 12 days, a city in which protests were 
consigned to a museumised space, Jantar Mantar, was reclaimed for protest by a crashing 
tide of humanity so huge, so peaceful and nonviolent, that it simply took back the city” 
(Menon & Nigam, 2011a, p. 17). The Maidan was also home to a giant poster of the wall 
                                                 
267 Counter-spaces, Lefebvre implies, are necessarily spaces of concrete personal relations, because they 
are in part a protest against the abstraction imposed by authorities as part of their arsenal of social 
control. As a counter-space, it “insert[ed] itself into spatial reality...against power and the arrogance of 
power” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 382). 
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of democracy – an anti-corruption petition for visitors to sign. Atop a makeshift stage, 
Anna declared it to be India’s second freedom struggle: 
Azadi ki doosri ladai shuru ho gayi; abhi yeh doosri kranti ki shuruat hai ...yeh ground 
mein baithe logon ko tai karna hai ..jab tak Jan Lokpal Bill nahi ayega…tab tak ground 
ko nahi chodenge..Lokpal bill lakar hi rahenge!268 
[The second freedom struggle has started; it is time to start the new revolution…People 
sitting on this ground have to decide…that until the Jan Lokpal Bill is passed…we will 
not leave the ground…We will ensure that the Lokpal bill is passed!] 
Another aspect of this movement was that not only the state-assigned spaces of 
protests such as Jantar Mantar or Ramlila Maidan became part of everyday discourse and 
political participation; by violating the everyday intentionality it also led to the peripheral 
alleys and streets becoming centres of protests. “That ‘democratic’ element caught the 
imagination of a vast number of common people who were not only present in Delhi’s 
Ramlila Maidan but also thronged solidarity rallies in big and small towns all over India’’ 
(Mohanty, 2011, p. 17). Seeing this widespread support and participation, Kejriwal 
appealed to the people from the stage at the Maidan to put pressure on and hold their 
respective elected representatives accountable by organising sit-ins and dharnas: 
aap sab se nivedan hai ki apne apne sansadon ko pakadiye: hamne unko vote dalke 
chuna hai; Aapne apne elake mein apne sansado ke ghar ke bahar dharna kijiye; aur 
unse kahen ki voh publicly bataye ki voh sarkar ke Lokpal bill ke saath hai yah Jan 
Lokpal bill ke saath hai; Sarkar ke saath hai yah Anna Hazare ke saath hai?269 
[Ask everyone to hold their elected representatives accountable. We have all voted 
them to power; demonstrate in front of your elected representatives in your respective 
localities and make them publically answer whether they are in support of the 
government’s Lokpal Bill or the Jan Lokpal Bill. Are they with the government or with 
Anna Hazare?] 
The citizens responded to this call by bringing the city under siege (TNS, 2011). Many 
offices and houses of elected representatives were targeted; for instance, people 
protested opposite the residence of the then Chief Minister Mrs. Sheila Dikshit, Finance 
                                                 
268 Source: video recording of Anna Hazare’s speech at Ramlila Maidan on 19th August 2011 provided to 
the author by his organisation.  
269 Source: video recording of Arvind Kejriwal’s speech at Ramlila Maidan on 26th August 2011 provided 
to the author by his organisation.  
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Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Human Resource Development Minister Kapil Sibal and 
some MPs to pressurise the government to pass the Jan Lokpal Bill. They shouted 
slogans against the chief minister and also mentioned the Comptroller and Auditor 
General (CAG) report on the CWG. These spaces represent sites of political power and 
their occupation by ‘the common people’ was a potent symbolic intervention and 
assertion. 
 
Figure 6.2: Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi270 
Figure 6.2 portrays the presence of the common man at the Ramlila Maiden in 
full strength for Kejriwal’s swearing-in ceremony on 28th December 2013. People from 
all walks of life came to witness the ceremony as they saw Kejriwal’s victory as their 
own – that of the Aam Aadmi. The energy on the field was incredible as crowds poured 
in and the metro lines leading to the Maidan were overcrowded with slogans of ‘aam 
aadmi zindabad!’ (Long live the common man!) and ‘Inquilab zindabad!’ (Long live the 
                                                 
270 Image taken by the author, 28th December 2013, Ramlila Maidan, New Delhi. 
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revolution!) filling the air.271 In terms of spatial assertion, the ceremony was not just a 
statist procedural ritual, it signified a heterotopia of an alternative political culture in 
terms of the political subjectivities it constituted; it visibilised the common man and 
simultaneously initiated an oppositional culture of doing politics. It challenged the 
symbolic power of the dominant political parties such as Congress and the BJP along 
with the bureaucratic arrogance and red-tapeism. It is crucial here to point out the 
emergence of the AAP as an anti-establishment party; challenging the old classical 
political party format, set into motion the techno-managerial mode of doing politics, 
analysed in the next section. Rather than being celebrated as AAP’s win, the moment 
was hailed more as a victory of people’s power; the Maidan as a site signified people’s 
assertion.  
Huge numbers of people, men, women, youth and children, had come to see the 
leader who had emerged from amongst them take oath as the chief minister of the 
NCT. It was evident that it was a ‘victory for the common man’ because anybody could 
sit anywhere in the sitting arena; there were no distinctions made or VIP areas 
demarcated. At the outset, this was startling because Delhi’s political culture is so 
inherently defined by bureaucratic protocols and hierarchy that it was unimaginable that 
an official event of such administrative and political importance could be conducted 
without reserved seats for VIPs, passes/tickets and barricading. People were mostly 
enjoying their moment of new-found empowerment and felt a sense of entitlement now 
that a ‘common man’ was in control and had the power to bring about change.  
The crowd stood by patiently as they waited for their leader to arrive on the 
stage and speak to them. Aam aadmi topis and the tricolour adorned the ground. A 
tumultuous welcome greeted Kejriwal when he arrived on stage and people saw him on 
the giant LCD screens set up alongside. Everyone patiently observed the official 
                                                 
271 Field notes: Observations from Ramlila Maidan, 28th December 2013, New Delhi. 
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swearing-in and waited for his speech. The mood in the ground was of triumph and 
people cheered in excitement, hope and a sense of pride. Kejriwal expressed his faith in 
the people’s power and asserted if they all worked together then change was possible.272 
When articulating his reason for joining politics and forming a political party he made it 
clear that it was the need of the hour to bring about systemic changes and ‘clean’ the 
system. 
Annaji ne kaha tha ki rajniti kichad hai…lekin hamko laga jab tak rajniti nahi badlegi 
tab tak kuch nahi badlega…kichad mein ghusna padega aur kichad ki safai karni 
padegi..rajniti ko saaf karna padega…aur aaj ka din uss journey mein ek etihasik din 
hain 273 
[Anna said that politics is murky…Still, we thought that unless and until politics 
changes nothing will change …We will have to enter the murk and clean the 
dirt…There is a need to clean politics ...and today is an historic day in that journey.] 
Kejriwal also made the people in the audience take an oath in the spirit of the political 
movement and the agenda of anti-corruption that he had come to represent. He led the 
oath as the audience repeated after him, “Main Kasam khata hun ki apni zindagi mein na 
kabhi rishwat longa aur na kabhi rishwat doonga” [I pledge that in my lifetime I will neither 
take bribe nor will I ever give bribe].274 It was a dynamic and energetic moment as one 
could observe the compelling commitment with which people participated in the pledge 
reflected an insurgent citizen subject who believed in the potential of a new political 
culture. Maidan had been transformed into a counter-space of people’s power, a spatial 
embodiment of people’s struggle and politics of becoming. 
6.2.2 Discursive counter public – of jan lokpal and sabhas 
The Maidan was also emblematic of an alternative counter public as it defied the 
dominant discourses and aimed to create new social relations based on horizontality, 
egalitarianism and collectivism. It became a space to organise as jan (the people) and to 
                                                 
272 Field notes: observations from Ramlila Maidan, 28th December 2013, New Delhi. 
273 Field notes: Kejriwal’s swearing-in speech, Ramlila Maidan, 28th December 2013, New Delhi. 
274 Field notes: observations from Ramlila Maidan, 28th December 2013, New Delhi. 
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discuss and debate their perspectives and opinions on the Bill. Different versions of the 
Bill were being discussed amongst the participants; people’s opinions as to how they 
envisioned the Lokpal which represented the people’s version would shape up were 
being garnered through opinion polls using multiple media platforms. Efforts were also 
made by Team Anna to promote dialogue and discussion amongst various groups. 
Kejriwal gave a standing invite to people, political parties and other civil society groups 
such as the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI) to come 
and debate in front of the people and the media so that there was nuanced debate 
regarding various versions of the Bill. Consequently, different versions were proposed 
by various civil society groups. One such was drafted by the NCPRI led by Aruna Roy 
(Mittal, 2011), “another by the Lok Satta Party leader from Andhra Pradesh, 
Jayaprakash Narayan and yet another by the former chief election commissioner, T. N. 
Sheshan” (Mohanty, 2011, p. 18). These alternative versions were not only 
representative of the internal dynamics within different civil society groups but also the 
involvement of different groups of people in this discursive and deliberative process. 
The critical engagement that this exercise invigorated represented the self-reflexive 
nature of the movement.  
As a discursive counter public it employed different discursive practices to vent 
political critique. One of the ways was to adopt political parody, impersonations and 
satire in a performative manner. For instance, activists like Kiran Bedi, an eminent 
member of Team Anna, and known as a committed, honest and upright officer, with 
her ‘ghoonghat act’275 decided to vent her ire on an MP who had come to Ramlila Maidan. 
“Ask him what he is going to do,” she told the crowd. “They [MPs] say one thing inside 
[parliament] and another thing outside”. And then, raising her pitch, she exclaimed: 
“They [the MPs] wear masks!” Then Bedi, ever the comedian, to the great amusement 
                                                 
275Source: the description and translation is based on a NDTV Hindi news channel item (NDTV, 2011). 
(http://www.ndtv.com/video/news/news/video-story-209298). 
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of the crowd proceeded to pull a scarf from the neck of a young activist on stage, 
wrapped her head with it like a ghoonghat (veil) and proceeded to mock MPs and their 
hierocracy in public life. “This is how they behave,” she stated, “one thing with a mask 
and another without a mask”. While these theatrics were hugely criticised (TNN, 2011) 
and raised not a few eyebrows, performative actions such as the ‘ghoonghat act’ should be 
understood in the context of activist performances, political parody and political 
critique. This technique was being used as a strategy in a manner which was not just 
mere entertainment but also an affective and humorous way to make a point – in this 
case, the deceptive nature of the political class. For instance, famous comedian Jaspal 
Bhatti presented a mocking version of the government’s Lokpal Bill, joining Team Anna 
for a 15-minute fast under a banner saying ‘government-approved fast’, thereby 
sarcastically highlighting the highhandedness of the government in dealing with public 
protests. “It is really surprising that you do not need permission to give or take bribe 
but to protest against corruption, you need government’s approval. The politicians 
don’t bother to take any sanctions while doing scams of crores of rupees”, (Bhatti, 
quoted in Chandel, 2011). Humour is used to underline the irony of the political 
leadership and the government’s coercive interventions.  
Also as an alternative discursive counter public, the Maidan enabled constituting 
non-sectarian subjectivities for the jan (people) – a universal identity in opposition to 
identification based on caste, religion or gender. Evident in one of the announcements 
made by Kejriwal from the stage at the Maidan on the festive occasions of Ramzan 
(Ramadaan for Muslims) and Janmashtami (Lord Krishna’s birth anniversary for Hindus) 
he stressed that we should fight as ‘Indians’ rather than as Hindus and Muslims. 
…sathiyon kal ek bahut bada din hai: musalman bhaiyon ka roza hai aur hinduon ki 
Janmashtami; kal shaam mein hum Roza iftaar karenge aur raat ko Janmashtami ka vrat 
kholenge; Hindu Muslim Sikh Isayi aapas mein hai bhai bhai: humein yeh bach ke rehna 
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hai hamari sarkaron ne aur humari partyon ne angrzo se divide and rule policy seekha 
hai…humein ek mutthi ki tarah dharm aur jati se upar uth kar rehna hai276 
[Friends, tomorrow is a very important day; as it’s Roza [Ramadan] for Muslims and 
Janmashtami (the birth of Krishna) for Hindus. Tomorrow, in the evening, we will have 
the Roza iftaar (breaking of the fast) and at night break the Janmashtami fast. Hindus, 
Muslims, Sikhs and Christians are brothers; we should be cautious since our 
governments and political parties have learnt the policy of divide and rule from the 
foreigners. We should rise above religion and caste like a fist.] 
It was the inclusive ‘Indian’ identity rather than a divisive one which explained the use 
of nationalistic slogans and the tricolour dominating the semiotic field. The distinctive 
politics of the symbolic habitus will be discussed in detail in the next station, but here 
the emphasis is on the galvanisation of the Indian citizen subject. 
The spatial strategies followed by the AAP during the election campaign for the 
Delhi Assembly in December 2013 also capitalised on the spatial geographies of the city 
by using two techniques of yatra politics; ‘Jhadoo chalao Baiman Bhagao Yatra’ (Sweep the 
broom, chase the corrupt!) combined with dialogic engagement through jan sabhas 
(public meetings). The AAP organised a ten-day rally with the intention to reach out to 
every citizen of Delhi and, with its slogan ‘Jhadoo Chalo Baiman Bhagao’ (AAP, 2013b), 
sought support for ‘cleansing’ the political system. The campaign gave visibility to the 
new political party and Kejriwal and also gave the opportunity for people to interact 
with him directly. While following Kejriwal in his constituency, in one of the middle-
class government employees’ residential areas in Sarojini Nagar the support and appeal 
that the new party had garnered was visible. People came out to the locality parks and 
playgrounds in large numbers to express their support; others did so from their 
balconies by either waving or holding brooms to symbolise the ‘clean sweep’.277 At the 
end of each local area yatra, Kejriwal addressed jan sabhas, where people could come and 
express their concerns. The response from the people was effectively powerful as they 
attended in large numbers and expressed their issues and problems ranging from water, 
                                                 
276 Source: video recordings of Arvind Kejriwal’s speech from Ramlila Maidan, 28th August 2012 provided 
to the author by his organisation. 
277 Field note: following the Yatra in December 2013, New Delhi. 
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electricity and roads to corruption at different levels of government establishments. 
These jan sabhas organised by the AAP at different wards, localities and parks were the 
other counter-spaces created during the Delhi election campaigning. Thus, with regard 
to the spatial strategies, one could observe continuity, as both the movement, and now 
the party, activated citizens’ involvement and embodied presence through spatial 
interventions across the city. 
These counter-spaces ruptured the everyday use of these spaces from mundane 
activities to spaces for civic political conversations. They became sites that injected 
political and civic activism into masses. At one of Shazia Ilmi’s jan sabhas, in her 
constituency of R.K. Puram, the sheer presence of local people in the public meeting 
reflected two things: first, the engaged participation demonstrated the vacuum people 
experienced in the absence of a dialogic process between citizens and local level 
administrative bodies. Second, that people therefore utilised these sabhas as an 
opportunity to raise their issues of concern with a prospective representative, an 
exercise which they took seriously. Consequently, the colony’s park was transformed 
into a discursive counter public with the residents of this lower-middle class colony, 
with sometimes the whole family in attendance. A large visible presence of women in 
these sabhas represented the party’s appeal amongst them. As will be discussed later, 
women were the strongest support base garnered by the movement. After listening to 
the AAP’s agenda lay out by Ilmi, residents raised concerns which affected them on an 
everyday basis and questions related to blueprints for implementation.278 It was evident 
that people felt a sense of being taken seriously as they were being asked and listened to 
rather than being treated as mute spectators.  
There are two observations that should be highlighted. First, the nature of the 
demands made by the people mainly addressed service delivery expected from the 
                                                 
278 Field note: following Shazia Ilmi, R. K.Puram 12th September 2013, New Delhi. 
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government, reflecting a neoliberal consumer citizen. There was hardly any discussion, 
for instance, around the provisions of the Lokpal Bill, despite the sharing of narratives 
of individual experiences of corruption. Second, few jan sabhas that I attended while 
shadowing candidates were mostly organised in collaboration with the Resident Welfare 
Associations (RWA). The collaboration exhibited that consumer citizens preferred this 
organisational format to negotiate state and consumer services and it aligned well with 
their anti-political stance. Their partnership was an overlap of both class and political 
orientations. Despite the nexus, both the movement and the party disrupted the 
neoliberal subject formation of regimented and spatially segregated existence and, by 
constituting counter-spaces and public in opposition to state power, the movement 
activated spatial assertion by neo-liberal civic citizens.  
6.3 The Anti-Corruption Matrix of Deshbhakti 279and Self-Righteous Citizen 
Subjects 
This section examines the symbolic habitus of the anti-corruption movement 
and the AAP. The protest by Team Anna which included Kejriwal, Bhushan and Bedi280 
had, in themselves, embodied a sense of virtue and moral resoluteness as opposed to 
the political class which was universally assumed to be corrupt – and by doing so 
created an ‘other’ in the political class. The performative essence of this protest politics 
juxtaposed a patriotic and a self-righteous citizen subject against the political class and 
the state establishment; “first and most common are anti-neta [anti-politician] 
performances, i.e., the self-presentation as the diametrical opposite of the establishment 
Indian neta or politician” (Roy, 2014, p. 50). The movement had a strong anti-
                                                 
279 Deshbhakti means patriotism. 
280 Team Anna refers to activists who were part of the core committee during the first phase of the 
agitation. It consisted of prominent members such as Arvind Kejriwal IRS(Indian Revenue Services), 
Kiran Bedi (retired Indian Police Services), Shanti Bhushan (senior advocate and former law minister), 
Santosh Hegde (former Solicitor General of India), Prashant Bhushan (lawyer) and Manish Sisodia 
(former journalist). They were also quite active in different public forums. 
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establishment tone which subsequently led to the evolution of a new political party in 
the political landscape of Delhi. Tracing the transition from the IAC to the AAP, I 
argue that the repertoire of this symbolic mobilisation, couched in practices of vigilante 
patriotism and middle-class aesthetics of cleanliness, constitutes an insurgent civic 
citizen with anti-political ethics. 
6.3.1 Ideological in-betweens: from being anti-political to the political ‘sweep’ 
 
Figure 6.3: Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra281 
Figure 6.3 displays the tricolour adorning the protest site at Ralegan Siddhi 
(2013) where the last phase of the movement was held to ensure that the Lokpal Bill 
would be passed in the Rajya Sabha.282 The quintessential patriotic slogans of ‘Bharat 
Mata ki Jai’ (Hail Mother India) and ‘Inquilab Zindabad (Long Live the Revolution) 
reverberated around the area. The movement brought everyone together under the 
tricolour, symbolically making the national flag the representational site of various 
discourses and people from all political dispositions. It visualised the field with an 
affective resonance of patriotic fervour and devout nationalism. It was also emblematic 
                                                 
281 Image taken by the author, 9th December 2013, Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
282 The upper house of the Indian parliament. 
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of how people, after the verdict on the national flag in 2002,283 had come to use the flag 
outside of the ‘official’ in the public domain and as representative of their nationalistic 
commitment:  
The immediate outcome of this re-codification was to end the state’s monopoly on 
displays of the national flag and to thereby reconfigure the flag as an ordinary rather 
than an extraordinary sign, something that anybody could display in place on any day of 
the year. (Roy, 2006, p. 519)  
This mobilisation could be perceived as one of the first instances when the tricolour 
was made part of the visual field so strikingly and claimed by the masses all over the 
country. The tricolour has since become part of everyday politics and a symbol of 
people’s claim making against the state, in effect making the citizen subject visible, as 
when many flag-waving youth congregated in defiance of Section 144284 during the 
Anna protests. The journey of the tricolour has been mapped through different phases 
of Indian nationalist struggles from being a state-bound symbol post-Independence to a 
more liberalised existence in the present times (Jha, 2008; Pai, 2009; Roy, 2006).  
The embracing of the national flag within the present context is a newer phase 
in the evolution and assertion of the tricolour as a state-authorised symbol. Its 
usurpation by a people’s movement draws attention to the agential aspect of meaning 
making involved with the tricolour as it reverses the gaze of how the symbol of the flag 
is perceived; the nation also gets constituted when the flag is owned by the people and 
can be used by them to express their commitment or disaffection towards the nation. 
Underscoring the reverse process of identification, Jha (2008) argued that the unfurling 
of the national flag brings hitherto marginalised and invisible subjects to the attention of 
                                                 
283 Redefining the relationship between the national flag and the people, in the judgment passed by the 
Shenoy Committee on 26th January 2002 with reference to the case between the Indian state and Navin 
Jindal, Indian citizens could now fly their flag whenever they wished thereby relaxing the Flag Code (Roy, 
2006). See https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1332036/. 
284 Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1973, empowers a magistrate to prohibit an assembly 
of more than four people in an area, according to the Indian Penal Code. 
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the nation. In this vein, the seizing of the tricolour stands in for both visibilising the 
common man and also showing patriotic allegiance.  
Practices of patriotism such as waving the national flag also leads to questioning 
the nature and the limit of this performative political action and the ideological political 
field therein. Menon and Nigam (2011a) argue that it is not necessary to always identify 
the presence of the national flag as associated with nationalism; it could also be seen 
here as the national flag displacing other kinds of sectarian flags. According to them: 
the national flag was in place of sectarian party flags. The national flag was standing in to 
signify a space in which all interests could come together on this one issue, perhaps 
only momentarily, but it was a moment worth focusing on. (p. 18)  
Although I agree with Menon and Nigam’s claim that the national flag brings people 
from different political dispositions under one platform, this is not the only thing it 
does; it also reflects the anti-politics and anti- political class stance that the movement 
exhibits. 
Aaj tak humne koi jhanda nahi banvaya; hamare andolan aur party ka koi jhanda nahi 
hai, hum sab rashtriya jhande ki neeche aate hai…kyunki hum sab ko deshbhakti ki 
bhavna jodti hai!285 
[Until today we have not had a flag; we don’t have a separate flag for ourselves – 
neither the movement nor the party. We all come under the national flag…because the 
feeling of nationalism holds us all together.] 
Hitashi’s response above to my enquiry regarding the absence of a separate flag 
for the AAP highlights the affective patriotic sentiment associated with the tricolour. 
However, underlying this unity is a constant tendency to ‘neo-nationalism’ (Arunima, 
2012) and the national flag, as discussed above, circumscribed the visual semiotic field 
under the leadership of Anna, as no flag of any political party was allowed in the protest 
site. Vigilante patriotism against the corrupt state and the political class translated into 
legitimising an anti-political party stance as the only way to ‘save’ the nation. On the 
other hand, it constituted a self-sacrificing political subject as the ideal citizenry with no 
                                                 
285 Interview with Hitashi, 24th Janaury’2014, at Pariavartan office, Sundarnagari, New Delhi.  
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space for critique. Many participants of the movement, whom I met later as AAP 
volunteers during the fieldwork in Delhi, Mumbai and Ralegan, considered politics to 
be a ‘dirty’ affair which explained their anti-political activity; thus, while the reclaiming 
of the national flag by the masses was libratory, the underlying logic was pre-defined by 
vigilante patriotism. 
6.3.2 ‘Gandhian’ Anna: anti-political and religio-moralistic standpoint 
sahi azadi abhi tak nahi mili, vahi loot, vahi gundagardi, vahi bhrashtachar…gore gaye 
aur kale aa gaye...bhrashtachar mukt bharat nirman karna zaroori hai isliye azadi ki dusri 
ladai.286 
[Actual independence is yet to come. Same loot, same hooliganism, same 
corruption…The whites have gone and the browns have come…It is important to 
make India corruption free and so the need for a second struggle of Independence.] 
Anna referred to his fight against corruption as the ‘second freedom struggle’ 
and started his anti-corruption agitation by undertaking an eleven day fast at the Maidan 
on 19th August 2011 (Thawani, 2010) which capitalised on the collective social memory. 
His acts of defiance were powerful; he was arrested by the Delhi police on 16th August 
2011 at his residence to prevent him from holding his protest at JP Park in New Delhi, 
initially refused to leave Tihar jail (PTI, 2011c) and later asked his supporters to occupy 
the Maidan until the Lokpal was passed. On being released from Tihar, Anna went to 
pay obeisance to Gandhi at Rajghat and the Amar Jawan Jyoti287 at the India Gate after 
which he headed to the Ramlila Maidan (PTI, 2011d). 
Anna became the transnational symbolic figure of the anti-corruption 
movement in India.288 As the face of the movement, he positioned himself as the 
embodiment of Gandhi and adopted his strategy of nonviolent protests. Kisan Babarao 
Hazare, fondly addressed as ‘Anna’ is a social activist. He was awarded the Padma 
                                                 
286 Interview with Anna Hazare at Jantantra Morcha’s two-day meeting of volunteers, 6th October, 2013, 
New Delhi. 
287 Memorial to the unidentified dead of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. 
288 For instance: “It’s hard to imagine this diminutive, celibate octogenarian being the dynamo behind an 
entire popular movement. But in India, Anna Hazare cut a Gandhian pose that transfixed the world’s 
largest democracy and put its sitting government’s feet to the fire” (Tharoor, 2011).  
251 
Bhushan in 1992 for his contribution in rural development for transforming Ralegan 
Siddhi, his drought-prone village, into an ideal model village by adopting a successful 
water harvesting, conservation and management method. Before getting involved with 
the IAC in 2010, Anna was already campaigning against corruption under the banner of 
Bhrashtachar Virodhi Jan Andolan (BVJA), the people’s movement against corruption set 
up in Maharashtra in 1991. His sustained efforts led to the resignation of six corrupt 
ministers and many officers of the Maharashtra state cabinet and officials. He was also 
part of the Right to Information (RTI) campaign for which again he fasted 
(implemented by the state government of Maharashtra with effect from 2002) which 
became the draft base for the National Right to Information Act 2005. Anna had a 
history of leading campaigns concerned with issues of decentralisation of power and 
corruption at state level. 
Often hailed as the Gandhi of contemporary times, Anna always had a huge 
picture of Gandhi as part of his backdrop and dressed like him. “He was Gandhism 
personified and appeared as another great fighter” (Visvanathan, 2012, p. 107). As well 
as following the Gandhian ideology of considering villages as the central unit of 
economic and social development, he also brought in a discourse of spirituality and 
morality by stressing character-building and honesty in mainstream politics and the 
public sphere. “Gandhiji ka rasta hi sahi raasta hai...par uske liye charitra sahi hona chaiya”289 
[Gandhi’s way is the correct pathway…but for that character has to be right]. Anna has 
consistently used Gandhian methods of civil disobedience, fasting and mass 
mobilisations for all his campaigns. “The old man was not just an iconic figure but a 
spiritual warrior of a different kind. As he explained later fasting comes easily to those 
who are celibate. He made it sound almost like a simple dietary regime’’ (Visvanathan, 
2012, p. 105).  
                                                 
289 Interview with Anna Hazare on 6th October 2013, New Delhi. 
252 
In the initial days, it was only natural that when Anna, a Gandhian, appeared in 
Ramlila Maidan with the image of Bharat Mata (Mother India) in the backdrop and 
flanked by two self-styled godmen in saffron, Baba Ramdev and Sri Sri Ravishankar, 
doubts were cast about the ideological orientation of Team Anna and the possibility of 
a right-wing connection with groups like the RSS as the symbolic repertoire resembled 
that of the Hindu right. Furthermore, ideological neutrality had been the hallmark of the 
anti-corruption movements that India had seen thus far: both the JP Movement and VP 
Singh’s290 mobilisation had ‘anti-corruption’ as their overarching agenda and hence both 
the movements achieved a sizeable base and logistical support for the right-wing groups 
RSS, Jana Sangh and, eventually, the BJP. 
Baba Ramdev291 was part of the initial IAC coalition which involved other 
activists along with Team Anna. The first agenda that they initiated was to lodge an FIR 
(First Information Report) against Suresh Kalmadi, the president of Indian Olympic 
Association (IOA) and the chairman of Indian Olympic Association 2010 in relation to 
the CWG scam. Baba Ramdev, Anna Hazare, Swami Agnivesh, Kiran Bedi, Arvind 
Kejriwal, the Archbishop of Delhi, Vincent M Concessao, Maulana Mehmood Madani 
and others attended a meeting at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi, and sought to register a 
public complaint at Parliament Street in connection with CWG scam (Thawani, 2010). 
Both Ramdev and his supporters from the Bharat Swabhiman Trust also participated in 
the rally at Parliament Street. Kejriwal’s initial reason for getting Ramdev on board was 
to capitalise on his mass support base as the other members of the group had very 
limited public outreach. 
                                                 
290 VP Singh was the seventh prime minister of India (1989-90). Previously, as finance minister in Rajiv 
Gandhi’s cabinet (1984-87), he was feared by the industrial class as he unleashed what is known as raid raj 
to check financial irregularities which led to many of them being jailed, etc. He therefore had launched a 
massive fight against corruption. https://countercurrents.org/2016/11/29/remembering-v-p-singhs-
fight-against-corruption/ 
291 Ramdev was born Rama Krishna Yadav and popularly called Baba Ramdev, is a yoga guru, owns 
Patanjali Ayurvedic Ltd and actively pursues political issues. 
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However, for Team Anna, Ramdev’s association with the RSS and his own 
specific agenda on anti-corruption along with issues of who would be the central figure 
of leadership in the movement soon led to differences. Ramdev’s close allegiance with 
the right-wing group RSS led to increasing critique of the mobilisation and the 
allegation that the movement was a proxy for the BJP. Also, there was a realisation that 
Ramdev was largely concerned with the recovering the black money issue and not so 
much about the Jan Lokpal Bill. Kejriwal could foresee that the agenda could be diluted 
and mobilisation could get divisive. By December 2010, Ramdev started to feel 
sidelined as the drafting of the Jan Lokpal Bill progressed and distanced himself from 
the January rally planned for 2011. While both Anna and Ramdev were conspicuous by 
their absence in the meeting regarding the rally, Anna sent a letter of support expressing 
his solidarity while Ramdev did not. Thus, the internal dynamics between the IAC and 
Team Anna gradually led to the mainstreaming of Anna and escape from an overt right 
wing takeover. 
Furthermore, by replacing the Bharat Mata backdrop with that of Gandhi’s 
imagery, the overt right wing assimilation was averted successfully (IANS, 2011).The 
symbolic shift achieved two performative functions: first, it signified an ideological 
clarity on the part of Team Anna that they were centrist in their approach rather than 
on the right of the political spectrum despite the fact that many sympathisers of the 
anti-corruption movement were right wing conservatives. In fact, during fieldwork I 
encountered many supporters whose political activism went back to the anti-reservation 
protests or were members of the Youth for Equality (YFE)292 organisation. However, 
redefining the symbolic habitus reflected self-reflexivity and being receptive to 
audiences’ discomfort with the use of an image that had been appropriated by the 
                                                 
292 In opposition to the government’s OBC Reservation Policy in 2006, group of youth including students 
and professionals formed the Youth for Equality (YFE) platform. It is an organisation that is against the 
policy of affirmative action for the lower castes and classes. 
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Hindu Right. Bringing Gandhi into the visual field implied a concerted effort to 
dissociate from the right wing and keep its ideological positioning along the centre of 
the political spectrum. It also clearly established Anna as the main leader or face of the 
movement. 
Mein ek fakir aadmi hoon; mandir mein rehta hun; Sone ke liye ek bistar hai aur khane 
ke liye ek plate hai… Jeevan mein tay kar liya hai…jab tak jionga samaj aur desh ki sewa 
karte rahunga; jab mein maronga samaj aur desh ki sewa karte hue maronga.293 
[I am an ascetic. Living in a temple I have one bed to lie on and only one plate to eat 
from…I have decided that as long as I will live, I will serve the society and the nation; I 
will die, too, while serving my society and the nation.] 
Anna always described himself as a social worker ‘prajasewak’ (one who serves 
people) and ‘apolitical’, a selfless crusader dedicated to the country. The self-
righteousness and the weight of public service became the ideal against the corrupt 
political class. The idea of prajasewak was engrained in the distinction between ‘social 
work’ and ‘political work’ wherein anything social was selfless, as opposed to being 
political. Politics was considered to be dirty and associated with self-interest and 
manipulation. He preferred non-party based political representation rather than political 
party/interest-based representation. “Paksh tantra aur party tantra ne jantantra ko aane nahi 
diya; jagruk hona zaroori hai, party nahi janta se desh mein bhavishya milega”294 [The interest-
based system or party-based system has not allowed democracy to come in. We need to 
be vigilant, not in any party, but in people lies the future for the country].  
His protest platforms have always been anti-political, connoting in practice that 
no members of any political disposition would be allowed to share/enter the stage. Not 
only was politics ‘dirty’ but the political class was also considered to be corrupting, 
untrustworthy and disloyal. It was because of this that he discounted any comparison 
with the JP movement, because it was driven by political parties and had representatives 
                                                 
293 Field notes: Anna’s speech in the last phase of fasting and protest at Ralegan Siddhi, 10th December 
2013, Pune, Maharashtra. 
294 Field notes: Anna’s speech at Ralegan Siddhi, 10th December 2013, Pune, Maharashtra. 
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from political parties who were part of the agitation. On drawing any analogy he 
clarified that, “JP ka andolan alag tha...aur usme gadbad ho gaya kyonki usme paksh aur party ke 
log the”295 [JP’s movement was different…and it was messed up because there were 
people from different political parties]. According to him, democracy has been ruined 
by political party-based interest articulation, mobilisation and participation. This disdain 
for electoral and party politics can be observed in two concrete spheres, one being his 
village, where he was instrumental in bringing about fundamental changes in terms of 
environmental sustainability and overall development and the other the anti-corruption 
movement itself. 
Anna spearheaded the last phase of the protest to push the passing of the Lokpal 
Bill from Ralegan Siddhi, his village in Ahmednagar district in Pune, Maharashtra where 
he fasted from 10th December to 17th December 2013 (A. Rashid, 2013). After 
performing the ritualistic aarti and paying respect to the Gandhi statue installed in his 
ashram (hermitage) compound, he launched his proposed indefinite fast near the 
Yadavbaba temple complex. This temple complex and his village is the heterotopia of 
Anna’s socio-religious, paterfamilias and anti-political belief system. It is interesting to 
note that all the arrangements for the protest were made just outside the Yadavbaba 
temple which is considered to be the focal point of all crucial decision-making in the 
village. Sharma (2006) points out the rebuilding of the temple was one of the primary 
things that Anna did after returning to the village and it gradually became the centre for 
all meetings, collective decision making and social gatherings. After paying respect to 
the deity in the temple, Anna started his fast. The public address system located within 
the temple complex is used to announce developments to the villagers – from 
announcements that Anna was beginning a fast to the arrival of political dignitaries, and 
                                                 
295 Interview with Anna Hazare, 6th October 2013, New Delhi. 
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to solicit funds from the general public.296 The elaborate arrangement for 
announcements with the public address system installed within the temple complex 
itself shows the significance of the temple in the larger religio-social life of Ralegan and 
the reason Anna chose this as the venue for his fast. Anna’s fasting, as the public 
announcement system signifies, had become a ritual performance in the everyday life of 
the village. 
One of the major changes initiated by Anna after he accepted the leadership of 
the village was the decision to abolish elections to the gram sabha (village council) and 
replace them with the process of nominating members in the belief that elections led to 
corruption. There have been no elections in the village, neither gram panchayat (village 
assembly) nor that of the cooperative societies for the past 24 years (Sharma, 2006). 
One of the stories told to me during the course of the fieldwork in Ralegan Siddhi was 
that those persons found guilty of moral deviations were tied to an electricity pole in the 
Yadavbaba temple and whipped with Anna’s belt as punishment.297 Irrespective of 
whether this really happened or not, this narrative reflects the acceptance of Anna’s 
high moral authority within the village. For instance, all the shops in the village were 
shut during the nine days of Anna’s fast, mostly voluntarily although there were some 
who expressed resentment and explained that “this is when we can do business as 
people have come from outside the village; but we can’t do it”.298 Anna’s moral 
authority is unquestionably followed in the belief that he is right; those who disagree do 
not have the courage to deviate for fear of being ostracised by the rest of the villagers. 
Meeta and Rajivlochan (1994) highlight in their incisive piece that the transition of 
Ralegan ‘Shindi’ (a particular plant) to ‘Siddhi’ (accomplished) manifests the moral 
                                                 
296 Field notes: observation from the protest site, 10th December 2013, Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, 
Maharashtra. 
297 Field notes: observation at the protest site, 13th December 2013, Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
298 Field notes: observation at the protest site, 12th December 2013, in Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
Response by a random shopkeeper close to the protest site. 
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transformation of the village under Anna’s leadership as he formed a youth forum 
called the ‘tarun mandal’ for moral cleansing and social reform. As observed in the field, 
drinking and smoking were prohibited in the village as these were considered immoral 
activities.299 Thus, Ralegan Siddhi can be interpreted as the microcosm of Anna’s moral 
fiefdom.  
A similar moralistic fascism could be observed in his broader political 
interventions on issues of corruption and terrorism. “If any candidate takes or gives 
money in Vidhan Sabha or Parliament for asking questions or voting, such people 
should be given severe punishment, in fact according to me, they should be hanged,” 
Anna said (“Hang MPs”, 2011). He had a similar view regarding Kasab’s300 execution 
(Shaikh, 2012). Expression of blatant support for hanging as a mode of punishment 
both for politicians and criminals brings out two dangerous aspects of his moral 
philosophy. The demand that corrupt politicians be subject to drastic punishments 
demonstrated his high subjective moralistic stance but, most importantly, also his 
disregard for procedures of legal justice and justifying mob justice based on archaic and 
non-negotiable norms of morality. The anti-political predisposition explains Anna’s 
decision to neither join nor support the formation of the AAP which emerged as the 
political extension of the anti-corruption movement of which he was the flag bearer but 
rather to instead launch a counter movement, Jantantra Morcha, on the anniversary of 
Gandhi’s death on 30th January 2013 (Byatnal, 2013). During the last phase of the 
protest held at Ralegan Siddhi, when Anna was fasting, the leaders of different political 
parties ranging from the Maharashtra Navnirman Samiti (MNS) to the AAP came from 
Delhi to express solidarity. When AAP leaders like Mayank Gandhi, Waghela, Gopal 
Rai, Kumar Vishwas and Sanjay Singh came to Ralegan they were not allowed to share 
                                                 
299 Field notes: observation from the protest site, 8th December 2013, in Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, 
Maharashtra. 
300 Ajmal Kasab was a Pakistani terrorist, who took part in the Mumbai attacks in 2008. He was caught by 
the Indian forces, put on trial and sentenced to death in 2012. 
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the stage with him because of their political party membership and so Kumar Vishwas 
and the other leaders sat with the supporters and also addressed the crowds from there 
rather than the podium.301 
Unlike the middle-class nature that dominated to some extent the mobilisation 
in Delhi and Mumbai, the composition of the supporters at Ralegan were largely rural 
villagers. The composition and range of supporters therefore counter the dominant 
opinion that the anti-corruption movement was a middle class movement. Apart from 
villagers from Ralegan, there were supporters who had come from nearby villages, cities 
and neighbouring states as well as from Delhi. There was huge participation by women 
and school children as well. For some it was an opportunity to see the ‘Gandhi of their 
times’ as one said, “Gandhiji ko dekhne aye hai!”302 [I have come to see Gandhiji!]. There 
were many youth groups, students from nearby colleges and universities from Pune 
(Mahasrashtra) and Rajasthan who came prepared with skits, songs and poems, all of 
which had anti-corruption as the overarching theme. Many of the supporters had their 
own stories to share about their encounters with corruption ranging from bureaucratic 
hurdles and land and fertiliser mafias to issues of basic accessibilities to land, water and 
education leading them to extend support for Anna and the Lokpal Bill. Here, too, one 
could observe not just the range in participation across classes but also the nature of the 
issues or concerns of people in the rural regions who were mainly involved with the 
agricultural economy and the nexus between government and the corporate houses. 
Chants of “Anna tum sangharsh karo hum tumhare saath hai” [Anna, we are with you in this 
struggle] and “Main bhi Anna; tu bhi Anna; ab toh sara desh hai Anna”, [I am Anna; you are 
Anna; now the whole country is Anna] were constantly heard as supporters tried to 
                                                 
301 Field notes: Observations from the field during the last phase of the protest held, 12th December 2013, 
Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra.  
302 Field notes: Rakesh’s (a student from 5th Standard who had come with his classmates to the protest 
site) response to my enquiry as to why he had come to Anna’s protest, 11th December 2013, Ralegan 
Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
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infuse energy and support to Anna.303 Ten people from the supporters also volunteered 
to undertake ‘kuposhan’ (fasting) in solidarity with Anna. The only female participant 
amongst them, Sarita,304 38 years old, who worked in the fields, came from the nearby 
Gowra village to express solidarity: 
Lokpal Bill lane ke liye aan-shan pe baithi hun; Lokpal bill aane se saara samaj badal 
jayega..dilli bhi gayi thi 12 din kuposhan bhi kiya tha, kal se yahan pe kuposhan shuru 
kiya hai…jab tak Anna baithenge..tab tak mein bhi baithongi …Annaji hamare devta 
hai…voh apne liye kuch nahi kar rahe…desh ke liye kar rahe hai…agar Anna ko kuch 
nahi hota…toh mujhe bhi kuch nahi hoga! 
[I am fasting to bring in the Lokpal Bill; the whole society will change if the Lokpal Bill 
comes in… I went to Delhi as well and fasted for twelve days…I started fasting here 
yesterday as well…I will sit as long as Anna continues his fast…Annaji is our God…He 
is not doing anything for himself…he is doing it for the country…If nothing happens 
to Anna…nothing will happen to me as well.] 
Two supporters from outside Pune who also fasted in solidarity with Anna 
shared that for them Anna was akin to Gandhi. As described by one of the supporters, 
Shiv Kheda,305 60 years old from Janunda village, Rajasthan had been fighting its own 
battle against corruption, especially in village level administration under the control of 
sarpanches, for the last twenty years: 
Mein pichle teen varshon se Anna ke saath juda hua hoon…dilli mein bhi tha …gramin 
sthar pe jo bhrashtachar hai usku door karna hai…aur uske liye padyatra kar raha 
hu…Anna Gandhi swaroop hai”  
[I have been with Anna for the past three years...I was there in Delhi as 
well…Corruption at the rural level needs to be removed …and for that I am 
undertaking a journey on foot…Anna is like Gandhi.]  
Gandhian practices combined with socio-religious authority led to Anna’s larger appeal 
amongst the supporters as the narratives above describe. However, it also depicts that 
the subjectivities that his leadership propelled were of uncritical allegiance and awe.  
Anna always ended his fast with a highly symbolic gesture; for example, at 
Ramlila Maidan coconut water was served to him by minority Muslim and Dalit girls. 
                                                 
303 Field notes: observation from the protest site, 10th December 2013, in Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, 
Maharashtra. 
304 Interview with Sarita, 11th December 2013, Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
305 Interview with Shiv Khedha, 11th December 2013 at Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra. 
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This ending was specifically designed to replicate how Gandhi reached out to Muslims 
and Dalits and also to counter the critique that these sections were largely absent from 
the mobilisations. Anna broke his fast in the first round at Ramlila Maidan after twelve 
days and finally at Ralegan after nine days after the Lok Sabha passed the Lokpal Bill in 
the Parliament on 18th December, 2013 (Byatnal, 2013). The change of the protest 
venues for the movement from Delhi to Mumbai and then the small village of Ralegan 
Siddhi demonstrated the influence and appeal of Anna’s personality to different sections 
of the population from urban to rural. Also, the diversity in the nature of concerns 
associated with the rural population went beyond just the political class battering to 
raising concerns that affected them on an everyday basis of survival as peasants, small 
farmers, traders and retailers. It also gives an insight into the different dimensions of his 
appeal amongst the masses, which goes beyond the mediatised image argument and the 
urban middle class composition.  
Hazare had struck a deep chord. He had become larger than life, an icon symbolizing 
something more. To the young, he represented integrity, the commitment to fight 
corruption. He was seen as a symbolic link to history, to the credibility and ethics of the 
nationalist movement. (Visvanathan, 2012, p. 107)  
Through the anti-corruption movement Anna challenged the political class by using the 
same Gandhian symbolism of the ‘Gandhi topi’ which was instrumental in establishing 
an independent political class in opposition to British colonial rule. It is also ironic that 
he used Gandhian techniques to highlight the corrupt practices of Congress, the party 
seen as the inheritor of Gandhi’s legacy of the freedom movement and ideology. 
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Figure 6.4: AAP volunteers, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi306 
6.3.3 From Gandhi to Anna to AAP – the topi’s radical anti-Congress and non-
khadi spin 
Figure 6.4 shows AAP volunteers wearing AAP topis during the campaign. It was 
perhaps the first time women activists were seen wearing the headgear in both phases – 
movement and party.307 The AAP topi had a broad reach among the masses since it was 
cheap and therefore more accessible. It emerged as a powerful social equaliser – both in 
terms of class and gender.  
The strikingly visible thing that came to dominate the visual field of Delhi from 
the initial days of the protests at Jantar Mantar was the ‘I am Anna’ topis. In Indian 
history, the Gandhi topis were an essential part of the nationalist struggle but they had 
been non-existent in the political culture of protests and political life for a long time 
                                                 
306 Image taken by the author, 3rd December 2013, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi. 
307 Field notes: I observed that women activists wore AAP topis not only at rallies and demonstrations but 
also within party offices.  
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since Independence. This movement bought back to focus the Gandhi cap yet again 
into the political culture, while sustaining its subversive element, ironically against the 
Congress party.  
Having been humiliated for wearing the Sola topi in 1917, which was considered 
a symbol of British Imperialism, Gandhi developed his own version of a khadi headgear 
which became the symbol of the nationalist struggle.  
Two years later he was to exploit this symbolism by inventing his own personalized 
form of headwear – a white folding khadi version of the Kashmiri cap – which later 
became known as the Gandhi cap. Gandhi wore it for less than two years but it became 
one of the most popular symbols of the nationalist struggle. (Tarlo, 1996, p. 70)  
The use of the white khadi Gandhi topi became a part of the official uniform of the 
Congress party. Post-independence, the khadi topi was eventually reduced to being part 
of the attire of those political activists’ attire who identified themselves as followers of 
Gandhian ideology and his non-violent strategy. Anna Hazare is one such prominent 
Gandhian social activist. However, Anna wearing the Gandhi topi and leading an anti-
corruption political struggle against the entire political class, and effectively against the 
ruling Congress party, reflects the irony of the situation. The visual field with supporters 
wearing a Gandhi topi but with the tagline ‘I am Anna’ meant more than the addition of 
a tagline to the headgear; it also implied a larger ideological transformation. This 
semiotic opposition of the khadi Gandhi topi being worn in opposition to the Congress 
Party reflects the journey of both the Gandhi topi and the Congress Party as the flag 
bearers of the nationalist movement and the inheritors of Gandhian legacy coming full 
circle.  
The Gandhi topi also underwent a literal makeover from khadi (cotton) to china 
net in an authentic aam admi takeover from Anna. During both the Gandhian era and the 
Anna phase of the anti-corruption movement, the topi continued to be made of cotton. 
The tagline shift from ‘Main hoon Anna’ (I am Anna) to ‘Aam Admi’ (common man) for 
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the Anna topi was not just an ideological shift of the movement to a political party but 
also symbolised its adaptation into a common man’s version of the attire as well.  
The caps are made of ‘China Net’ — a type of polymer imported from China and 
known for its durability. But its edge lies in the price — such caps cost Rs 3 to Rs 5 
each against Rs 10-12 for those made from traditional textiles. (Nair, 2013)  
The shift made by an upcoming political party governed by its financial limitations 
meant a shift from cotton to china net. “Unlike their rivals who have much deeper 
pockets, AAP leaders made it clear that they wanted the cheapest material available” 
(Nair, 2013). 
However, this choice should be analysed beyond its cost-benefit, for its impact 
on the larger political culture. The shift from khadi to china net needs to be read through 
the broader political ideology of the AAP representing the masses and not the political 
elite. “A reading of khadi thus already exists in terms of the semiotic of corruption in 
modern Indian public life. It is one that reads khadi as ‘purity’ and ‘renunciation’ and 
now as corruption and thievery’’ (Chakrabarty, 2001, pp. 28–29). Since khadi has been 
associated with the corrupt political class, the choice of moulding the Gandhi/Anna topi 
according to the AAP’s ideology gave it a new lease of life by salvaging it from its deep-
seated eliteness and transforming it into a symbol of the masses – the aam aadmi. The 
Gandhi topi during the nationalist movement represented a person’s political and moral 
commitment and was a visual marker of the values of swarajya (self-rule) and swadeshi 
(indigenous).308 Similarly, in the anti-corruption movement, the AAP topi evolved its 
own normative field of moral righteousness and honesty in public life for its activists 
and supporters, as discussed in the next section. The metamorphosis of the Gandhian 
topi to ‘Anna topi’ to ‘AAP topi’ signified the political transition both ideologically 
specific to the anti-corruption movement and to the far-ranging Indian political culture. 
                                                 
308 During the nationalist movement khadhi was symbolic of economic self-reliance against British 
industrial products. Therefore wearing the Gandhian cap during that period signified political allegiance 
to Gandhian non-violent struggle against British Imperialism. 
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6.3.4 ‘Nayak’ Kejriwal: the political turn with the AAP 
Ek party ne bhi Lokpal bill ko support nahi diya, do saal ho gaye; haar ke hamein Aam 
Aadmi Party banana pada; sabne hamare mazak udhaya;khudh chunav lado aur khud 
apna Lokpal bill pass karo; hum aap ki chunauti sweekar karte hai; hum khud chunav 
ladenge, jeetenge aur apna Lokpal bill pass karenge.309 
[It has been two years. None of the political parties supported the passing of the Lokpal 
Bill; we then had to form the Aam Aadmi Party. Everybody made fun of us, saying 
‘fight elections on your own and pass your bill’; we are now accepting the challenge. We 
will now fight the election on our own, win it and will pass our Lokpal Bill.] 
The AAP, the anti-establishment party, was launched by Kejriwal couched in the 
language of urgency and necessity and decided to contest the Delhi Assembly elections 
of 2013 (Ali, 2013). Since then, it has transformed the nature of elections and political 
culture, per se, of Delhi. The formation of the new political party by Kejriwal marked a 
major shift from the anti-political stance that the movement had projected under Anna 
thus far. This evolution therefore implied two levels of transition, first at the level of the 
movement shift from the narrative of ‘dirty politics’ to ‘cleansing the system’. One 
could draw a parallel with what Fernandes (2006) described as the ‘clean up’ of the city, 
an inherent part of the new middle classes’ constitution of its civic culture. Second, at 
the level of political party formation, the AAP emerged as an anti-political 
establishment party310 in opposition to the existing dominance of the INC and the BJP 
in the political landscape of the national capital of New Delhi.  
                                                 
309 Field Note: Kejriwal’s speech at the Jan sabha held at Sector 9, R.K. Puram, 15th September, 2013, New 
Delhi. 
310 Abedi defines anti-political establishment parties as parties that fulfil the following criteria: “a) A party 
that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues. b) A party that 
perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment. c) A party that 
asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political establishment and the people” (Abedi, 
2004, p. 12). 
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Figure 6.5: AAP supporters, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi311 
Figure 6.5 depicts the hero-like identification that supporters had with Kejriwal; 
the poster was made by the supporter himself, who was at the jadhoo chalao yatra in 
Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi. In this poster, Kejriwal’s face has been photo-shopped onto 
a Bollywood film poster in which the protagonist of the story stands up against the 
corrupt political system. 
Kejriwal emerged as the ultimate redeeming nayak (hero) by bringing in the 
political turn to the hitherto anti-politics movement despite being an outsider to the 
political system and thus signified performing the anti-political self. The more 
revolutionary, fiery and impatient face of the movement, as opposed to Anna’s calmer 
demeanour; Kejriwal was considered the main architect of the movement and 
subsequently the formation of the AAP. Realising that there was a lack of political will 
to finally legislate on the Lokpal Bill on the part of the existing political parties, Kejriwal 
decided to enter the field of electoral politics and launched the AAP on 26th November 
                                                 
311 Image taken by the author, 3rd December 2013, Sarojini Nagar, New Delhi. 
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2012. Representing himself as one of the ‘common men’, his performance of dissent as 
an outsider to the political system had a potent impact on the masses – whether it was 
the burning of the government’s version of the Lokpal Bill during the movement in 
2011 (PTI, 2011b) or organising satyagraha (non-violent resistance) around unfair tariffs 
on water and electricity in 2013: approximately 50 RWAs pledged their support to the 
AAP’s campaign and refused to pay water and electricity bills (DHNS, 2013). Electricity 
bills were also burnt in different parts of Delhi on the occasion of Holika Dahan.312  
A former tax officer and an RTI activist, Kejriwal had been a social activist 
working through his two initiatives, the People’s Cause Research Foundation (PCRF) 
and Parivartan (an NGO), before he ventured into the anti-corruption crusade. He and 
his NGO worked mainly in Sunder Nagari, enhancing residents’ access to public 
services and entitlements such as water, public distribution system (PDS) and electricity 
by effectively using RTI.313 He was also instrumental in starting the anti-privatisation 
campaign of the Delhi Jal Board in 2005. By employing confrontationist, oppositional 
and aggressive positions, he was able to establish legitimacy as an ‘outsider’ working 
against the existing corrupt political class and the political order. The dominant cleavage 
hence became the political class versus the citizens and the anti-establishment party, 
invigorating the aam aadmi.  
As the very name of the AAP demonstrates, the idea of the ordinary plays a central role 
in these politics. Like other anti-establishment parties around the world, AAP presents 
itself as a party that advocates for the ordinary citizen or common man who is 
neglected, misunderstood and actively silenced by the political establishment (Roy, 
2014, p. 42). 
By invigorating the category of the common man or the people against the 
system, they constructed the ‘other’ in the political class. The AAP accused the political 
class of betrayal, corruption and self-enrichment and portrayed themselves as anti-
                                                 
312 It is a bonfire on the eve of the Hindu festival of Holi. According to the myth, it signifies burning the 
devil Holika. In this case the occasion was used to signify defiance against the incumbent Congress 
government in the national capital. 
313 Field notes: Parivartan Office, 15th November 2013, Sundar Nagari, New Delhi. 
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systemic game changers pledged to the politics of Gandhian swaraj. They decided to 
enter the electoral fray for the Delhi Assembly elections of 2013 on the agenda of anti-
corruption and passing of the Lokpal Bill. The ideological plank that defined the AAP 
campaign was aimed at systemic change, democratisation, and accountability. Swaraj, as 
the foundational principle, was explained in the manifesto,314 detailing the different 
levels at which decentralisation of power would take place to ensure political 
accountability to the common man. The dominant discourse was always about not 
contesting for power, but to work towards democratisation of governmental institutions 
and agencies, focusing therefore on self-governance whether at the level of block, 
municipality or state administration. “Satta parivartan ke liye andar ja rahe hai; satta bhogane 
ke liye nahi ja rahe hai; satta vahan se hatakar aapke haton mein dene ke liye ja rahe hai”315 [We 
are going in for systemic changes, not to reap the benefits of the system. We want to 
transfer the reins of control of the system from them to you.] 
Emphasising a systemic overhaul by cleansing the political system of corruption, 
the party launched the jhadoo (broom) as the symbol of the party (Baliga, 2013) at the 
Valmiki Temple, in Valmiki Colony (Ali, 2013) with the slogan, ‘poore desh mein jhadoo 
lagayenge bhrashtachar mukt banayenge’’316 (We will use the broom throughout the country 
and make it corruption free). The choice of an ‘outcaste symbol’ such as the broom 
signified the equivalential logic that it would play across classes while also advancing the 
agenda of non-sectarianism; I refer to it as an outcaste symbol because of two 
underlying significations. First, from the perspective of purity and pollution, despite 
being used for cleaning, the broom is always differentiated and kept separate in a 
household. Second, as an implement used for sweeping and sanitation, it is invariably 
                                                 
314 See the AAP’s Manifesto for the 2013 Delhi Assembly Election. The section on ‘Swaraj ki Niti’ further 
elaborates on the role of Mohalla Sabhas where decisions regarding civic development will be taken in 
accordance with the residents involved (pp. 4-5). The 2013 Manifesto (Hindi version) is available at: 
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/AAP%20manifesto%202013.pdf 
315 Field Note: Kejriwal’s speech at Jan Sabha, Sector 9, R.K. Puram, 15th September 2013, New Delhi. 
316 Field Note: Kejriwal’s speech at Jan Sabha, Sector 9, R.K. Puram, 15th September 2013, New Delhi. 
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associated with the outcastes according to the Hindu caste system – Valmikis. The 
party’s launch of its symbol at Valmiki Temple made visible this section of people, i.e. 
the sanitation workers, and emphasised their role in keeping the city clean and liveable 
couched in the narrative of dignity of labour: 
With the broom which symbolises dignity of labour, the party hopes to clean the filth 
which has permeated our government and our legislature. The country needs a clean 
sweep of its corrupted mainstream political parties. (AAP, 2013a) 
The AAP’s statement above, however, demonstrates that despite the transition from the 
movement to the party it was still nested in perceiving politics to be ‘dirty’ and hence 
the repertoire of the broom through the grid of cleansing. It is also interesting to 
analyse the nature of political subjectivity that is aimed at constituting through this 
choice. At the launch Kejriwal claimed: 
The ‘broom’ symbolises that the time has come to clean the politics of the country. The 
Aam Aadmi Party has vowed not to give a ticket to any tainted candidate. The ‘broom’ 
will become our weapon from now on. We will fight shoulder to shoulder with this 
community to clean this country. (Ali, 2013) 
By announcing camaraderie in cleansing the political system one can observe a 
partnership being charted out with the Valmiki community who are considered 
outcastes according to the Hindu caste hierarchy. In fact, Valmikis are outcastes even 
within the Dalit community, since they are even lower in the hierarchy than the already 
marginalised Dalits. The inauguration was symbolic of mainstreaming them and their 
work; most potently, claiming their partnership in an endeavour against the existing 
political system also gave them an acknowledgement of being part of the system – 
inclusiveness and a role – which was denied by the state administrative category of 
being a ‘Scheduled Caste’ and an assumed liability for the government. The community 
felt included and, as citizen stakeholders, part of the larger political agenda. However, 
this also demonstrated the inbuilt assumption of equating cleaning as the job of a 
particular caste, and thus may inadvertently contribute to perpetuating the caste-based 
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social order. Also, the broom has a broader significance in the Hindu way of life as it is 
considered auspicious. One of my middle-class Hindu respondents, a resident of Delhi 
Vishal, said, “Koi bhi shubh kaam karne se pehle jhadhoo se hi toh safai hoti hai, jaise Lakshmi ji 
ke aane se pehle bhi”317 [Before starting anything auspicious, we clean with the broom; for 
instance, before welcoming Lakshmiji]. The broom as a symbol is a floating signifier, 
enabling supporters from varied sectarian backgrounds to identify with it. It is loaded 
with different meanings depending on which section of the society one talks to and 
therefore in its ambivalence lays its equivalential logic; it binds all classes together. In 
the larger scheme of politics though, this shift translates into changing the signposts for 
mobilisation from a non-emphasis on religion, caste and identity to the mainstreaming 
of class. 
A balanced combination of traditional campaign methods and dialogic 
interactions along with techno-managerial strategies helped the new insurgent party to 
reach out to the masses effectively in its electoral debut for the 2013 Delhi Assembly 
elections. Strategies such as jhadoo chalao yatra and jan sabhas, discussed in the earlier 
section, combined with an effective door-to-door campaign laid the basis for the party’s 
outreach strategy. Furnishing information and facts to the masses was one of Kejriwal’s 
most effective election strategies. Making people aware of government policies, the 
claims that citizens can make against the government, the loopholes in the system and 
ensuring bureaucratic and political accountability formed the crux of his jan sabhas and 
other public meetings. Unlike the traditional parties who depended more on rhetoric, 
the AAP’s fact-based approach reflected the shift in political practices that the party was 
setting in motion which I term the ‘techno-managerial approach’. The other crucial shift 
that accompanied the managerial outlook was the renaming of party cadres as 
‘volunteers’. Emblematic of the managerial outlook to doing politics, the relationship 
                                                 
317 Interview with Vishal, a government employee, 23rd January 2014, Sector 3, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. 
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between the political party and its workers was refashioned into a ‘volunteering’ activity, 
albeit governed by the same disciplinary norms.  
Two interesting aspects of the AAP’s election campaign were its unique process 
of candidate selection and the most extensive procedure of manifesto-making. Arresting 
the clout of money and muscle power that had dominated elections in Delhi, the AAP 
asked individuals who were capable of garnering support from a minimum of one 
hundred people within his/her constituency to file applications as candidates. After a 
month-long procedure and public scrutiny, the party’s candidatures were finalised. The 
party’s manifesto-making was also a highly creative process which set the AAP apart 
from other political parties. Taking a people-centric approach rather than a sector-wise 
one (which is usually the focus of manifesto-making) the AAP decided to take up issues 
that concerned a specific constituency by going to the people directly. Consequently, it 
had 71 manifestoes, one for each constituency and one with the overall blueprint for 
the whole of Delhi (AAP, 2013c; PTI, 2013a). For example, the manifesto for Greater 
Kailash (GK) was subdivided into various areas and their specific concerns, while that 
for Savitri Nagar focused on the issue of sewage lines and the drainage system whereas 
it was issues concerning the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor that found mention in 
the GK manifesto. The overall manifesto for Delhi, interestingly, had a section on 
social justice as well as sections on other developmental agendas. Despite categorising 
different minority sections based on their ascriptive identities such as religion or caste, 
the articulation of their claims was based on their rights as citizens. Jan sabhas played a 
crucial role in getting feedback from citizens to refine these specific manifestos.  
Challenging the dominant political parties who had the money and power to 
erect big hoardings, the AAP chose to place posters with slogans ‘kise chunenge aap 
baimaan ya imaandaar’’ [Who will you select, the corrupt or the honest?] on the common 
man’s mode of transport – pulled rickshaws and auto-rickshaws. The auto-rickshaw 
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campaign was one of the most innovative strategies introduced by the AAP, for which 
both, the pulled rickshaws and auto-rickshaws were challaned (fined) and harassed by 
various administrative wings of the Delhi government (either through the Delhi police 
or the traffic police) which at that time was under the control of the Congress party. Yet 
they continued to be the most loyal supporters of AAP. By reaching out to large 
sections of masses, the AAP registered a spectacular debut by winning 28 seats out of 
70 and emerged as a real contender for political power. Apart from the electoral victory, 
it was the coalition of supporters across classes and regions that the party was able to 
garner which was of political significance. The next section discusses the nature of the 
political subjectivity constituted by the movement/party. 
6.4 Political Subjectivity: Self -Righteousness and Techno-Managerial Politics 
Hitashi, a 25 year old BPO worker who left her job during the Anna movement 
said: “Andolan se ek disha mili …topi pehenke mein nikalti hoon toh badlav ki zimandari ka 
ehsaas hota hai..!”318 [The movement gave me a direction to life…When I wear the cap 
and go out there is a feeling of responsibility to bring about change]. She got involved 
as a volunteer and gradually became an activist with the AAP. She said that the journey 
from being a first-time protester in the Ramlila Maidan to managing booth-level 
campaigning in areas of Seemapuri and Mustafabad had been incredible. The more 
striking aspect of her narrative was when she said that wearing the AAP topi instilled in 
her a sense of responsibility to bring about change. Following AAP activists during the 
campaign validated how the AAP topi had developed its own normative field. The 
activists/participants’ bodies became sites of significance. By wearing Anna topis and 
performing opposition and dissent by physical acts of disobedience they created public 
discussion among the common masses. By making their agendas visible, they 
                                                 
318 Interview with AAP Volunteer Hitashi, 24th January 2014, Parivartan Office, Sundernagar 
constituency, New Delhi. 
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transformed themselves into agents of change. “Topi pehan ke bahut izzat milti hai…badi 
zimmedari ka ehsaas hota hai…kuch galat nahi kar sakte”319 [Wearing the cap brings in a lot 
of respect…It is a source of great responsibility…Therefore I must not do anything 
wrong]. It is this performative essence that the AAP topi inheres, as activists themselves 
became crusaders and problem-solvers. 
Apart from getting respect from people, volunteers (for example, the auto-
rickshaw drivers) felt that they should act or needed to hold themselves to a higher moral 
standard than they had before – both legally and behaviourally.320 Wearing the AAP topi 
came to imply a moral legitimacy; it became a tool for negotiating or intervening in any 
situation of crisis. As observed during fieldwork, a faulty electricity bill issue could be 
rectified by a few AAP topi-wearing volunteers going to the relevant office, raising the 
issue, being taken seriously and being assured that the issue raised would be taken care 
of by the authorities. After this, one of the volunteers noted that “topi mein bada damm 
hain”321 [there is a lot of power in the topi]; the performative essence of the moment was 
that of self-appraisal – to be in a position to initiate change or intervene and hence be 
“suffused by sentiments of heroic achievement” (Roy, 2014, p. 49). The movement and 
the party invigorated large numbers of young activists who had hitherto been apolitical 
to become active volunteers in the party. Many of the activists, with their stories of 
tenacity, sacrifice and political commitment, do not only represent a deep sense of 
political agency in fighting the system but also inspired spectators to political action. All 
of them represented moral resoluteness and had stories of sacrifice and commitment 
describing their evolution as AAP volunteers. The movement initiated large sections of 
                                                 
319 Field notes: statement by one of the respondents while following the auto-rickshaw campaign, 25th 
November 2013, CP, New Delhi. 
320 Field notes: observations while following the auto-rickshaw campaign, 25th November 2013, CP, New 
Delhi.  
321 Interview with Vikas, AAP volunteer, 11th November 2013, New Delhi. 
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newcomers into political work, challenging their fundamental belief that doing politics is 
dirty. 
6.4.1 Aam ‘aadmi’ volunteers – beyond the ‘middle’ class 
The anti-political stance of the movement was one of the compelling reasons 
for the neo-liberal, middle-class professionals and corporate citizen subjects to support 
the movement which then was extended to the party as well. The non-sectarian outlook 
led to a class coalition. Consequently, politics was reduced to ‘management’ of interests. 
The techno-managerial nature of both the movement and the party can be attributed to 
this leadership and the involvement of large numbers of the professional middle classes 
from the early days. Many activists who continued to be part of the new party 
formation were the backbone of the legal wing and the social media campaign for the 
2013 election campaign. However, the involvement of the middle class as leaders of this 
civic activism was not a new phenomenon. Mohanty (2011) argues that many of the 
movements which intervened for further democratisation prior to the anti-corruption 
protests of 2011 were initiated by the middle class; for example, the civil rights 
movement was largely middle-class-led. Similarly, the mobilisation of the Dalits has its 
base among the upwardly mobile middle class educated sections within the community 
who spearheaded the movement. But what was new, argued Sitapati (2011), was that for 
the first time the middle class interests were successfully dispersed as representing 
everyone else’s interests also. Extending his argument, and based on my own 
observations and talking to activists at the New Delhi AAP office (which was Kejriwal’s 
constituency), it can be claimed that the reasons for the participation of young 
corporate MBAs and lawyers were governed by the logic of ensuring the accountability 
and efficiency of the government state machinery. One of the activists, Dinup 
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Mathew,322 a corporate professional volunteering at the New Delhi constituency office 
described his reasons for joining the party: 
I have been at the receiving end of unfair government practices in both my personal 
and business lives. Greasing the palms of all and sundry to get the most routine work 
done was increasingly a norm. I had no option. (D. Singh, 2013) 
The stories of Ankit Lal, an IT professional, who left his job to manage the social media 
campaign and Dr Raizada, a practicing doctor based outside India, who came back to 
contribute to the campaign and was in charge of managing the link between the party 
and the various NRI activist groups in the UK, Canada and Australia are similar. Hence, 
the middle class section was heavily involved in the transition from the movement to 
the formation of the party.  
In addition to this background role, one could also observe more sustained 
involvement by some of these young professionals who took on, for instance, the 
responsibility of running a constituency campaign or becoming candidates themselves. 
Many students from colleges, universities and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) 
either took a year off or did not sit for their exams as they felt it was crucial to be part 
of the movement and ‘do something’ for the country. IItian, Vikram,323 who was 
responsible for organising the campaign amongst the students in IIT Delhi (one of the 
first student bodies that extended support to the IAC under the banner ‘IITians Against 
Corruption’) and decided to be part of the party responsible for the Malviya Nagar Unit, 
said, “Agar mein exam deta toh apne liye deta- naukri karta apne parivaar ko support karta- lekin 
mein ek dayre ke under seemit ho jata’!” [If I had sat the exams it would have been for 
myself; I would have started working and supporting my family. But I would have 
limited my potential by doing this]. Vikram’s response brings out the combination of 
                                                 
322 Field notes: conversation with Dinup Mathew in AAP office, 12th November’13. He shared the same 
sentiments and reasons for becoming active in the movement as mentioned in the news report, 
Connaught Place, New Delhi. 
323 Interview with Vikram, 2nd February 2014, AAP office, Malviya Nagar, New Delhi. 
275 
moral self-righteousness and performing civic activism which defined the young AAP 
activists.  
The corporate classes comprised another powerful support base for the 
movement as they organised their ‘moral panic’ against ‘corruption’ (Ravinder Kaur, 
2012). A group of corporate houses wrote an open letter detailing their anxiety and the 
reasons they identified with the movement (expressed as ‘governance deficit’) (“India 
Inc’s letter’’, 2011)324 and pledged their support. As pointed out by Ravinder Kaur 
(2012), the fear of losing investments underpins the active participation of corporate 
players in the anti-corruption movement. The idea of ‘nation as a brand’ (Ravinder 
Kaur, 2012), along with the politico-legal perspective of analysing politics defines the 
participation of techno elites. Sitapati (2011) also highlights that the non-
representativeness and undemocratic aspect of the Jan Lokpal Bill did not seem to 
bother the middle classes and the elites. The largest fallout of the campaign, however, 
has been that the corporate sector have been kept out of the framework of the Lokpal 
Bill altogether since its focus is on the bureaucratic and the political classes (Giri, 2011; 
Ravinder Kaur, 2012; Navlakha, 2011). Thus the corporate class continues to be 
insulated from any accountability despite being involved in financial frauds and 
irregularities of varied kinds. 
However, the anti-corruption movement also signified the struggle against day-
to-day bribery and malpractices for the urban poor.  
It was no longer just a composite of middle class groups and NGOs and their 
constituents but also that of ordinary people – rickshaw pullers, vegetable vendors, auto 
rickshaw drivers, students and lower class families with all their members spent time in 
the Maidan. (Mohanty, 2011, p. 17)  
                                                 
324 The India Inc’s (Corporate sector) second letter to the leaders can be read here: 
http://www.dnaindia.com/money/report-india-inc-s-second-open-letter-to-leaders-1597346 
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Thus, a range of different professional bodies/trade unions also came together to 
pledge their support – doctors, IITians, auto-rickshaw wallahs and the dabba wallahs325 of 
Mumbai – for the movement and also for the party. Mayank Gandhi elaborated on the 
nature of participation with regard to mobilisations that took place in Mumbai, running 
parallel to the campaigns in Delhi: 
People from various groups – dabba wallahs, boot-polish wallahs, the coolie workers 
association, chemists associations and business wallahs were all there. There was not a 
single association that did not join us, cutting across all classes and across all 
boundaries.326 
Visiting the AAP offices at Chakala and Ralegan during Anna’s second fast at 
Ralegan, the media-generated version of the ‘middle class event’ (Rajagopal, 2011b) 
faltered; it broke the stereotypical perspective of viewing the movement as being urban-
based. On the contrary, the AAP displays a continuum along both rural and urban lines, 
as well as across the classes. Different sections of the lower-income groups across the 
cities of Delhi and Mumbai participated in the movement/party. One of the permanent 
fixtures at the AAP office in Delhi’s Connaught Place was Vijay Baba, a rickshaw-puller 
who was busy handling the phone-in campaign for the party. After being harassed by 
the police for having AAP posters on his rickshaw, he thought that by campaigning in 
this manner he also could be part of this politics of change.327 For many, such as 
rickshaw pullers, auto-rickshaw wallahs and dabba wallahs, opting out from a day’s work 
and sitting at the Maidan meant a loss of livelihood for the day but they still volunteered 
during the movement phase and later contributed in campaigning for the AAP. For 
example, the dabba wallahs of Mumbai who are renowned for their efficient lunch 
delivery service and, up to that point, had never gone on strike, decided to go on a one-
day strike in support of the movement. “We want to show the people that we are with 
                                                 
325 The men who deliver tiffin box carriers to the white collar office work force. It is a common practice 
in Mumbai. 
326 Interview with Mayank Gandhi, December 16th, 2013, AAP Office [Chakala Branch], Mumbai, 
Maharashtra.  
327 Interview with Vijay Baba, Hanuman Road AAP Office, October 2013, New Delhi. 
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them. When the whole nation is supporting Anna Hazare, we thought that we should 
also support him in our small way,” said Raghunath Medge, president of the Nutan 
Mumbai Tiffin Association (Raja, 2011; “Supporting Anna Hazare” 2011). 
Affected by the day-to-day experience of corruption in the forms of challans 
(fines) and bribes that they had to pay to the police or transport authorities for licenses, 
to the existing inflation in the economy made the auto-rickshaw wallahs of Delhi 
support the cause of anti-corruption and this group emerged as one of the strongest 
support bases of the party. While following the auto-rickshaw campaign in Connaught 
Place, near the New Delhi constituency office, Sanjay Chawla, the coordinator of the 
campaign, while distributing AAP posters and topis, explained the systemic flaws which 
made them the victims of corrupt practices. Given the absence of regularisation of the 
licensing system or parking charges, they are forced to pay bribes to the police in order 
to survive. But, he said, “Kejriwalji hi hamare helpline hain….vo hi hamare samasyon ko dur 
karengey!328 [Kejriwal is our helpline...He will resolve our problems!]. He explained that 
the auto-rickshaw wallahs that are part of the campaign are often threatened directly or 
indirectly by the police. However, despite these threats, none of them withdrew from 
the campaigning responsibilities; in fact, all of them gave up one day’s work to 
campaign for the party. Two other volunteers, Tiwari and Om Prakash, described how 
they had been involved since the campaign against electricity prices. All of them, with 
no background in any political work, had now evolved into political activists of the 
AAP. Also, in Varanasi, during Kejriwal’s campaign for the general election in 2014, 
Nandu, an ardent supporter attending Kejriwal’s nomination day rally told me that: 
                                                 
328 Field notes: following the auto campaign in the New Delhi Constituency with Sanjay Chawla and 
interview with him on 18th November 2013, New Delhi. 
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Kejriwalji hi hain jo hamare liye kaam kar rahein hai…dikkate pareshani samajhte 
hai..ek yahi party hai jo paisa nahi banti..Kejriwal ne kisi ko diya nahi…ulta log apni 
swaicha se jo nban sake de rahi hai..!329 
[Kejriwal is the only one who is working for us…He understands our difficulties and 
problems…His is the only party that is not distributing money...Kejriwal has not given 
money to anyone...On the contrary, people are voluntarily giving according to their 
means to him.] 
Similarly in Varanasi, I observed that the urban poor were the AAP’s largest support 
base. However, what needs to be highlighted here is that this coalition of classes, not 
just the middle classes, is possible because of the non-definition of the structural 
reasons for corruption and the unified opposition against the political class. Therefore, 
supporters’ expectation of the current political leadership was accountability as claim- 
making neo-liberal citizen-subjects – which did not involve much critical scrutiny of 
what the bill may entail. 
6.4.2 Aam ‘aurat’ volunteer – the blind spot 
The participation and mobilisation of a large number of women activists and 
volunteers was the hallmark of the anti-corruption mobilisation. The range of social 
composition varied across the rural/urban divide and across classes. Also, the non-
sectarian axis of the mobilisation galvanised women as co-partners in the struggle 
against corruption. The political subjectivities that it constituted was that many women 
and young girls who were hitherto apolitical and considered politics to be dirty became 
poll campaigners, did door-to-door campaigns and engaged with prospective voters; 
also some even ended up becoming candidates for the new insurgent party. Hence one 
observes the possibility for a civic identity to be invigorated. Sarita,330 the sole woman 
activist who fasted at Ralegan Siddhi in solidarity with Anna alongside nine other men, 
recounted her struggle to get to Delhi from Pune and to convince other women from 
her village to come when Anna fasted for the first time at Ramlila Maidan in 2011: 
                                                 
329 Interview with Nandu, auto-rickshaw driver, 28th April 2014, Varanasi, while following the AAP 
campaign in Varansai for the general election 2014, U.P. 
330 Interview with Sarita, 11th December 2013, Ralegan Siddhi, Pune, Maharashtra.  
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Ghar wale bahut bolte hai…mein akeli gayi dilli dusri das auraton ke saath…sunane ka 
nahi…acha sunane ka..bura sunane ka nahi…aadat padi hai mujhe acha sunane 
ki…apne parivar aur desh ke bhavishya ke liye kar rahi hu 
[People at home kept nagging me. I went to Delhi along with ten other women, 
without any family member accompanying me. There is no need to listen to nagging, 
only listen to good things, no need to listen to bad things. I am used to listening to only 
good things. I am doing it for the future of my family and my country.] 
On the other hand, Nivedita, a 32-year-old mother of two and dedicated 
volunteer at the AAP R.K. Puram branch, was a first-timer in election campaigning; she 
had joined the Anna Hazare movement because of her own personal struggles related to 
her children’s school admissions and price rise. 
Hamesha parivar ko prathmikta di…isliye job bhi chodha; Iss bari maine apne kaam ko 
prathmikta di…bachhon ko bukha bhi choda hai campaigning ke dauran…par nikal jati 
thi.331  
[Every time I prioritised my family…I left my job also; this time I prioritised my 
work...I left my kids hungry during the campaign period...but still, I left.]  
Her commitment to the anti-corruption cause shown in her narrative is the story of 
many such women volunteers. Sarita and Nivedita represent the wide spectrum of rural-
urban women who were mobilised as part of the movement. They would go to the 
Maidan almost every day and eventually joined the party to bring about change and fight 
against corruption. However, the fact that women’s activism is always couched in their 
association with the larger nation as mothers, daughter and wives (Sarkar & Butalia, 
1995) has resonance with respect to the mobilisation here as well. Speaking to many 
such activists on the ground, I noted that particularly women’s activism is guided by the 
motivation to lift the country out of crisis, a deep-seated motivation in the gendered 
understanding of nationalism.  
The emphasis on a non-sectarian outlook guiding the movement/party gave the 
impression that women were considered as equal partakers in the struggle rather than 
considering or bracketing them as ‘women’ volunteers or vote banks. Attending the 
                                                 
331 Interview with Nivedita, 5th January 2014, Munirka AAP Office, R.K. Puram constituency, New Delhi. 
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mahila wing (women’s wing) meeting in the AAP office, one of the volunteers, Pushpa, 
said, “AAP mein mahoul alag hain…yahan auraton ki izzat ki jaati hai”332 [The environment 
in the AAP is different…women are respected here] when explaining her reasons for 
joining. There is no denying the fact that compared to other political parties the 
presence of women at different levels of organisational management was responsible 
for many women activists continuing to be part of the party, even after the movement 
halted. They felt that as a political party the AAP was ‘different’ as there was ‘space’ for 
women and they were serious about the issues of women’s security and anti-corruption. 
From being homemakers, confined within the private sphere, they were now 
transformed into full-time political activists. Hence a lot of my female respondents from 
middle or lower-income group families where engaging in politics which was initially 
seen as ‘dirty’, felt empowered. They felt a sense of self-worth and confidence in the 
public sphere, speaking to people about issues and agendas and, most importantly as 
first-timer political activists, felt an overall change in the attitude towards politics – it 
was no longer dirty. 
The AAP, despite being a nascent political party, had also given party tickets to 
women candidates for the Delhi Assembly elections 2013, demonstrating gender parity 
not just in participation but also in leadership. Following these candidates through their 
campaigning was an interesting experience on the field as they were not categorised 
according to their gendered roles or stereotyped such as ‘women leaders’ or stree shakti 
(women power), etc.333 They were valued in their own right as participants/volunteers in 
the struggle against corruption. One observes therefore that the emphasis on non-
sectarian politics translates in practice on the ground as gender, caste, class or religion is 
not the locus for mobilisation. As the combination of the trio of female candidates 
                                                 
332 Field Note: an observation from the women’s meeting on 16th October 2013 at the AAP [New Delhi 
Constituency] office, Hanuman Road, Connaught Place, New Delhi.  
333 Field Notes: following the three female candidates during their campaigning in November 2013, New 
Delhi. 
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displays (Rakhi Birlan [SC/lower-class/Mangolpuri], Bandana Kumari [upper 
caste/middle-class/Shalimar Bagh] and Shazia Ilmi [Muslim/upper-class/R.K. Puram], 
none of the sectarian aspects of their identities were capitalised on in the public 
campaign to target particular vote banks. Though efforts were made organisationally to 
have more women candidates, conversations with them revealed few were willing to 
contest; however, the party did manage to influence a large section of women activists 
to join as volunteers thereby activating them into political work.334 Jaishree, an activist 
with Saheli and an AAP volunteer, who during the first phase of the protests managed 
to organise and lead interested women from her colony in batches of ten to the Ramlila 
Maidan, described how things had changed in the colony of Sangam Vihar (Asia’s largest 
unauthorised colony): 
Despite being largely uneducated and homemakers, they not only campaigned in their 
own capacity within their networks but have since also taken up proactive roles in the 
mohalla sabhas (town councils), especially intervening in the issue of water distribution 
and management. Earlier, they did not even know the difference between an MLA and 
a councillor, but now they not only know, they also engage in politics.335 
Visiting the colony and interacting with the volunteers there, it was obvious how 
institutions and the legal system can be completely absent from people’s lives. The 
ghetto has been the hub of many illegal activities to provide basic amenities such as 
water; tanker mafias had usurped the role of distribution, forcing people in these areas 
to pay bribes to access drinking water, food ration or security. Many women in this 
colony who joined the AAP said they now felt a sense of hope that things would change 
when a people’s party came to power and took up issues of day-to-day corruption and 
systemic flaws. 
However, what is important to analyse is the nature of activism or political 
subjectivity that is constituted for women volunteers and to what extent they are able to 
                                                 
334 Field Note: an observation from the women’s meeting on 16th October 2013 at the AAP [New Delhi 
Constituency] office, Hanuman Road, Connaught Place, New Delhi. 
335 Interview with Jaishree, AAP volunteer, 20th January 2014, Sundarnagri, New Delhi. 
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renegotiate or challenge the existing patriarchal norms. The fact that many women and 
girls came out of the confines of the household to enter the public sphere and engaged 
in political activities needs to be assessed from the perspective of the challenging of 
patriarchal norms and control. From that perspective, the women’s activism that the 
anti-corruption movement and the party have encouraged seems to have constituted a 
social activist-oriented activism for women rather than political worker subjectivity. Most of 
the women activists and young girls were motivated by the objective of service and 
intention of bringing about change through anti-systemic non-political interventions. 
Coming from the NGO sector, many would also make it clear that they joined the party 
because it provided a forum for helping people. Therefore the larger orientation of 
women’s activism was within the norms of the patriarchal expectation of women’s role 
in societal change.  
The de-gendered perspective which defined the AAP as a political party also 
represented its patriarchal and sexist underpinning; in particular, after it formed its 
government in Delhi many policy decisions and actions displayed a conservative 
tackling of issues. I wish to highlight two aspects – one ideological and another of 
practices that establish that the AAP, like all the other political parties, is equally deep- 
seated in patriarchy and status-quoist in its dealing with women subjects. First, in the 
wake of the 16th December gang rape case of 2012,336 the mainstreaming of women’s 
security became one of the dominant agenda points of the party. It was first proposed 
to set up a citizens’ security force and to install CCTVs to check sexual harassment and 
‘Eve-teasing’ (sexual harassment of women). The approach towards managing issues of 
sexual harassment through technical solutions is one of the ways through which sexual 
assault is abstracted from social behaviour and patriarchal power relations. Hence, 
rather than stressing gender sensitisation as part of policy making, the emphasis on 
                                                 
336 It involved the brutal sexual assault of a young girl in South Delhi, India.  
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intrusive surveillance technology and setting up security guards, was based on the 
patriarchal norms of surveillance and control of female sexuality and mobility, along 
with male patronising protectionism. Second, the most direct way in which this played 
out was when a number of Ugandan women living in Khirki village were subjected to a 
midnight police raid and were assaulted on the orders of Law Minister Somnath 
Bharti337 on the alleged assumption that they were engaged in drug trafficking and 
prostitution, thus exposing the racist stereotyping and sexism informing Bharti’s 
actions. As reported, the women complained of physical abuse, double discrimination, 
being publicly forced to give urine samples and being humiliated in AIIMs (All India 
Institute of Medical Sciences) during the medical tests (PTI, 2014a). This incident 
revealed that the ideology of patriarchal protectionism and control over women’s 
sexuality combined with rigidity of conservative morality informed practice.  
6.4.3 The ‘dirt’ within – of invisibilities, vigilantism and authoritarianism 
The presence and visibility of the new middle classes in the mobilisation of both 
the movement and the party implied two things: First, its dominance covered up the 
absence of sections that were not part of the ‘Anna moment’/‘anti-corruption’ 
movement. The AAP’s affective politics hints at these differences. Their claim making is 
based on the class position of middle class assertiveness as opposed to people engaged 
in a social movement challenging larger structural changes. “Party activists express a 
kind of self-righteous outrage that is markedly different from the sentiments of despair, 
fear, humiliation or “wounded injuries” advanced by other political movements” (Roy, 
2014, p. 52). One of the dominant issues of concern was the fact that the structural 
inequalities that perpetuate corruption were not part of the debate or discussion. 
Despite anti-corruption being a floating signifier, it did not garner support from many 
                                                 
337 Somnath Bharti, a lawyer by profession, was elected from the Malviya Nagar constituency to the AAP 
Delhi government formed in 2013. He was the Minister for Law, Tourism, Administrative Reform, Art 
and Culture in Kejriwal’s cabinet.  
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sections of people who made their assertion by ‘not being there’ at Ramlila Maidan. The 
reason that the Lokpal Bill and the narrative of anti-corruption left out any discussion of 
corporate involvement in corruption (Giri, 2011; Navlakha, 2011; Sitapati, 2011) and 
NGOs from its ambit led many social movement groups to opt out from the anti-
corruption mobilisation. The minority groups and their leaders, by and large, were either 
critical or indifferent. Minority groups and social movements who raised issues about 
corporate finance and land acquisition were absent. Mohanty (2011) also highlighted 
that movements protesting against mining and other extractive projects in different 
states were absent; various groups fighting for forest rights and implementation of 
various acts were critical of the campaign. The absence of minorities during the 
mobilisation had to do not only with the dominance of new middle class civic aesthetics 
but also the inherent majoritarian nationalist vigilantism inherent in the mobilisation.  
As discussed earlier, the presence of national flags should be analysed beyond 
standing in for anti-sectarianism but as signifying rigid nationalism. The anti-political 
party stand translated into strictly undemocratic on-field regimentation accompanied by 
a dangerous ideological mix of extreme sentiments of being against both the politicians 
and all political parties. Second, the narrative of a monolithic understanding of the 
nation was thrust upon from above, with any discourse that questioned or unsettled the 
idea of ‘One India’ being equated with being ‘anti-national’. Arunima points out that 
“the gravest aspect of the Anna Movement has been its contribution to bolstering the 
increasing fearsome tendency towards neo-nationalism” (2012, p. 115). Neo-nationalism 
became most evident around two controversial agendas: holding a plebiscite in 
Kashmir338 and the issue of racism in Khirkhi village.  
                                                 
338 Here, in this context, Prashant Bhushan is referring to the use of the AFSPA (Armed Forces Special 
Powers) Act by the Indian government within Kashmir to check terrorism and is suggesting that a 
plebiscite should be called to seek the people’s mandate for its deployment in the state. 
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The issue around holding a plebiscite in Kashmir came up in 2011 after 
Bhushan, a member of Team Anna, commented that:  
The government can decide if the army needs to be deployed to deal with external 
threats along the border. The government can also decide if the army needs to be kept 
to help protect the minorities in the valley. But there should be a referendum on 
whether people want AFSPA to continue in the valley or not. (Bhushan, quoted by 
Kunwar, 2014) 
Bhushan’s statement reveals a viewpoint considering the disenchantment that people in 
the state of Kashmir have had against the Indian state, but his opinion on a plebiscite 
was perceived as divisive to the integral unity of the country. However, the reaction that 
his opinion elicited, both from Anna and Kejriwal, unequivocally displayed the dangers 
of the conservative and reactionary understanding of patriotism and hard line 
nationalism. Anna reacted to Bhushan vociferously by reinforcing his commitment to 
nationalism and patriotism aligned to an undivided India:  
It was then I pledged the rest of my life in the service of my country. Even today you 
can see the marks on my forehead left behind by Pakistan’s bullet. This is my active 
conviction that Kashmir is an integral part of India and will remain so. Today once 
again if I have to, am ready [sic] to take part in war against Pakistan. But some people 
can only speak and don’t do anything on ground [sic] (in reality for Kashmir) and this is 
unfortunate. (Hazare, 2011) 
Consequently, Bhushan was invariably bracketed as being an anti-national and 
questions were raised as to whether he should be allowed to continue as part of Team 
Anna (PTI, 2011e). Similarly, in 2014, Kejriwal and the AAP disassociated themselves 
from Bhushan’s statement (Parsai, 2014). Under pressure, Bhushan had to reformulate 
and reinstate his position to prove his commitment to India’s unity and integrity. This 
episode signalled to lack of space for a dialogue or for dissenting voices or the 
questioning of the dominant perspective. With respect to the ideological understanding 
of nationalism within the movement there was no scope for any deviation from an 
integrated and undivided idea of an Indian nation. Overall, one observes continuity in 
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the texture of both the movement and the party in the context of understanding the 
nation, and the practice of patriotism is circumscribed by uncritical obedience. 
Similar vigilantism and majoritarianism was evident in the Khirki village 
incident. Somnath Bharati, the then law minister of Delhi authorised raids in the 
Khirkhi extension against African nationals accused of drug peddling and prostitution 
on the basis of complaints filed by the RWA. The press reported that the proper legal 
procedures were not followed, but more importantly it signified ‘vigilante justice’ being 
meted out on the basis of racism against African nationals and inherent sexism. Bharti’s 
action was followed by further racist attacks on African nationals living in the area. This 
incident brought out two aspects, the issues of everyday racism inherent in Indian civil 
society and vigilante justice based on racist and sexist stereotypes instigated by groups 
such as the RWAs. The nexus between the AAP and RWAs, as discussed earlier, is 
evident in this case as well. The fact that an independent body comprising private 
individual members such as the welfare association was instrumental in arriving at a 
consensus to dislodge the African community from the area displays the majoritarian 
xenophobic anxiety. The dangerous aspect of this majoritarian consensus is further 
strengthened if the political leadership fails to scrutinise the cases and initiates legal 
actions based on the dominant majoritarian perspective. The Khirki village incident and 
the nexus discussed above highlights the complexity of anti-establishment parties such 
as the AAP who lack clearly defined ideological positioning. They would support claim-
making by non-political organisations such as welfare associations, which are usually 
guided by a majoritarian outlook, without hesitation. Both the above cases focus on the 
problems associated with a moralistic and self-righteous understanding of political 
subjectivism.  
Anti-establishment parties such as the AAP are also part of the post-ideological 
phase which explains their rejection of politics and adoption of a techno-managerial 
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approach. This in turn translates into an organisational pattern governed by the NGO 
rather than political party format. NGO-based activism tends to be concentrated on the 
leader as most of the form and course of their respective cause-based mobilisations are 
based on their individual initiatives and convictions unlike a political party which has a 
broader body of members at different levels to which the leaders are accountable. The 
NGO format institutionalises a highly moralistic and authoritarian leadership and in this 
case both Hazare and Kejriwal displayed this tendency. Despite the fact that 
individually, both of them were leaders of impeccable character, commitment and 
dedicated years of public service to their respective causes and campaigns, the exercise 
of ‘moral authority’ represented by Hazare and authoritarian decision-making by 
Kejriwal reflected the undemocratic tendencies within the movement/party.  
Kejriwal’s decision on 14th February 2014 to resign as chief minister because of 
his inability to pass the Lokpal Bill in the Delhi Assembly laid bare his hasty and 
autocratic decision-making. His move can be assessed on two levels: firstly, the decision 
to resign could be read as a high moral commitment to the agenda of passing a Lokpal 
Bill that the movement and the party was committed to and he was unable to do that as 
the two dominant political parties, the BJP and Congress, opposed it. However, the 
sudden decision was both historic and shocking. When he announced his resignation 
from the AAP’s party office and the supporters cheered holding jhadoos (brooms), he 
was hailed as a leader who sacrificed his political position to the larger issue at stake, 
that of fighting corruption. However, it is doubtful that this particular decision was 
subject to a democratic process or if the rest of the MLA’s (Member of Legislative 
Assembly) in his cabinet were taken into his confidence before announcing such a 
drastic decision. Secondly, absence of consultation can also be seen with respect to 
citizens of Delhi. The Aam Aadmi (common man) had been part of the decision making 
process since the inception of the AAP: most of the final decisions were based on 
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modern day referendum techniques including SMS, surveys and voting – for instance 
decisions from the establishment of the party itself to staking claim to form the 
government with outside support from Congress were all based on taking the citizens 
of Delhi into their confidence. However, when it came to Kejriwal’s resignation, no 
consultation took place and public opinion was not sought; consequently, the masses 
felt betrayed. Internal consultation processes had also been a consistent issue since the 
days of Team Anna. Many activists (including Ekta Parishad activist P.B. Rajagopal and 
water conservationist Rajendra Singh) (HTB, 2011) left the core committee of the IAC, 
resigning their positions because of unilateral decision making by Kejriwal. The 
individual self-righteousness and non-consultative nature of decision making eventually 
led to many prominent activists leaving. In more recent times, activists who were also 
ideological mentors of this political experiment from the initial phase of the IAC to the 
AAP, including Shazia Ilmi, lliyas Azmi, Prashant Bhushan and Yogendra Yadav, have 
resigned due to the lack of inner party democracy in decision making. 
Finally, despite the anti-corruption movement providing forums and space for 
discussions for various other activist groups and NGOs to give suggestions and 
feedback on the formulations of the Jan Lokpal Bill during the movement, it was 
noticeable that when alternatives were suggested by, for example, the NCPRI, they were 
not engaged with or accepted. The hardline approach adopted by Team Anna during 
the different stages of negotiation with the government with regard to their version of 
the Jan Lokpal Bill reflected an imposition and sometimes represented a lack of 
flexibility to accept suggestions from different groups or the government on their 
version of the Bill. As Visvanathan (2012) argued, Team Anna needed to be more 
flexible and receptive to alternative and consensual decision-making. Rather than being 
uncompromising, the party needed to be acknowledge that the Lokpal Bill would not be 
a ‘one size fits all’ solution to corruption. “Corruption needs a more cautious and 
289 
nuanced problematic and a wider set of solutions. To put it facetiously, Hazare’s group 
should not look like an A grade version of the Munna Bhai effect” (Visvanathan, 2012, 
p. 15). This perspective is also reflected in making the Lokpal an all-powerful authority, 
which overlooks the other institutional positions. 
The narrative of anti-politics and the clean/dirty binary which dominated the 
discourse of the movement led to shaming of political institutions such as the 
parliament, the political class on the whole and the realm of politics itself.  
Politics which dredges up the worst and puts them in positions of authority is where all 
iniquity originates. And no institution constituted through politics can be trusted with 
the public good, free of the oversight of a body established on foundations of virtue. 
That is the paradoxical and self-defeating message of Hazare’s movement. 
(Muralidharan, 2011, p. 12) 
The fact that the major part of the movement’s discursive tone was anti-political had 
the effect of portraying the realm of politics as something to be wary of and sidelined 
the maturity and strength of the democratic institutions and traditions that have defined 
Indian democracy. However, the rise of a new political party in the AAP ushered in a 
new phase in New Delhi’s political system and culture in a democratically vibrant way. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The anti-corruption movement and its symbolism thus ruptured the dominant 
political culture of the National Capital Territory. By mainstreaming the aam aadmi 
against the power of the state and its authority it deepened democracy by disturbing the 
neo-liberal regimentation of the civic-citizen subject. As discussed, the movement, and 
eventually the political party, mobilised hitherto apolitical or anti-political citizen 
subjects into sustained political civic activism. The movement revitalised counter-spaces 
of protest and dissent such as the Ramlila Maidan and Jantar Mantar and intervened in 
the neoliberal and statist spatial segregation by invigorating a confrontationist civic 
citizen unsettling the sanitised political culture of Delhi. The bottom-up approach in 
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defining the symbolic and discursive field of the mobilisation demonstrated the 
democratic and constructive nature of its repertoire and self-reflexivity with respect to 
audiences’ identification. In mapping the evolution of the anti-political movement 
under the banner of the IAC to the emergence of an anti-establishment party in the 
AAP, one observes that it has been embedded in the new middle class civic aesthetics 
and anxieties. Therefore, while the anti-corruption movement operationalises the 
category of a ‘common man’ and a transgressive claim-making self, it also visualises a 
neo-liberal civic citizen.  
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis has provided an immersive study of symbolic mobilisation, by three 
types of identity-based assertions - religious, caste and civic – from the vantage points 
of their respective participants. It does this by deconstructing their performative 
political actions within the local spatial and symbolic habitus, and examining this within 
a comparative framework. 
I will highlight in this concluding chapter the substantive findings of the case 
studies to analyse the nature of the subject formation that symbolic and performative 
political action constitutes. 
7.1 Revisiting the Research Questions 
The thesis has argued that the encounter between symbolic mobilisation and 
subject formation does not lead to an assertion of agency in a monolithic form but 
rather generates layered experiences for the political self in the symbolic political field. 
Tracing these performative practices outside of institutionalised domains in everyday 
and spatial engagements, I have sought to problematise the distinction between legal 
and cultural citizenship. Using a comparative frame, I have drawn out the unifying, yet 
distinctive, characteristics across the three case studies which I summarise in the 
following discussion. The first section on symbolic representation discusses their 
respective symbolic habitus and the power equations they sought to destabilise. The 
second deconstructs their spatial assertions in the form of the counter-spaces that 
emerged in the respective cityscapes. Finally, the section on political subjectivity 
assesses the three cases in terms of the extent to which democratic subjectivities were 
constituted. 
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7.1.1 Symbolic representation: identification and assertion 
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that symbolic politics constitutes claim-
making subjects. Intervention in a symbolic universe enables different social classes to 
contest the dominant power structures along caste, religious, class and gender lines, thus 
transforming subjectivities. The availability of alternative symbolic repertoires and the 
intersection of neo-liberalism and identity lead citizen-subjects to affiliate with 
assertions that challenge different power hierarchies. The discussion in the three case 
studies demonstrated that all these mobilisations through symbolic interventions in the 
political field served to question the existing power hierarchies.  
The repertoire of Dalit intervention through Ambedkar’s commemorative 
memorial and statues discussed in Chapter 5 disrupted the Brahmanical field of 
perception. Mayawati’s ‘statues of dis-order’ challenged the caste Hindus’ symbolic 
order, extending the politics of Dalit assertion from the micro to the macro level in UP. 
The Ambedkar Sthal and statues signify values of constitutional equality and dignity for 
middle and lower class Dalits, and even for sub-castes such as the Balmikis. Despite the 
intra-caste hierarchy between Jatavs and Balmikis, the figure of Ambedkar unifies them 
as Dalits, and the Dalit symbolic habitus challenges the violence of the dominant Hindu 
nationalist worldview by choosing to assert their Dalit identity. The choice of 
Ambedkar as an icon combined with the adoption of Buddhist imagery with its 
alternative architectural motifs outside of Hindu temple art (such as stupas and viharas) 
represents a conscious decision by the community to defy both Hinduism and its 
practices. It also displays the Dalit community’s respect and appreciation of Ambedkar’s 
vision which inscribed and ensured dignity as a fundamental right for Dalits and all the 
other marginalised sections in Indian society through the Constitution. 
 The anti-corruption protests with their deep-seated symbolism in Gandhian and 
patriotic repertoires enabled civic-citizen assertion. Chapter 6 discusses the anti-
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corruption matrix, from its beginnings as a non-political party initiative under the 
banner of the IAC with a broad anti-political agenda through its evolution into a new 
anti-establishment political party with the formation of the AAP. The unfurling of the 
national flag (tricolour), instead of the flags of political parties or groups, in the protest 
grounds, streets, alleys and at spontaneous sit-ins in New Delhi signified claim-making 
by the common masses. The anti-political field was defined by the practices of 
patriotism and governed by norms of self-sacrifice and history being made associated 
with Gandhi. The political twist to the movement, Kejriwal’s decision to form a new 
political party, was defined by the politics of swaraj, and the jhadhoo as the party’s symbol 
signified the shift in the narrative from ‘politics is dirty’ to ‘cleansing the system’. The 
appearance of AAP topis on New Delhi’s streets symbolised not only the common 
man’s assertion but also a powerful blow against the existing political parties and culture 
of the city. 
The fact that people across classes identified with Modi as Vikaspurush 
demonstrated that his dispersed symbolic practices stood for upward social mobility and 
determined leadership as discussed in Chapter 4; they gave aspiration and hope, 
especially to the youth and the lower classes. Modi’s emergence in India’s political 
system challenged the established dominance of the dynastic politics of the Congress. 
He symbolised the emergence of lower caste and class assertion, both against the elite 
Congress establishment and also within the BJP. A successful blending of Hindutva 
symbolism with technological suavity ensured that the Hindutva agenda of social 
engineering was carefully woven into the agenda of development. The symbolic habitus 
ranged from Modi masks, kurtas, and chai-pe-charchas to political rallies including saffron-
clad sadhus with conches, and Modi sena. In Gujarat, the majoritarian ethno-religious 
identity (a combination of Gujaratiness and Hinduness) combined with the reiteration 
of annual developmental rituals to ensure that the Gujarat growth story was performed 
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and successfully circulated. In Vadodara, Modi’s male Hindu supporters across classes 
were observed to identify with his assertive masculinity. He was seen as the patriarch of 
Gujarat who ensured security for all Gujaratis. His Hindu women supporters’ backing 
was based on his promise of a safe and secure environment for all women and various 
schemes targeting female empowerment. On a pan-India level, Modi as chai wallah 
signified to the masses the successful journey of a common man staking claim to the 
top political position in the country. Modi’s humble background stood in stark 
opposition to the political and dynastic legacy of Rahul Gandhi as the leader of the 
Congress Party. However, the Gujarat growth model reflected the majoritarian symbolic 
universe and thus lacked visibility for Muslim and Dalit minorities, demonstrating the 
symbolic violence inherent in a majoritarian symbolic assertion.  
7.1.2 Symbolic participation: spatial assertion and re-signifying cities 
The thesis has demonstrated how cities get re-signified through symbolic 
assertion. By activating counter-spaces in opposition to the dominant spatial 
segregation/categorisation symbolic mobilisations embody new subjectivities. Citizen-
subjects disrupted the bracketed frame of events through embodied participation across 
specific spatial locations in Lucknow, New Delhi, Vadodara and Varanasi, as discussed 
in the respective chapters – thus, these spaces were re-signified with new meanings. 
These physical sites were not just the loci of material, political assertions and 
contestations for specific groups, but also the means to stake their ‘right to the city’. As 
a symbolic material assertion, this also enabled groups to redefine social interaction and 
dynamics between identity-based groups.  
Built during Mayawati’s regime, the Ambedkar Parivartan Sthal in the middle of 
Lucknow redefined the city as a counter-space with Bahujan sensibilities. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, both the commemorative memorial and the Ambedkar statues in the villages 
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signify Dalit spatial claim-making, previously denied to them by the Hindu caste order. 
The Sthal makes visible the history of caste oppression and the struggle for equality that 
have been embodied in Dalit icons across time. It challenges the idea of purity and 
pollution in Hinduism with its choice of Buddhist architecture, character of visitors and 
its extension of the idea of the ‘right to leisure’ to include Dalits. The Sthal, by evolving 
into one of Lucknow’s most popular tourist attractions, has redefined and transformed 
the city. By inscribing Lucknow’s spatial and visual landscape with Dalit history the 
Sthal challenges the dominant Brahmanical frame of reference associated with the city. 
The anti-corruption movement redefined Lutyens’ New Delhi with the Aam 
Aadmi’s sensibilities, challenging the political and symbolic power of the political elite. 
The re-invigoration of counter-spaces such as the Ramlila Maidan and Jantar Mantar, and 
the spontaneous sit-ins and marches by the masses on New Delhi’s streets displayed the 
common man’s right to the city. By generating these counter-spaces of civic activism, 
the anti-corruption movement defied the apolitical regimentation of the capital’s 
outlook. The sanitised political capital of New Delhi with all its bureaucratic red-tape 
was destabilised by the movement and, eventually, the AAP taking charge of the city. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, by activating the masses, both the movement and the AAP 
jolted the complacency of the established political parties and bureaucratic aura of the 
city through the norms of civic activism, democratic equality and political 
accountability. 
On the other hand, Gujarat emerged as an exceptional spatial prototype of 
Modi’s surajya (good governance) with its own model of growth, unlike the rest of India. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Modi’s coronation as the Vikaspurush was based on the 
success of the Gujarat model which he wanted to implement across the rest of India. 
Modi’s growth model, as it evolved in Vadodara, was defined by two particular spatial 
dynamics. First, developmentalism was governed by reiterative state practices such as 
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spectacular summits rooted in the neoliberal ethos. Second, spatio-culturally, his model 
exhibited ethno-religious norms of Hindu-Gujarati identity which topographically 
excluded and ghettoised both Muslim and Dalit minorities. While Vadodara represented 
homogeneity spatially, Varanasi as a spatial site challenged Modi’s symbolic habitus.  
Though he aimed to capitalise on the city’s association with the Hindu cosmic 
order, the inherent syncretism of Varanasi made it a counter-space for political 
opposition to emerge, both discursively and symbolically, especially from the Muslim 
minorities. Unlike in Gujarat where the Muslim population was, in effect, invisible, in 
Varanasi there was a visible counter-assertion of Muslim subjectivity in support of the 
AAP. Kejriwal provided an alternative symbolic register which was unassuming, yet 
powerful. Even though there were significant shifts in Kejriwal’s secular disposition, the 
nature of Kejriwal’s symbolic assertion (unlike Modi’s) was more in keeping with the 
syncretism that Varanasi stood for, an open rather than a pre-defined space. While 
staying within the sacred cosmos of Varanasi, Kejriwal and the AAP represented in 
their symbolism a non-oppositional space for the ‘other’, a space symbolically absent in 
Moditva. Hence, the Muslim minority bunkars, the weaving community of Varanasi, 
threw their weight behind the AAP. In the initial few weeks of Kejriwal’s campaign in 
Varanasi, in the field one could sense a mix of anxiety and fear, along with some hope. 
This gradually transformed into minority participation: skull caps were replaced by AAP 
topis, people came out onto the streets for rallies and jan sabhas, defying the symbolic 
dominance of the Modi wave and asserting their political choice.  
Spatially, Modi’s case study showed that developmental politics sought to re-
signify the city on the lines of heterotopias rather than counter-spaces, a homogenised 
spatial entity capitalising on the majoritarian ethos and standardised developmental 
practices.  
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7.1.3 Symbolic representation and participation: democratic subjectivity? 
All three case studies of symbolic mobilisation discussed in the thesis constitute 
political subjects who have asserted their identification with a particular symbolic 
register. But to what extent were they democratic? As discussed in Chapter 3, my 
conception of democratic subjectivity is based on two levels of identification, first at the 
level of taking up (assumption), and second, the reiteration of being a democratic-
subject.  
Modi’s symbolic mobilisation, discussed in Chapter 4, demonstrated an 
instrumentalist mobilisation (top-down practices) that constituted less democratic 
political subjects compared with the Dalit and the anti-corruption mobilisations. The 
Vikaspurush campaign, based on a non-discursive and majoritarian agenda, occluded the 
scope for a second level of iteration –that of an evolved democratic citizen. In the 
context of ‘doing’ Hindu identity there was little potential for challenging or deviating 
from hegemonic norms or practices and, in the absence of any self-reflexive questioning 
of the doing of their Hindu identity, the politics of performativity did not contribute to 
constitute democratic subjectivities. From this perspective, it can be claimed that Modi’s 
constituency of supporters, based on top-down practices and obscuring diversity and 
dissent, is less democratic than the other two cases.  
In the AAP case study, hitherto apolitical or anti-political citizen-subjects from 
varying socioeconomic backgrounds came out onto the streets and campaigned, 
sometimes even giving up jobs. Many ‘first-timers’, both men and women, took part in 
rallies, campaigns, protests and demonstrations and some also joined as full-time party 
workers. Political subjectivities thus constituted through AAP’s mobilisations fractured 
the disciplined, individualised and routinised subjectivities characteristic of neo-
liberalism. Therefore, active political participation in the public sphere outside of neo-
liberal regimentation signals democratic assertion. 
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The symbolic politics of statues in the Dalit movement constituted a defiant, 
embodied, visible Dalit subject. Mayawati’s memorial project not only visualised the 
caste struggle against the Hindu social order but also the Dalit subject as a claim-making 
citizen. The Dalit subject, by being seen in a monumental public setting, transgresses the 
Brahmanical/nationalist field of perception. Also, the Dalit gaze embedded in the visual 
practices of awe, civic pride and de-sacralised reverence aides in producing an assertive 
political subjectivity. The construction of the commemorative memorial and statues of 
Ambedkar visualised the Dalits’ struggle and their assertion through iconopraxis. First, 
the symbolism around Ambedkar and the Constitution, Buddhism and Mayawati in the 
Dalit public sphere is representative of, as discussed in Chapter 5, denting the dominant 
mould of Brahmanical social order, Hinduism and Brahmanical patriarchy. Thus, the 
values governing Dalit identification are based on the precepts of equality, dignity and 
justice as its symbolism made caste hierarchy, untouchability and socio-economic 
exclusion visible.  
Second, it is evident that the representation of Dalit interests has not been 
monopolised by the political party, either in UP or Gujarat, thereby demonstrating 
critical reflexivity, creativity and dialogue within the movement. In Lucknow, the link 
between the two forms of symbolic interventions, the memorial and the statues, is itself 
representative of an organic process within the movement. At the micro-level, the 
erection of Ambedkar statues by Dalits has been a long-standing practice. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, individually or collectively, they would arrange for the funds 
required and put up their own statues of Babasaheb in their courtyards or the village 
squares. Mayawati accelerated this intervention at the macro level by building the huge 
memorial depicting a broader historical span of struggle against the caste system on a 
pan-India level. This demonstrated a bottom-up approach, from the micro to the macro 
level. Also, civil society groups have relatively more autonomous organisational and 
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discursive space within the community, as seen in the case of Dalit mobilisation in 
Gujarat. In the absence of a specific political party representing Dalit interests it was the 
various civil society organisations that took the lead during the anti-Patel statue 
campaign. 
The comparative study of iconographic practices around Ambedkar statues 
across UP and Gujarat highlights how the mobilisation in Gujarat challenged the 
cohesive Hindu coalition that Modi and the BJP had been trying to build and 
underscored the prevalence of strong caste bias informing Modi’s developmental 
agenda. The counter-mobilisation challenged the symbolic register of Patel upper caste 
dominance, practices of untouchability and the institutionalised marginalisation of 
Dalits within Gujarat. Through symbolic politics Dalit subjects transgressed, defied and 
reasserted their political self against the symbolic violence and dominant discursive 
practices inherent in Hinduism in both Lucknow and Gujarat. 
On the other hand, the anti-corruption protests foregrounded the common 
man’s dissent against the established political system. The visual practices in the 
movement involved a combination of both the sacralised (Anna) and de-sacralised 
(Kejriwal) ways of looking by the supporters, but, whatever their respective motivations, 
the citizen-subjects were looking back at power and authority with conviction. The 
initial anti-political movement led by the IAC brought agitated residents of New Delhi 
from across class backgrounds onto the streets against the political leadership. The main 
agenda motivating the spontaneous outrage was the demand for an ombudsman to hold 
the political class accountable. Initially, the participants in the protests, as I discuss in 
Chapter 6, believed the realm of politics to be ‘dirty’ and considered the entire political 
class to be corrupt and self-aggrandising. The values of honesty, patriotism and sacrifice 
governed the masses who risked police brutality and participated in impromptu sit-ins 
and marches through the streets of the city. Gradually, as the movement branched out 
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to become a new political party in the AAP, many eventually also continued their 
affiliations with the party. As the political circumstances demanded, they become first-
time candidates, campaign managers and volunteers for the AAP. In the transformation 
from activists to political party volunteers, their perspective on politics also underwent a 
drastic turnaround. They no longer considered the political field to be dirty; rather it 
was a powerful means to bring about systemic changes. Furthermore, as first-timers, 
when they engaged in election canvassing they felt a sense of evolution and 
accomplishment. 
The initial movement phase of protests also displayed scope for dialogue and 
self-reflexivity. As discussed, the protest sites acted as alternative deliberative spaces for 
discussions among people, leaders and civil society groups. At various moments during 
the protests, for instance, the controversies around the background imagery and other 
points revealed the movement’s willingness to listen to the voices of criticism raised by 
supporters and observers and make amends. Corruption worked as a ‘floating signifier’, 
making it possible for the auto-rickshaw drivers and the corporate class alike to rally 
behind the movement. The IAC and the AAP foregrounded class identity as a 
mobilising category without substantially challenging or disturbing structural 
inequalities. Redistributive governance appeared acceptable to the people because it 
does not disturb established hierarchies or the dominance of the middle classes while 
seeking to improve services to all. 
The emergence of the AAP as a political force in New Delhi brought about a 
shift in the existing political culture and practices, challenging, for instance, the everyday 
practices of the political class. Ideologically, the AAP offered an alternative agenda of 
good governance, making ordinary people’s inclusion in decision-making and 
participation possible in its campaigns. Also, by not positioning itself within the older 
ideological brackets of the Left and the Right, the AAP moved away from the dominant 
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ideological spectrum in the existing party system. By asserting the rights of the common 
man and making them visible as claim-making citizen-subjects, it effectively departed 
from the deep-rooted patronage-based mobilisation tactics used by both the BJP and 
Congress. Electorally, by displacing both Congress and the BJP, one after the other, in 
the politics of the national capital, it also emerged as the ‘new age’ anti-establishment 
political party which was redefining the way of doing politics. By managing the 
aspirational neo-liberal subject who demands accountability and responsiveness but also 
ensuring some redistributive mechanisms of inclusive governance, the AAP received 
support across the classes in both elections (although more so among the lower classes 
and the minorities). Emerging out of a social protest movement, the political party has 
instigated dissenters’ ‘speaking back to power’ – encouraging and empowering citizen- 
subjects to challenge state authority. 
In comparison with the first two studies, Modi’s constituency can be seen as 
majoritarian neo-liberal assertion. The politics of development inherent in the 
mobilisation of the Vikaspurush constituted an infantile sacralised political subject. The 
combination of Gujarati-Hindu identity and neo-liberal anxieties led to a majoritarian 
assertion on a new level, enabling a Hindu nationalist party, for the first time, to come 
to power with a substantial majority in an Indian general election. Based on annual 
developmental rituals, Modi’s good governance model combined values of ethnic-sub-
nationalism and Hindutva to produce need-based consumers, but not claim-making 
citizens. Therefore, citizen-subjects were reduced to passive recipients of the state’s 
benevolence rather than being active participants in defining the agenda. Moreover, as I 
point out in Chapter 4, the minorities were imperceptible in Modi’s growth model in 
Gujarat. This same tendency was seen during the campaign of generating compliant 
followers. For instance, the symbolism of Modi as the chai wallah was aimed at bridging 
the gap between caste and aspirational politics with Modi himself representing the 
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symbol of upward mobility in terms of caste and the neo-liberal dictum of ‘survival of 
the fittest’. It would appear to have yielded political dividends for both Modi and the 
BJP (as discussed in Chapter 4), attracting the support of OBCs and classes across the 
board. However, the problem with his symbolic register, as discussed, was the denial of 
discursive space to dissent, and the absence of any deliberation in the campaign. The 
lack of discursive platforms across different forums during the campaign demonstrated 
the leader-centric outlook and exposed the complacency of majoritarian non-engaged 
subjects. Modi’s aggressive masculinity empowered a type of political subjectivity that 
saw domineering decision-making as emblematic of effective leadership rather than as 
authoritarian and a violation of democratic norms; this subjectivity constituted voters as 
mass admirers, uncritically following their leader. Furthermore, the darshan visual 
practices informed Modi’s politics constituting sacralised and devout adherents who 
were content to just see their leader. The construction of uniformity within Modi’s 
politics of development produced visible majoritarian assertions and largely dependent, 
uncritical subjects. Modi’s case study therefore suggests that Butler’s theory of 
performativity needs to go further; political subjects situated in dominant cultures and 
discursive practices do not feel the need to subvert or produce counter-hegemonic 
cultural practices.  
Butler’s theory of performativity is, though, helpful in teasing out the nuances 
and layers of subversive doing of identity – as evident in the cases of Dalit and civic-
citizen subjects. The constraints of the politics of performativity become exposed when 
applied to political subjects occupying positions of power in the cultural schema. In this 
case, despite the fact that Hindu subjects occupy multiple positions, their majoritarian 
identity occludes all other insecurities, making them passive recipients of top-down 
symbolic manipulation. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, my conception of 
democratic subjectivity consists of two levels – the assumption of democratic 
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identification followed by its reiteration. Despite active political participation in the 
public sphere, the absence of the need and the space for deliberation, critical reflection 
and re-significations meant that democratic political subject formation was very limited 
in the Modi campaign. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
The discussion of identity-based assertions through symbolic mobilisation and 
their respective habitus is limited to the dominant identity as the unit for analysis. It 
does not claim to explain the cultural and symbolic system of the multiple intra-
identities that exist within identity groups. For instance, there are alternative symbolic 
registers and practices for OBCs (Other Backward Classes) within Hinduism, Balmikis 
within Dalits and between JM and the AAP. However, the focus of this work has been 
to bring attention to the significance of the politics of symbolism and performative 
political action in claim-making. Similarly, the discussion around the symbolic habitus, 
practices and dispositions of identity based groups is not exhaustive and is not limited 
to the specific repertoires that have been stressed here in the respective case studies. 
Only a few repertoires were chosen for discussion to enable comparison and continuity 
across the case studies. Finally, spatially, too, the discussion is drawn from specific 
localities of the respective cities.  
7.3 Contributions 
Stepping back from the immediate empirical context of these cases, how does 
this thesis speak to wider bodies of knowledge in the discipline of political science? 
By employing a co-constitutive lens, this thesis has sought to challenge the 
dominant framework of elite manipulation. It draws on and seeks to extend the works 
of Wedeen, Verdery, Hansen and Isin to dissect performative politics and subject 
formation. I now want to highlight how it contributes to the larger conceptual and 
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methodological approaches that enabled this research and which, hopefully, can be 
extended further to the study of politics. 
The study of the encounter between identity, performative practices and the 
politics of symbolism takes centre stage in the project. By applying a constructivist 
approach to identity and symbolic politics, I have sought to critique the dominant 
understanding of this encounter as having a contrived character based on the 
assumptions that: a) identity is understood to be static and predefined; b) participants 
are passive consumers of the symbolic habitus; and, c) the encounter is not considered 
as democratically consequential. Instead, the meaning-making approach across the 
identitartian assertions discussed here shows that performative practices through 
symbolic interventions have the potential to challenge dominant hierarchies, visualise 
hitherto marginalised political subjects and intervene in the field of perception. This, 
combined with a co-constitutive lens of deconstructing the symbolic universe, allows 
the challenge of the dominant perspective based on elite manipulation and the 
conventional distinction made between followers and leaders within a mobilisation. 
Theoretically, this thesis uses the conceptual frame of performativity for political 
analysis. It has demonstrated that perceiving identity-based assertions through 
performative practices allows the deconstruction of the everyday symbolic habitus and 
location of the political subjects in relation to various discursive practices. Butler’s 
conceptualisation of performativity is insightful in conceiving identity as a doing rather 
than as performance or theatrics, providing scope for political agents to defy, negotiate 
and transgress hegemonic practices. Practices of identification are employed by all 
groups through symbolic interventions; however, as the case studies in the thesis have 
demonstrated, the subject position of groups and their symbolic power determines 
whether they will exert agential subversion or acquiesce. Therefore, one could claim 
that, despite Butler’s constructivist underpinning in relation to identity and 
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subjectification, there are limitations to performative politics in the context of an 
assertion by a majoritarain identity. In the absence of a felt need to disturb the power 
dynamics, discursive determinism rather than agential subversion defines political 
subjectivity in the case of dominant identities. 
Furthermore, the application of the spatial standpoint to symbolic politics and 
embodied practices enhances this analysis in two ways. First, the spatial angle to 
symbolic mobilisations dismantles the artificial binary between symbolic and material. 
By focusing on the symbolic habitus, situated within local cityscapes, one is able to 
discern that each symbolic assertion redefines the material space with its own values and 
norms whilst also capitalising on what already existed in that particular space in terms of 
its symbolic capital. Therefore rather than it being symbolic or material, it is symbolic 
and material at the same time for the identity groups. Following from this, it also situates 
embodied subjects anchored in spatial sites. So, for instance, depending on their spatial 
location, identities on the fringe can feel invisible or visualised within their respective 
symbolic narratives and universe. 
Thematically, this thesis advances the enquiry into symbolic politics in 
mainstream political science which has usually considered symbolism to be secondary to 
political mobilisations. Employing the Bourdieusian lens of symbolic power to study 
various identity based groups foregrounds not just assertion, but also symbolic 
representation in the political field. Through the case study of the Ambedkar Sthal, the 
thesis supplements the limited research around symbolism in Dalit politics. Specifically, 
by examining the politics of statues, which to date has been explored only through the 
lenses of nationalism or race, it provides a new frame of reference from the perspective 
of caste politics. In the thesis, the comparative frame locates two opposing identity-
based assertions, Hindutva and Dalit symbolisms, within the same analytical framework, 
allowing analysis of simultaneously evolving mobilisations from both perspectives (e.g., 
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in the case of the Patel vs Ambedkar statue campaigns). Also, by evaluating the visual 
practices inherent in each of these movements, the thesis attempts to map how the 
democratic field of perception is experienced by political subjects. 
Finally, I pursue the ‘visual’ methodologically, too; this thesis applied an inter-
disciplinary approach to the collection of data. It combines the visual with interpretive 
ethnography which facilitated the uncovering of the affective and expressive aspects of 
a symbolic habitus. Furthermore, employing photographs from the fieldwork also 
contributed to providing new ethnographic knowledge. By using photographs and 
narratives as two equally important sources of data, the images are no longer merely 
extensions of discourse but, instead, narratives in their own right. 
By focusing on the politics of symbolism, the thesis deepens our understanding 
of agency and subject formation. Subject formation and agency are not as much about 
empowerment or subordination as the rationalist and materialist approaches would like 
to define this encounter, but about the space for negotiation, transgression or assertion 
of an identity. I have also highlighted that there are limits to the performative dimension 
of political action, wherein lies the potential to constitute undemocratic political 
subjects and conceal subjects on the margins. 
307 
7.4 Symbolic Encounters Ahead 
 
Figure 7.1: District Collector’s Office, Surendranagar, Gujarat339 
“The gau rakshaks [cow protection ‘vigilantes’] beat us because they think the 
cow is their mother. Well, then, they should take care of her and pick up her carcass 
when she dies” (Rathod, quoted in Daniyal, 2016). Just as I was finishing this thesis, 
Gujarat was embroiled in yet another Dalit mobilisation in the wake of the Una attacks 
in July, 2016. Four Dalit youth who were skinning the carcasses of dead cows were 
beaten and assaulted by Hindu men who claimed to be self-appointed gau rakshaks and 
accused the Dalits of killing the cows (TNN, 2016). The assault of these young men by 
a vigilante group led to massive protests by Dalit groups across the state. In one district 
in Surendranagar, the Dalits decided not to perform their traditional job of removing 
dead carcasses, in protest.340 Figure 7.1 displays the carcasses of dead cows that were 
dumped in front of the district collector’s office. The symbolism of these performative 
                                                 
339 Image Source: https://scroll.in/article/812329/your-mother-you-take-care-of-it-meet-the-dalits-
behind-gujarats-stirring-cow-carcass-protests 
340 https://scroll.in/article/812329/your-mother-you-take-care-of-it-meet-the-dalits-behind-gujarats-
stirring-cow-carcass-protests 
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protests by the Dalit groups around cows’ carcasses highlights the other side to the 
politics around ‘holy cows’ harnessed by Hindutva groups. By projecting the symbolism 
of carcasses the Dalit mobilisation highlights the highly important, yet still stigmatised, 
job that they continue to perform for a society bounded by the caste system. This Dalit 
uprising is also demonstrative of Dalit assertiveness and the relevance of the politics of 
symbolism in claim-making. Movements such as these reaffirm the central claim of the 
thesis that symbolic politics and the representation therein interrupts the existing 
habitus and field of the perception, impacting the political culture of the democratic 
politics. This thesis is an effort to contribute to our understanding of the potential and 
limits of symbolic mobilisations.  
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